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Abstract
The research attempts to analyse welfare mix changes of Korea between 1987 and 2002, 
and to explain why such changes happened and through which processes. First of all, I 
have developed a welfare mix pentagon model, which consists of the state, market, 
enterprise, third and family sectors. Then, the research utilises the welfare mix approach 
as the dependent variable and analyses the welfare mix changes in Korea using the 
independent variables, i.e., transformations of external and internal environments, 
political institutions, and the institutional legacies of the welfare mix. The research, in 
this respect, can be understood as an attempt to build a theoretical bridge between the 
welfare mix approach and contemporary explanations of the development and 
adaptation of the welfare state.
The main findings and arguments of the research are that there were significant 
changes in the welfare mix structure during the research period and such changes in the 
welfare mix can be understood as the results of the intermediations between structural 
transformations and the dynamics of welfare politics. Whereas the structural factors 
relating to environments and domestic institutions provided the basic conditions, 
contexts and constraints for the welfare mix changes, the dynamics of welfare politics 
shape the actual forms and changes. Most of all, the research suggests that, whilst the 
impact of environmental transformations should not be overemphasised, the 
explanations privilege the importance of political and institutional variables. Political 
democratisation and social pact institutions have provided the fundamental 
preconditions for the operation of welfare politics. Politics mattered, not only in the 
development of the welfare state, but also in welfare mix changes. In spite of significant 
changes of the welfare mix, the research also argues that the welfare mix changes 
basically followed a path-dependent route, whereby the previous institutional legacies 
constrained and influenced the development of the welfare mix. Furthermore, the 
research has also discovered that the role of the state remained vital in managing the 
national responses to the transforming environments as well as the fact that the typical 
modes of state intervention in social welfare were strongly retained and represented 
within the welfare mix changes.
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. The Welfare Mix Approach and the Originality of the Research
The research attempts to analyse the welfare mix changes of Korea between 1987 and 
2002, and to explain why such changes happened. It is based on the welfare mix 
approach but seeks to overcome the limitations of contemporary welfare mix models. 
The welfare mix approach usually refers to the existence of various sources or sectors, 
beyond the welfare ‘state’, in welfare provision. However, the contemporary welfare 
mix models are either descriptive or normative, and most of them have failed, or have 
not sought, to provide an analytical framework to explain the dynamic nature of the 
welfare mix. So the research takes the independent variables -  i.e., environments and 
institutions -  that have been developed by the contemporary theories on the welfare 
state to explain its changes and dynamics, and adapts them to the welfare mix approach. 
Before mentioning the purposes of the research, let me start by raising some rationales 
why the welfare mix approach is taken in the research.
First, as the contemporary welfare mix approach emphasises (e.g., Rose, 1985a: 
13-15; Johnson, 1999: 22), historically the devices of meeting human needs have neither 
been uniform nor monopolised by the state sector. The social welfare system, as an 
arrangement of institutions meeting welfare needs of people, has always been mixed in 
nature. Even when the welfare state emerges as the dominant welfare provider, non-state 
sectors like the market, the family and the third sector still play an important role in the 
overall provision of welfare. So if one is interested in the level of social welfare in a 
society, it proves insufficient to consider only the state sector. A good empirical example 
is the OECD’s recent works on net social expenditures, which indicate the importance 
of the private sector when measuring welfare efforts (Adema, 2001). Generally, public 
social expenditures used to be identical to the overall welfare efforts of a society in
1
many comparative social policy studies. The level of welfare efforts have been indicated 
as an important factor when explaining the differences of welfare outcomes especially 
between the big welfare states in Scandinavia and welfare state laggards like the US. 
However, when the private social benefits are included in the measurement of welfare 
efforts, such differences between OECD nations are much decreased.
Second, the notion of a welfare ‘state’ does not seem to be suitable to understand 
the overall social welfare in the less developed and developing world where non-state 
sectors play more important roles in people’s welfare. Despite some differences, most 
advanced economies have developed welfare state models which set a dominant role for 
the state in social welfare. However, such welfare state models basically reflect a 
Western-centred perspective on social welfare. In the less developed and developing 
world, the major sources of people’s welfare are more diversified and the role of the 
state has been marginal or moderate in social welfare. Nonetheless, overwhelming 
research has been concentrated on state welfare rather than the overall welfare mix. In 
this respect, as Gough et al. (2004) suggest, the informal welfare regime must be 
identified alongside the welfare ‘state’ regime, it is necessary to widen the analytical 
scope to a wider welfare mix approach. This is exactly what the research attempts to do. 
In other words, the research sets the welfare mix as a dependent variable and seeks to 
explain its changes with independent variables which will be set by the research model.
Third, there is a theoretical need for conventional welfare state studies including 
the welfare regime approach to pay more attention to the welfare mix. The welfare mix 
forms one of the triangular pillars that constitute the welfare regime paradigm, 
alongside de-commodification (welfare outcome) and stratification effects. However, 
contemporary welfare regime studies not only lack systemic analysis of the overall 
welfare mix as key components of different welfare regimes, but also narrowly define 
the welfare mix with a private-public dichotomy (Esping-Andersen, 1990) or omit an 
important component of the welfare mix, e.g., the third sector, in the analysis (Esping- 
Andersen, 1999). Moreover, while Esping-Andersen stresses that the components of the 
welfare regime -  the welfare mix, welfare outcomes and stratification effects -  are 
associated and interact with one another, there is a lack of consideration of which one 
precedes the other. But, as Powell and Barrientos (2004: 85) indicate, ‘the welfare mix 
is the basis upon which the welfare regime is built’. Logically, analysis of the structure 
of the welfare mix should be considered first when explaining the different welfare
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outcomes of different welfare regimes. So, to develop a more sophisticated welfare 
regime model, more theoretical attention is required to build a straightforward causal 
relationship as to how different institutional legacies and political institutions form 
different welfare mix structures and, again, how different welfare mix structures 
produce different welfare outcomes.
On the other hand, the numerous recent theoretical products bridging the 
common challenging environments and the various responses of welfare states also 
seem to need to be supplemented by the welfare mix approach. Many have argued that 
the economic globalisation and/or post-industrialisation have eroded the basic 
conditions of the traditional welfare state models and have required welfare states 
restructuring but, at the same time, the impacts of such environmental factors have been 
various according to the mediation of national political institutions and various reforms 
of the welfare state have been reflected by the past institutional legacies of the very 
welfare state structures (Scharff, 2000; Mishra, 1999; Esping-Andersen, 1996; Pierson, 
2001b; Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002). However, have the policy changes resulting from 
the mediated effects of environments and political institutions influenced only state 
welfare? If the mediation of changing environments and political institutions has 
required a changing role for the state in social welfare, has it been accompanied with 
overall changes in the welfare mix including non-state sectors? To understand the 
influences of environments and institutions that current welfare state theorists have 
focused on in their analyses, the conventional theoretical frameworks need to widen in 
scope to incorporate a broader welfare mix model, and vice versa. Since the role of the 
state, not only as a direct provider but also a regulator and fmancer, is vital to the 
welfare mix structure, the impacts of such variables explaining the welfare state can be 
applied to non-state sectors, and finally the overall welfare mix structure in a society. If 
the welfare mix is dynamic, rather than static, welfare mix models should include those 
variables which explain the dynamics. This is what I attempt to do in the research.
The originality of the research can be clarified here. First of all, the research 
criticises the current welfare state theories that have narrowly fixed on the role of the 
state in social welfare and, instead, suggests utilising the welfare mix as the dependent 
variable. At the same time, it recognises that existing welfare mix models should be 
modified using the theoretical performances of the welfare state theories that have 
emphasised the influence of environments, institutions and politics. Therefore, the
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research attempts to construct a theoretical bridge between contemporary welfare state 
theories whose primary concerns have not moved away from an exclusive fixation on 
the ‘state’ and the existing welfare mix approach, which itself remains either descriptive 
or normative. In this respect, it cannot provide an analytical tool for explaining the 
dynamic, changeable nature of the welfare mix.
1.2. Why Korea?
Ultimately, the research attempts to integrate conventional welfare state theories with 
the welfare mix approach, to explain the dynamics of the welfare mix in Korea. The 
research chooses the Korean case for its case study due to the interesting features of the 
Korean welfare mix. First, Korea is one of the best examples revealing the hybrid nature 
of the welfare mix. Strong familialism has been maintained in social welfare with the 
region often being described as having a Confucian culture (Jones, 1993; Rieger and 
Leibfried, 2003). Korea and Japan have also developed a well-organised enterprise 
welfare system which has been frequently interpreted as a substitute for the state 
welfare and a typical feature of industrial relations (Y.H. Cho, 1996; K.J. Hong, 1999; 
C.J. Lee, 1997; H.K. Song, 1994, 1995; Shinkawa and Pempel, 1996). Although the 
mixed state of the welfare mix has been suggested as one of the most important features 
of the East Asian model (Esping-Andersen, 1997; Goodman and Peng, 1996; Goodman, 
White and Kwon, 1997; Jacobs, 2000), systematic research covering all components of 
the welfare mix is scarce.
Secondly, Korea has experienced rapid change in its socio-economic and 
political situation since the late 1980s. Such rapid changes seem suitable to use to adapt 
conventional welfare state theories, focusing on the impact of environmental factors and 
national political institutions, in the case of Korea, through analysis over a relatively 
short time period. The political democratisation since 1987 not only led to regime 
change -  from authoritarian military regimes to a civilian government in 1993 and the 
first peaceful regime change through a democratic election in 1997, but has also
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provided the basic conditions for working welfare politics. Departing from being a 
measure for securing political legitimacy, social welfare programmes have emerged as 
one of the critical fields through which different political economic factors have been 
interwoven and allowed to interact. At the same time, the Korean economy has been 
integrated more and more into the global economy, with the internal pressures such as 
de-industrialisation, ageing and family dissolution being raised to the surface. Would 
such rapid economic, social and political changes, as Johnson (1999: 264) expected, 
lead to significant welfare mix changes over a relatively short time-span?
Thirdly, unlike Japan and Taiwan, Korea experienced the financial crisis in 1997. 
Although the financial crisis revealed the devastating impact of economic globalisation 
on the Korean economy, it also provided an opportunity to reconsider Korea’s 
developmental model and to launch major welfare reforms afterwards. Indeed, the 
financial crisis can be regarded as the second historical juncture following the political 
democratisation of 1987. Recent studies on the Korean welfare state point out that the 
role of the state has been greatly expanded in social welfare since the financial crisis of 
1997/8 (H.K. Lee, 1999; H.J. Kwon, 2001, 2002; D.M. Shin, 2000). Coverage of all 
major social insurance programmes was universalised, new public assistance 
programmes were launched with reinforced state responsibility, and health reforms were 
finally implemented to unify hundreds of fragmented health insurance agencies and 
funds into a single nation-wide system. All the reforms, except the unification of health 
insurance funds, were concentrated within a short period of time between 1998 and 
2000. In this respect, at least in terms of state welfare, the financial crisis seems a 
historic milestone. Is it therefore possible to evaluate the various impacts of the 
financial crisis on the welfare state in a similar way to earlier evaluations of the impact 
of the Great Depression and the Second World War on Western welfare states? If the 
state has expanded its role as a financer and direct provider in social welfare, then has it 
led to changes in the overall welfare mix structure and a movement towards the Western 
style welfare state? These questions relate directly to the final reason why the research 
selects the Korean case.
The Korean case clearly presents the relationship between the role of the state 
and non-state welfare. Traditionally the state in Korea has been analysed as a typical 
developmental state based on strong power and autonomy vis-a-vis civil society and 
business as well as labour. State intervention in social welfare was typically based upon
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regulation, rather than direct provision (H.J. Kwon, 1997). As a matter of fact, the 
government not only stressed and supported the role of the family in social welfare, but 
has also prescribed mandatory enterprise welfare programmes through its labour laws 
and even introduced private individual pension programmes. Moreover, although its 
role had remained marginal in social welfare, the third sector has been the subject of 
higher regulation and supervision from government. These institutional features not 
only present the important relationship between the role of state and non-state welfare, 
but also raise a more interesting theoretical concern about the path dependent nature of 
the welfare mix -  i.e., whether or not past institutional legacies could be and thus 
explain the trajectory of changes in the welfare mix. Indeed, has the expansion of state 
welfare since the financial crisis meant a changing role for the state in the welfare mix, 
from a regulatory role to a role as a direct provider? If so, has the increasing role of the 
state in social welfare driven out provision from non-state sectors? And, closely related 
to the role of the state in social welfare, has the direction of the welfare mix changes 
been isolated from the past welfare mix structure, or has it been significantly dependent 
on the institutional legacies of the welfare mix? These questions closely relate to the 
goal and objectives of the research.
1.3. Goal and Objectives of the Research
Based on an understanding of the necessity of the welfare mix approach as well as the 
suitability of the Korean case, the goal of the research is to analyse changes in the 
welfare mix in Korea between 1987 and 2002 and to explain its dynamics using three 
sets of independent variables. The research proposes a holistic approach that attempts to 
integrate both structure-centric and actor-based approaches to the explanation of welfare 
mix changes in Korea. The research will mostly focus on the structural factors that 
provide the basic conditions for welfare mix changes. External forces and internal 
pressures have required changes to or reform of the social welfare institutions. However 
it is too functionalistic to suppose that such grand environmental changes automatically
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influence the specific direction of welfare reforms. Instead, as recent research from the 
new institutionalist school suggests (e.g., Garrett, 1998; Pierson, 2001b; Swank, 2002), 
it seems more important that the various features originated from different political 
institutions resulting in different contexts and constraints for the adaptation of the 
welfare state and, possibly, overall changes in the structure of the welfare mix. In this 
research, I shall also argue the importance of the structural and institutional features of 
political institutions (e.g. political democratisation and social pact politics) and the 
institutional legacies of welfare mix structure. Alongside structural and institutional 
factors, the research endeavours to not ignore the processes of welfare mix changes, i.e. 
welfare politics in which various interests of different political actors and related 
behaviours interact. Although the structural and institutional factors provide the 
conditions, contexts and constraints for welfare mix changes, the interaction and 
dynamics between different political actors significantly influence social policy 
processes.
To achieve the goal of the research, three specific objectives are defined. The 
first objective is to construct a research framework to analyse welfare mix changes 
using the independent variables of the research, namely environmental factors, political 
institutions and the institutional legacies of welfare mix structure. To do so, the research 
is largely based on theoretical works within the welfare mix literatures and the various 
impacts of globalisation, post-industrialisation and political institutions on the welfare 
state. The second objective is to investigate the development of and changes in the 
welfare mix structure in Korea. Although the main scope of the research is restricted to 
changes in the welfare mix between 1987 and 2002, it is necessary to briefly examine 
the development of the welfare mix structure until 1987 in order to extract its historical 
legacies. Ultimately, the research will demonstrate the path-dependent development of 
the welfare mix. The third objective of the research is to explain changes in the welfare 
mix and how institutions and environments influenced the welfare mix and through 
which processes. The political, institutional intermediation between structural changes 
and welfare mix changes will be analysed, and the importance of ‘politics’ will be also 
emphasised when considering welfare mix changes, not necessarily restricted to the area 
of the welfare ‘state’.
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1.4. The Scope of the Research
The research seeks to analyse the welfare mix of Korea between 1987 and 2002. The 
fifteen year long time span of the research covers three regimes after the 
democratisation of 1987; the Rho Tae Woo (1988-1992), Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) 
and Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) governments, although a brief investigation of the 
development of the welfare mix until 1987 will be conducted to provide a discussion on 
its historical legacies. Although seeming a relatively short time for presenting welfare 
mix changes, the research period covers both historical junctures -  the political 
democratisation of 1987 and the financial crisis of 1997/8 -  of modem Korean history 
since 1961 during which time political authoritarianism and a process of 
industrialisation were established. Most of all, 1987 was one of the greatest milestones 
in modem Korean history and Korea has experienced rapid political, economic and 
social change for the fifteen years since 1987. The political democratisation triggered by 
the democratisation movement of 1987 changed the basic conditions of political 
institutions, giving more room for political actors to participate in welfare politics and 
providing fertile soil for the growing civil society. Along with its fast growth until the 
mid 1990s, the Korean economy has been integrated into the global economy and, 
ultimately experienced a devastating financial crisis in 1997/8. In addition, long-term 
demographic and social pressures like de-industrialisation, population ageing and family 
dissolution have increased. The research attempts to explain how such rapid socio­
economic and political-institutional changes have influenced the welfare mix stmcture 
and through which political processes during the last fifteen years. The scope of social 
welfare benefits and services that the research examines is outlined below.
The research frequently uses words such as ‘social welfare’ and ‘social 
protection and health’ as well as utilising the term ‘welfare mix’, instead of ‘social 
policy’. This is because ‘social policy’ usually refers solely to the domain of the public 
sector but this research incorporates the private sector. Nonetheless, it is necessary to 
examine the definition of social policy in order to set up the scope of the research. 
Empirically, the Social Policy Association classifies seven service-based components of 
social policy; income protection and social security; employment, health care, education, 
housing, personal social services and criminal justice (Alcock, Erskine and May, 2003).
But, usually, the scope of social policy consists of income maintenance, health and 
social services, and sometimes includes education, housing and employment policies 
(Gough, 2000: 181). In the case of the scope of social welfare benefits and services in 
the research, I shall use the term ‘social protection and health’ and attempt to restrict the 
scope of research to reveal the features of the Korean welfare mix. Here I define social 
protection and health benefits as public and private equivalents of income maintenance, 
health and social services including Active Labour Market Programmes (hereafter, 
ALMPs). With regard to housing benefits, only public assistance programmes provide 
relevant housing benefits1 on a means-tested basis under the heading of ‘social 
protection’, but I do not consider other types of private housing provisions. In addition, 
education is excluded from the scope of the research, following the dominant tendency 
of the IGO’s definitions on social welfare expenditures2 (Adema, 1999, 2001 for the 
OECD guidelines; European Commission, 2000; ILO, 1996).
However, this definition is seemingly service-based primarily focusing on who 
takes benefits and services, how they are run and how they perform. Of course there are 
crucial tasks in social policy analysis but, in this case, various types of state 
interventions that influence human well-being -  such as labour protection, the 
establishment of minimum wages, regulation of non-state sectors etc. -  could be 
excluded. In this respect, Gough defines the term social policy as ‘forms of state 
intervention in the sphere of reproduction of labour force and the household’ (Ibid). 
Especially, it is very important to acknowledge in the welfare mix research that these 
state interventions directly and indirectly influence the welfare provisions from non­
state sectors. Therefore, I shall include the role of the state in finance and regulation 
within the scope of the research. Accordingly, research concerns are restricted to the 
structure of welfare mix provisions, but also covers issues concerning the finance and 
regulation of the welfare mix.
1 In Korea, housing benefits were firstly introduced in the public assistance reform o f 1999.
2 In reality, there has been a dispute whether education expenditures should be included in the overall 
welfare efforts o f  a nation. The ideological tension regarding higher education forms the central part o f  
the dispute. For details on the dispute, see Wilensky et al, 1985 (Chapter 1). In most international 
guidelines on social expenditures (or social security cost, social protection), education expenditures are 
not included. More importantly, under the Korean academic tradition, education policy has been largely 
separated from social policy discussions. The research is reflected by the situation in Korea. Instead, I 




This single case study is eclectic, in terms of applying both a long-term historical 
analysis and a cross-sectional approach. At first, the research is a single case study 
based on a historically interpretative strategy, despite its relatively short time coverage. 
According to Ragin (1987), case-oriented research often attempts to accomplish both 
historical interpretation and causal analysis. Historical interpretive works try to explain 
‘specific historical outcomes or processes chosen for study because of their significance 
for current institutional arrangements or social life in general’ (p.3). Based on such 
interpretations, case studies can ‘produce limited generalisations concerning the causes 
of theoretically defined categories of empirical phenomena’ (p.3 5).
In social policy studies, single case studies adapting an elaborate historical
interpretive analysis have been quite popular, especially when scholars intend to put an
emphasis on the distinctiveness of the case chosen or to provide a counter-case against
existing general theories. More representatively, many studies of welfare state
development have depended on single case studies. For example, whereas Gough
(1978) and O’Connor (1973) attempt to extract the general morphologic construction of
the capitalist state from their single case studies on the British and the American welfare
states respectively, scholars such as Skocpol (1992) and Korpi (1978) emphasise the
 ^ (
distinctiveness of their chosen cases -  American exceptionalism and the Swedish 
social democratic model. In addition, some specific case studies on the social policy or 
welfare state of Korea have emerged recently (H.J. Kwon, 1999; D.M. Shin 2000). This 
research inevitably requires a historical single case study because it aims to analyse the 
changes and dynamics of the welfare mix structure in Korea.
The research also applies a cross-sectional method, in terms of comparisons 
between the different sectors of the welfare mix -  the state, the market, the enterprise, 
the third and the family sector -  at different points in time through analysis of the 
structure of the welfare mix. The dynamic nature of the welfare mix implies that the 
relative importance of each sector is changeable, so a cross-sectional comparison of the 
five sectors is required to explain the nature of its dynamic structure.
3 The belated and half-hearted development o f social-welfare policies in the US (Pierson, 1994: 31). Also 
see Weir, Orloff and Skocpol (eds.) (1988).
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Followed by theoretical works for constructing the research framework in Chapter 2 and 
3 as well as the brief discussions on the environments, institutions and welfare politics 
in Korea in Chapter 4, the main research tasks, namely to analyse and explain the 
changes and dynamics in the welfare mix will take place in Chapter 5, 6 and 7. In these 
chapters, the research not only combines quantitative and qualitative research methods, 
but also in an inevitably synthetic way, for example, through building on existing 
sectoral studies and referring to various opinions and debates about policy processes and 
welfare politics. In Chapter 5 and 6 ,1 shall use quantitative research methods to analyse 
welfare mix changes. Since there has been no systemic research covering all the 
different sectors of the welfare mix together, I have to synthesise all split information 
and data on the welfare provisions of different sectors. The quantitative research 
includes analysis of both empirical data on expenditure (Chapter 5) and non-expenditure 
(Chapter 6). Expenditure analysis has been regarded as an appropriate method for 
measuring welfare efforts and has been used in research on inter-sectoral comparisons 
and on the overall welfare mix structure covering all five sectors together. Here, I rely 
considerably on the official, primary data (e.g. the third sector’s expenditure on health 
and welfare4) and the secondary expenditure data already produced by other scholars 
(e.g. the state’s expenditure, mandatory enterprise welfare expenditure5). However, I 
also have to gather, reorganise and classify split data and estimate expenditure based on 
them6 (e.g., voluntary enterprise welfare, private income transfers).
In Chapter 6 ,1 turn the analytical foci to the non-expenditure empirical evidence 
that reveals the institutional features of welfare provisions from the different sectors not 
indicated by monetary data. Most representatively, for example, the coverage of benefits 
and the actual number of service recipients are important indicators applied to most 
components of the welfare mix. In addition, there is other information related to the 
welfare provisions of state and non-state sectors, such as the number of institutions 
providing social services, the number of residents in social service institutions, the 
number of employees and volunteers in the third sector, the income sources of elderly 
households, the contribution and the number of contract of private individual pensions 
in the market sector, and time survey data of individuals. Inevitably, this work builds on
4 Directly available from National Accounts, Bank of Korea.
5 Directly available from Kho et al. (2002).
6 For detailed research methods on the expenditure study, see Section 5.1.
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official statistics and other scholars’ studies on the welfare provisions of specific 
sector(s). But, again, I shall synthesise and reorganise them considerably to support my 
arguments on how the welfare mix structure has changed during the research period. I 
shall also develop my own interpretations on the path-dependent development of the 
welfare mix changes.
In Chapter 7, the research will also employ a qualitative study to explain the 
dynamics of the welfare mix. Since this qualitative study focuses on the processes of the 
welfare mix changes, the contextual explanations are of great importance. To make such 
statements, I shall depend not only on extensive formal, academic literatures but also a 
large amount of informal data and information. Firstly, I shall rework the existing data 
including the academic literatures of other scholars to grasp the bigger picture revealed 
in the social policy processes and their political nature. But, inevitably, I also depend on 
various ‘grey literature’ to develop a more complex understanding of welfare ‘politics’ 
and to construct contextual narratives to explain the policy processes. The official 
statements of business agencies, trade unions and civil society organisations form a 
particular source of grey literature. These statements reveal the recognitions of the main 
political actors on environmental factors and their responses to the behaviour of other 
political actors. Articles in newspapers and other press outputs will give information on 
the dynamic interaction between different political actors. And I shall cite the comments 
and speeches of the President’s directly or indirectly (via newspaper articles), to indicate 
the position of the government and/or the Presidents themselves at each particular 
moment in time. Furthermore, I have gathered reminiscences of key personnel, both 
directly and from mediated sources, to discover the stories behind the policy processes 
and/or policy decisions. I have also depended on a collection of the reminiscences of 
and interviews with the key personnel of the Civilian government, which have been 
produced and published by a newspaper company8. Regarding the relatively recent 
welfare politics under the Kim Dae Jung government, I have directly obtained the
7 There have been many studies on the development and/or welfare provisions o f  the state sector, the 
enterprise welfare and the third sector (see Chapter 4 and 6). But in cases o f the markets and the family, 
theoretical and empirical concerns o f social policy studies have been either very low or restricted to some 
fragmented issues like private income transfers (e.g., B.D. Son, 1998, 1999), so systematic academic 
research on either the market or the family sector has been scarce in social policy studies in Korea.
8 Special News Team of Dongailbo (an influential newspaper company in Korea), Lost 5 Years -  the 
behind stories o f  the Civilian Government 1800 days, 1999. This two-volume, 700-page-long book is the 
collection o f the newspaper articles that were published serially in 1998, including a wide-range o f  
reminiscences o f and interviews with influential politicians and key personnel o f the government.
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relevant information from interviews with two professional activists who worked for 
civil society organisations and were deeply involved in the social policy making 
processes. By synthesising formal and informal information alongside existing 
academic works, I construct contextual statements to analyse and interpret social policy 
processes and to develop my argument on how environments, institutions and the role of 
the state and other political actors have been intermediated and how they have been 
associated with the changes of the welfare mix.
1.6. Organisation of the Research
The research consists of eight chapters. In this introductory chapter, I have already 
provided the goal and objectives of the research, followed by mentions of why the 
welfare mix approach is required and why the Korean case selected. It has also 
introduced some issues regarding the scope and methods of the research. The following 
two chapters attempt to investigate the theoretical bases of the research related to its 
dependent and independent variables. The first step found in Chapter 2 is to define the 
dependent variable. Here I shall introduce the welfare mix approach, examine the 
welfare mix models suggested so far, and develop a new welfare mix model suitable for 
the purpose of this research. It is mainly based on a review of the literature on the 
welfare mix and similar concepts like welfare pluralism and mixed economies of 
welfare. In Chapter 3, I shall define the main independent variables, present related 
theoretical works and construct an analytical framework to explain the dynamics of the 
welfare mix. The independent variables are comprised of three sets. The first set is 
environmental factors; external forces (economic and political globalisation) and 
internal pressures (transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society). The second 
and third sets are defined by the term of ‘political institutions’ covering democratic 
political institutions and the ‘institutional legacies’ of the welfare mix respectively. 
Based on the theoretical works presented in Chapter 3, I shall propose a research 
framework to analyse how the defined independent variables influence welfare mix
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changes through which policy processes.
From Chapter 4, the research focuses on the Korean case. Initially, before 
analysing the welfare mix in Korea, Chapter 4 briefly describes trends within the 
independent variables during the research period to gain a basic understanding of the 
economic, political and social circumstances of Korea. Furthermore in looking to take a 
longer historical perspective I shall examine the development of the welfare mix since 
the 1960s when the Korean industrialisation took off, because these works in this period 
could provide discussion of the path-dependent development of the welfare mix in post- 
1987 period. Following brief discussion of the basic conditions for the development of 
the welfare mix, the research focus is restricted to the period between 1987 and 2002. In 
Chapters 5 and 6, I shall provide wide ranging empirical evidence about the provisions 
of the welfare mix and the changes in the welfare mix during the research period. In 
Chapter 5, despite the expenditure study covering only the period between 1990 and 
2001 due to data restriction, it will be able to show trends in various aspects of welfare 
mix changes. Chapter 6 will present other important qualitative and quantitative 
evidence to illustrate the extensive institutional features of the welfare mix changes, 
which cannot be grasped within monetary terms. These analyses of welfare mix changes 
and its provision should reveal the dynamic nature of the welfare mix over the research 
period. The last research stage explaining the welfare mix changes is placed in Chapter 
7. Here I shall turn the analytical focus to the qualitative, political processes of welfare 
mix changes. This will be done by looking at chronologically at how political 
institutions and other environmental factors have influenced the welfare mix changes 
through which political and policy processes. Ultimately, I shall argue the importance of 
national politics to the dynamics of the welfare mix in Korea.
Chapter 8 will give conclusions where I shall summarise the main findings in 
chronological order before proceeding to additional discussion on the path-dependent 
route of the welfare mix changes. The main explanations and arguments of the research 
will be rearranged into a variable-by-variable order. Overall in a departure from 
functionalistic perspectives that usually overemphasise the impact of environments, I 
shall argue the importance of political institutions and national welfare politics to the 
welfare mix, rather than the welfare state in specific. Finally, I shall suggest the 
direction of future research, i.e., the necessity of the welfare mix approach in social 
policy studies.
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CHAPTER 2. THE WELFARE MIX APPROACH
Historically speaking, the mixed state of welfare existed far before the emergence of the 
welfare state. Even after the settlement of the welfare state, as Rose (1985a: 13-15) 
indicates, the state has never been the sole source of welfare provision and a reduction 
of the state does not necessarily reduce the overall welfare level in a society. However, 
it was relatively recently that social policy research began to put its emphasis on the 
welfare mix. A rise in discussion of the welfare mix has accompanied the critiques on 
the traditional welfare state model since the late 1970s. Instead of the Post-War 
Consensus on the so-called ‘Keynesian-Beveridge welfare state’ 1, a new social 
consensus, which accepts a mixed economy of welfare, seems to have emerged.
Basically, the notion of the welfare mix is likely to be based on the idea that 
there exist ‘functional equivalents’ to the state sector with which the ‘welfare needs’ in a 
society can be met (Gough and Kim, 2000). The level of well being in a society cannot 
be recognised only as the state’s commitments to social welfare, but can be understood 
as the result of a wider welfare mix structure incorporating the market, the third sector 
and the family. In this respect, the terminology of the ‘welfare mix’ can be understood 
as the analytical and empirical concepts for indicating the mixed state of welfare. Here, 
we need to distinguish the welfare mix from other similar terminologies -  the ‘mixed 
economy of welfare’ and ‘welfare pluralism’. All of these terminologies have often been 
used interchangeably. Although all refer to the mixed or plural characteristics of social 
welfare provision in general and social services delivery in particular, they seem to have
1 However, the terminology o f ‘Keynesian-Beveridge welfare state’ almost synonymous to the ‘Golden 
age o f welfare capitalism’ is wrong if  we remember Beveridge as a welfare pluralist. He asserted that the 
level o f social benefit should remain at a ‘minimum’ level not to violate an individual’s voluntary effort 
and work incentive (Pinker, 1992:275). Private savings should be supplemented by social insurance 
benefits in his three-tier income maintenance system (Beveridge, 1942). In reality, the development o f the 
British welfare state for the 30 years after the War, had been based upon the Marshallian principle, i.e. 
social right, rather than Beveridgian national minimum principle. It was Thatcher’s government that 
returned to Beveridge in terms o f welfare pluralism (Pinker, 1992; Powell & Hewitt, 1998). What is 
different from Beveridge’s notion, however, is that ‘the new social consensus’ seems to accept the mixed 
economy o f welfare in basic welfare provision (Powell & Hewitt, 1998:8).
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different origins, emphases and contexts.
Most of all, the term welfare ‘pluralism’, implies a rather political and 
ideological orientation especially within the British political tradition. Welfare pluralists 
argued that the state-dominated structure of welfare provisions should be pluralized to 
cope with the problems of state welfare provision. It is inevitably related to the 
controversy of welfare responsibility between private and public sector (Johnson, 1993; 
Walker, 1993). Although not all welfare pluralists assert the declining role of the state in 
welfare provision, welfare pluralism itself has been frequently used as common rhetoric 
for the New Right to promote privatisation. On the other hand, the term mixed 
‘economy’ of welfare has more economic and managerial concerns like efficiency and 
effectiveness. This term seems basically affinitive to the market, so has been widely 
used when discussing the introduction of market principles or quasi-market factors in 
the delivery system of social services, such as competitive tendering, contracting-out, 
the introduction of fee-for-services, allowing commercial providers of social services, 
and cost-effectiveness evaluation. Although such initiatives originated from the US 
tradition which stresses the relationship between the economic and social market 
(Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989; Gilbert, 1993), the introduction of market principles in social 
services has become pervasive in most European countries since the 1980s (Ascoli, 
2002; Ascoli and Ranci, 2002).
Different from welfare pluralism and mixed economy of welfare, the term 
‘welfare mix’ is a relatively neutral terminology, which expresses a mixed state of 
welfare production, delivery and responsibility in a society (Rose, 1985a; Evers, 1993, 
1995). Although it has been used as a term relatively free from both economic 
rationalism and ideological debates, the welfare mix often implies dynamics between 
sectors and a potential change in the mixed state of welfare. According to Evers (1993: 
28), whilst both welfare pluralism and welfare mix are concerned with the historical, 
conceptual and value dimensions of pluralism, ‘it is the welfare mix approach which 
centres on the question of linkages, interactions and balances between the sectors of 
pluralistic welfare systems’.
The remainder of this chapter divided into four sections. To understand 
contemporary issues regarding the welfare mix approach, the next section briefly 
introduces the trends of discussions and debate related to the welfare mix approach, 
based on literature reviews. The second section investigates the welfare mix models
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proposed so far, discusses their limitations and suggests a potential alternative model to 
analyse the welfare mix structure among different sectors of the welfare mix. The third 
section defines five sectors of the welfare mix and examines relevant theoretical and 
empirical issues to clarify what is meant by each of the five sectors. The fourth section 
makes short concluding remarks concerning constructing a theoretical framework for an 
analysis of the dynamics of the welfare mix structure.
2.1. Literature Reviews: Discussions around the Welfare Mix
In this section, I demonstrate three major trends in the discussion of the welfare mix 
approach. First of all, I briefly illustrate the historical development of welfare mix 
discussion, following such relevant traces as the rise of welfare pluralism as the critique 
to the traditional welfare state model, the privatisation and marketisation of social 
welfare systems by New Right governments, the enhanced role of the third sector or 
civil society as the alternative to both state and market, and the emergence of the Third 
Way which emphasises the private-public partnership in social welfare. Whereas the 
first stream of discussions have been related to restructuring the welfare system towards 
a more mixed one, the second and the third trends pay more attention to a specific 
component of welfare mix. The second stream is the critiques of feminists both on the 
gendered nature of the welfare state and on privatisation by New Right governments. 
Especially, their micro-perspective on informal caring indicates that the burden of 
family equates with the burden of women. The third set of discussions focus on the role 
of enterprise (or occupational) welfare in the welfare mix, especially in East Asian 
welfare models.
2.1.1. Historical Trend of Welfare Mix Discussions: from Welfare Pluralism to the 
Third Way
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It was during the 1970s that welfare pluralism became fashionable. The rise of welfare 
pluralism, especially in the UK, was primarily related to critiques of the traditional 
welfare state. Most critiques by welfare pluralists have focused on the centralised 
administrative system of statutory welfare; rigid bureaucracy, lack of responsiveness 
and flexibility to clients’ needs, centralised control on resources and power, problems of 
democracy and participation in decision making process, limited freedom of choice, 
ineffectiveness and inefficiency, excessive professionalism and so on (Wolfenden 
Committee, 1978; Hadley and Hatch, 1981; Beresford and Croft, 1984; Johnson, 1987; 
Mayo, 1994). Therefore welfare pluralism supports decentralisation and participation in 
welfare provisions in general and particularly in social services. Welfare pluralists 
suggest enlargement of the informal and voluntary sectors, but they see neither sector as 
an exact substitute for the state, and do not desire a widening commercial sector 
(Johnson, 1987: chapter 3). The state should maintain its position as the regulator and 
main funding body despite its reduced role in welfare provision.
Although welfare pluralism per se does not mean a reduction in the state’s role, 
it has been exploited by the New Right, as rhetoric for privatisation strategies to 
disengage the state and vitalise the commercial sector. From the early 1980s, after the 
collapse of the social consensus on the mixed economy based on the Keynesian 
economics, the Reagan administration in the US and the Conservative government in 
the UK attempted to roll back the state in social and economic spheres and to restore the 
market principle within social welfare. Welfare pluralism, for the New Right, is a 
synonym for privatisation and commercialisation in welfare provision (Johnson, Ibid). 
Although their efforts for the retrenchment of the welfare state were not successful in 
universal programmes, there were significant cuts in public assistance programmes as 
well as the implementation of massive privatisation policies in health, housing, 
education and social services (Pierson, 1991; Pierson, 1994; O’Connor, 1998). As a 
result of those privatisation policies, private markets were greatly expanded under New 
Right governments in areas which had originally been regarded as the state's primary 
provisory responsibility, such as pension, health and social services . Moreover, market
2 In the UK, 20% o f households are paying into personal pension schemes in 1993 (Association of British 
Insurers, 1997: 56). In the US, while traditional occupational pension schemes have declined since the 
1980’s because of the higher pressure on cutting labour costs, there has been a significant growth in more 
individualised schemes financed by the employee with tax benefits, e.g. 4 0 IK plans and IRA (Esping- 
Andersen, 1996: 16). In the health service area, the importance o f private health insurances increased not 
only in the US where private markets have dominated health services and the people under 65 do not have
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principles such as cost-effectiveness, competition, and consumer choices permeated 
even the realms of public social services, in the UK via the introduction of such systems 
as quasi-markets and compulsory competitive tendering (CCT)3 (Glennerster, 1998; 
Glennerster and Le Grand, 1995; Le Grand and Bartlett (eds), 1993). The introduction 
of the quasi market in health services and community care from 1991 was based upon 
the expectation that competition within the quasi-market was likely to 'induce efficiency, 
increase choices and empower users' (Johnson, 1999: 123). These strategies targeted the 
marketisation of provision and delivery structures while the state maintains its financing 
and regulatory role. In a sense, a higher reliance upon private markets and marketisation 
strategies seems to reflect a greater concern about the issue of economic efficiency. 
However, at the same time, these features of welfare pluralism fuelled by the New Right 
have concentrated on aspects of political reasoning and ideology, especially in the UK 
(Evers, 1993: 12-3). Under the ideology of the New Right, welfare pluralism has been 
no more than a levy of state’s responsibility to the private sector and an effort to seek a 
cheaper alternative. Therefore, for those who are opposed to welfare pluralism, the 
alternative to the existing welfare state is to change the state sector itself (Walker, 1993).
On the other hand, there has been another trend that focuses on the welfare mix, 
stressing the role of the third sector as the alternative to both state and market. It sees 
the third sector as crucial in restructuring the welfare system and, in some cases, 
reorganising the relationship between state and civil society. According to Hansmann 
(1987: 29-32), consumers do not have as much information as providers when they 
purchase some kinds of goods and services. In these circumstances, the market principle 
that assumes consumers’ free choice on the basis of sufficient information cannot work 
normally. As a result, some proxy indicators that can assure a certain degree of 
standards within the services may be needed at the time when consumers choose their
public health insurance, but also in the UK, Netherlands, France and Germany (Choi et al, 2000; 
Brunsdon, 1999). Aside from pension and health services, nursery and residential services have been 
highly dependent on the private market. Traditionally, family-run small businesses in the private market 
have been major providers in residential care in the US. Recently, however, large-scale, franchised 
residential and nursing facilities are growing fast (Gilbert and Gilbert, 1988). The Private market is also 
dominant in Canada and Japan (Johnson, 1999: 131). In the UK, the proportion o f the private market in 
nursing and residential home industry has been increasing dramatically since mid-1980s; in 1995 73% of 
nursing home and 55.7% o f residential home places were provided by the private market (Ibid).
3 While Britain has created a new type of market (internal quasi-market) within the public boundary, 
American approach was placed by the use o f existing private markets outside public sphere. Based on the 
liberal economic thought that prefer cash benefits rather than in-kind types not to hurt private markets, the 
US has developed voucher systems like food stamps as well as expansive tax expenditure schemes 
(Gilbert and Gilbert, 1989; Gilbert, 1993).
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providers (Salamon, 1987: 109). Here, the non-profit nature of the third sector can 
provide that kind of signal. Consumers suppose that third sector organisations would 
provide a better quality of service than those provided by for-profit organisations 
because third sector organisations are based on a more charitable and humanistic 
purpose rather than motivation for profit. Therefore, third sector organisations seem 
more deserving to attract consumers’ trust. On the other hand, third sector organisations 
can be expected to overcome the limitations of state services (Douglas, 1987). It can 
serve the minority, and they may give consumers a greater variety of choices as well as 
an increased opportunity for participation (Johnson, 1987: 114). Furthermore, when a 
new need arises that the government cannot cope with, the third sector agencies can 
provide new social services, to fill the void (Kramer, 1981: 8)
However, explanations based on economic rationality vis-a-vis the government 
and market failure have been subject to severe criticism by scholars of the European 
third sector. Evers argues, for example, that the economic rationality perspective that 
regards third sector organisations as either competitors to market providers or a 
substitute for state agencies ignores the potential of fostering social cohesion and 
empowerment4 (Evers, 2001: 222). For Evers (1993), the third sector seems central in 
the definition and discussion of the overall welfare mix. He suggests the third sector as 
part of the public space in civil society intermediates different social spheres and 
rationales. Due to its character, the tension field between state, market and community, 
many third sector organisations are themselves mixed in the welfare mix (Evers, 1993: 
21). This is an indication that the borders between sectors have become increasingly 
blurred. Most of all, the concept of the welfare mix implies a mission to search for more 
synergetic welfare mixes, which could improve efficiency and guarantee a more 
participatory, democratic system. Kendall (2000) also has a relatively optimistic view 
on the contribution and potential of the third sector in terms of flexibility, social capital 
and innovative intelligence in policy processes. He evaluates it as the main force which 
has induced the restructuring of the welfare system to counteract attacks on the welfare 
state.
4 Evers argue that, ‘first o f all, it neglects people’s role as cooperating citizens or members o f  a 
community -  as people who are capable of joining in ‘civic’ actions e.g. by associating and volunteering; 
secondly, the consumerist orientation, which is exclusively about the ‘exit’ options o f service consumers 
tends towards disregarding people’s role as producers and/or co-producers o f social services -  their 
‘voice’ options, as members o f associations, cooperatives and other third sector organisations’ (Evers, 
2001: 222, Italic from original).
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We can ascertain that European intellectual traditions have often focused upon 
the third sector as the alternative to improve the quality of social services, and also to 
encourage people to participate in the decision making process. Here third sector 
organisations are the basic components for producing social capital5, so they become the 
main source of alternatives towards ‘making democracy work’ (Putnam, 1993). In this 
respect, PestofFs social enterprises and Hirst’s associations, which are for a more 
participatory and democratic social service system, are the other names of the third 
sector organisations (Pestoff, 1998; Hirst, 1994; 1997). However, despite its analytical 
strength on the role of the third sector in the welfare mix, such a society-centred 
approach seems to overemphasise the third sector or voluntary sector in the overall 
welfare mix and seems to concentrate mainly on social service rather than welfare 
system as a whole. This approach is relatively ignorant of traditional income 
maintenance schemes. Above all, most researchers from this approach have an overly 
romantic view of the potential of the voluntary sector.
Nevertheless, the role of civil society and the private-public partnership has been 
highlighted again, and even embodied more politically and ideologically, by the ‘Third 
Way’. Although the ‘Third Way’ has been suggested as a broad term to refer to the 
‘renewal’ of social democracy and/or the overall reform projects of leftist parties6, we 
can find that some of the key areas of structural reform identified by third way 
approaches retain the welfare mix approach. The third way criticises the market 
fundamentalism of the New Right and argues the necessity of widening the 
interventions of the government. It emphasises that ‘the state should not dominate 
within markets or civil society, although it needs to regulate and intervene in both’ 
(Giddens, 2001: 6). In reality, the approach does not deny the necessity of the 
marketisation and decentralisation strategies originating from the New Right, but 
instead looks to follow them with substantial reforms to gain better co-operation and a 
better quality of service (Blair, 1998, 15-17). At the same time, the third way places the
5 Putnam defines social capital as ‘features o f social organization, such as trust, norms and networks, that 
can improve the efficiency o f society by facilitating coordinated action...Like other forms of capital, 
social capital is productive, making possible the achievement of certain ends that would not be attainable 
in its absence.’ (1993: 167)
6 Often the Third Way has been referred to ‘recovering from long periods o f neoliberal rule’, but Giddens 
himself defines it much more broadly as ‘a much more generic series o f endeavours, common to the 
majority of left parties and thinkers in Europe and elsewhere, to restructure leftist doctrines (2001: 1-2)’. 
So, according to Giddens, there are different third ways, not only New Democrats in the US and New  
Labour in the UK, but also ‘Neue Mitte’ in Germany and other left parties’ routes in many European 
countries.
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role of civil society at the centre of its modernisation projects. It explicitly proposes a 
partnership with the voluntary sector in welfare provision and targets to strengthen civil 
society (Ibid: 14). Moreover, even though it recognises that the traditional family 
(breadwinner) model is not feasible any more, it does not forgive to encourage the 
obligation of individual and family (Giddens, 1998: 89-98). However, despite 
encouraging non-state sectors, it stresses the positive role of the state in social welfare, 
particularly as the most important financer and regulator in health, education and social 
services. After all, we can ascertain that, in a departure from the radical marketisation 
strategies of the New Right, the Third Way strongly emphasises the welfare mix 
approach on the policy agenda of leftist parties, in looking to at least in theory balance 
the state, market, civil society and family.
2.1.2. Feminists’ Critiques
Feminist scholars have concentrated on the gender issue embedded in the origins of the 
welfare state. According to George and Wilding (1994: 138-141), feminist critiques over 
the welfare state can be summarised as follows. First, based on the male breadwinner 
model, the traditional welfare state has reinforced women’s dependency on men as well 
as the inequality between genders because their entitlement to social benefits depends 
on the contribution of their husbands (also see Sainsbury, 1996). Second, the welfare 
state has failed to consider the particular needs of women related to ‘balancing home 
and work’ as well as the caring responsibility. Third, social policies have reinforced 
traditional family norms and the gender division of labour. One of the basic assumptions 
of the traditional welfare state is that women take the caring responsibility which is 
considered as their natural role.
Moreover, the trend of pluralizing welfare systems has reinforced women’s 
dependency. The privatisation of social services since the rise of the New Right 
deteriorated the position of women in society because the deinstitutionalisation of social 
services (in the name of community care) has imputed the state’s caring responsibility to 
the informal sector and to the family in particular. In this respect, Finch (1984) argues 
that community care is a fundamentally gendered concept, and Finch and Grove (1980) 
indicate a dual equation that community care equates to family care and family care to
22
care by women. Somewhat differently, May and Brunsdon (1996) analyse the impact of 
marketisation upon gender relations. For them, there has only been freedom of choice 
for men, and the enlargement of private welfare markets has nurtured a greater division 
of labour not only between genders but also among women. Wider sexual division in the 
labour market is primarily caused by the fact that the production and consumption of 
private welfare services are highly dependent on women. For most women there are few 
alternatives other than low-paid jobs in the private welfare market. Moreover, it must be 
pointed out that the privatisation of welfare designed to, rhetorically, ‘maximise choice 
of freedom’ has been accompanied with an ‘espouse of family responsibility’. These 
circumstances seem to entail greater dependency upon men (May and Brunsdon, 1996).
As an alternative to both traditional welfare models and privatisation of social 
services, O’Connor et al (1999) suggest the notion of ‘defamilisation’, which is defined 
as the capacity to form an autonomous household, vis-a-vis ‘decommodification’ from 
the labour market. A core feature when discussing gender relations within a state is 
whether women -  like most men -  are in the position of being able to choose freely 
whether or not they enter marital or other relationships. They suggest two to enhance 
women’s independence; paid work in the labour market and cash benefits from the state 
for their caring as a citizen’s wage. Although their critiques on the lack of labour market 
dynamics, their suggestions are very similar to Sainsbury’s (1996) ‘individual model’, 
in which ‘both men and women are earners and carers, benefits are targeted on 
individuals, and much caring work is paid and provided publicly’, as an alternative to 
male breadwinner model.
Despite the theoretical contributions of feminist approaches on the gendered 
nature of the traditional welfare state and informal care, there is a critical problem in 
assuming that all women share common interest regardless of class, race, immigrant 
status and so on (O’Connor et al, 1999; Ungerson, 1997; Morris, 1997). In practice, this 
is a hazardous assumption. There exist severe inequalities among women of different 
classes or groups. In addition, the private welfare market increases the division of labour, 
between well-educated career women whose domestic work and care responsibility 
commitment are easily resolved by the market and the less-advantaged women (mostly 
low income, black, immigrant women) who may suffer low-paid work and a domestic 
caring responsibility. It is dangerous to overemphasize gender without reference to 
traditional class structure, and issues of ethnicity and immigrant status. Moreover,
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Ungerson (1997) stresses that a number of feminist analyses have overemphasised the 
gender inequality of the caring obligation ‘between’ generations but neglected the 
gender issue within generations (or marital relationship). Using OPCS surveys, Arber 
and Ginn (1997) challenge the stereotype of ‘carer as middle-aged women’ and 
demonstrate that the elderly are not only care-receivers but also care-givers that look 
after their grandchildren and/or spouses. In addition, many empirical studies have 
indicated that, even though most of the informal caring burden is attributed to women, 
the caring experience is not exclusive to women. Based on the General Household 
Survey, Arber and Ginn (1999) argue that in some situations men also provide high 
levels of informal caring or emotional supports. Spillman and Pezzin also report that, in 
the US, despite a significant gap between genders, the portion of male care-givers 
(husbands and sons) has increased significantly and, accordingly, the gap has been 
reduced dramatically7 (see Spillman and Pezzin, 2000: Table 4 & 5).
2.1.3. Enterprise Welfare and East Asian Welfare Model.
As pluralizing welfare provision has been a main strategy for the welfare state reform, 
the relative importance of occupational welfare has increased in the overall welfare mix 
(Johnson, 1987: 138-139). Shalev (1996) argues that one of the most important changes 
to the welfare state has been the privatisation of responsibility in pension schemes and 
major direction has been the expansion of occupational pension schemes, in most 
advanced welfare states. The institutional features of occupational welfare and their 
relation to the state sector have been highlighted as crucial factors to categorise different
7 This trend also can be extracted from Gershuny et al.’s work (1991). He categorises the existing studies 
on the relationship between married women’s employment and their unpaid housework into two; i.e., 
adaptive partnership model and dependent labour model (Gershuny et al., 1991: 151). The former 
assumes that, when wives are employed, husbands spend more time doing housework in order to 
compensate for their w ives’ increased responsibility. The latter, by contrast, argues that women’s primary 
work is unpaid housework, not paid work in the market. Therefore, women’s dual burden can be expected. 
Many empirical studies have supported the dual burden proposition. However, he suggests the alternative 
model, the lagged adaptation model, that the behaviours o f households are adaptive to the changing 
environments but through an ‘extended process of household negotiation, extending over a period of 
many years, and indeed across generations’ (Ibid). He concludes that, ‘with women’s increasing entry into 
paid employment, so their total work load increases, as the DL (Dependent Labour) hypothesis would 
predict. But the increase is moderated, though not entirely offset, by the substitution o f some male unpaid 
work for some female. The compensation is not perfect as the women’s paid work increases faster than 
the men’s substitution o f unpaid for paid work, but nevertheless a process o f  adaptation is clearly under 
way’ (Ibid, 183).
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welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Furthermore in Scandinavia in particular 
where occupational welfare has been regarded as complementary rather than 
supplementary to the state welfare, occupational has been recognised as the genuinely 
hybrid state of welfare -  i.e. the interwoven area between the private and public sector, 
and the expansion of occupational welfare does not automatically crowd-out public 
welfare programmes when the power of trade union is strong. (Esping-Andersen, 
1996b: 329-30). As the coverage of occupational welfare grew, manual workers claimed 
equal treatment more and more, and it resulted in the legislation for a universal second- 
tier occupational pension in Scandinavian countries. This is what he calls the ‘leap­
frogging’ model, which represents the power of mobilised labour. It is justifiable in 
terms of the fact that occupational welfare has been very closely connected with state 
intervention, either through indirect incentives like tax benefits or a more direct form of 
regulation such as mandatory coverage. In this respect, occupational welfare should not 
be disentangled from the welfare state (Shalev, 1996: 4).
Enterprise welfare and related state interventions are emphasised when East 
Asian (Korea and Japan in particular) welfare models are discussed. Along with a strong 
familial tradition, well-developed enterprise welfare systems have been regarded as an 
important component of their social welfare models (Esping-Andersen, 1997; K.Z. 
Hong, 1999; Jacobs, 2000). One of the most popular explanations of the higher level of 
enterprise welfare, compared with a relatively low state commitments to direct social 
welfare benefits and services, is the cultural approach that puts an emphasis on societal 
particularity in the development of enterprise welfare. The cultural explanation argues 
that enterprise welfare in contemporary Japan is the direct result of traditional values 
peculiar to Japan such as a group-oriented mentality or paternalistic employer-employee 
relations (Abegglen & Stalk, 1985; Gordon, 1988; Vogel, 1985). Enterprise welfare has 
an affinity with Familism or Confuciansim, which place their priorities on cooperation 
and harmony within an organisation. Employers have absolute authority and a 
responsibility to look after their employees, while the virtues of employees are devotion 
and obedience to their companies. Enterprise welfare makes up the fourth pillar of 
Japanese industrial relations, alonside life-long employment, a seniority wage system 
and enterprise unionism (Dore, 1973; Song, 1994; J.S. Park, 1997; Peng 2000).
However, the cultural explanation ignores factors that influence the diversity and 
dynamics of enterprise welfare, i.e. the role of the state, and the behaviour, power and
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strategic choices of trade unions and business8. According to Cho (1996), the Japanese 
enterprise welfare system is a historical product of the labour militancy in the 
immediate postwar period on the one hand, and of the consolidation of enterprise 
unionism in the 1950s on the other. The generous enterprise welfare benefits were the 
product of the strategies of employers to strengthen pro-company unions, whilst at the 
same time it trying to weaken the militant unions. It formed the compromise between 
employers and pro-company enterprise unions. These features are also found in the 
development of enterprise welfare in Korea. According to Park (J.S. Park, 1997), since 
the political democratisation of 1987, enterprise welfare is the compromise outcome 
bargaining between business and labour, based on enterprise unionism, which limits the 
distribution issues to wage and enterprise welfare within a firm. Most of all, 
intentionally or unintentionally state interventions have stimulated the growth of 
enterprise welfare in the region. The government encouraged enterprise welfare through 
various policy instruments whilst it was reluctant to expand state welfare. There is an 
argument that weak trade unionism in Japan has been nurtured by social engineering by 
the government and business, rather than cultural factors (Johnson, 1987). But while 
Japanese industrial relations are based on the indirect and more sophisticated ‘soft 
authoritarianism’, Korean industrial relations are more dependent on ‘hard 
authoritarianism’, whereby the state directly controls or represses labour (J.S. Park,
1997). In Korea, based on the developmental state perspective -  a strong and 
autonomous state insulated from interest groups including business -  the nature of 
enterprise welfare has been often characterised by the state-centred approach. In other 
words, the state forced firms to expand their welfare roles instead of expanding its own 
direct welfare provision, as a de facto imputation of the state’s welfare responsibility to 
the business sector (Choi, 1992; Song, 1994).
8 The cultural-societal approach has more limitations. As Russell argues, the paternalistic feature of  
occupational welfare is not specific to Japan, rather it is a general feature even in the UK and the US 
(Russell, 1991: 270-273). Moreover, enterprise welfare under the state-socialism was evidently 
paternalistic (Lee, M.K., 2000). Furthermore the approach cannot explain its diffusion and imitation 
process (Park, J.S., 1997). If industrial relations including enterprise welfare were embedded in a specific 
cultural or societal tradition, it would not adapt to a new environment. But, as seen from the recent 
diffusion o f Japanese industrial relation to Europe and America, the custom o f industrial relation seems to 
be relatively autonomous from societal-cultural factors. Furthermore, assuming the given situation, 
cultural explanations can neither explain the historical context how enterprise welfare has been developed, 
nor the reason why the level and programmes of enterprise welfare has been different and discriminated 
from one enterprise to another.
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2.2. Models of the Welfare Mix
After the pioneering work by Titmuss (1958), various welfare mix models have been 
suggested since the 1980’s. Rose (1985a, 1985b) classifies three components of welfare 
production -  state, market and household, as does Esping-Andersen (1990). Whilst Rose, 
using empirical data, shows that the relative share between three sectors has been 
significantly stable since early 1950’s in the overall British welfare mix, Esping- 
Andersen focuses on how the risks and welfare functions have been allocated between 
state, market and household, within a political economy framework. However, both of 
them do not include the third sector. For Rose, voluntary (non-profit) organisations are 
not different to for-profit market organisations, since; they pay salaries and wages to 
their employees and, secondly, ‘profit is a small portion of the total cost of producing a 
service, and the cost per beneficiary is virtually the same in these organisations as 
elsewhere’ (Rose, 1985b: 17-8). However, the following criticisms are raised; the first 
criticism is that the state is one of the main employers, and the second is that the 
important principle for distinguishing between sectors is not the difference in 
production cost, but the purpose and principle of provision. Whilst Rose indicates the 
reason why the voluntary sector has not been considered, Esping-Andersen does not, 
despite his reference to and acknowledgement of its importance.
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Figure 2.2. The third sector and the welfare triangle
Genuine welfare mix models have been suggested as a form o f ‘welfare triangle’. 
Abrahamson (1992) shows a welfare triangle, which consists o f the state, market and 
civil society (see Figure 2.1). The principles of the three sectors are defined as power, 
money and solidarity respectively. The triangle represents the overall picture of the 
modem welfare system in post-war era in Europe; state-socialism in Eastern Europe, a 
social insurance-based (market principle) welfare state in Western Europe and the more 
dominant roles o f civil society institutions in Southern Europe. However, this model has 
a crucial limitation, i.e., an ignorance of the informal sector in the welfare mix.
More elaborate welfare triangle models have been proposed by Evers and 
Pestoff. For Evers, the three angular points comprise state, market and community 
(informal sector), with the third sector located in the ‘tension field’ where different 
social spheres and rationales are interwoven and intersect; i.e. 1) the conflict between 
the market (instrumental rationality), the third sector and state (solidaristic and 
democratic values), 2) the tension of the state (universalism) vs. the third sector 
(specialisation), and 3) more blurred borders between the informal and third sector, 
which both of them share the principles such as personal relationship, neighbourhoods 
and social network (Evers, 1993, 1995).
This idea about the welfare mix has been developed further by Pestoff (1998). 
He suggests the concept o f  the welfare mix as a set o f coordinates to assess the changing 
configurations o f providers o f welfare services. At the macro level the idea o f the 
welfare mix indicates a variation in the relative importance o f each sector in the
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governance of society, whereas at the micro level it presents the role of sectors within 
the social welfare delivery system. The welfare mix is neither fixed nor same, but it is a 
political, social and temporal term. A change in the welfare mix implies a change in 
dominant social values. As Figure 2.2 shows, he considers three essential dimensions 
constituting a very elaborate welfare triangle model -  public/private, for-profit/non- 
profit and formal/informal. Although his model shows the interaction, tension and 
potential cooperation between sectors, it is inevitably a third sector centred approach, 
rather than a neutral model to understand the overall welfare mix. It has the assumption 
(as Evers does) that the third sector should play a crucial role in the welfare mix of a 
society. For Pestoff, it is the third sector that coordinates and intermediates different 
sectors. It is the third sector that seems the only alternative ‘beyond the market and 
state’.
In practice, however, it is the state that can plan the nation-wide welfare model, 
regulate other sectors, mobilise resources and allocate them. It relies on the role of the 
third sector too much. It is a society-centred approach, followed by the state-centred 
approach of the traditional welfare state models. What is necessary in welfare mix 
analysis is not to adhere to a restructuring model based on a specific sector (either a 
market-oriented approach or the third sector centred one), but to understand the 
interaction between the state and civil society in the process of restructuring the welfare 
system. The relative importance of different sectors at different times depends on the 
previous development path of the welfare system. In terms of cross-national 
generalisations, no single sector can be stressed or assumed as a crucial sector in the 
welfare mix.
On the other hand, although both Pestoff and Evers refer to the dynamics of civil 
society, enhancing democratisation and participation through the third sector seems 
limited to the domain of personal social services, rather than the whole social welfare 
system incorporating both income maintenance and health. In other words, for both of 
them, restructuring the welfare system, particularly with the regards to the role of the 
third sector, means restructuring ‘social services’, rather than the overall social welfare 
system. Moreover, the triangle model neither seems feasible to an expenditure study, nor 
provides a comparative perspective. In summary, existing welfare pluralism or welfare 
mix debates lean towards normative discussion on which sector should take a dominant 
role in enhancing certain values such as participation, responsiveness, competition and
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equity, rather than presenting an analytical framework to enable researchers to view a 
complete picture of the welfare mix in a society.
In terms of providing a comparative basis for an expenditure study, the recent 
efforts of the OECD are useful. The OECD has developed the concept of ‘net social 
expenditure’ for an international comparative purpose, and has required OECD member 
nations to produce social expenditure statistics following its guidelines (Adema, 2001). 
This model not only considers public social expenditure, but also includes mandatory 
and voluntary private social benefits, and considers the effects of both direct and 
indirect taxation. Here voluntary private social benefits are defined as those provided by 
formal institutions (e.g., employers, non-profit organisations and religious groups) with 
an element of inter-personal redistribution as well as a ‘social purpose’9. According to 
this definition, most private insurance benefits10, notably private health insurance 
benefits, are excluded as are inter-household income transfers. However, the ‘individual 
(insurance) arrangements included are outside the social domain as they are based on 
individual risk-profiles and obtained at prevailing market price’ (p.9).
Moving from a narrow measure of public social expenditure to this broader 
model including private benefits, the OECD measurement substantially reduces cross­
national differences in ‘welfare effort’, if not leads to a convergence of net social 
expenditures. When all these items and tax-effects are considered, the net social 
expenditure of Sweden drops down from 35.7 to 30.6 per cent of GDP, whereas the US 
figure climbs steeply from 15.8 to 23.4 per cent of GDP. These figures suggest that 
simply considering public expenditures would cause the results to be misleading. Even 
so, this model conceptually depends on the public-private dichotomy model and 
inevitably does not consider various components of the welfare mix as needs satisfiers, 
and disregards informal types of welfare in particular. Therefore, several elements of the 
welfare mix are excluded from the estimations, notably private purchases of benefits, 
intra-family transfers and services in kind.
9 Regarding the definition o f ‘social’, ‘the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) groups such 
benefits with a social purpose across the following areas; services for the elderly and disabled; survivors; 
family cash benefits; family services; active labour market policies (ALMPs); unemployment 
compensation; housing benefits; public health expenditure; and other contingencies e.g., cash benefits to 
those on low income’ (p.33)
10 Life-insurance benefits have an evident social purpose with an element o f inter-personal redistribution 
but are excluded due to the difficulty dividing ‘survivors components’ expenditure data from pay-outs as 
a saving instrument in case o f policy-expiration. But, in Korea, the two different components can be 
divided.
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Table 2.1. Components of the extended welfare mix
State
Domestic
Public cash benefits and social 
services
Supra-national
Cash and service flows from 
international organizations and national 
donors
Market Private insurance and purchases of need satisfiers
Private insurance and purchases of need 
satisfiers from MNCs
Enterprise Employee benefits provided by domestic enterprises
Employee benefits provided by 
multinational corporations
Community Benefits provided by NGO/NPISH* and community organizations
Aid and services from international 
NGOs
Household Direct provision of need satisfiers within household
International remittances from 
household members abroad
* Non-governmental organisations; non-profit institutions serving households 
Source: Gough, 2001.
Alternatively, if one focuses on the various sources of monetary income, the 
structure of the welfare mix could be understood as the sum of individuals’ social 
income. Standing (1999) defines social income (SI) as the sum of the money wage (W), 
the value of benefits or support provided by the family, kin or local community (CB), 
the amount of benefits provided by the enterprise in which the person is working (EB), 
the value of state benefits (SB), and private income benefits gained through investment, 
including private social protection (PB). However, Standing’s concept of social income 
is basically a monetary aspect of welfare and does not consider service provision. More 
recently, Gough (2001) proposed an extended model of the welfare mix when he 
widened the scope of welfare regime research into the developing world. He classified 
the welfare mix into five sectors -  the state, market, enterprise, community (third sector) 
and households, and extended the range of the welfare mix into the international 
counterparts to the domestic sources of welfare11 (see Table 2.1). When the extended 
model is applied to the welfare regime approach, Gough et al. (2004) demonstrate that 
more informal sources (most notably, family) are crucial in the welfare mix in the 
developing world.
11 But in the research, I only consider domestic parts o f the welfare mix. It is due to the fact that the 
international dimension is o f little importance in Korea, but would be o f greater consequence in less 
developed countries where aid flows are significant, service provision is more internationalized and 
household migration and remittances are important (Gough and Kim, 2000).
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One of the main problems of the welfare mix models introduced so far is that 
their analytical foci have been heavily dependent on the structure of welfare provision. 
However, the mixed state of welfare is not restricted to provision. Burchardt et al. 
(1999), for example, suggest three dimensions of the public-private mix of welfare; i.e, 
provision (who is the provider?), finance (does the public sector pay for the service 
either directly or indirectly?) and decision (can individuals choose for themselves the 
provider used or the amount of service?). Based on these categories, they generate eight 
possible combinations of welfare activity and classify the forms of privatisation such as 
outright privatisation contracting-out, marketing public services, user charges, vouchers 
and tax relief (Burchardt and Hills, 1999).
Thus, the privatisation and marketisation of social service delivery systems have 
not only brought a more pluralized delivery structure in welfare provision, but have also 
raised the issue of who pays for them and where the finance comes from. This issue is 
especially prevalent when related to the rising quasi-markets in a range of social welfare 
fields like social services, health care, education and social housing (Glennerster, 1992, 
2003; Le Grand and Bartlett (ed.), 1993; Taylor-Gooby (ed.), 1998; Ascoli and Ranci 
(eds.), 2002). In this respect, Glennerster (1992) argues that provision and finance of 
welfare should at first be conceptually divided. Similarly, the issue of regulation has 
been a central feature of the welfare pluralism debate (Johnson, 1987). Especially, for 
those who see a pluralisation of welfare provision as inevitable, the critical issue is how 
to find more suitable regulatory models to avoid the adverse effects of increasing 
complexity -  e.g. rising inequality and unevenness of coverage (Svetlik, 1993). Most of 
all, we should recognise that the issues of regulation and finance in welfare provision 
are closely related to the role of the state. The reduced role of the state in direct 
provision does not mean reduced state intervention, but implies that it is changing, not 
withdrawing, its roles focusing more upon interventions as a fmancer and regulator (e.g., 
‘enabling state’ of Gilbert (1989) and ‘the third way’ of Giddens (1998) and Blair 
(1998)).
So, if we have to extend our welfare mix discussion to the issue of regulation 
and finance, what would be a possible welfare mix model? Table 2.2 suggests an 
alternative model, originally developed by Anheier and Seibel (1998), including finance 
and regulation as well as provision. In their comparative case studies on the former 
communist societies in Central and Eastern Europe, they demonstrate four ideal
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approaches to social service delivery. Between two extreme approaches -  state-oriented 
and market-oriented, there is a traditional mixed economy approach where the 
government and the third sector are mainly involved in provision, finance and 
regulation within the welfare mix, and contemporary mixed economy approach where 
the market sector is included along with the state and the third sector. As Johnson (1999: 
25) evaluates, it is an useful model but has a serious weakness: i.e., it says nothing about 
the balance between sectors. In reality, it neither provides an analytical framework for 
analysing the relative importance of different sectors, nor does it include two important 
components of welfare mix, i.e., enterprise welfare and the family. Most of all, the 
model was originally developed to analyse ‘social service’ structure, rather than to cover 
the welfare mix as a whole, including income protection.
Table 2.2. Approaches to Service Delivery
Approach Provision Finance Regulation
State-oriented Government Government Government
Traditional mixed Government Government Government
economy Vol. Agencies Private sources Self-regulated assocs
Contemporary mixed Government Government Government






Market-oriented Commercial suppliers Fees and charges Markets
Source: Modified form o f Anheier and Seibel (1998); recited from Johnson, 1999: 24.
Then, what should the alternative model of the welfare mix be like? Here, I 
would like to argue some basic propositions for an alternative model. First, the welfare 
mix should primarily remain a neutral term to express the mixed state of the overall 
welfare system. It enables us to understand the dynamic nature of the welfare mix, since 
it can indicate potential change in the welfare mix without specific preference to a 
particular sector or value. The theoretical framework should be something beyond both 
descriptive and normative approaches. Second, the analytical framework of an 
alternative welfare mix model should be able to cover not only the structure of provision 
but also the issues of finance and the regulatory structure of the welfare mix. Third, the 
alternative model should be able to indicate the relative importance of each sector, so
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that it may contribute to our understanding about change and variance in the welfare 
mix, in terms of both comparative and time-series research. Fourth, enterprise welfare 
should be regarded as a separate sector in welfare mix discussion because the social 
benefits provided by enterprises for their employees are not necessarily determined by 
market principles, e.g., a monetary exchange determined by supply and demand.
Table 2.3. Components of Welfare Mix Pentagon: Characteristics and Principles











State Public Formal Non-profit No No/Yes
Right/
Citizenship
Market Private Formal For-Profit Yes No
Purchasing
Power
Enterprise Private Formal IndirectlyFor-Profit No Yes
Employment
Status
Third Sector Private Formal Non-profit No No Membership/Solidarity
Family Private Informal Non-profit No No Obligation/Affection
Hereby, I propose a ‘welfare pentagon’ model to investigate welfare mix 
structure as the dependent variable of the research framework. It is a pentagon model 
because it divides the welfare mix structure into five components -  the state, market, 
enterprise, third sector and family. First of all, Table 2.3 indicates the basic principles 
and characteristics of the five sectors. This allows us to reach beyond Pestoff’s model 
by considering a greater number of dimensions, in order to understand the rationales of 
each sector. Conceptually, such categories as public/private, formal/informal and for- 
/non-profit category seem straightforward. But, in the case of enterprise welfare, the 
dichotomy of for-profit/non-profit does not fully explain the logic of enterprise welfare 
provision. Of course, enterprises are for-profit organisations but, different from market 
provision, enterprise welfare provision is not decided so much by monetary 
compensation but by employment relations and/or status. At the same time, their 
provisions are also related to such profit-oriented efforts as higher productivity, 
industrial peace and wage control. So, it is better to define such features of enterprise 
welfare as ‘indirectly’ for-profit. On the other hand, state welfare is likely to be based on 
universal principles and social rights, but when the state is an employer it will provide
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employment-related provision for its employees. Market provisions are critically 
dependent on the purchasing power of individuals or households. Third sector provision 
seems more complex and thus it is difficult to conceptualise its benefit principles by a 
single word. They can be roughly divided into two types; one being (exclusive) 
membership and the other is based upon a wider value of social solidarity. The informal 
welfare provisions of family and household are based on more personalised motivations 
(affection) or cultural norms (obligation as a family member). Of course, it must be 
remembered that these characteristics indicate the ideal rationales and, in practice, they 
exist in various forms leading to blurred areas around the borders. Nevertheless, the 
features of each sector can be used as yardsticks to classify the specific forms into the 
five categories.
If the discussions on the welfare mix pentagon model so far have been mainly 
related to principles and definitions, it is necessary to develop the model to analyse the 
welfare mix structure. Table 2.4 advances the pentagon model to analyse the welfare 
mix structure, covering provision, finance and regulation altogether. In terms of welfare 
provision, the welfare pentagon model I propose does not restrict its scope to social 
services, but is wide so as to cover various social welfare institutions including both 
income protection and health care. The provision column of Table 2.4 confirms that, 
although different sectors can provide functionally equivalent welfare provisions in a 
specific area (for example income maintenance and social services), the principles and 
motivations of the welfare provisions are very diverse and differ according to which 
sector provides as Table 2.3 suggests. The real complexity of the welfare mix approach 
can be found in the finance and regulation structure, and it is here that we can find the 
importance of state intervention in the overall welfare mix. The state has a specific role 
and is involved either directly or indirectly in regulation and finance in all four non-state 
sectors.
In terms of finance, the state plays a role as an indirect financer through its 
taxation system. Usually the government provides tax benefits in the form of income or 
tax deductions for private health and pension insurance premiums as well as on 
purchases on private services and goods (e.g., nursery, nursing home services and 
purchases of equipment for the disabled). Employers’ contributions for enterprise 
welfare are also recognised as a kind of labour cost and subject to tax benefits. In some 
cases, the government provides direct financial support to the third sector organisations
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that provide social services instead of the state sector. Also, third sector (non-profit) 
organisations are not subject to corporate tax. In addition, the government provides tax 
credits to households for their dependent members such as children, the elderly and the 
disabled. Similarly, the state intervenes in non-state sectors through various regulations. 
Public bodies monitor and supervise the quality of services offered by private providers. 
They also regulate welfare markets. The state can introduce mandatory enterprise 
welfare programmes as well as permit new welfare markets through legislation. 
Administration of justice can be involved in family provisions, e.g., unless parents look 
after their children properly, then they may be prosecuted.
Table 2.4. Structure of Welfare Mix Pentagon: Provision, Finance and Regulation
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Therefore, we can evaluate that these state interventions in finance and 
regulation are the centre of the complexity of the welfare mix. If we specify finance or 
regulation structure as the criteria that define different sectors, inevitably all the borders
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between the five sectors of the welfare mix are blurred because state interventions are 
present in all non-state sectors. To make clear the distinction between the five sectors of 
the welfare mix, in this respect, the analysis should focus upon welfare provision. In 
other words, we can clearly divide the borders among different sectors of the welfare 
mix only when focusing on their production of welfare. Nonetheless, I shall also deal 
with the role of the state in the welfare mix with additional analyses of the structures of 
finance and regulation. Even though the main focus of the research is on welfare mix 
provisions, explanations of them still privilege the government because of its finance 
and regulatory role.
2.3. Components of the Welfare Mix
In this section, based on the welfare mix pentagon model proposed so far, I deal with 
some definitional and theoretical issues to clarify what is meant by each of the five 
sectors. I focus on role of the state in social welfare, debates of market provision, the 
definition of enterprise welfare vis-a-vis the market sector, discuss the definition and 
potential of the third sector, and issues of culture, norms and gender inequality in family 
provision.
The State Sector
Since there are numerous studies on state welfare, the welfare state or the role of the 
state in social welfare, here I will only define the major roles of the state in welfare mix. 
According to Shin (2000: 30-2), the role of the state in social welfare can be classified 
into four types; i.e., income transferor, service provider, financial supporter and 
regulator. First, the state provides cash benefits to people through various institutional 
apparatus like social insurance (entitlement based on contributions), universal 
allowances (social right) and public assistance programmes (means-tested). Secondly,
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the state takes a role as a direct provider in education, training, employment, health and 
other social services. Thirdly, the state provides financial support to other non-state 
sectors, both directly through financial subsidies for their social service provisions and 
indirectly through tax expenditures like tax credits and income deductions. Fourthly, the 
state plays a role as regulator by establishing conditions and guidelines as well as 
monitoring and supervising the social services provided by non-state sectors.
Although the traditional ‘welfare’ state model has been the target of criticism -  
on the grounds of its inefficiency, bureaucracy, unresponsiveness and passivity -  and 
has been subject to restructuring in many advanced economies, the state welfare still 
remains a dominant sector in the welfare mix when we consider the four roles of the 
state indicated above. Most of all, universal income maintenance programmes including 
social insurance benefits have not been touched even in the US and UK where the neo­
liberal policy reform agendas were mostly pervasive, even though there has been a 
significant erosion of public assistance schemes and social services in such countries 
(Mishra, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996a; Pierson, 1994). However, even in those 
cases the state’s regulatory role and financial responsibility have been sustained and in 
some cases reinforced, although in the last two decades a significant portion of the 
state’s social service provision has been transferred to either commercial providers or 
non-profit organisations in many advanced welfare states (Ascoli and Ranci, 2002; 
Ranci, 2002; Johnson, 1999). Instead, it can be noted that the state’s interventions, 
regarding the third and fourth role, have influenced the welfare provisions of non-state 
sectors.
The M arket Sector
The market provision of social welfare goods consist of financial service markets -  like 
private health insurance, life-insurance (only in case of the death, illness or accident of 
the insured), individual pension markets -  and welfare service markets based on self­
payment for health, residential and other personal services. In the market sector, mainly 
the finance comes from fees, charges and insurance premiums that are collected from 
consumers according to a ‘fee-for-service (or benefit)’ principle. Despite the existence 
of government regulation over markets, the market sector is distinguishable from the
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other sectors for the following reasons; first, market provision is based on monetary 
exchange, second, both the availability and service quality are determined by the 
purchasing power of individuals or households, and, third, commercial providers aim to 
profit through their welfare provisions (see Table 2.2 and 2.3). These features of market 
provision indicate two opposed implications.
On the one hand, market provision has been regarded as widening the scope of 
consumer choice because for-profit organisations must respond to the various and 
changing needs of consumers better than other forms of organisation, otherwise 
consumers would exit the market. In theory, free markets minimise X-inefficiency or 
unnecessarily high cost outputs as well as ensure consumer sovereignty (Glennerster, 
2003: 17). So, market supporters argue that market provision is more efficient than the 
state system because in public provision bureaucrats have no incentive to reducing cost 
and consumers do not have to restrict their demand (Johnson, 1999: 107). In addition, 
there is an assumption that market competition allows an improvement in the overall 
social service delivery system as well as a higher quality of service to consumers. Even 
some welfare pluralists like Hadley and Hatch (1981), who have reluctant attitudes 
toward commercial sector, admit the function of the commercial sector as a ‘safeguard’ 
to maintain the quality of social services.
However, some sceptical questions arise about the nature of market provisions. 
It is the purchasing power that determines the range of choice in the market, and 
markets respond to demands, rather than needs (Mayo, 1994; Johnson, 1993; Walker, 
1993). In other words, enhancing consumer choice through markets reflects the 
financial capability of individuals and, therefore, it nurtures inequality. This point is 
supported by the fact that most benefits of tax expenditure and credit subsidies for 
housing and child care, American alternatives to direct services and provisions, have 
ascribed to middle class and higher class (Gilbert & Gilbert, 1989; Gilbert 1993). 
Moreover, the existence of competition per se does not necessarily mean higher quality 
and, moreover, there is no sufficient evidence that market services are more efficient 
than services from other sectors12 (Mayo, 1994).
12 Most inter-sectoral studies on health services in the US show that, if  one considers only costs, for- 
profit hospitals are more efficient (Gilbert and Tang, 1995: 211-214). Some empirical studies in the UK 
also indicate that for-profit agents provide nursing and residential home services at a low price (Judge and 
Knapp, 1985; Biggs, 1986; recited from Johnson, 1999: 98). However, these cheaper services can be 
provided at the expense of the quality of service and/or the labour conditions o f service workers. Despite 
its theoretical robustness, the claim that market provisions are more efficient than those of other sectors in
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The Enterprise Sector
Regarding enterprise welfare, two definitional issues can be raised. One is why 
‘enterprise welfare’ is used rather than ‘occupational welfare’, and the other is why the 
enterprise sector should be distinguished from the market sector. First, the subsequent 
use of the term ‘enterprise welfare’ in the research. Basically, the actual programmes of 
occupational welfare and enterprise welfare are not different, and both terms have often 
been used interchangeably. However, strictly speaking, occupational welfare has a wider 
meaning than that of enterprise welfare. The notion of enterprise welfare only identifies 
the benefits or programmes implemented through enterprises (either through direct 
operation or by contracting-out) and mostly by employers’ contribution. As Johnson 
says, however, occupational welfare schemes have been and can be initiated not only by 
employers, but also by trade unions and professional associations (Johnson, 1987: 137). 
In this respect, whereas the term ‘occupational welfare’ is a prevailing one in Western 
welfare states, which have the institutional legacies of guilds, trade unions and mutual 
aid associations, the term ‘enterprise welfare’ is more popular in East Asian countries 
like Korea and Japan. Since enterprise welfare is the only de facto  form of occupational 
welfare and, therefore, is more familiar terminology in Korea (and Japan), this term is 
subsequently used throughout the research.
On the other hand, most literature on the welfare mix classifies enterprise 
welfare (mostly defined as occupational welfare) as part of the market sector (Esping- 
Andersen, 1990, 1996 and 1999; Johnson, 1987, 1999; Rose, 1985b; K.Z. Hong, 1999) 
because it reflects the position of the labour ‘market’ and its suppliers are for-profit 
companies that cannot be disassociated from the market. However, enterprise welfare 
should be distinguished from the market sector because it does not always follow 
market principles. First, enterprise welfare has different determinants than those of 
wage. Whereas wage is a variable cost determined by working hours, enterprise welfare 
(as a kind of non-wage labour cost) should be regarded as the quasi-fixed or fixed cost 
determined by the number of workers (Ehrenberg and Smith, 1991: 145-146). Various 
enterprise welfare programmes are provided whether or not workers are employed, and 
in this respect the level of benefit is less related to productivity differences between
social services seems to lack an empirical basis. In this respect, Johnson (1999: 107) comments that in 
reality, very often the debates on welfare markets are based on ideology rather than empirical evidence.
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workers. The benefit principle of enterprise welfare is employment status, rather than a 
for-profit motivation. Secondly, the finance and regulatory structures are different from 
those in the market sector (see Table 2.3). The finance of enterprise welfare comes 
almost exclusively from employers and substantial parts of voluntary enterprise welfare 
programmes are negotiated by collective bargaining between labour and business. 
Thirdly, the neo-classical assumption that independent labour suppliers and demanders 
exchange their labour force and wage in the labour market in a period unit, is unrealistic. 
Suppliers and demanders make long-term, rather than short-term, contracts through 
firms that consist of very complex hierarchical organisations and decision-making 
processes. The complicated relations intermediated through organisation mean that 
compensation to workers is not solely determined by their marginal productivity since 
those relations imply attributes that can not translated into a supply and demand 
relationship (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992; recited from K.Z. Hong, 1996: 186). In other 
words, enterprise welfare is not so much a direct compensation at the expense of 
supplying labour as an outcome of a firm’s strategic considerations, either for the 
retention of skilled labour or for the curtailment of transaction costs. Aside from the 
intra-organisational features of firms (K.Z. Hong, 1996), there are other explanations for 
the development of enterprise welfare, such as role of the state, political economy and 
cultural approaches (Y.H. Cho, 1996; Choi, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 1996b; M.K. Lee, 
1997; J.S. Park, 1996; C. Park, 1997; Song, 1994, 1995).
By and large, enterprise welfare can be divided into two types; mandatory and 
voluntary benefits. The former, mandatory type of the enterprise welfare is mandated by 
the state through its legislation processes, not determined by the market principles of. 
supply and demand. Many welfare states have levied responsibility for providing 
welfare provision to employers -  most notably within incapacity-related benefits 
(sickness, disability and benefits related to occupational injuries and accidents) and 
employment based pension contributions in many OECD countries (Adema, 2001: 11). 
In case of the latter type, employers provide enterprise welfare benefits voluntarily or 
according to collective agreements with trade unions. Enterprise welfare benefits are 
affected by a political concern to maintain industrial peace and the general economic 
conditions, than by the productivity of workers. The level of enterprise welfare benefits 
neither depends on the purchasing power, nor the benefits that accompany monetary 
exchange. Instead it depends on the financial capability of employers. So if their
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employment status is the same, the generosity of enterprise welfare benefits provided by 
each workplace is likely to be determined by the size and/or payment ability of the firms 
that they are employed in. Therefore, like market provision, enterprise welfare is likely 
to nurture inequality among workers, especially between workers in small and large 
workplaces.
The Third Sector
It is very difficult to provide a universal definition of the third sector. In the US, the 
third sector organisations are usually defined, in terms of their tax relationship with the 
government, as organisations that do not seek profits are exempt from paying Federal 
corporate tax (Rose-Ackerman, 1986; James, 1990; Salamon, 1995). Accordingly, Non­
profit organisation is the most frequently used terminology within the American context. 
Although the non-profit feature can also be found, the terminology of NPO, based on 
the US tax system, is not suitable within the European context. There are many non- 
associational organisations like cooperatives and self-help groups that cannot be 
explained by the taxation relation. So many European scholars indicate that the 
definition should be different from one country to another, by their own historical and 
societal tradition, although the third sector tends to be explained in context of a civil 
society (Evers, 1993, 1995; Svetlik, 1993; Pestoff, 1998; Kendall, 2000). After all, a 
definition of the third sector is highly dependent upon its relationship with other sectors. 
Generally speaking, the third sector can be distinguished from the market in terms of its 
non-profit features and from the informal sector in terms of its formal organisational 
features.
Regardless of the definitional problems, the third sector has drawn a great of 
research attention, as it is viewed as a vital sector in restructuring the overall welfare 
system. Sometimes, the third sector has been located in the ‘tension field’ between the 
state, market and informal sector, and it is assumed that it takes not only roles of 
intermediating and coordinating different sectors, but also a crucial role in overcoming 
the problems of the traditional welfare state model (Evers, 1993, 1995; Pestoff, 1998). 
As the state has withdrawn from its role as a direct service provider and newly rising 
needs have emerged, the third sector has expanded its service-providing role under the
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finance and regulatory role of the government. The third sector has also played an 
important role in advocacy and campaigning (Kramer, 1981; Johnson, 1999: 187-93).
Nonetheless, the capability (or feasibility) of the third sector has been 
continuously regarded as oubtful. According to Johnson (1993), the voluntary sector has 
problems inherent to its nature; namely, fragmentation, uneven and incomplete coverage, 
inequity and accountability. Moreover, the third sector is dependent upon finance from 
government subsidiaries (Salamon, 1989), and could threaten the autonomy of voluntary 
organisations which are under substantial regulation by the government. This could 
ultimately damage the comparative advantage of the third sector, i.e. flexibility and 
responsiveness, especially if market principles permeate to the overall social service 
delivery system, in the form of the quasi-markets, contracting-out and competitive 
tendering not only amongst non-profit providers but also between profit and non-profit 
providers. Under these circumstances, higher concern for business management skills 
and competition for government funding have become unavoidable and have brought 
about the standardisation of social services (Ascoli and Ranci, 2002; Ascoli, 2002). As a 
result, the advantages o f the third sector -  namely, flexibility, responsiveness and 
variety -  have all begun to fade.
The Family
Different from other sectors, welfare provision by the family is based on informal 
motivations like affection, reciprocity and obligation. For example, Horrell (1991: 220) 
indicates that unpaid housework is minimally affected by wage variables or time spent 
in paid work; instead, cultural and social norms would appear to have a greater 
explanatory power. Most empirical studies of the perceptions of informal carers have 
reported that ‘the obligation to care exists, but is limited, complex and ambiguous’ 
(Elliot, 1996: 128). According to Twigg and Atkin (1995), the provision of informal care 
often seems inconsistent. They argue that, aside from those structural variables like 
gender, age, class and race, there are subjective factors that affect caring provision 
including the attitudes of carer, i.e., carers’ attitude and perception of the caring role and 
the cared for. Similarly, Finch and Mason (1999) show that the normative feature of 
informal care is complex and is subject to personal interpretation. Moreover, the
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prevalence of informal welfare provision in East Asian countries has tended to be 
explained by such norms as familism and filial piety originating from Confucian culture. 
For example, filial piety in Korea can be characterised as unconditional and self- 
sacrificing behaviour and, therefore, the direction of transfer is one-way rather than a 
basic mutual support (Lee and Sung, 1996, 1997; Sung, 1994). Adult children support 
their parents on the basis of filial piety even if the children’s situation is very difficult. 
The children restrict their needs and consumption and, instead, provide income transfers 
to their parents. They want to spend their resources on their parents rather than on 
themselves.
However, internal pressures such as ageing populations, the higher participation 
of women, an increasing divorce rate and single-parent households may have seriously 
eroded the basic conditions affecting the family’s capacity to provide welfare goods, 
whereas exactly the same factors have multiplied the welfare needs of the family. 
Although its importance has faded, the family is still one of the most important welfare 
providers for people across the world. This is particularly true in Korea where inter- 
generational private transfers are one of the most important income sources for not only 
the elderly who have retired but also the young adults who have not yet entered the 
labour market. Furthermore, in Korea, as we shall see in Chapter 6, households where 
the elderly live with their adult children are still common and many adult children live 
adjacently to care for their elderly parents. In this respect, the strong familial tradition 
has been cited as one of the most outstanding features of the welfare system in East- 
Asian countries (Esping-Andersen, 1997; Goodman and Peng, 1996; Gough, 2001; 
Kwon, H.J., 2001). The importance of the family can be especially stressed in terms of 
services and caring. The family remains the most fundamental unit to provide care and 
services to children, patients, the disabled and aged. Informal caring not only requires 
the direct physical and mental labour of care-givers, but is accompanied by opportunity 
costs (see Table 2.4). Since women have most often fulfilled this caring and service role, 
the issue of inequality is raised at the same time. The inequality regarding family 
service provisions is not confine to the gender inequality, but also the inequality 
between the caregiver and receiver, and between different classes among women.
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2.4. Conclusion
Most welfare mix ‘models’ have failed either to identify the welfare mix in the context 
of a causal relation or included all the crucial components constituting the welfare mix. 
Although there have been some pioneering efforts to explain the welfare mix through 
the dynamics within a civil society or via the government (Evers, 1993, 1995; Pestoff,
1998), their purpose seems to proclaim the importance and potential of the third sector, 
rather than to explain the whole structure and dynamics of the welfare mix. This 
purpose tends to lead their analyses not only to be static, normative and descriptive 
depictions, but also gives a romantic view on the issue, i.e., the expansion of the third 
sector would solve the current welfare state’s problems. So there is a paradox in the 
existing research on the welfare mix; many studies have discussed the welfare mix but 
most of them have focused on separate sectors, rather than considered the whole picture 
with the welfare mix as the dependent variable.
Removing embedded preference or dominance to a specific sector, this research 
attempts to operationalise ‘the welfare mix’ in Korea, as a dependent variable, and to 
explain its changes with the independent variables. To do so, it is necessary to, first, 
suggest a new welfare mix model, the welfare pentagon, to identify all the components 
of the welfare mix together and, second, to construct a theoretical framework for 
explaining the changes and dynamics of the welfare mix using variables such as the 
changing environments and domestic political processes. In this chapter, I suggested a 
welfare mix pentagon model to deal with the first task. The second task will be passed 
over to the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 3. ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS, POLITICAL 
INSTITUTIONS AND WELFARE POLITICS
Whereas I examined the welfare mix approach as the dependent variable of the research, 
the purpose of this chapter is to define independent variables and to construct a 
theoretical framework for the research. First of all, the following section defines two 
sets of environmental factors; i.e. external forces and internal pressures. While external 
forces outside the border of nation states have been called ‘globalisation’, factors such 
as the population ageing, the changing employment structure of the service sector and 
the radical transformation of household and family structures can be summarised as 
‘post-industrial’ pressures that have taken place within domestic spheres. Although 
globalisation and post-industrialisation can be defined as the environmental factors that 
shape general constraints over advanced welfare states, there have been strong 
arguments stating that their impact on social welfare systems are contingent or diverged 
according to the domestic political institutions each country. The second section deals 
with the very theories and related discussions, which put emphasis on the importance of 
democratic political institutions and welfare state structures (institutional legacies of the 
welfare state), especially in the context of the changing environments stated above. 
Finally, based on these theoretical reviews, I shall develop an analytical framework for 
the research in the third section; i.e., the research model to explain how environmental 
factors and national political institutions have influenced the changes in the welfare mix 
and through which policy processes. Here, I shall briefly define the components of the 
research model.
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3.1. Changing Environments and the Welfare State
3.1.1. External Forces: Globalisation
Set aside from its reality and preciseness, usage of the term ‘globalisation’ has extended 
to apply to economic, political, social and cultural spheres. World society theory, for 
example, understands globalisation as a comprehensive concept not limited to only the 
economic sphere but also to including politics, law, education, science, culture and so 
on -  thus applying to virtually all components of everyday life (Meyer et al, 1997). 
Despite its expansive implication, globalisation is fundamentally seen as an economic 
phenomenon because other types of globalisation are regarded as the derivatives caused 
by and therefore following economic globalisation. In other words, economic 
globalisation forms the basis of political and socio-cultural globalisation. In this respect, 
although some stress is put upon the political and ideological meanings of globalisation 
(Mishra, 1999), many scholars of the welfare state tend to focus on the features of 
economic globalisation, especially the international mobility of capital (Hirst and 
Thompson, 1999; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Esping-Andersen, 1996a, 1999; Garrettt, 
1998; Swank, 2002). This research sees globalisation only within economic and 
political terms because the socio-cultural aspect of globalisation is often vague and 
therefore hard to be analysed within social policy studies.
Economic Globalisation
Economic globalisation primarily stresses the unprecedented integration of the world 
economy in terms of trade in goods and services, capital mobility and the 
internationalisation of production systems due to the rapid development of micro­
electronics, telecommunications and computing technologies (Yeates, 2001: chapter 2). 
The global integration of financial markets and international capital mobility form the 
two most pertinent features of economic globalisation. As seen in Table 3.1, the 
growing rate of world FDI inflows has far exceeded the levels of world trade and output. 
Really, there has been a dramatic increase in capital mobility in terms of the flows of 
FDI. Increased capital mobility has occurred due to the fact that most capital control
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mechanisms had been dismantled before the early 1990s. Under such conditions, the 
process of economic globalisation has given capital a relatively superior position vis-a- 
vis the state and labour because it has guaranteed the international mobility of capital 
(Mishra, 1999: 6). In other words, the international mobility of capital -  the so-called 
‘exit’ option -  has strengthened the structural power of capital (Gough and Fansworth, 
2000). At the same time, the trends in capital mobility and the enhanced structural 
power of capital reflect the erosion of Keynesianism i.e. the weakened capability of 
macroeconomic management of nation states. Now capital return is not decided by the 
domestic interest rate of a nation but instead by global competition to induce foreign 
capital (Scharf and Schmidt, 2000:5). To build favourable conditions to attract capital, 
nations have had to accept significant erosion of their policy instruments including 
regulation, taxation and public expenditure.
Table 3.1. Economic globalisation: FDI inflow, world output and world exports
(Billion U.S. dollars, ratio)
1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 1980s/1970s
1990s/
1980s
A. FDI Inflows 7 52 56 204 322 1,377 4.5 4.8
B. World Exports 309 1,960 1,894 3,414 5,035 6,252 2.3 2.1
C. World Output - 11,704 12,804 22,558 29,112 31,377 1.6 1.8
A/C (%) - 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.1 4.4 - -
B/C (%) - 16.7 14.8 15.1 17.3 19.9 - -
Source: Reorganised from Wong and Adams, 2002: Table. 1.
In this context, economic globalisation is said to have changed the basic 
assumptions of the Keynesian welfare state and to have curtailed viable social policy 
options (Mishra, 1999; Scharpf, 2000a; Strange, 1996). Problems including 
unemployment, inequality and increased fiscal constraints on governments have been 
regarded as resulting from a process of economic globalisation. The internationalisation 
of capital markets has reduced the capacity of government’s macroeconomic 
management, the increase of transnational transfer of capital has empowered its 
structural power vis-a-vis state and labour and the exposure to wage compression from 
NICs has deepened the inequality structure as well as chronic unemployment. This 
provides the context for the ‘downward convergence’ hypothesis whereby states are
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forced to adapt similar policies towards ‘social dumping’ or a ‘race to the bottom’ to the 
lowest level of social welfare, i.e. neo-liberal welfare state (Cemy, 1996; Gill and Law, 
1988; McKenzie and Lee, 1991; Sinn, 1993; Tanzi, 1995; Strange, 1996). Under the 
fierce competition caused by attempts to induce capital, governments tend to abandon 
the comprehensive welfare state and redistributive policies that inevitably cause the 
higher taxation and labour costs. Instead, states implement neo-liberal policies such as 
deregulation, marketisation and privatisation.
However, the arguments for economic globalisation so far are faced with the 
three following counter arguments. The first counter argument is that, with regard to 
economic integration, the current state of the international economy is by no means 
unprecedented nor irreversible (Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Weiss, 1997). Rather, the 
present world economy is less open and capital is less mobile than during the 
international economic regime between 1870 and 1914. The second counter argument 
concerns the geographical scope of globalisation. Even if the present state of the 
international economy can be said as (economic) globalisation, the scope of 
globalisation has been limited to a few geographical regions -  North America, Western 
Europe and Japan -  but most of the rest of the world has been excluded from economic 
globalisation. In this respect, the present state of world economy is not so much 
globalisation as ‘Triadisation’, coupled with the ‘de-linking’ of many developing 
countries from the most developed regions (Petrella, 1996: 77-78; also see Appendix 
Table 1-1 and 1-2). The third counter argument challenges economic-centred 
explanations. As we shall discuss below, the impact of economic globalisation is not 
uniform across countries but instead it is diverse according to the domestic institutions 
of nation states. In this respect, politics matters and past institutional legacies are crucial 
if looking to understand national adaptations to the global economy (Esping-Andersen, 
1996a; Garrettt, 1998; Rhodes, 1996, Scharpf, 2000a, 2000b; Swank, 1998, 2002). Even 
though globalisation is important and different from the past internationalisation, it is 
not totally new, neither does it demand the withdrawal of the roles of nation states; 
rather it has raised the necessity of restructuring the roles of governments. Modem 
governments provide the basic conditions for competitiveness, for example, health, 




Political globalisation primarily refers to the intensified transnational nature of political 
interaction. Holton (1998:109) refers to it as ‘the changing global context of political 
awareness, processes and activity’. As the international economy has become 
increasingly integrated, there has been a growing awareness of social, economic and 
environmental issues becoming problems of an international nature. In this respect, 
International Governmental Organisations (hereafter, IGOs) have had an increased 
involvement in transnational policy coordination, national policy implementation and 
global resource (re)distribution1 (Deacon et al, 1997: chap.3; George and Wilding, 
2002: chap. 7 and 8; Yeates, 2000: chap.4). Most of all, the policy advice of major IGOs 
-  such as the World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), World Trade 
Organisation (WTO) and the International Labour Organisations (ILO) -  has influenced 
the national policy making processes directly and/or indirectly. Their influences have 
been exerted not only through policy recommendation and advice, but also through the 
levying of sanctions and/or providing assistance in the form of aid and loans. The most 
outstanding examples of IGOs’ influences on national policies are the structural 
adjustment programmes of the IMF and the WB. Both institutions provide loans for 
economic structural adjustment to countries with payment difficulties. These loans, of 
course, are accompanied by social and economic conditionalities. The loan 
conditionalities require the beneficiary countries to pursue a socio-economic reform 
programme towards a free market economy, usually thus will include the currency 
devaluation, the removal of exchange rate and capital mobility control, the withdrawal 
of price and wage control, the privatisation of public enterprises and services, the 
deregulation of industry and industrial relations, increasing labour market flexibility, a 
reduction in public expenditure and cuts in social services (Lopes, 1999; Owoh, 1996). 
Although the WB provides loans which look to mitigate the adverse effects and
1 Despite the growing importance of IGOs in international politics, it is pointed out that IGOs are 
fundamentally ‘inter-national’ rather than ‘trans-national’ organisations. It is still the case that nation 
states have sovereignty and dominate international politics. IGOs are limited to levying sanctions or other 
compulsive instruments to countries which do not implement international agreements (Yeates, 2000: 
chap.4). As economic globalisation ii unlikely to drive out the role o f the state per se , the higher influence 
of IGOs on national policies does not restrict the ability o f states to exercise national sovereignty.
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impoverishment caused by economic reform, there has been a great deal of criticism of 
the conditionality of Structural Adjustment Loans (SAL) because they have been said to 
be the main cause of impoverishment and political corruption in many countries (Ghai, 
1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Rodrigeuz and Griffith-Jones, 1992; recited from 
Deacon et. al., 1997: 61). According to Chossudovsky (1997), 80 % of world population, 
or 4 billion people, are under the direct influence of SAPs.
On the other hand, some have argued about the positive impacts of global social 
policy or welfare globalism to national welfare states (Deacon, 1997), in terms of a 
spread of the Western welfare state model (policy learning) to welfare state laggards, 
non-Westem nation states or newly emerging welfare states. For example, whereas the 
policy recommendations of the IMF, WB and OECD are based on a neoliberal 
conception of the welfare state, the ILO argues for fairly comprehensive social 
standards including the rights of association, a basic wage level (minimum wage), fair 
working conditions and equal rights for female and immigrant workers. In the laggard 
welfare states the ILO’s standards have been the international pressure to improve their 
labour standards and social welfare system2 (Strang and Chang, 1993; see also Abu 
Sharkh, 2002 for the impact of ILO standards in nations states across the world). For 
reformist or progressive politicians, the ILO’s guidelines have been utilised as a type of 
‘international obligation’ in order to continue social and labour reforms (Yeates, 2000: 
74).
3.1.2. Internal Pressures: Post-Industrialisation
The change of environments surrounding social welfare systems is not confined to the 
external forces. Although the process of economic and political globalisation, based on 
the general logic of capital movement, has been recognised as the new grand variable to 
explain the recent development of welfare states, it is also true that globalisation 
theories have been subject to a lot of criticism. Some post-industrial theorists protest 
against the globalisation argument that globalisation caused higher pressure on the 
welfare state (Pierson, 1998, 2001a; Ivemsen and Wren, 1998; Iversen, 2001).
2 Strang and Chang (1993: 259) argued that, ‘the ILOs most concrete contributions to policy are seen in 
the laggard welfare states o f the industrialised world. ... where welfare is politically viable but contested 
international standards most usefully amplify, legitimate and depoliticize policy options’.
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According to them, it is the transformation of endogenous factors within nation states, 
rather than the exogenous variable called globalisation, that explains the most 
outstanding feature of recent welfare state development -  i.e., the austerity agenda of 
welfare states. Empirically speaking, Iversen (2001) finds that there is little evidence to 
support the assertion that globalisation is a serious threat to the welfare state. When 
deindustrialisation variables are controlled, the correlation between trade openness and 
welfare spending disappears. Pierson (2001a: 81) indicates that the coincidence of 
welfare state austerity and global economy leads to a false perception of a casual 
relationship between them. If one argues ‘A caused B’, it implies that ‘if A had not 
occurred, B would not have occurred’ (Fearon, 1991; recited from Pierson, 1998: 541). 
However, he consequently asks, even if globalisation had not occurred, would the fiscal 
constraint of the welfare states not have occurred?
For post-industrial theorists, the nature of problems is derived from internal 
pressures; changes in employment structure to a service-based economy, welfare state 
maturation, an ageing population and the transformation of household structures 
(Pierson, 200la:83). These four factors can be defined as the post-industrial pressures 
which primarily cause the ‘unprecedented budgetary stress’ upon the welfare state. 
These post-industrial transformations are internal in nature and happen within the 
borders of nation states. Some would argue that the first pressure is related to the global 
economy but Pierson protests that the impact of globalisation on the first force is at best 
modest whilst the other three do not relate to globalisation at all (Ibid). Unlike the 
dramatic transformation brought about by the globalisation process, post-industrial 
pressures are ‘slow-moving, undramatic’ but have ‘fundamental consequences over 
time’ (Ibid\9A).
Among the four post-industrial pressures that Pierson defines, the research seeks 
three domestic transformations, excluding welfare state maturation, as purely socio­
economic internal pressures that can be presumed as independent from the political and 
institutional features of a nation. Instead, the structural features of the welfare state or 
the mode of state’s regulation over social welfare is regarded as a sub-component of 
domestic political institutions which will be discussed in the following section, along 
with a discussion of other democratic political institutions. Let me start from the first 
socio-economic transformation, i.e. de-industrialisation.
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De-industrialisation and Changes of Employment structure
The first post-industrial pressure came through a transformation of the employment 
structure coupled with a process of de-industrialisation from a manufacturing to a 
service based economy. Over the last 30 years, employment in manufacturing has 
seriously decreased in all OECD countries with a large proportion of new employment 
being created in the service sector. The overall production levels and therefore 
production related employment has remained stagnant at best (Scharpf, 2000a, 2000b). 
These trends can at least partly explain the chronic unemployment problem throughout 
Continental Europe. In Germany, France and, to a lesser extent, Italy, the fall in industry 
employment has not been cushioned by the creation of new jobs in the service sector. In 
these countries, the gap between industry based job losses and levels of job creation in 
the service sector is approximately 4-5% -  this figure is similar to the increased 
unemployment rate during the same period (see Appendix Table 1-3).
The shift to a service-based economy3 coupled with the process of de­
industrialisation has certain implications. First of all, the productivity gap between 
manufacturing and service sector has caused a deepening of income inequality. At the 
same time, the enlarged service sector is a reflection of a shift to the higher participation 
of women and the rising need for personal services. These pressures are closely related 
to other post-industrial pressures; particularly the ageing population and the 
transformation of household structures.
Ageing
Another important post-industrial pressure influencing the social welfare system is the 
issue of population ageing. Whilst the increase of the elderly has remained relatively 
steady in the major OECD countries except Japan during the last 40 years, it is 
projected that the trend will be quite different for the next 40 years; the ratio of the aged 
65 or over will almost double (see Appendix Table 1-4). Japan and Italy are the most 
serious cases, not only in terms of the ratio of the aged to the entire population but also
3 For detailed discussions on the driving forces of the transformation o f the employment structure, refer to 
Appendix 1.
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in terms of its speed. Although the seriousness of the ageing problem varies across 
countries, the implications to social welfare systems are straightforward. First of all, the 
increase of the elderly causes higher social welfare demands; not only in terms of the 
number of recipients but also due to the increasing amount of time people are receiving 
benefits and services, especially in pension and health care. OECD projections until 
2040 point out that population ageing alone will cause health and pension expenditure 
to double or even triple (OECD, 1994; recited from Esping-Andersen, 1996a: 7). In 
addition, as the number of the aged are increasing and they are getting much more older, 
they need more personal services.
Transformation of Household Structures
The last post-industrial pressure concerns the micro-foundation of human society, i.e., 
the transformation of family or, more correctly, household structures. The typical norm 
of a nuclear family, consisting of one male-breadwinner and housewife with 2 or 3 
children, has been challenged and has already significantly disappeared; women do not 
stay at home any more, so do not bear enough children and, moreover, the basic norms 
of family are dissolving. These trends mean that the basic assumptions that sustain the 
modem welfare state have begun to collapse.
First of all, a full-time housewife is not the typical norm of a society any more. 
In all OECD countries there has been a dramatic increase in women’s labour force 
participation although there is significant variance across countries (see Appendix Table 
1-5). A possible implication of the higher participation of women is an acceleration in 
the process of family dissolution thus causing new social service needs. Furthermore, in 
many cases women have been suffering from a dual burden -  a requirement for unpaid 
domestic work alongside paid labour (Gershuny et. al., 1991; UNDP, 1999; Ungerson, 
1987). The dual burden of women is closely related to the low fertility trend.
Second, factors such as cultural change, developments in birth control methods 
and women’s higher participation have accompanied a sharp fall in the total fertility rate 
(Pierson, 2001a: 96; Castles, 2003). The fall is especially noticeable in Germany, Japan, 
Italy and France -  countries which Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) classified as the 
Conservative regime (also see Appendix Table 1-6). Whilst social democratic Sweden
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encourages working women to have children through comprehensive and universal 
public social services as does liberal America through active personal service markets. 
In Continental Europe (especially the Southern part) the lack of ‘family-friendly’ public 
policy or ‘defamilisation’ apparatus results in the ‘low fertility equlibrium’ (Castles, 
2003; Esping-Andersen, 1999: chap.6).
Third, untypical forms of household such as single-parent households and 
people living alone are increasing rapidly. This can be understood as the process of 
family dissolution. The divorce rate across OECD countries excluding Italy, has 
increased dramatically; the average divorce rate in major OECD countries almost tripled 
between 1960 and 1995 (see Appendix Table 1-7). The high divorce rate, coupled with 
increasing numbers of unmarried mothers, has caused a dramatic rise in single-parent 
households. In the USA, the percentage of single-parent households out of all families 
with children rose from 9.1% in 1960 to 22.9% in 1988 whilst in Germany the share 
also rose from 8% in 1972 to 13.5% in 1988 (Pierson, 2001a: 97). It is now the case that 
single-person households are the fastest growing household type everywhere (Ibid: 98). 
This accompanied with a higher divorce rate and an increase in single-parent 
households, has caused a decline in average household size. It should again be noted 
that the dissolution of the family itself has not only created new welfare needs, but also 
restricted the capacity of the family to cope with the new risks caused by post-industrial 
pressures.
3.1.3. The Influences of Globalisation and Post-industrialisation on the Welfare 
Mix: Introduction to Functionalist Approaches and Critiques
So far, I have identifies the external forces and internal pressures that could have been 
presumed to be having an influence on the social welfare system. Whereas globalisation 
has created new environments challenging the basic assumptions of traditional 
Keynesian welfare states, post-industrial forces can explain the current fiscal 
predicaments of modem, advanced welfare states. Although most of the discussions on 
globalisation and post-industrialisation have concentrated on the state sector, we could 
suggest that these internal and external forces also influence the other four sectors -  
the market, enterprise welfare, the third sector and the family. In order to bridge these
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Table 3.2. Influences of External Forces and Internal Pressures on the Welfare 
Mix: 14 Functionalistic Hypotheses
External Forces (G)
State 1. (GS+) Upward mobility: higher exposure to
(S) globalisation induces bigger government to
mitigate its dislocation.
Internal Pressures (I)
3. (IS+) Newly rising and diverse needs, 
which cannot be coped with through 
traditional state programmes, requiring new 
institutions and an expansion of public social 
services.
2. (GS-) Downward convergence or social 
dumping hypothesis: globalisation induces 
‘race to bottom’ of state welfare and 
regulation.
4. (IS-) Austerity hypothesis: despite diverse 
prescriptions, post-industrial pressures 
primarily require to take cost containment 
strategy, inevitably accompanied with 
reduction of state welfare, in restructuring 
welfare states.
Market 5. (GM+) Marketisation o f welfare:
(M) globalisation leads to permeation of market
logic to social services and the rise of 
international welfare markets.
6. (IM+) Expansion o f service market: post­
industrial pressure expands the welfare 
service market on both supply and demand 
sides.
Enterprise 7. (GE+) Non-labour cost competitiveness: 
(E) enterprises accept high labour costs
(including enterprise welfare) if higher 
productivity and stability of labour force are 
assured.
8. (GE-) Labour cost competitiveness: 
worldwide competition forces firms to 
reduce labour costs, hence enterprise welfare 
cut.
9. (IE—) Inferior service/irregular 
employment: workers in service sector not 
only receive less enterprise welfare but also 
have a weaker bargaining power. Hence, the 
inequality of enterprise welfare.
Third 10. (GT+) Resistance and compromise: higher
Sector involvement of NGOs or ENGOs in voice
(T) (resistant global networking against
globalisation) and welfare provision (co­
operation with IGOs’ projects)
11. (IT+) Expansion o f civil society: post­
industrial pressures not only induce the 
higher involvement of NGOs in voice and 
service provision, but also increase 
employment of civil society.
Family 12. (GF+) Increasing burden: growing
(F) economic and emotional vulnerability of
individuals needs for more family support
13. (GF-) Dual burden of women: 
globalisation encourages women’s 
participation and discourages non- 
remunerative care mechanism. These reduce 
the capacity of the family but also leads to a 
dual burden for women.
14. (IF-) Less capacity of family: women’s 
higher participation and family dissolution 
reduce the caring capability of households.
Note: the influence o f external forces (globalisation) G or internal pressures I on each sector’s welfare 
provision (S, M, E, N or F) can be either positive (+) or negative (-). For example, ‘GS+’ means the 
impact of globalisation on state welfare is positive.
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forces with the welfare mix structure, inspired by theoretical works, I have developed 
14 possible hypotheses that attempt to explain the impacts of external and internal 
environments on each o f  the five sectors of the welfare mix in Appendix 2 (see also 
Table 3.2 for the summary).
The hypotheses indicate that we cannot generalise the impacts of external and 
internal environments on the welfare mix in only one direction. I can hypothesise only 
positive influences on the market (Marketisation o f  welfare (GM+) and Expansion o f 
service market hypothesis (IM+)) and the third sector (Resistance and compromise 
(GT+) and Expansion o f  civil society hypothesis (IT+)). Concerning the impact of 
globalisation on the state sector, however, the Upward mobility (GS+) hypothesis 
suggests that higher exposure to the global economy would induce bigger government 
to mitigate its dislocation, but the Downward convergence or Social dumping 
hypothesis (GS-) strongly holds that globalisation leads to a ‘race to the bottom’ in 
welfare states. In the case of post-industrialisation, some would argue that Newly rising 
and diverse needs (IS+), which cannot be coped with through traditional state 
programmes, require the expansion of public social services, but the Austerity 
hypothesis (IS-) emphasises that post-industrial pressures primarily require the state to 
contain costs, inevitably accompanied by a reduction of state welfare. The dominant 
view on enterprise welfare (Labour cost competitiveness and Inferior service/irregular 
employment hypothesis) seems to focus on the negative influences of both globalisation 
and post-industrialisation, but it is also possible to suggest Non-labour cost 
competitiveness hypothesis (GE+) that enterprises would accept high labour costs (so 
high level of the enterprise welfare) if higher productivity and stability of labour force 
are assured. Similarly, both the Dual burden o f women (GF-) and the Less capacity o f 
family (IF-) hypotheses predict a negative impact on the family provisions, but the 
Increasing burden hypothesis (GF+) supposes that people would depend more on the 
family’s support when globalisation generates a growing economic and emotional 
vulnerability of individuals.
Although the impacts o f globalisation and post-industrialisation on five sectors 
of the welfare mix are basically interwoven and, therefore, it is very difficult to 
empirically extract the pure effects of the hypothesis, they can be understood as 
theoretical efforts to construct ideal types on the impacts of the environmental factors. 
Nonetheless, these hypotheses have the important theoretical implication that the
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impacts of environments are n)t restricted to the welfare ‘state’ but can be widened to 
the broader welfare mix. Hovever, they are all critically functionalistic since the 
environments are presumed asthe forces that inevitably and automatically influence the 
changes of welfare mix structire. They do not consider the role of political factors in 
these casual relationships. So hey not only neglect the importance of national politics, 
but also overlook the social pdicy processes whereby environments are intermediated 
by domestic institutions. In redity, as many have argued, the influences of external and 
internal environments are diTerse according to domestic institutions and national 
politics (Garrettt, 1998; Swank 2002; Iversen and Wren, 1998; Pierson, 2000a). Here it 
is necessary for us to set up thesecond, but more important, set of independent variables 
of the research; i.e., institutions and politics. This is the task of the following section.
3.2. Political Institutions and Welfare Politics4
3.2.1. Democratic Political Iistitutions and the Welfare State: Democratisation, 
Partisan Politics and Social Corporatist Institutions
Undoubtedly, the pivotal foundation of domestic political institutions in advanced 
economies is democracy. This is not the place for discussing theories of democracy, but 
we need to start our discussion from the relationship between democracy and the 
development of the welfare state. In spite of the existence of numerous competing 
arguments on the expansion of the welfare state, the establishment of mass democracy, 
by and large, has been regarded as a necessary condition for welfare state development,
4 1 do not try to construct ‘hypotheses’ between political-institutional variables and the welfare mix 
because o f the additional complexity involved. Different from the position that emphasises the impact o f  
grand variables like globalisation and post-industrialisation in the development of the welfare state in 
order to extract common and general trends across OECD nations, the political and institutional approach 
attempts to explain why the responses of different welfare states to the common challenges have been so 
diverse. Whereas the former can identify relatively evident causal relationship between the environmental 
transformations and the welfare state, the latter focuses upon the policy processes and dynamics o f  
different routes o f welfare state development. In this respect, the political-institutional approach has been 
used to construct middle range theories, which can be applied to small N.
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even though it cannot be a sufficient condition. The evolution of mass democracy, based 
on the expansion of suffrage to the working class (universal suffrage), has shaped the 
basic institutional opportunities for the working of ‘politics against markets’ (Esping- 
Andersen, 1985) or the establishment of social rights (Marshall, 1963) in the last 
Century, especially since the Second World War. In this respect, the welfare state means 
democratically managed capitalism and, for Marshall (1972), it is defined as 
‘democratic-welfare-capitalism’. Even Flora and Heidenheimer, the most famous and 
most representative of modernist theorists, put an emphasis on the importance of 
democracy as follows;
The real beginning o f the modern welfare state, however, had to await the 
transformation o f the absolutist state into mass democracy in the last third o f 
the nineteenth century, after a variable intermediary period o f liberal 
democracy with restricted suffrage. In thus linking welfare state development 
with evolution o f mass democracy, one may interpret the welfare state as an 
answer to increasing demands fo r  socio-economic equality or as 
institutionalisation o f social rights relative to the development o f civil and 
political rights. (1981: 22)
The establishment of mass democracy is a crucial precondition for welfare state 
development in most political theories including power resource theory (Castles, 1978; 
Stephens, 1979; Korpi, 1983, 1989; Esping-Andersen, 1985), pluralist political theory 
(Pampel and Williamson, 1989) and Christian democracy (Kersbergen, 1995). First of 
all, pluralist political theory pays attention to the competition between diverse interests 
groups around the distribution of socially scarce resources. Basically, politicians are 
very sensitive to election results and have to accept the requests of the specific interest 
groups with strong political power. In this respect, the expansions in public expenditure 
can be understood as an outcome caused by the competition amongst politicians and 
political parties to gain votes. As a result, an institutionalised exchange between votes 
and public expenditures occurs in liberal democracies. The pluralist approach to welfare 
politics is more suitable to explain the expansion of social expenditure in more 
pluralized welfare states, notably in the US where partisan politics are reflected beyond 
class structures. On the other hand, power resource theory focuses on the power of 
mobilised labour in a parliamentary democracy as the main driving force of the welfare 
state development. According to Korpi (1989), whereas the main power resource of
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capital originated from the possession of the means of production in the economic 
domain, have-nots can mobilise their political power through democratic institutions in 
the political arena. It was possible for leftist parties representing the interests of the 
working class to get power through democratic institutions and procedures and to 
implement reformative social policy against the general interests of the capital 
(Pzeworski, 1990:1-2; Mishra, 1990: 10-11). So the welfare state can be regarded as the 
compromise of structural conflicts between the democratic state and the capitalist 
economy, or the outcome of institutionalised class conflicts between the logic of the 
market and politics (Esping-Andersen, 1985). This theory seems particularly true when 
explaining the large welfare states in Scandinavia with highly mobilised trade unions 
and a strong Social Democratic party involved in partisan politics (Castles, 1978; 
Stephen, 1979; Korpi, 1983). However, both approaches have some difficulty when 
looking to widen the analytical focus to the development of Corporatist-conservative 
welfare states in Continental Europe. It has been the Christian Democratic and other 
conservative political parties that introduced social insurance legislation at the initial 
stage of welfare state development and that have dominated partisan politics for welfare 
state expansion (Rimlinger, 1971; Baldwin, 1990; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Kersbergen,
1995), even though the influence of leftist parties has been relatively more significant 
than those of their liberal welfare states counterparts. In this case, the expansion of 
welfare state institutions, mainly income-related and occupationally segmented social 
insurance, could have gained a broader inter-class coalition between the middle and 
working classes5.
In any case, it is a likely assertion that democratic political institutions based on 
mass or parliamentary democracy have been the strong basis on which the welfare state 
has developed. At the same time, the expansion of social rights can be understood as a 
consolidation of democracy by compensating for the socio-economic inequality of those 
who failed in the market (Linz and Stephen, 1996: 17-26). Such selective affinity 
between the welfare state and democratic institutions is not restricted to partisan politics 
within parliamentary democracy, but is also founded in the social or ‘democratic’
5 Regarding this, Wilensky (1981) found a strong relation between the Catholic party and social welfare 
efforts, and explains it as 1) Catholic parties are supported by various classes and groups, 2) reflection 
that social expenditures increased much more when the competition between Catholic parties and leftist 
parties was fierce.
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corporatism within macro social and economic policy consultations among peak 
associations.
Despite contesting arguments on the definition o f corporatism6, the relevance of 
corporatism in the context of welfare state development can be found in the more 
sophisticated definition by Schmitter (1974) and Lehmbruch (1979). First of all, 
Schmitter contrasts corporatism with pluralism by defining it as a mode of interest 
representation (1974) or interest intermediation (1979). For him, corporatism has 
distinctive features7 like a limited number of interest groups, compulsive membership, 
non-competition, and a hierarchical organisational structure. Each interest group can 
secure their monopolistic representativeness by gaining acknowledgement by the state. 
With regards to the role of the state in the interest intermediation system, he divided 
corporatism into societal corporatism where the autonomy of interest groups is 
guaranteed and state corporatism where they are subordinate and run from above by the 
political and coercive power of the authoritarian state. Whereas the former is working 
within democratic welfare state in advanced capitalist societies, the latter can be found 
in authoritarian and neo-mercantile states in less-developed societies (Schmitter, 1974: 
20-22). On the other hand, Lehmbruch (1979) defines the New corporatism8 as a mode 
of policy consultation among state and peak organisations of labour and capital that are 
mobilised on a large scale. The peak organisations collaborate with the government to 
form and implement comprehensive public policies and, most of all, a consensual 
income policy is regarded as the core part of corporatist policy consultation.
Democratic social corporatism is based on the principles of compromise and 
harmony among major social groups, rather than competition and conflicts among 
differentiated interest groups. Regarding this, Katzenstein (1984: 26-32) defines the 
three main features of democratic corporatism as follows; first, it is the ideology of a 
nation-wide social partnership; second, interest groups have relatively centralised 
organisational structures; and third, it facilitates to intermediate conflicts through
6 As a matter o f fact, the history o f corporatism is as long as Western history itself, originated from Greek 
and Latin traditions, and there have been numerous sociological and political thoughts concerning it 
(Wiarda, 1981). However, since this research does not seek to deal with the history and development of  
corporatism literatures, the main discussions on corporatism are restricted to the relevance o f social or 
democratic corporatism to welfare state development in post-war Europe.
7 They are opposite to the main components o f pluralist political theories like the existence of numerous 
interest groups, voluntary membership and competition among groups.
8 He calls it ‘liberal corporatism’ as the new type o f corporatism in the post-war era, which is neither the 
traditional corporatism o f pre-modem European societies nor the authoritarian one o f Fascist regimes.
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centralised voluntary and informal policy consultations and compromise among 
bureaucrats, interest groups and political parties. Such a centralised policy making 
structure based on democratic principles makes it possible to integrate social policy 
with overall macro-economic policy with a wide consent base among different class and 
interest groups, and to achieve both political stability and good economic performance. 
Garrettt and Lange (1986) conclude that, for example, countries implementing 
corporatist apparatus recorded higher economic outcomes and a better risk management 
capability over economic crisis. What is more important in the context of the research is 
that democratic corporatist institutions have been indicated to be the main factor driving 
the welfare state development in many European countries. Wilensky (1981) found that 
resistance against the expansion of social welfare expenditures and taxation was much 
lower in those countries that had strong corporatist institutions. Schmidt (1985) also 
concludes in his study on OECD nations that corporatism is strongly related to such 
socio-economic performances as the stability of the labour market, low unemployment 
and the expansion of comprehensive social welfare institutions. Similarly, Katzenstein 
(1985) indicates the importance of democratic corporatism in the small countries of 
Europe in explaining why those countries with higher trade openness have larger 
government. In the case of Mishra (1984, 1986), pluralist-corporatist dichotomy is the 
crucial standard in his typology of welfare states. In integrated or corporatist welfare 
states like Austria and Sweden, opposite to differentiated or pluralist welfare states like 
the UK, social policy is fundamentally integrated in economic policy and vice versa; so 
the issue of production cannot be separated from that of distribution, and both issues are 
dealt with through centralised corporatist decision-making processes. As a result, 
corporatist welfare states can better protect their welfare system than their pluralist 
counterparts.
To sum up, it has been possible for democratic corporatist welfare states to 
achieve both better economic performance, and sustain and in some cases even expand 
their comprehensive social welfare institutions, particularly in times of economic crisis 
or recession. Centralised bargaining among peak associations covering most social 
classes and groups could produce a policy package based on social consent. However, 
similar to the power resource model, strong trade unionism seems a vital component in 
the working of democratic corporatism because tripartite policy consultations among 
state, labour and capital as equal actors should presuppose the equal or equivalent power
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of labour vis-a-vis capital. However, changing environments -  both external (economic 
globalisation) and internal (post-industrialisation) -  have weakened the power of 
mobilised labour and it is again likely to threaten the viability of both social democratic 
partisan politics and democratic corporatism in advanced economies. But, is it all? Now, 
let me turn to more recent discussions of the role of political institutions in the era of 
welfare state reforms within changing environments.
3.2.2. Political Institutions, Welfare State Structures and Welfare Politics in 
Changing Environments: Path Dependent Routes?
As depicted in the preceding section 3.1, it seems evident that contemporary advanced 
welfare states are facing unprecedented challenges from both external forces 
(globalisation) and internal pressures (post-industrialisation or domestic socio-economic 
transformations). Although it is possible to conceptually divide the external and internal 
factors, both factors, have occurred coincidently and have often been interwoven since 
the 1970s. Such environmental factors are likely to restrict the capacity of the traditional 
welfare state model, and to require many welfare states to adapt to new environments. 
Frequently, there have been strong arguments stating that economic globalisation has 
caused the declining capacity of democratic institutions. The international mobility of 
capital would restrict the capability of Left governments to implement progressive pro­
welfare policies and, ultimately, weaken the viability of social democratic alternatives 
(Mishra, 1996). More fundamentally, the ‘exit’ option of capital has weakened the 
power resource of labour whereas the structural power of capital has been consolidated, 
and as a result social corporatist institutions and trade unionism have seriously 
deteriorated (Kurzer, 1993; Mishra, 1993). Moreover, post-industrial pressures have 
caused severe fiscal stress on the welfare state. However, the direction of the impacts of 
environmental factors has not simply been negative, i.e., the retrenchment of welfare 
state programmes. Many have indicated that the speed and degree of either globalisation 
or post-industrialisation, or both, have varied greatly across countries and national 
politics still matters in the adaptation to new environments as the processes of the 
welfare state expansion did; their impact on the social welfare institutions have been by 
no means uniform nor general, but diverse and specific according to the domestic
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politics and policy legacies of a nation (Bonoli, 2001; Esping-Andersen, 1996a; Garrettt, 
1998; Pierson, 1998, 2001a, 2001b; Rhodes, 1996, 2001; Iversen and Wren, 1998; 
Iversen, 2001; Scharpf, 2000a, 2000b; Swank, 2001, 2002). In other words, it is the 
diversity of national political institutions that can explain why different welfare states 
have revealed such divergent responses to common phenomena.
Most research that put emphases on the importance of domestic institutional 
features has heavily depended on the approach of new institutionalism, specifically 
historical institutionalism, which attempts to explain the differences of policy between 
countries in spite of similar policy issues (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 5-6). By and large, 
among the main arguments of historical institutionalism, the following three points 
seem valid when analysing the diverse policy responses of different welfare states. The 
first point is the importance of structures or institutions. In historical institutionalism, 
political institutions not only restrict the government’s policy capacities and political 
actors’ behaviour but also influence the formation of actors’ interests or preferences 
(Hall, 1986: 19; Pontusson, 1995: 118-9). In this respect, Swank (2002: 34-5) argues 
that political institutions and welfare state structures not only influence ‘the political 
capacities of pro-welfare state interests’, but also promote ‘distinct clusters of values, 
norms and behaviours that either favor or disfavor neoliberal reforms’.
The second focus is to put an emphasis on the importance of the history and 
context. Institutional features are by no means the sole determinants to explain policy 
outcomes, neither does it deny the importance of such variables as socio-economic 
development, ideas, distribution of power, class structures and group dynamics (Y.S. Ha, 
1999: 20-1). What historical institutionalism puts an emphasis on is the historical 
context within which those variables interact and how institutions structure political 
interactions (Thelen and Steinmo, 1992: 12-3). In this respect, historical institutionalism 
attempts to play the role of a bridge between state-centred and society-centred 
approaches, by focusing on the institutional features that structure relations between the 
state and society. Although historical institutionalism emphasises institutions and the 
relative autonomic role of the state, it does not miss the importance of the welfare 
politics among social groups. So political coalitions and partisan politics remain pivotal 
in analysing the cross-national diversity of welfare state policies under the changing 
environments (Garrettt, 1998; Iversen, 2001; Pierson, 1994, 2001b; Scharf and Schmidt,
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2000), along with the state’s essential role in constructing or revitalising social pact 
politics in situations of crisis (Rhodes, 2001).
The last important focus of historical institutionalism is to attach importance to 
the continuation and the path-dependent change of institutions, and their non-intended 
outcomes (Hall, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Krasner, 1984, 1988). Existing 
institutions that were established at the point of time (t) continuously restrict the room 
for policy choices at (t+1), and the institutions at (t) would produce non-intended 
outcomes at (t+1). So, as a result, not only are institutional changes basically 
incremental and follow a path-dependent route, but it can be expected that the 
institutions at (t+1) would be contingent and inefficient. However, in some instances, 
changes in institutional structure could happen fundamentally and intermittently. These 
exceptional cases can be speculated in particular times when traditional policy patterns 
face critical challenges from economic and political crisis. In these historical junctures, 
a nation can experience the re-formation of social relations and institutional structures. 
Such explanations of the institutional changes can be applied to the path-dependent 
development of the welfare state programmes (Esping-Andersen, 1996a, 1999; Pierson, 
2001b; Myles and Pierson, 2001; Wood, 2001) and the emergence of ‘competitive 
corporatism’ (Rhodes, 2001).
The analytical foci of historical institutionalism can help to explain why national 
responses to the convergent environmental changes have been so diverse and to 
emphasise the importance of domestic political institutions, welfare politics and welfare 
state structures. First of all, there have been strong counter arguments on the 
convergence thesis of economic globalisation. Following the tradition of embedded 
democracy that focuses on the compensatory nature of social welfare institutions which 
compensate for the insecurity caused by trade openness (see Cameron, 1978; 
Katzenstein, 1985), Garrett (1998) argues that Economic globalisation is getting viable 
but it drives out neither the importance of domestic political processes nor social 
democratic alternatives. Rather, economic globalisation evokes the necessity of 
government intervention to ‘mitigate the insecurities, instabilities and inequalities it has 
generated’ (p.4). He asserts that big governments and corporatist principles are still 
viable both politically and economically. First, politically, because of the short-term 
nature of democratic politics, policies radically changing people’s life in short-term 
cannot be implemented, and support for the welfare state has not been damaged even in
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the English-speaking world. Second, economically, ‘big government’ does not always 
cause the exit of capital. Where social democratic corporatism is strong, the government 
invests a great deal on social infrastructure, education and training which ultimately are 
beneficial to the economy. Accordingly, the impact of globalisation is different 
according to domestic partisan politics and the role of the government. He asserts;
Even in the global economy, and despite the fanfare to the contrary, citizens 
still have a real choice to make about how to govern the market, ultimately 
based on one’s view offairness o f market allocations o f resources. This divide 
has always been the sine qua non o f democratic politics. It remains so today. 
(p.25)
More sophisticated arguments on the diverse responses to economic 
globalisation can be found in Swank (2002). He provides strong evidence that the 
convergence thesis of globalisation, or social dumping thesis, cannot be generalised; the 
impacts of economic globalisation on the welfare state have been fundamentally and 
systematically shaped by political institutions -  features of the polity, the structure of 
the decision making authority and the structure of welfare state institutions -  within the 
domain of nation states. Along with the structures of programmes, universalism or 
corporatism, the political institutions -  such as social corporatism and electoral 
inclusiveness -  of larger welfare states in Western Europe have blunted the pressure of 
economic globalisation because they have promoted encompassing pro-welfare interest 
representations and universal or corporatist welfare state structures have maintained 
broader pro-welfare coalitions between the working and middle class. So, he argues the 
importance of class-based actors and the relative distribution of political power across 
those actors, following the ‘power resource’ tradition, as the central features of welfare 
state politics, and the viability of social corporatist institutions albeit weakening trade 
unionism (Swank, 2002: 281-3).
Similarly, Rhodes (2001) focuses on social corporatist institutions and the 
related new coalition structures that they have promoted. Under the conditions of 
domestic economic and/or social crisis as historical junctures, new social pact politics 
have emerged or corporatist institutions have been revitalised in many European 
countries since the mid-1980s, in order to retain macro-economic performances, to 
facilitate restructuring and to reform welfare programmes without the loss of basic
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social protection principles. According to Rhodes (2001), the new ‘competitive 
corporatism’ can be found in the Netherlands, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. The 
most outstanding and successful example is the Dutch case. In the Netherlands, a more 
flexible version of bipartite corporatism has been revitalised since the nation-wide 
social pact, the Wessenaar accord of 1982, which includes more decentralised wage 
bargaining, a flexible labour market and social security reforms. A movement from 
passive income support to efforts to facilitate labour market participation, helped 
overcome the severe unemployment crisis. Such economic, labour market and welfare 
reforms have been accompanied with higher compensation levels for irregular workers, 
and have resulted in the so-called ‘Dutch Miracle’ (Visser and Hermerijck, 1997), 
namely good economic performances and lower unemployment without rising 
inequality. Also In Italy, based on the stabilised social corporatism of the 1990s, various 
economic and welfare reforms including the abolishment of price indexation in wage 
bargaining, pension reforms and labour market reforms could have been implemented. 
In case of Ireland, a new tripartite corporatism emerged when the country faced the 
public debt crisis of 1986, the new social pact politics have attempted to deal with 
comprehensive economic and social policy issues including wage bargaining, tax, 
education, health and social security via centralised negotiation (O’Donnell, 1998). The 
various experiences of new social pacts politics show that the role of the state and 
domestic political institutions are indispensable in the extreme conditions of national 
crisis caused either by economic globalisation (e.g. foreign currency crisis) or by post­
industrial pressures (e.g. unemployment crisis, fiscal deficits).
Whereas new social pact politics reflect relatively radical changes to institutions 
in historical junctures, the very structures of welfare state institutions (past policy 
legacies) have been highlighted as one of the most important constraints affecting the 
degree and scope of contemporary welfare reforms (Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf 
and Schmidt, 2000; Scharpf, 2000; Swank, 2001, 2002; Pierson, 2001b), because they 
have nurtured specific interests, inter-class coalitions and preferential values that 
influence upon welfare politics. Basically, as Pierson (1994) indicates the ‘politics of 
retrenchment’ is different from the ‘politics of expansion’, the political viability of the 
foundations of the welfare state has remained almost untouched. He argues that welfare 
states have solid political strength based on the following two sources; i.e., ‘the 
electoral incentives associated with programmes which retain broad and deep popular
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support’ and ‘the institutional ‘stickiness’ which further constrains the possibilities for 
policy reform’ (2000b: 411). Whilst universal programmes and income-related social 
insurance institutions usually retain broader and strong coalitions by protecting them 
from retrenchment pressures, means-tested programmes are on fragile political ground 
and have been the main target of retrenchment in liberal welfare states.
So, although either economic globalisation or post-industrial pressures have 
required the restructuring of welfare state structures, the direction and degree of welfare 
reform has been restricted by the institutional legacies of past welfare state structures 
and changes in welfare state programmes have been predominantly incremental in 
major welfare states. In this respect, post-industrial theorists Iversen and Wren (1998), 
who focus on the transformation of the employment structure to service economies, 
assert that the policy responses of different welfare states to the common ‘trilemma’ 
between budgetary restraint, income inequality and employment growth have differed 
greatly. Whilst the neo-liberal route has taken fiscal discipline and employment growth 
at the expense of earning equality and class distinction, the Christian Democratic 
countries of Continental Europe have suffered from chronic high unemployment, social 
exclusion and an insider-outsider division of the labour market because they have 
pursued earning equality and fiscal discipline. Alternatively, Social Democratic 
traditions have followed earning equality as well as employment growth in the public 
sector, but this has caused severe fiscal deficits and higher taxation. They comment on 
the different paths of the different welfare state regimes that ‘the influence of 
ideological legacies and existing socio-economic institutions becomes clear’ (p.544). 
Similarly, Scharpf and Schmidt (2000: 335-6) address the different routes of policy 
responses to the economic constraints of globalisation as follows;
[T\heir [different welfare states] adjustment paths differ: not only because 
they started from different initial positions, but also because their policy 
aspirations continue to differ. ... Under these economic constraints ... the size 
o f the welfare state and the level o f redistribution remain to the national 
political choice.
To sum up, the political factors that influenced welfare state development until 
the 1970s -  democratic polity, partisan politics and corporatist institutions -  have 
remained valid in the adaptation of welfare states to changing environments. Although it
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seems true that the reforming or restructuring of welfare state institutions has risen as 
main policy agendas attempt to cope with macro economic and social changes, both 
external forces and internal pressures have altered the preconditions of traditional 
welfare state models, in almost all advanced democracies, the direction and scope of 
national policy responses has been diverse and heavily dependent on national politics 
and past institutional legacies. In conclusion, the importance of domestic political 
institutions has always been critical in the development of the welfare state, from its 
expansion from the initial stage to its restructuring in the contemporary era.
3.3. Research Framework
Based on the general discussions and theories dealt with in Chapter 2 and the previous 
sections of this Chapter, I propose the analytical framework of the research as shown in 
Figure 3.1. As mentioned in Chapter 1, the purpose of the research is to analyse welfare 
mix changes between 1987 and 2002, and to explain how environmental factors and 
political institutions have influenced such changes through which policy processes. So 
the research considers three sets of independent variables; namely, one being external 
forces and internal pressures that require contemporary welfare states to adapt, and the 
other two sets are domestic political institutions and past institutional legacies that have 
shaped the real direction and scope of welfare reforms or changes to social welfare 
institutions. Welfare politics as social policy processes are likely to be facilitated by the 
former environmental factors, but it is possible within the context and restrictions that 
political institutions provide. Finally, the research framework indicates that these 
independent variables have an impact on changes in welfare mix structures. The 
dependent variable of the research is the overall welfare mix, rather than a specified 
welfare state. Now, in the remaining part of this section, I shall briefly introduce each 
component of the research framework.
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Figure 3.1. Research Framework
Environmental Factors
External Forces. Economic globalisation has been regarded as one of the most 
important challenges to traditional welfare state models that are heavily based on 
relatively closed economies making Keynesian macro economic policies possible. Trade 
openness, FDI and international mobility of financial capital have been indicated as the 
major indicators of economic globalisation. The arguments are frequently raised that 
higher trade openness has led national economies to global competition, the national 
government have to make efforts to induce global capital and the ‘exit’ option of the 
capital has strengthened its structural power vis-a-vis labour. So economic globalisation 
has weakened the capabilities of nations states in macroeconomic management, injured 
the basic economic, political and social assumptions of Keynsian welfare states and 
ultimately led to a ‘race to the bottom’ in social protection (McKenzie and Lee, 1991; 
Cemy, 1996; Mishra, 1999; Strange, 1996). Sometimes, as seen in the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997, economic globalisation has been accompanied by political pressures 
from IGOs like IMF and WB. When a national economy faces a severe foreign currency
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crisis and asks for Structural Adjustment Loans from the IMF and WB, the policy 
autonomy of the nation state is likely to be damaged significantly through the policy 
recommendations and conditionalities of the emergency loans (Lopes, 1999; Owoh,
1996). However, there have been counter arguments that, to mitigate the negative 
effects and to cushion the higher risks caused by economic globalisation, governments 
have expanded their intervention policies. This compensation hypothesis originated 
from Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1985) and, more recently, Rodrik (1998) who found 
a positive correlation between trade openness and the size of governments in terms of 
public expenditure. Many recent studies have suggested that the impacts of economic 
globalisation cannot be generalised, but are diverse according to national political 
institutions9 (Garrett, 1998; Scharpf, 2000; Swank, 2002).
Internal Pressures. According to post-industrial theorists, the challenges to traditional 
welfare state models fundamentally originate from domestic socio-economic 
transformations such as de-industrialisation with rising levels of service employment, 
population ageing and family dissolution. Post-industrial pressures not only create new 
risks and demands to be dealt with by state (family dissolution), but also lead to severe 
burdens upon existing state programmes (population ageing). Under the condition 
caused by de-industrialisation such as low overall productivity and a growing service 
sector, such higher burdens ultimately lead to a critical fiscal constraint on the 
government (Pierson, 2000a). This ‘unprecedented budgetary stress’ from the welfare 
state, therefore, forces states to accomplish the politics of austerity to reform the public 
welfare system. However, as the speed and degree of post-industrialisation has varied 
greatly across countries, the impacts of post-industrial pressures are neither uniform nor 
general. In this respect, post-industrial theorists stress the importance of domestic 
politics and past institutional features in the processes of adaptation to post-industrial 
pressures (Pierson, 1998, 2000a, 2000b; Iversen and Wren, 1998; Iversen, 2000).
9 Similarly Rieger and Liebfried (1998, 2003) also pay attention to the compensatory features o f welfare 
state programmes in the era o f economic globalisation. However, put somewhat differently, they place the 
welfare state as the independent variable explaining the degree and direction o f economic globalisation, 
rather than the dependent variable explained by it. They argue that historically the welfare state has 
accomplished a decisive role in determining the pace, timing and extent o f globalisation and in managing 
the social and political effects o f economic restructuring in a nation. For them, the internationalisation o f  
national economies has always been mediated by the state and welfare state programmes, as functional 
equivalents to protectionism, have been the basis o f the openness o f national economies. For their detailed 
arguments, see Rieger and Liebfried (2003).
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Political Institutions
Democratisation/Parliamentary Democracy. It has been widely accepted as a 
universal trend that there is a selective affinity between democracy and welfare state 
development. Both power resource theory (which focuses on mobilisation of the 
working class mobilisation and a strong leftist party) and the pluralist perspective 
(which focuses on the interaction between interests groups) cannot be completed 
without the prerequisite of political democracy (Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985; 
Pampel, 1981; Pampel and Williamson, 1989). By not strongly depending on Marshall’s 
linear development processes of social right, we cannot deny that political 
democratisation provided the fundamental institutional settings for the expansion of the 
democratic principle to the social arena. In this respect, Schmitter and O’Donnell (1986) 
indicated that democracy tends to diffuse political democracy to welfare and social 
democracy. Democratisation made it possible for social groups to participate in policy­
making processes through either less-institutionalised ways like lobbying and on-the- 
street politics, or more institutionalised ones like class-based partisan politics and social 
pact politics. The establishment of procedural democracy from authoritarian rules seems 
critical to the working of welfare politics in developing countries, because it provides 
the fundamental preconditions for the real involvement of social groups in social policy 
making processes.
Social Pact Institutions. Where a mobilised working class based in heavy mass-scale 
industries is strong in countries like Austria, Norway, Germany and Sweden, policy­
making processes have not been confined to the partisan politics based on the 
parliamentary democracy but have been extended into a more direct social consent 
mechanism in the form of social corporatism (Katzenstein, 1985; Schmidt, 1985). A 
wide range of policy issues have been dealt with through considerably centralised 
‘social pact politics’ between peak associations of businesses, trade unions and the 
government, including wage bargaining, working conditions, employment and social 
welfare. In this case, strong trade unionism (or balanced power between labour and 
capital) seems indispensable for true negotiation without the coercive quiescence of
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labour10. Although traditional social corporatist institutions have weakened along with 
the declining of trade unionism, those countries with relatively strong social corporatist 
institutions have protected, and even improved, their welfare states quite well (Garrett, 
1998; Swank, 2002). Moreover, in situations of national economic, unemployment and 
public finance crisis in some European countries, new social pact politics have emerged 
or social corporatist traditions have been revitalised since the early 1980s, in order to 
induce social consents amongst major social groups (Rhodes, 2001; for the outstanding 
Dutch case, also see Visser and Hermerijck, 1997). What Rhodes calls ‘competitive 
corporatism’ seems an effective way to find equitable, democratic solutions without the 
one-sided scarification of labour or mass social disruption. As a result, although neo- 
liberalists take a sceptical attitude to social corporatism, it has been a critical 
institutional factor in both the expansion and reform of social welfare programmes.
Institutional Legacies of the Welfare State11 (Welfare Mix).
Many have indicated that the past institutional legacies of welfare states have been one 
of the most important constraints affecting the degree and scope of contemporary 
welfare reform and that the welfare reforms of different welfare states follow different 
path-dependent routes (Iversen and Wren, 1998; Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000; Swank, 
2002; Pierson, 2001b). Welfare state structures influence the political capacities of pro­
welfare interests, not only by nurturing vested interests and broader inter-class 
coalitions regarding specific social welfare programmes, but also by promoting pro­
welfare values, norms and behaviour in welfare politics (Swank, 2002). In social 
democratic and conservative-corporatist welfare states, there have been strong political 
bases for maintaining universal and income-related social insurance, and promoted 
broader pro-welfare norms and coalitions across the working and middles class. But, in
10 In this respect, some argue that trade unionism appears vital in democracy itself because it has led the 
scope of democracy to be expanded from a procedural (political arena) to a substantive (social and 
economic democracy) level and has contributed to the consolidation o f democracy by requiring social 
pact institutions to deal with socio-political conflicts (Rueschemeyer, Stephens and Stephens, 1992; 
Huber, Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1997).
11 Pierson (2001a) classifies the institutional legacies o f the welfare state -  what he calls ‘welfare state 
maturation’ -  as an indicator o f post-industrialisation, but I include them in the category o f political 
institutions because they can be understood better in terms o f the political context that shapes the 
direction and degree o f policy changes in the welfare politics, rather than as a macro socio-economic 
transformation.
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liberal welfare states, considerable welfare state retrenchments have been implemented, 
especially in public assistance programmes. On the other hand, the institutional legacies 
of the welfare state could refer to the structural features of state intervention in social 
welfare. It is particularly useful to note this when the analytical focus is widened to look 
at a broader perspective of the welfare mix. The state has intervened in the welfare 
provisions of non-state sectors through various legal, financial and regulatory tools. If a 
country had a tradition of dependence on the third sector in social service provision, for 
example, responses to newly rising welfare needs would reinforce the utilisation of third 
sector provision instead of initiating direct provision by the state (for European welfare 
mix cases, see the edited volume of Ugo Ascoli and Costanzo Ranci, 2002). Also, 
somewhat differently, previous regulation of the state over non-state sectors could 
produce non-intended or contingent outcomes12 (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In the research, 
the institutional legacies include not only the past institutional features of state welfare 
and other state interventions in social welfare, but also those of non-state sectors in 
social welfare provisions. So the focus is placed on the broader welfare mix structure 
when discussing its path-dependent development, alongside state interventions.
Welfare Politics in Social Policy Processes
It is the welfare politics in social policy processes where various political actors 
sometimes come into conflict and sometimes construct coalitions with other actors in 
order to achieve their own interests. Despite the fundamental emphasis on the domestic 
political institutions that shape interests, cross-class coalitions and programmatic 
coalitions, the importance of traditional class-based actors still remains as a central 
feature of welfare state politics in Western European countries (Swank, 2002: 283-4). In 
these cases, welfare politics taken place through formal political mechanisms like 
partisan politics and social pact institutions. Important political actors include not only 
the working class (trade unions) and social democratic parties, but also Christian 
Democratic parties, groups and the middle class which construct welfare state defence
12 For example, when the state mandated employers’ responsibility for providing unemployment benefits 
or severance payments to prevent abuse o f lay-offs, such regulation would cause an immense increase in 
related enterprise welfare expenditure at a time of mass unemployment. This was the case in Korea during 
the economic recessions and the following explosion o f unemployment between 1997 and 1999.
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coalitions {Ibid, chapter 4 and5). If international capital mobility has strengthened the 
structural power of capital, the broader coalition between the working and middle class 
has been shaped in the context of the democratic political and welfare state institutions 
in the politics of welfare reform. So partisan politics and social corporatist institutions 
seem still viable in a global economy (Garrett, 1998), and the working class and strong 
trade unionism remain as the pivotal pillar in the welfare politics. However, where the 
degree of mobilisation of the working class is low and leftist political parties are absent 
from partisan politics, or where the working class is excluded, or remains nominal, in 
the welfare politics by a strong state-business coalition or democratic political 
institutions are not fully developed or underdeveloped, various non-class-based political 
actors dominate welfare politics. Whereas the former is the case in countries where
pluralist interest group politics dominates like the US (Pampel and Williamson, 1989),
• 1 ^the latter indicates the role of civil society in developing countries . Especially,
regarding this research in particular, the role of some influential Civil Society
Organisations (hereafter CSOs) as advocacy groups has dramatically expanded in the
welfare politics of Korea, in shaping pro-welfare coalitions with trade unions and,
sometimes, pro-welfare Ministries of the government (for the roles of CSOs in the
welfare politics, see B.Y. Alin, 2000; Y.M. Kim, 2002; J.Y. Moon, 2001; K.Y. Shin,
2003).
Welfare Mix as a dependent variable
In the research model, the dependent variable is the overall welfare mix and therefore 
looks at the broader structure of social welfare provision, and so the research is not 
solely confined to state welfare. In the research, the welfare mix consists of the state 
sector and four non-state sectors, i.e., the market, the enterprise, the third and the family
13 In this respect, Weigle and Butterfield (1992) provide a useful model for the developing processes of 
civil society as democratisation rruoves forward. Under authoritarian regimes, civil society plays only 
marginal roles allowed by the regimes, but such a defensive civil society turns to a mobilised civil society 
that resists the authoritarian regimes in order to gain political democracy. Once the procedural democracy 
is established, an institutionalised c;ivil society emerges with institutionalised democratic procedures and 
norms. The active participation of the civil society in welfare politics can be realised in the last stage 
(institutionalised civil society). So political democratisation can be regarded as a critical precondition for 
the active participations o f CSOs in welfare politics, and this is the very case in Korea as I shall discuss in 
Chapter 7.
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(household) sector. As mentioned in the concluding section of the previous chapter, it 
gives the research a particular originality which makes it distinctive from most existing 
research, which usually analyses the impacts of environmental factors and/or political 
institutions on the welfare state. In so far as environmental factors and political 
institutions have had an influence on state welfare, the same logic can be applied to non­
state sectors. Although state welfare is the main area that political actors attempt to 
reveal their interests in social policy processes, it is also true that the welfare provisions 
of non-state sectors can be the targets of welfare politics in various ways. Overall, the 
state’s interventions including regulations and financial supports are critical in the 
welfare provisions of the enterprise, market and third sectors. So, in this respect, the 
flexible interaction between state interventions and actions in non-state sectors are very 
important to consider when analysing welfare mix structure. In addition, more direct 
welfare politics can be viewed regarding the provisions of non-state sectors; for 
example, business protests and lobbies for the expansion of welfare markets, and there 
are complicated conflicts over enterprise welfare between business, labour and the state.
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CHAPTER 4. ENVIRENMENTS, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS, 
INSTITUTIONAL LAGECIES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE WELFARE MIX IN KOREA
The Korean economy was recorded as one of the fastest growing economies in the 
world between the early 1960s and the mid-1990s, before it faced the financial Crisis of 
1997. But the dynamics of Korea are not restricted to its economic development during 
the hey-days. Politically and socially, Korean society has revealed relatively fast and 
dynamic transformations particularly since the democratisation of 1987. Based on a 
democratic transition from authoritarian regimes, for example, a procedural democracy 
has been established in political institutions, a relatively strong trade unionism has 
appeared as an important variable in policy processes, and the dynamic civil society1 
has widened its scope to various social issues. Before examining the welfare mix in 
Korea, it is necessary to investigate the trends of political, economic and social changes, 
because they have provided the basic conditions for welfare mix changes. At the same 
time, the institutional legacies of the welfare mix until 1987 should be defined in this 
chapter if we are to recognise the incremental, rather than revolutionary, nature of the 
changes to social welfare institutions.
In the first section, I shall describe the socio-economic changes driven by 
external forces and internal pressures. The Korean economy has been greatly integrated 
into the global economic order since the early 1990s and it experienced the financial 
crisis of 1997. Domestically, Korean society has been transforming from an industrial to 
a post-industrial society, and features of both exist together. The second section 
specifically presents the changes in political institutions -  the political democratisation 
since 1987 and the experiments with social pact institutions. These domestic
1 The dynamic civil society has been indicated as a typical factor indicating the very unique case of the 
Korean politics. Some journalists say ‘too dynamic Korea’ when they comment the explosive power o f  
civil society in the recent President ratification issue (Hankeorae 21, 14/4/2004). Really, civil society 
plays a significant role in many social and political issues, and this is again the case in welfare politics.
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institutional features, including the historical legacies of the welfare mix, have shaped 
the opportunities and restrictions within welfare politics. I shall define the main political 
actors in welfare politics in the same section. In the third section, I shall demonstrate the 
institutional legacies o f the welfare mix and related state interventions ensconced within 
its development until 1987, which can be assumed to have influenced welfare mix 
structure in the period post-1987.
4.1. External Forces and Internal Pressures in Korea
4.1.1. External Forces: Integration into the Global Economy
At least until the mid-1990s, the achievements of the Korean economy deserved to be 
called a ‘miracle’. As Cho indicates, Korea’s economic development can be identified by 
positive features such as high growth rates, fast increases of per capita income, low 
unemployment rates, the prompt transformation of industrial structure to manufacturing 
industry and rapid increases in international trade (S. Cho, 1994:30). The average 
economic growth rate exceeded 8 per cent in the 1960s and 1970s2 and such high growth 
rates were maintained until the Crisis (see Table 4.1). The per capita national income 
exceeded 10 thousand US dollars in 1996, a huge rise from about two hundred US dollars 
in 1961. Although there was high inflation in the 1960s and 1970s, the consumer price 
index became stable from the early 1980s. The chronic unemployment problem of the 
1960s, caused by continuous labour inflows from rural areas, began to be transformed 
into a labour shortage from the mid-1980s. As seen from Table 4.1, the Korean economy 
achieved almost full-employment (below 3 per cent) until 1997. As national income 
increased, the gross saving rate had been over 30 per cent of GDP in the 1980s and the 
1990s, and such increases in domestic savings could in turn fuel higher investment.
2
The growth rates were on average 7.8per cent between 1962 and 1966 (the First economic 
Development Planning Period), 9.7per cent between 1967 and 1971 (the second term), 9.1per cent 
between 1972 and 1976 (the third term), and 5.7per cent between 1977 and 1981 (the fourth term).
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1980 37.8 1,598 607 -2.1 3.5 21.4 24.4 32.2
1985 81.3 2,229 870 6.5 2.4 2.3 31.1 30.5
1987 111.2 3,201 822 11.0 1.8 3.1 38.4 30.2
1990 178.8 5,886 708 9.0 1.8 8.6 37.5 37.6
1991 216.5 6,810 734 9.2 2.0 9.3 37.3 39.8
1992 245.7 7,183 781 5.4 2.1 6.2 36.4 37.3
1993 277.5 7,811 803 5.5 2.3 4.8 36.2 35.4
1994 323.4 8,998 804 8.3 2.0 6.3 35.5 36.5
1995 377.3 10,823 771 8.9 1.7 4.5 35.5 37.3
1996 418.5 11,385 805 6.8 1.6 4.9 33.8 38.1
1997 453.3 10,315 951 5.0 2.3 4.4 33.4 34.4
1998 444.4 6,744 1,399 -6.7 5.7 7.5 33.9 21.3
1999 482.7 8,595 1,190 10.9 5.1 0.8 32.9 26.9
2000 522.0 9,770 1,131 9.3 3.3 2.3 32.4 28.3
2001 551.6 9,000 1,291 3.1 3.1 4.1 30.2 27.0
2002 596.4 10,013 1,251 6.3 2.5 2.7 29.2 26.1
Sources: Bank of Korea, National Accounts 1980-2002; Korea Labour Institute (1992, 2003), KLI Labour
Statistics.
The good performance of the Korean economy was fuelled by an augmentation 
of exports on the basis of favourable international economic conditions (Lee HK, 1999; 
Shin DM, 2000). When industrialisation took off in 1960s, Korea had scarce natural 
resources, little domestic capital and weak domestic markets. Based on affluent labour, 
Korea’s developmental state took the EOI (Export Oriented Industrialisation) model as 
its economic developmental strategy, instead of the ISI (Import Substitutive 
Industrialisation) model. Accordingly, the Korean economy has been heavily reliant on 
international trade -  in particular via the processing trade where Korea exports 
manufacturing goods whilst importing raw materials and capital goods. Moreover, until 
the 1980s, the international economic order based on the GATT system provided 
favourable conditions for international trade to developing countries such as Korea; a 
preferential tariff rate could have applied to Korea as well as it could maintain relatively 
protected domestic markets. Under such favourable conditions, the state played a
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critical role in EOI processes; it encouraged exporting industries, induced and allocated 
foreign loans, controlled the financial institutions to support exporting firms and exerted 
a high level of regulation over the domestic capital market as well as international 
capital flows. All the interventions were aimed at increasing exports. As a result, 
Korea’s exports increased fast3 and the export growth has been recorded as one of the 
fastest in the world. Some analysts comment that the good economic performance of 
Korea, along with Japan and the other three Tigers of East Asia, show the success of the 
‘developmental state’ model4.
As seen from Table 4.2, the amount of international trade as a percentage of 
GDP exceeded 60 per cent throughout the 1980s. Although the expansion of domestic 
markets caused by the real increase in national income pulled down the percentage of 
international trade to below 50 per cent of GDP in some years of the early 1990s, its 
importance began to rise following the Crisis of 1997. The rapid increase in trade in 
1998 was due to a sudden devaluation of Korean currency during the Crisis, however 
the percentage of international trade was also above 70 per cent of GDP in 2000 when 
the exchange rate was stable (see Table 4.1). The increase of exports was the main 
catalyst that allowed the Korean economy to overcome the unprecedented economic 
recession of 1998, and the following financial crisis, by achieving approximately 10 per 
cent of economic growth between 1999 and 2000. Therefore, the importance of 
international trade has always been critical in the Korean economy. At the same time, 
most domestic markets for goods have been opened since the early 1980s. Most of the 
barriers and restrictions to manufacturing imports were either withdrawn or weakened 
during the 1980s and, according to the Uruguay Round, most agricultural markets were 
also opened (S. Cho, 1994: chapter 7; D.M. Shin, 2001).
Interestingly, the financial markets and international capital mobility were highly 
controlled under the state’s direct regulation until the early 1990s, even though 
international trade has played a critical role in the Korean economy in a similar way to 
small European countries like Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Scandinavian
3 At the same time, due to the feature of Korea’s international trading (the proceeding trade), the increase 
in exports was inevitably accompanied by a similar increase in imports.
4 The developmental state model originates from Johnson’s work on the Japanese case between the 1920s 
and 1970s. According to him, the wonderful economic performance o f the Japanese economy were 
possible on the basis o f a competent bureaucracy autonomous from society. This state-centred approach to 
the economic development processes has been much adapted to the Korean case. For details, see Amsden 
(1989) and the edited volume of Woo-Cummings (1999).
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countries. In 1981 the government announced a set of plans for the liberalisation of the 
financial market but hardly achieved this aim during the 1980s. Nationalistic military 
regimes preferred foreign loans as opposed to FDI as foreign loans allowed the 
government to manoeuvre and allocate imported capital to regional firms and therefore 
provide investment for heavy industry (D.M. Shin, 2000: chapter 6). Except in some 
restricted regions, FDI inflows were not welcomed and many regulations and 
restrictions on international capital flows remained until the early 1990s.
Table 4.2. Major Indicators of Economic Globalisation: 1980-2001









1980 64.0 28.1 0.0 0.0 9.1
1985 65.8 32.4 0.3 0.9 6.9
1987 65.3 35.0 0.5 1.6 6.7
1990 53.4 25.7 0.3 0.8 5.6
1991 52.0 24.4 0.4 1.0 5.5
1992 50.3 24.4 0.2 0.6 6.5 0.9
1993 48.0 23.8 0.2 0.5 6.7 2.2
1994 49.3 23.9 0.2 0.6 8.4 2.1
1995 53.2 25.6 0.4 1.0 11.3 2.0
1996 53.9 24.9 0.4 1.2 13.3 2.4
1997 58.9 28.6 0.6 1.7 14.3 2.6
1998 71.0 41.6 1.7 5.7 26.8 4.0
1999 64.9 35.4 2.3 8.3 16.4 10.7
2000 72.1 37.3 2.0 7.1 11.4 13.6
2001 69.1 35.6 0.8 3.1 11.4 11.2
1. Gross Capital Formation
2. Gross Private Capital Flows following the World Bank definition. It is the sum of the absolute values of 
direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows recorded in the balance of payments financial 
accounts, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of monetary authorities and general government.
3. Investment Inflow to Korean Stock Market
Sources: World Bank, WDI2003 online; Bank of Korea, National Accounts 1980-2002.
However, Korea’s financial markets began to be dramatically liberalised and 
internationalised from the early 1990s. In 1992, the direct investment of foreign 
investors on the Korean stock market was allowed. Especially, when the Kim Young
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Sam government (1993-1997) launched so-called Saegyewha policies targeting OECD 
membership, policies to increase the openness of foreign currency and capital markets 
were implemented positively (Son and Jung, 2001). Regulation and restrictions over 
short-term foreign loans were withdrawn in 1993. Korean firms and other short-term 
financial institutions could borrow foreign capital directly and most regulations over 
foreign currency trading ’were alleviated. Short-term loans from foreign financial 
institutions increased dramatically and they were the direct cause of foreign currency 
crisis in 1997. As seen from Table 4.2, the gross private capital flows increased rapidly 
from 1994 (also see Appendix Table 3-2 and 3-3). But FDI inflows remained redundant; 
the level of FDI inflows never exceeded 1 per cent of gross capital formation until 1995. 
It was after the Crisis that the Korean government began to induce FDI more positively, 
in order to overcome the foreign currency crisis. Most of all, a liberalised financial 
market and greater capital mobility have provided the basic conditions for the mass 
investment inflows into the stock market since 1999. Following the worst stock 
devaluation of 1998, foreign investors began to put enormous investments, 
corresponding to 10.7 per cent of GDP in 1999, into the Korean stock market. Since 
then, the Korean stock market has been critically vulnerable to foreign investors5. As a 
result, in terms of international trade, FDI inflows and financial market openness 
including capital mobility, the speed of economic globalisation of the Korean economy 
has dramatically intensified since the Crisis6.
Comparatively speaking, the importance of international trade was higher than 
in any other of the G7 countries and its scale was twice the OECD average in 2000 (see 
Table 4.3). In terms of international trade, the Korean economy has been structurally 
dependent on the conditions of global markets and, therefore, is very vulnerable to 
external shocks like a sudden fluctuation in the exchange rate, international interest rate 
and oil price. In addition, the figures in Table 4.3 indicate that the level of financial 
market openness of Korea intensified during the 1990s; although FDI inflows and 
capital mobility were less than the average of developed economies, the level of 
financial market openness of Korea was higher than that of Japan (and Italy in terms of
5 For example, KOSPI fluctuates according to the movement o f foreign investors. The average share 
possession o f foreign investors in the 10 largest companies is almost 60per cent (Chosunilbo, 13/4/2003).g
There were some revised trends o f FDI and GPCFs in 2001 as the Korean economy became stable, but 
it is hard to say whether such decreases mean a change in the basic conditions o f economic globalisation 
(esp. international capital mobility) per se. Rather, paradoxically, such a fluctuation can be understood as 
evidence of how vulnerable the Korean economy is to external forces.
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FDI). Moreover, it is worthwhile to indicate that the financial market openness of Korea 
has caught up with the OECD average figures of 1990.
Table 4.3. Major Indicators of Economic Globalisation: International Comparison
____________    (% o f GDP)
Trade in Goods 
1990 2000




Canada 43.7 73.8 1.3 9.3 8.1 30.5
France 37.1 50.4 1.1 3.3 20.6 35.7
Germany 46.0 56.2 0.1 11.1 9.8 41.4
Italy 32.0 44.7 0.6 1.2 10.6 23.7
Japan 17.1 18.0 0.1 0.2 5.4 10.5
UK 41.2 43.9 3.4 8.4 35.3 119.8
US 15.8 20.8 0.8 3.1 5.7 17.1
G7 33.3 44.0 1.1 5.2 13.6 39.8
OECD 30.1 36.0 1.0 4.2 10.8 32.0
Korea 53.4 72.1 0.3 2.0 5.6 11.4
1. Gross Private Capital Flows 
Source: World Bank, W DI2003 on-line.
4.4.2. Internal Pressures: Transformation from an Industrial to a Post-industrial 
Society
Until the 1980s, it can be asserted that Korea’s internal pressures originated from 
industrialisation processes. However, it is very difficult to identify the transformation of 
Korea’s socio-economic structure during the 1990s with such dichotic terms as 
industrialisation and post-industrialisation. Following Pierson’s definitions of post­
industrial society (Pierson, 2001a), Korea’s internal pressures seem a half way split 
between the two, i.e. a mixed state between industrialisation and post-industrialisation, 
or more correctly, it is ‘transforming’ from industrial to post-industrial society. For the 
last decade of the 20th century, Korean society has entered the post-industrial era in 
terms of its employment structure and the transformation of household structures. 
However, for the other two factors, the maturing of the welfare state and the ageing 
population, Korea seems still far from the post-industrial stage, even though both of 
them would inevitably put heavy pressures on the Korean society in the long term.
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Table 4.4. Employment Structure
Total
(thousand)
By Industry By Type
Industry 
Employment1 




(% o f  
total)
Paid Employment 
Regular Temporary Daily 
(% of Paid Employment)
1980 13,683 29.0 37.0 47.2 79.9 20.1
1985 14,970 30.8 44.3 54.1 82.8 17.2
1987 16,354 34.0 44.1 56.2 83.4 16.6
1990 18,085 35.4 46.7 60.5 54.2 29.0 16.8
1991 18,649 36.0 47.7 62.7 55.5 28.7 15.7
1992 19,009 35.0 49.3 62.7 57.4 27.7 14.9
1993 19,234 33.5 51.7 62.1 58.9 26.7 14.4
1994 19,848 33.2 53.1 62.9 57.9 27.8 14.3
1995 20,414 33.3 54.3 63.2 58.1 27.9 14.0
1996 20,853 32.5 55.9 63.3 56.8 29.6 13.6
1997 21,214 31.2 57.5 63.2 54.3 31.6 14.1
1998 19,938 27.8 59.8 61.7 53.1 32.9 14.0
1999 20,291 27.4 61.0 62.4 48.4 33.6 18.0
2000 21,156 28.0 61.1 63.1 47.9 34.5 17.6
2001 21,572 27.5 62.6 63.3 49.2 34.6 16.2
2002 22,170 27.3 63.3 64.0 48.4 34.5 17.2
1. The portion o f total employment recorded as working in the industrial sector, including mining and
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction, corresponding to major 
divisions 2-5 (ISIC revision 2) or tabulation categories C-F (ISIC revision 3).
Source: KLI, Labour Statistics, various years
Table 4.5. Main Indicators of Household Structure
Women’s Participation 




Divorce rate4 AHM5 % of SH6
1980 42.8 38.7 2.83 5.9 4.5 4.8
1985 41.9 39.0 1.67 10.3 4.1 6.9
1990 47.0 39.3 1.59 11.4 3.7 9.0
1995 48.4 40.4 1.65 17.1 3.3 12.7
2000 48.6 41.4 1.47 35.9 3.1 15.5
2002 49.7 41.8 1.17 47.4 3.2 16.1
1. Female labour force as % o f total female working age population (aged between 15-64).
2. Female labour force as % of total employment
3. Total Fertility Rate (birth per woman)
4. The number o f divorced divided by the number o f married (percentage).
5. Average number of household member
6. Single-person households as % o f total
Source: World Bank, WDI2003 on-line; NSO, [http://kosis.nso.go.kr/cgi-bin]
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Most of all, for last two decades, the employment structure has changed 
dramatically (see Table 4.4). In 1980, one third of the total labour force were employed 
in the agricultural sector and 29 per cent by the secondary industries. Industrial 
employment reached its peak (approximately 35-36 per cent) between the late 1980s 
and the early 1990s. The period corresponded directly to the heyday of Korea’s labour 
movement between 1987 and 1989. Until 1990, agricultural employment was pulled 
down to below 20 per cent. Korea’s industrialisation intensified in the 1980s. From 
1992, however, employment in industries began to decrease and, especially, during the 
economic crisis of 1998 produced mass unemployment in the industry sector. Industrial 
employment was reduced by 3.5 per cent in a single year. Since 1998, the industrial 
employment has remained below 28 per cent, which is the same level as the 1970s. At 
the same time, agricultural employment has continued to decrease to around 10 per cent. 
The large loss of industrial jobs and the continued decrease in agricultural employment 
have been absorbed by an increase of service sector employment. The share of service 
sector employment in the total employment began to exceed 60 per cent from 1999. 
Until 2000, the ratio of industrial employment in Korea fell down to a similar level to 
the average level of developed economies (see Table 4.7).
The industrial employment ratio was far lower than that of Germany, Japan and 
Italy, countries whose economies still depend on traditional manufacturing industries 
(which make up more than 30 per cent of total employment). What must be indicated 
here is that the speed of de-industrialisation has been faster than in any other of the 
advanced economies. Between 1990 and 2000, industrial employment in Korea 
diminished by 7.4 per cent, whilst the G7 average decreased by 3.9 per cent and the 
OECD average decreased by only 1.9 per cent. In addition, the ratio of regular 
employment in the total paid employment figures also decreased significantly. From 
1999, irregular types of employment (temporary and daily workers) began to make up 
more than half the paid employment figures (see Table 4.4). As a result, along with the 
fast decreases of industrial employment, the flexibility of the labour market has been 
significantly reinforced.
Some indicators concerning household structure and family behaviour also show 
the trend of transformation toward a post-industrial society. As seen from Table 4.5, 
women’s economic participation has continuously increased for the last two decades at
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the expense of a rapid decrease in the fertility rate . Like in advanced economies, dual 
earner households have become popular in Korean society, especially among young 
couples. Since public social services offering maternity support and child fostering have 
not been developed, the increasing economic activity of young, married women has 
resulted in a rapid reduction in the total fertility rate. Korea’s fertility rate fell down to 
1.13 in 2002, which is the lowest level in the world alongside Italy (see Table 4.7). In 
addition, traditional family values have become weak and family dissolution 
phenomena began to occur during the 1990s. The divorce rate leaped up to the world’s 
highest level. Single households increased rapidly; this was not only due to an increase 
in young people living alone, but also due to a rapid increase in single elderly people, 
who had previously lived with their adult children. Coupled with a declining fertility 
rate, the increase of single households resulted in a reduction in the average number of 
household members.




a. 0-14 b. 15-64 
(% of total) (% of total)
c. 65+ 
(% o f total)
Dependency Ratio 
Elderly Total 
(c/b, %) ((a+c)/b, %)
1980 38,124 34.0 62.2 3.8 6.1 60.8
1985 40,806 30.2 65.6 4.3 6.5 52.6
1990 42,869 25.6 69.3 5.1 7.4 44.3
1995 45,093 23.4 70.7 5.9 8.3 41.4
2000 47,008 21.1 71.7 7.2 10.1 39.5
2010 49,594 17.2 72.1 10.7 14.8 38.7
2020 50,650 13.9 71.0 15.1 21.3 40.8
2030 50,296 12.4 64.6 23.1 35.8 55.0
Source: NSO, [http://kosis.nso.go.kr/cgi-bin]
However, in terms of the ageing population which has already been indicated as 
one of the most important internal pressures to the fiscal viability of mature welfare 
states, it is hard to say that Korean society has already entered the post-industrial stage 
(see Table 4.6). In 2000, the proportion of elderly began to make up just over 7 per cent 
of total population as ten working age persons were needed to support one elderly
Korea is also well known for its unprecedented achievement in birth control policy since the early 
1960s, and it was not until 1996 that the policy was formally withdrawn.
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person. At least within next two decades, the severe pressures driven by an ageing 
population would not be near at hand in Korea. However, what is more important is, 
again, the speed of ageing. It is expected that, according to the official population 
prospect, it would take only 20 years to transform from an ageing (7 per cent) to an aged 
society (14 per cent). In 2040, the elderly dependency ratio would reach 51.6, which 
means two working age persons should take responsibility for supporting one elderly 
person (see Appendix Table 3-6). Not only would the ageing speed be the fastest in the 
world, but also, alongside Japan and Italy, Korea would record one of the highest 
elderly dependency levels among OECD countries until the year 2040. Such an ageing 
pressure would make an enormous financial impact on pension and health schemes. 
Although Korea’s National Pension Insurance schemes have not matured, there have 
already been continuous trials for pension reforms in order to improve their long-term 
sustainability8.





Fe. Lab. Force (T E )3 
1990 2000
Dep. Ratio, Elderly4 
1990 2000
Canada 24.4 22.6 1.8 1.6 44.0 45.8 16.6 18.3
France 31.0 24.7 1.8 1.9 43.4 45.1 21.3 24.7
Germany 40.95 34.5 1.5 1.4 41.8 42.3 21.7 23.3
Italy 32.3 32.4 1.3 1.2 36.7 38.5 22.3 26.9
Japan 34.1 31.2 1.5 1.4 39.8 41.4 17.2 25.2
UK 32.3 25.4 1.8 1.7 42.4 44.1 24.1 24.6
US 26.2 22.9 2.1 2.1 44.3 46.0 18.9 19.2
G7 31.6 27.7 1.7 1.6 41.8 43.3 20.3 23.2
OECD 29.9 27.0 1.7 1.7 41.7 43.4 19.2 21.6
Korea 35.4 28.0 1.8 1.36 39.3 41.4 7.2 9.4
1. See the note o f Table 9.5
2. Total Fertility Rate (births per woman)
3. Female labour force as %  o f total employment
4. The ratio between working age population (15-64) and elderly population (65+)
5. 1991
6. 2001
Sources: see Table 4.6
8 For details, see chapter 7.
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In conclusion, it seems evident that the transformation of Korea’s economic and 
social structure in the 1990s has revealed some post-industrial features, despite the 
dominant remnants of the features of an industrial society. If a line were drawn 
following the ratio of industrial employment between 1980 and 2000, then the shape 
should be an inverse U curve. Indicators regarding family dissolution and household 
structure also indicate similar post- industrial phenomena to those that other advanced 
countries have already experienced. Moreover, such internal pressures have been more 
intense, as the economic crisis of 1998 caused various social problems like 
homelessness, mass unemployment, inclining irregular employments and other family 
dissolutions (Cho SH, 1999; Jung YT, 1999; Jung WO, 1999; Kim JK, 2001; Kim SC, 
2001; Kim SK et al., 2001). Really, the transformation to a post-industrial society has 
been taking place as fast and condensed as previous industrialisation processes did. 
However, the demographic pressures have not been realised yet. On the whole, it would 
maybe be more correct to say that, features of industrialisation and post-industrialisation 
processes were revealed together in the 1990s. At least, it seems evident that, whatever 
these changes are called, such internal pressures have become important environmental 
factors.
4.2. Political Institutions and Welfare Politics In Korea
4.2.1. Political Institutions: Democratisation and Social Pact Institutions
The political economy of Korea between 1961 and 1987 can be distinguished by two 
distinct factors; one is the Export Oriented Industrialisation (EOI) dominated by the 
government and the other is the ‘hard authoritarianism’ of military regimes based on 
cronyism between the state and business. Regardless of direct involvement in the 
distribution of imported capital to privileged large firms, the authoritarian governments 
have intervened in industrial relations directly through repressive labour controls. 
Although business provided th<e regime for the political rents that were required to
maintain the political bases of the regimes, the state basically enjoyed strong political 
autonomy from society9. Procedural democracy was not established, labour was not 
mobilised, and civil society remained at what Weigle and Butterfield (1992) define as a 
defensive civil society which was mostly controlled by the regime.
When the regime refused the amendment of Constitutional law to allow a direct 
Presidential election in 1987, when people’s claims for democratisation abruptly 
exploded against the military regime. Millions of people, students and workers marched 
on the street and protested for political democratisation. Finally, the Presidential 
candidate of the ruling party, Mr. Rho, accepted the direct Presidential election. Such 
movements for democratisation continued within the labour movement. Based on a 
rapid mobilisation of the working class, there were a great number of strikes between 
1987 and 1989, and numerous workers participated in the labour movement. In the 
period of the ‘Great Struggle of Labour’ in 1987, more than 3,700 strikes were reported 
and roughly 1.3 million workers fiercely resisted the capitalist exploitation and the 
repressive state. The state’s control over labour on the behalf of employers and most of 
the restrictions on unionisation were withdrawn with the enactment of the New Labour 
Law of 1987 (C.I. Park, 1996). It seems evident that the democratisation of 1987 has 
changed the basic landscape of Korean politics, even though the political activities of 
trade unions were still prohibited and regime change via the opposition party failed.
Korea’s democratisation after 1987 not only meant the maturing political 
democracy. The political democratisation led to democratic presidential elections 
resulting in peaceful regime change, and in the 1997 Presidential election a pro-welfare 
President (Kim Dae Jung) was elected. Considering the Constitutional polity of the 
Korean political system -  a strong Presidential system, the birth of a President with a 
pro-welfare attitude could influence the overall position of the government on social 
welfare issues. Furthermore, the democratisation has also provided the basic 
preconditions for the operation of ‘real’ welfare politics, beyond the monopolised policy 
processes of the state (B.H. Park, 2001). Free from the great shadow of the authoritarian 
state, the labour movement began to stretch itself and civil society was brought back as 
a watchdog vis-a-vis the state and business. Although the state’s dominance and the
9 The state’s control over capital, based on bureaucratic elites insulated from social actors, was also 
accompanied by more direct policy instruments. This trend, despite differences in degree, continued until 
1987. The state decided a priority o f investment, imported foreign capital and allocated it to domestic 
firms. For the role o f the state in industrialisation processes and economic development, see Amsden 
(1989).
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power of business have continued in social policy processes, it is also true that various 
social groups have raised their own voices when social welfare issues have arisen. The 
activists who had dominated the democratic movements in the 1980s permeated to civil 
society, and the new CSOs have widened their voice mechanism into welfare politics 
since the mid-1990s. After all, the situations of CSOs as well as business and labour 
have risen as influential political actors and they often participate in social policy 
making processes.
The political democratisation of 1987 is especially important in terms of creating 
the momentum for the explosive trade union movements between 1987 and 1989 
because the reinforced trade unionism has provided a basic condition for the social pact 
politics that have been continuously experimented with since 1990. Due to militant 
strikes and industrial disputes, the average increase in real wage rate exceeded 10 per 
cent between 1988 and 1990. Business and the state could not force labour to accept a 
one-sided wage restriction anymore. They had to recognise labour, which had grown as 
a social partner on the back of the political democratisation. As a result, the necessity 
for a social pact mechanism, where the mobilised labour and business could deal with a 
set of comprehensive issues on wage and social welfare emerged. Experiments with 
social pact politics were consistently attempted throughout the 1990s and the dynamics 
of welfare politics were revealed more evidently under the frame of social pact 
institutions (B.S. Yoo, 2003; Choi et al., 1999; Choi et al., 2000). Before the Crisis, the 
social pact politics were experimented through the Wage Agreement Council (WAC, 
1990-1997), the National Economic and Social Conference (NESC, 1993-1994), the 
Presidential Committee on Industrial Relation Reform (PCIRR, 1996-1997), and, after 
the Crisis, through the Tripartite Committee (1998 afterwards). In conclusion, while the 
political democratisation has become a basic preposition for the working of welfare 
politics, a set of social pact experiments during the 1990s sought the institutionalisation 
of welfare politics.
4.2.2. Defining Main Actors of Welfare Politics 
The Government
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Although the political democratisation since 1987 has created the basic conditions that 
meant various social groups have been able to participate in the social policy making 
processes which previously had been almost dominated by the professional government 
bureaucracy, it has hardly changed the fact that the government (the President and his 
Administration) has been the most important actor in Korea’s welfare politics. As Shin 
indicates (K.Y. Shin, 2003: 11), until the Crisis of 1997 the government dominated 
policy development concerning social welfare issues, but excluding a few examples, 
neither trade unions nor employers’ agencies had paid much attention to them. 
Especially, under the Constitution of a President-centred polity, the government’s 
bureaucracy could not help substantially making the regimes’ political interest 
(especially the Presidents’) be reflected in the social policy making processes. It is not 
difficult to find examples that the civilian governments led by Kim Young Sam (1993-
1997) and Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) also manipulated them according to political 
necessity just as previous authoritarian regimes had implemented social welfare 
legislation to gain political legitimacy (K.R. Sung, 2002; Y.Y. Park, 2002). Since the 
President is to exercise a decisive power in all decision-making, their (and probably 
their professional staffs’) recognition of the social welfare institutions has been critical 
in social policy making processes. It was especially true when intra-governmental 
conflicts between different government Ministries, usually between economic 
Ministries and social Ministries, were revealed (B.Y. Ahn, 2000).
Generally speaking, the government’s social policy making processes are mainly 
related to the provision of state welfare, but the government as an actor in welfare 
politics has also had an influence on the welfare provisions of non-state sectors through 
their various interventions and regulations. In addition, the government continued 
throughout the 1990s to make efforts to institutionalise a social pact mechanism 
between labour and business (B.S. Yoo, 2003). Through borrowing the form of a social 
pact mechanism, the government sought to stabilise industrial relations now they could 
not depend on a physical repression, as previous military regimes had done. Within the 
framework of the mechanism, the government played a role as an arbitrator who 
induced a macro agreement between business and labour, which was to exchange wage 
restrictions and/or the labour market flexibility with an expansion in overall social 
welfare provision including enterprise welfare.
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Political Parties
Different from the West, the politics of welfare in Korea have not been based on 
ideological orientation or the class-structure. The differences in policy agenda between 
political parties, therefore, are not so clear, although the democratic camp leaded by 
Kim Dae Jung revealed more pro-welfare characteristics. Except for a few reformative 
legislations passed by the National Assembly between 1988 and 1990 when the 
opposition parties of the democratic camp took a majority in the National Assembly (but 
the legislation was not implemented due to an execution of the President’s veto), it is 
difficult to find examples where political parties and/or parliamentary politics have 
dominated welfare politics. Especially, as most alternatives concerning welfare reform 
since the Crisis have been produced by CSOs, trade unions, employers’ agencies and the 
Administration, not by political parties. Their roles have been basically passive; they 
have just politically accepted (or selected) one of the existing alternatives raised by 
other groups (Y.M. Kim, 2001: 49-50).
Interest Groups
In a way similar to political parties, the role of interests groups and/or recipients groups 
(notably pensioners’ group) has not been outstanding in welfare politics. This could be 
due to the fact that the expansion and the launch of social welfare institutions was 
concentrated in the period since 1987 -  i.e., under the condition of immature welfare 
institutions, the emergence of interests groups surrounding them could not but remain 
weak. In other words, the immature welfare institutions have not yet produced interest 
group politics (or pluralist politics) in Korea (Y.M. Kim, 2001) For example, as Kim 
indicates, the voice of the pensioners’ group, which has been one of the most powerful 
voices in pension reforms in most welfare states, cannot be found because full old age 
pension payments will not be initiated until 2008 (Y.M. Kim, 2004). The only exception 
was the ‘specialisation of dispensary and medical practice’ within the health reforms of 
1999, where two powerful professional groups (doctors’ and pharmacists’ groups) 
produced a politics of conflict, but this was related to the earlier reform of Medical 
Insurance which was launched in 1977.
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Labour (Trade Unions)
As indicated before, trade unions have not had a political party that speaks out for their 
interests, so they have had to express their position concerning social policy issues 
directly Trade unionism at a national level consists of a dual system; i.e., the FKTU 
(Federation of Korea Trade Unions) and the KCDTU (Korea Confederation of 
Democratic Trade Unions). Both of them were very important actors in Korean welfare 
politics, but the dual system revealed a complex dynamic within labour as well as with 
business and the state (Y.M. Kim, 2001). Until 1996, the government only recognised 
the FKTU as a negotiating partner with legal status but excluded the KCDTU from 
social pact politics. The result was a crippled social consent that most workers could not 
agree with. Only when the government and business recognised the legality of the 
KCDTU in 1996, were the social pact politics that the government introduced after 1996 
able to produce some outcomes (B.S. Yoo, 2003; H.Y. Sun, 2004). In terms of attitudes 
to the social welfare institutions, on the other hand, there were significant differences 
between labour groups (between the FKTU and the KCDTU), even though both of them 
basically leant towards a preference for the expansion of social welfare. Whilst the 
FKTU put its priority in the interests of its union members, the KCDTU argued for a 
more comprehensive welfare state model based on social solidarity.
Business (Employers & Employers’Associations)
As D.M. Shin (2000) indicates, Korea’s social policy before the Crisis was basically 
business-friendly as the view of social welfare was that it should not be a barrier to 
economic development and the competitiveness of firms. Seen in this way, the interests 
of business had been reflected by the positions taken by the government. So it was not 
necessary for business to express a different voice from that of the government in 
welfare politics. Large firms accepted the government’s interventions and regulations 
for expanding enterprise welfare in order to maintain stable industrial relations, and 
hardly protested against social insurance institutions at the initial stage because the 
burden on firms remained modest at best. When the government tried to perform an 
operation against the solid Chebol (large conglomerates) system during the Crisis,
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however, business groups began to take a different stance from that of the government 
(especially on the negotiating table of the Tripartite Committee). The KEF (Korea 
Employers Federation) and the FKI (Federation of Korea Industries) are representative 
employers’ agencies and their think tanks like the EKER (Institute for Korea Economic 
Research) and the CFE (Centre for Free Enterprise) have also played a significant role 
in terms of presenting the alternative ideas of business’s (J.K. Kim, 2003). The business 
groups not only asserted the necessity of neo-liberal economic reform to overcome the 
Crisis, but also indicated that the expansion of social welfare under the Kim Dae Jung 
government would cause a rise in labour costs and, ultimately, a weakening of the 
competitiveness of firms. In addition, the business community was worried that the 
expansion of social insurance would crowd out the private insurance market (Y.M. Kim, 
2001: 47). For business, the alternative, which employers’ agencies argued for, was the 
expansion of the private insurance market and the privatisation of social insurance.
Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)10
Many indicate that the most outstanding feature of Korea’s welfare politics is the role of 
CSOs which can hardly be found in other welfare states (Y.M. Kim, 2001; K.Y. Shin, 
2002, 2003; Ahn, 2000). Y.M. Kim (2001: 48-49) asserts that in no social policy 
literature have CSOs been seen to have exerted such a powerful influence in welfare 
reform as they have done ini Korea. Since 1997 CSOs have emerged as an important 
actor in welfare politics evem though most of influential CSOs were founded in the late 
1980s or the early 1990s. The People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy 
(hereafter PSPD) was founded in 1994, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice 
(hereafter CCEJ) in 1989 aind Green Korea in 1991. As advocators of the whole 
population, and especially the unprivileged who could not easily mobilize their interests, 
they argued with the government that the social disruption caused by the Crisis should 
be coped with via an expansion of ‘solidaritic’ social welfare institutions. In this respect, 
they constructed a coalition nvith the KCDTU and did not hesitate in confronting the 
opposite social forces (like thee KEF, the FKI, the Ministry of Finance and Economy and
10 In the study, the third sector off Korea is divided into NPOs (Non-profit organisations) and CSOs. 
While NPOs have provided direct social services under the state’s support and supervision, CSOs have 
deployed social movements as advo*cates o f others.
94
sometimes the FKTU) with the logic of the social solidarity or the public interest. 
Sometimes they constructed a critical-collaborative relationship, substantially a 
coalition, with the Kim Dae Jung government to overcome opposition to the welfare 
reforms proposed. Their role was decisive especially in public assistance, health and 
pension reforms between 1998 and 2000 (J.Y. Moon, 2001).
4.3. Institutional Legacies of the Welfare Mix and Related State Interventions in 
Social Welfare until 1987
As discussed in the previous chapter, the institutional legacies of welfare state 
programmes have been indicated as one of the most important factors in understanding 
the changes and reforms of developed welfare states under the influence of changing 
environments. However, for less-developed or emerging welfare states like Korea 
whose social insurance institutions have only just been universalised and would thus 
take many years to reach full maturation11, the maturity effects of welfare state 
programmes -  such as institutional stickiness, vested interests and programme-based 
coalitions -  cannot be fully adapted. Instead we must focus on the wider shape of the 
previous welfare mix and the related interventions of the state in social welfare 
provision. It has often been argued that non-state sectors (especially the enterprise and 
family sectors) have taken significant roles in social welfare provision in East Asian 
countries like Korea and Japan, and this welfare mix structure could explain the low 
levels of state expenditure (Esping-Andersen, 1997; Goodman and Peng, 1996; 
Goodman, White and Kwon, 1997). In this respect, Kwon (1997) argues that, unlike 
Western welfare states, in Korea the state has maintained its main regulatory role in 
social welfare rather than taken a role as a direct provider and financer, therefore the 
state has been able to expand social welfare programmes without a direct financial 
burden. Accordingly, the interventions of the state, especially its regulatory role over
11 National Health Insurance (or previously National Medical Insurance System) could be an exemption 
because it was universalised to the entire population in 1989. But, as I shall discuss below, in terms o f its 
low benefit level and scope, it is difficult to assert that the NHI has fully matured.
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welfare provisions in non-state sectors seem vital when looking to understand the 
overall welfare mix structure in Korea. If so, what are the typical interventions of the 
state and how have they contributed to the institutional legacies influencing welfare mix 
structure in Korea?
First, the income maintenance programmes have been heavily reliant on social 
insurance institutions but no universal benefits financed by general taxation have been 
introduced. This meant that it was possible without making a direct financial burden on 
the state. Since social insurance institutions have been almost exclusively financed by 
employers and employees, the payment capability for social insurance contributions was 
crucial for the expansion of coverage. So the initial coverage of social insurances 
programmes was restricted to employees of large and medium size workplaces and, 
before being expanded to employees of smaller workplaces and the self-employed. The 
state’s financial support of the social insurance funds has been very low or almost 
negligible12. Nonetheless, the state has mandated, regulated and controlled the social 
insurance system. As shall be discussed below, a principle of minimal financial 
responsibility has been consistently sought in the state’s interventions in social welfare 
provision.
Secondly, instead of providing direct state welfare benefits and services, the
state has encouraged or mandated social welfare provisions by non-state sectors through
various interventions. Traditionally, the state has utilised third sector organisations in
social service provision. Although traditionally its role had been marginal in social
welfare, the third sector has provided most social services and, in turn, has been subject
to the strict regulation and supervision as well as the financial support of the
government. The state also prescribed mandatory enterprise welfare programmes
through labour laws. Mandatory benefits like severance or retirement pay and paid
maternity leave were introduced as a substitute for or complementary to the
1 ^underdeveloped state welfare . In addition, the state has had a preference for indirect 
tax expenditures as opposed to direct state provision, and it has encouraged the
12 The state supports the administration costs and offers minimal aid for the contributions of the rural 
self-employed (the half o f the lowest contribution thresholds) in national health insurance.
13 Once, the mandatory severance pays have played a role o f pension and unemployment benefits for 
workers. But, even after universal coverage of National Pension insurance and Employment Insurance 
was established, they still remain as the largest part o f enterprise welfare expenditure. It is one of the most 
interesting cases about ‘institutional stickiness’ or, more generally, path-dependent development. Detailed 
discussions shall be dealt with below.
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expansion of welfare (insurance) markets and (voluntary) enterprise welfare provision.
Thirdly, strong familialism is a fundamental feature in the welfare mix structure 
of Korea. The government has stressed the role of the family as the primary provider of 
welfare. In any welfare reforms and the long-term blueprint for social welfare14, the 
emphasis on family responsibility has never been abandoned. The most representative 
examples of the strong familialism in the social welfare system are the underdeveloped 
social service systems and the strict entitlement conditions for public assistance benefits. 
The ‘condition of support obligator15’ was not abolished even in the public assistance 
reforms of 1999. At least until 2002, there had been no proposals for universal social 
services or benefits that attempted to be a substitute for the role of family. Instead, the 
government has supported the role of the family through indirect tax expenditure such 
as tax credits for children, the disabled and elderly, and income deductions for 
household expenditure on social services
What then are defined as the institutional legacies of the welfare mix in Korea 
and how were the state interventions discussed above part of their make up? From now 
on, let me trace the development of the welfare mix until 1987 and extract the core 
features of the institutional legacies of the welfare mix, starting with state welfare.
4.3.1. State Welfare: Minimised Financial Burden of the State
An analysis of the institutional legacies of state welfare should start from the emergence 
of the authoritarian developmental state. In 1961, General Park Chung Hee and the 
young officers following him took power by a coup d’etat in 1961 under the banner of 
‘sweeping corruption’ and ‘modernisation of the fatherland’. The lack of legitimacy for 
the military government forced them to show a blue print for a brighter future to people 
who had suffered from the Korean War and poverty. It is true, as known from the fact 
that the per capita GNP remained no more than 80 US dollars until 1960, most people
14 For example, National Welfare Planning Board, Saegyewha Committee (1996) and Presidential 
Committee for Quality o f Life, Office of the President (1999, 2002).
15 The public assistance programmes o f Korea have prescribed a set o f entitlement conditions. One o f the 
most important standards is the ‘condition of support obligator’ or ‘breadwinner standard’. According to 
this condition, those who have any relative or family members able to support them cannot receive the 
benefits. Despite some amendment,, the range o f relatives and family members has typically included, not 
only parents and children, but also grandparents, grandchildren, son- and daughter-in-laws.
97
were in absolute poverty. The military government launched the first ‘Five-year 
Economic Development Plan’ (1962-1966) to develop the welfare system model in 
Korea, and also established the Social Security Investigation Committee (SSIC) within 
the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs in 1962. For the first five years of Park’s 
military regime, Korea accomplished an average 8.5 per cent level of economic growth 
(see Table 4.8.). Within 3 years, massive social welfare legislation was enacted; first 
came public assistance legislation, the Livelihood Protection Law (1961) and the 
Disaster Relief Law (1962); second, as social insurance enactments, the Military 
Personnel Pension Law (1963, hereafter MPP), the Industrial Accident and Injury 
Compensation Insurance Law (1963, hereafter IAICI), the Medical Insurance Law 
(1963, hereafter MI); and third, as a social service legislation, the Children Welfare Law 
(1961) was launched (C.S. Nam, 2000; B.H. Park, 2001).
However, the numerous initial legislations were just declarations and came far 
from real implementation. The public assistance system was not implemented until 1969, 
the MI programmes began to be implemented without a compulsory coverage 
stipulation and the IAICI initially covered only workplaces with 500 or more employees. 
Alongside the existing Government Employee Pension Scheme (1960, hereafter GEP), 
only the MPP scheme was launched as planned, in order to attract the loyalty of the core 
governance forces -  civil servants and soldiers. According to C.S. Nam (2000: 22-23), 
these features revealed corporatist-conservative as well as liberal features. First of all, 
the initial stage of the Korean welfare state can be described as corporatist-conservative 
because the military regime tried to pursue stratification by separating special 
occupational groups (public officers and soldiers) from general people within social 
insurance institutions. Another reason why the regime hesitated to implement social 
welfare legislation which stands as evidence of the traditional logic of a liberal 
perspective, was that due to the economic concerns the social welfare system had to be 
restricted so as not to obstruct economic growth and the industrialisation process. Even 
from the earliest stage the authoritarian military regimes manipulated the social welfare 
system as an instrument for governance and control over society and the economy. 
Statutory social services (residential services for the needy) and public assistance 
programmes were based on the strong familialism, i.e. the subsidiarity principle that the 
state only intervenes when family functions fail, and their coverage was restricted to 
very poor target populations whose family members could not care for them. The use of
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the social welfare system by military regimes as an instrument for ensuring political 
legitimacy continued until 1987 (H.K. Lee, 1993: 73).
When Park’s regime reinforced its coercive governance through amendments to 
the Constitution in the early 1970s, the strong state restated its political and economic 
intentions in the state welfare more actively. The government legislated for the National 
Welfare Pension Law (1973) as a compulsory pension scheme covering general workers. 
The purpose was two fold; the first was to mobilise the domestic capital required for the 
construction of heavy manufacturing industry through compulsory saving, and the other 
was to attract loyalty to the regime. However, the pension system failed to be 
implemented because of the Oil Shock in 1973. As the governance mechanism of the 
regime became more coercive during the 1970s, the government’s concerns for social 
welfare were reduced. As seen from Table 4.8, compared with the fast-growing 
economic ability, the social welfare expenditure of the central government as a 
percentage of GDP shrank even though the MI and the medical assistance programmes 
were being implemented from 1977. As a matter of fact, the implementation of 
compulsory medical insurance programmes did not amount to a higher financial burden 
on the state at all. The basic feature of the expansion of the social insurance system has 
been the state’s fiscal neutralisation and the top-down expansion of coverage. The state 
designed all the social insurance systems so as not to burden its contribution to the 
funds, so compulsory coverage started from the larger workplaces where employers 
could pay social insurance contributions without state aids. Moreover, the Tow- 
contribution and low-benefit’ principle of social insurance was retained due to the 
economic concerns (Kim and Sung, 1993; H.K. Lee, 1993).
Even when the new military regime took over from Park’s in 1980, the basic 
features had hardly changed even though there was a second massive wave of social 
welfare legislation in the early 1980s and the coverage of the Medical and Industrial 
Accident Compensation Insurances were expanded. The new military regime led by
1 17generals Chun and Rho took power during a very unstable political and economic 
period caused by the assassination of Park and the second Oil Shock in 1979. The 
regime strengthened their repressive control over labour and the democratisation 
movements, and it pronounced the liberalisation and deregulation of the market. At the
16 The 11th and 12th President (1980-1988).
17 The 13th President (1988-1993).
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same time, the regime declared the ‘realisation of the welfare state’ as a political 
rhetoric. In 1981, a set of social service legislations passed the National Assembly, 
including the enactment of the Elderly Welfare Law and the Disabled Welfare Law, and 
a full amendment of the Child Welfare Law. The coverage of the MI was expanded to 
workplaces with 100 or more in 1981 and 16 or more employees in 1983. In 1982, the 
coverage of the Industrial Accident Compensation Insurance widened to workplaces 
with at least 10 employees from those with 100 or more employees in the 1970s.
Table 4.8. Historical Trends of Major Economic Indicators and the Social Welfare 







Total Gov. Gov. Social Welfare Exp.c
Exp.b as % 
o f  GDP3
% o f total 
Gov. Exp. % o f GDP3
1. 5-year average since 1961
1961-1965 8.5d - 23.8 3.2 0.7
1966-1970 11.4e 12.3 23.5 2.7 0.6
1971-1975 7.9 15.6 20.4 1.5 0.3
1976-1980 7.0 17.4 20.9 1.7 0.4
1981-1985 7.8 7.3 20.3 2.4 0.5
1986-1990 9.5 5.4 17.8 3.6 0.6
1991-1995 7.5 6.2 18.6 4.7 0.9
1996-2000 4.6 4.0 22.7 4.9 1.1
2001-2002 5.4 3.4 25.4 7.4 1.9
2. Trends o f  5-year Average according to Regime Changesf
1988-1992 8.0 7.4 17.9 4.6 0.8
1993-1997 6.9 5.0 19.5 4.3 0.8
1998-2002 4.4 3.5 24.8 6.1 1.5
a. GNP until 1970
b. including general and special accounts
c. Expenditures o f  the central government on social insurance, public assistance and social services
d. 1962-1966
e. 1967-1971
f. Rho Tae Woo (1988-1992); Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) and Kim Dae Jung (1998-2002) Government 
Sources: Bank o f Korea, National Accounts, various years; Korea Development Institute (1987), Korean 
Public Finance fo r  Last 40 Years-, Shin (2000: Table 4.12 and 6.12); Ministry of Health and Welfare, 
Statistical Yearbook o f  Health and Welfare, various years.
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However, as stressed repeatedly, the legislation and the expansion of coverage in 
the early 1980s should be understood within the same context as the previous regime. 
Although it is evident that this legislation contributed to welfare state expansion in some 
respects, they were basically implemented for the purpose of securing the regime’s 
political legitimacy. In reality, the corporatist and liberal nature remains intact; the 
occupational division of the social insurance system was maintained, the introduction of 
Unemployment Insurance was cancelled under the reasoning of the ‘welfare disease’ 
and, different from their formal orientation towards universalism, the real contents of 
the social service programmes enacted during this period were restricted to low-income 
families (C.S. Nam, 2000: 27).
To sum up, under the authoritarian regimes, the major policy concerns 
concentrated on economic development, but state welfare programmes were only 
considered in order to gain their political legitimacy. The basic principles underlying 
social policy were that state welfare programmes should not be an obstruction to 
economic growth and that the financial burden on the state had to be minimal. So, 
income maintenance programmes were constructed mainly utilising social insurance 
and their coverage was restricted to the workers in large workplaces whose employers 
could pay the contributions. The minimised financial burden on the state was also aided 
by the strong familialism in public assistance and statutory social services. The state 
intervened only when the family failed. Really, the state was very hesitant to be a direct 
financer and minimised the scope of its direct welfare provision in social welfare. But, 
instead, it encouraged the welfare provisions of the non-state sectors and exercised a 
strong regulatory power over them, as shall be discussed afterwards.
4.3.2. The Market Sector: Growing Private Insurance Markets and Market 
Dominance in Health Expenditure
In Korea, since the role of the state in social welfare had remained residual, the welfare 
needs of most people should have been generally dependent on non-state sectors. 
Except for some privileged employees who enjoyed a substantial level of social
• 1 Qprotection from occupational pension schemes, medical insurance and the IAICI , most
18 Public employees, military personnel and private school teachers had been covered by some
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of the private employees in relatively small workplaces and the self-employed were 
virtually excluded from not only public social welfare programmes but also generous 
enterprise welfare programnes. So, until then, the welfare provisions of the non-state 
sectors for most people meant family provisions or individuals’ market purchases19.
Table 4.9. Principal Indicators of Insurance Business: 1975-2002
(per cent of GDP)
Year
Premium Writen 





1975 0.7 0.7 1.4 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.9
1980 1.6 1.0 2.6 2.5 0.9 3.4 0.8 0.6 1.4
1985 4.9 1.3 6.2 3.1 0.7 3.8 8.2 10. 9.2
1990 9.0 2.0 11.0 5.1 1.2 6.3 16.6 2.2 18.8
1995 9.4 2.9 12.3 5.9 1.5 7.4 17.4 2.8 20.1
1997 10.8 3.6 14.4 9.1 1.7 10.8 19.0 3.6 22.6
1998 10.4 3.2 13.7 10.3 1.6 11.9 18.7 4.1 22.7
1999 8.6 3.0 11.6 7.8 2.2 10.0 19.7 4.4 24.1
2000 8.9 3.2 12.1 7.2 2.2 9.4 19.1 4.2 23.4
2002 7.4 3.4 10.8 4.4 2.1 6.5 22.3 4.9 27.2
Sources: KIDI, Insurance Statistics Yearbook, various years.
Especially, related to welfare markets, the insurance industry grew fast during 
the 1980s (see Table 4.9). The total earned premium of insurance industries was 1.4 per 
cent of GDP in 1975 and the figure rose up to 2.6 per cent in 1980. In 10 years, the scale 
of insurance markets became approximately 5 times larger, from 2.6 per cent to 11.0 per 
cent of GDP. In 1990, in terms of the earned premium as per cent of GDP, Korea had the 
9th largest insurance market in the world, compared with 25th in 1982 (KIDI, 1983 and 
1991). It was largely due to the enormous growth in life-insurance markets during the
occupational pension schemes and medical insurance until the mid-1970s. For employees in large 
workplaces, along with a substantial level o f enterprise welfare, they had been entitled to the IAICI and 
medical insurance until the 1970s.
19 However, the development o f market provisions in social welfare such as individual pension, private 
health insurance and purchases o f private welfare services has been relatively recent one (mostly in the 
1990s). So, until the late 1980’s, what could have been regarded as welfare markets had been financial 
savings in private insurance companies and individual payments for medical services, which were not 
covered by social insurances. Hence, in order to understand the importance o f welfare markets before the 
1990s, we need to see the financial market in general.
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1980s. It is possible to say that such a fast growth of the private insurance markets 
indicates how much people had to depend on the market sector in meeting their welfare 
needs when the state welfare remained residual.
If private insurance markets exclusively depend on individual contributions, on 
the other hand, the working of market principles in traditional social welfare areas until 
the early 1990s can be found in the individual payments for health services. Until 1977 
when the Medical Insurance was launched, people should have paid all the fees for 
medical treatments directly. As the coverage of the Medical Insurance had been 
expanded, however, the number of people who had to pay all the fees for medical 
services had decreased. The Medical Insurance (the National Health Insurance after
1998) had covered only 29.8 per cent of people in 1980 but its coverage was 
universalised in 1989. Nevertheless, the benefit level and scope have been low and the 
proportion of individual payments for medical treatment has always been substantial; 
the burden of households in the gross health expenditures was 60 per cent in 1985, 53 
per cent in 1990 and 51 per cent in 1995 (Chang et al, 2002: 96). It was, and still is, 
because the real benefit level of most of the expensive medical treatments and services 
was low or none. So, the financial burden of individuals was exceptionally high when 
they or their family faced a serious illness and the availability of expensive medical 
treatments was highly dependent on the payment capability of individuals or 
households20.
To sum up, under a situation of undeveloped public income maintenance 
programmes, private insurance markets (especially the life-insurance market) grew very 
fast during the 1980s. Additionally, the low benefit structure of the Korean medical 
insurance system nurtured resulted in high individual payments on health services, so 
the market dominance in the health expenditure did not change even though the 
coverage of the Medical Insurance was enlarged during the 1980s.
20 Because o f its adoption of a fee-for-service system as a retrospective payment, when the government 
severely control the price o f medical services, health service providers have an incentive to provide either 
expensive medical services not covered by the NHI, or overuse medical treatments to get greater 
reimbursement from the NHI (Lee et al., 1999: 38).
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4.3.3. Enterprise Welfare: Substitute for State Welfare
In Korea enterprise welfare has meant more than mere fringe benefits. Korea’s initial 
programmes were introduced as a means to exert control over the low-wage labour 
force during the first stage of industrialisation. As the power of the trade unions has 
grown, it has been developed as the main pillar of industrial relations to maintain 
industrial peace. Most of all, the state has encouraged, or sometimes mandated, private 
firms to provide enterprise welfare benefits, as a kind of macro labour and industrial 
policy. In this respect, alongside the role of the family, it has offered a de facto 
substitute for the residual state welfare, regardless of its distributional effects (Choi, 
1992; Song, 1994, 1995; Hong, 1996, 1999; Park, 1997). In this part of the section, I 
will trace the development of the enterprise welfare until 1987.
Until 1961, the Korean economy was highly dependent on international aid and 
achieved hardly any economic growth. Since the main industry of Korea was agriculture, 
the scale of non-agricultural employment was very small, whilst less than 8 per cent of 
the working age population were employed in mining and manufacturing industry. The 
unemployment was pervasive and most workers were exploited under very poor 
working conditions. The first labour legislation, the Labour Standard Law was enacted 
in 1953. Although the law prescribed retirement pay as an enterprise welfare benefit, it 
was not a compulsory stipulation. Moreover, the major purpose of the law was to 
suppress labour unionism and socialism, rather than improve working conditions. In this 
period, employment per se was regarded as welfare. There was no substantial enterprise 
welfare, nor state welfare.
As discussed above, genuine industrialisation was launched in 1962 when a 
military dictator, General Park, occupied power through a coup d’etat, in order to 
legitimate his regime. The Export Oriented Industrialisation (hereafter EOI) based on 
low labour costs formed the main strategy of the authoritarian military government. The 
state initiated the EOI whilst private enterprises have provided its engine (Johnson, 
1987). In the earlier stages, the military government seemed reformist, but the 
government soon formed a ruling coalition with business, though an exchange of 
economic privilege for political rent. The EOI of Korea was based on the two direct 
government interventions in tandem, i.e. repressive labour control on the one hand, and 
nurturing domestic capital accumulation through credit allocation on the other. As there
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was not a substantial level of capital and advanced technology in the 1960s, the EOI 
meant encouraging labour intensive industry. So it was important to maintain low wages 
and to control labour forces. Although mandatory severance pay was legislated for in 
1963 and enterprise welfare appeared in 1960s, most programmes remained a basic 
level related to workers’ livelihood, such as dormitory provision, medical care and a 
canteen (see Table 4.10). Moreover, these programmes were also directly connected to 
the employers’ considerations about productivity through direct physical control. More 
importantly, the inequality of enterprise welfare between large and small workplaces 
had already appeared (Hong, 1999: 174). The initial compulsory coverage of mandatory 
severance pay was restricted to workplaces with 30 employees or more, so the scheme 
covered only 5 per cent of total employment in 1966. In addition, it was only possible 
for relatively large workplaces to provide the voluntary programmes.
Table 4.10. Diffusion of Major Non Statutory Enterprise Welfare Programmes 
Before the Financial Crisis in Korea
Programmes Before 1961 1962-1972 1973-1987 1987-1997
Catering or Canteen (*) * *
Dormitory, Company House (*) * *
Medical Facility (*) * *
Aid for Ceremonial Occasions (*) % *
Mutual Aid Association (*) * *
Culture, Sport and Recreation (*) *
Vocational Training (*) *
Evening School (*) *
Credit Association (*) *
Saving Support (*) *
Education Support (*) *
Housing Loan (*)
Intra-Company Welfare Fund (*)
Enterprise Pension Plan (*)
(*) Introduction and Expansion 
* Generalisation
Source: Song, 1995: 37; Hong, 1999: 172.
With the launching of heavy manufacturing industries based on the manual male 
labour forces, the President Park, who experienced a legitimacy crisis during early the 
1970’s, strengthened the basis of his political authoritarianism. As can be seen from the
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restriction of labour rights as well as wage controls, labour was thoroughly excluded 
and repressed. From 1980 the state forced an artificial industrial peace through 
legislating the establishment of ‘labour-business councils’ in firms. At the same time, 
the state’s control over capital, based on bureaucratic elites insulated from social actors, 
was also accompanied by more direct industrial policy instruments. This trend, despite 
differences in degree, continued until the 1980s. The state decided for a priority on 
investment, imported foreign capital and allocated it to domestic firms. So the state 
enjoyed a high level of relative autonomy vis-a-vis business. Firms (mostly Chebols) 
grew dramatically during this period, but they were sometimes forced to provide 
enterprise welfare at the expense of low wages maintained through the state’s labour 
policy. The compulsory coverage of mandatory severance pay was extended to 
workplaces with 16 or more employees through an amendment of the Labour Standard 
Law in 1975, and 44 per cent of paid workers were covered by the programme in 1980 
(see Table 4.11). Basically, despite its deferred wage nature21, the main function of 
mandatory severance pay was to act as a substitute for pensions and unemployment 
benefits when state welfare w/as virtually absent for general workers in the private sector 
(Bang et al., 2001; KEF, 1999; FKI, 1999b). Also, along with the state’s interventions 
like the Saemaul Movement (a government-dominated campaign since 1973), new 
kinds of voluntary enterprise welfare programmes were introduced to support the 
livelihoods of workers between 1972 and 1987. Such programmes as cultural and 
recreational facilities, vocational training, evening schools for juvenile labour forces, 
and support for workers’ individual savings and school fees were a supplement to the 
low wage system (see Table 4.10).
In summary, until 1987 the labour intensive industry of Korea required a 
maintenance of a low-wage system and industrial peace, and the state took a coercive 
line on labour policy. The pollicy was committed to the harsh repression of trade unions 
and industrial disputes. Based on the ‘hard authoritarianism’ of the state, employers 
were free riders on the state’s labour policy. The authoritarian state not only took a 
major role in industrialisatiom and industrial relations, but was also the most important 
determinant of the expansiom of enterprise welfare. For the cost of low wages and 
industrial peace maintained b;y the state’s coercive labour policy, the employers had to
21 The judicial precedents o f the Siupreme Court of Korea as well as the prevalent view in labour law 
define mandatory severance pay as a  deferred wage (J.L. Im, 2002).
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provide enterprise welfare benefits and programmes for their workers as the state levied 
the responsibility for workers’ welfare to employers. As a result, for core workers, the 
enterprise welfare benefits not only supplemented their low wage, but also were a 
substitute for the undeveloped state welfare programme. However, those facing 
relatively inferior working conditions (irregular workers and the employed in small 
workplaces), were often excluded from most of the enterprise welfare benefits and 
major social insurance schemes.
Table 4.11. The Coverage Expansion of Mandatory Severance Pay
Compulsory Coverage 
(size o f  workplace)
N o.of workers 
covered 
(Thousands)
Percentage o f  
total employed
Percentage o f  
total paid 
employed
1966 30 or more 453 5.0 -
1975 16 or more 1,228 11.7 -
1980 16 or more 2,841 19.7 44.0
1985 10 or more 3,786 24.3 46.7
1990 5 or more 5,366 29.0 49.0
1998 5 or more 5,786 29.7 47.1
Source: Bang et al, 2001: 3; Korea Labour Institute, KL1DB 2.5, 2000.
4.3.4. The Third Sector: Entrusted and Subordinated NPOs in Social Service 
Delivery System
The process of third sector development has been reflected in the rapid social changes 
since the 1960s. J.K. Kim (2000) argues that the legacies of rapid industrialisation have 
been influential on the third sector; i.e., just as the government has intervened in the 
market through allocating subsidies and credits as well as various regulation policies in 
order to ‘strategically foster the growth of targeted industries’, it has also induced the 
growth of the third sector. Under the circumstance of its dominant position vis-a-vis 
civil society, the state has not only increased its financial support to the third sector, but 
also utilised the third sector to provide social services that have been considered to be 
the government’s responsibility (J.K. Kim, 2000: 10). The state’s dominance in the 
development of the third sector, what Salamon and Anheier (1996) call the ‘statist’ 
feature, has been commonly indicated in many studies as a predominant feature of the
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third sector in Korea22 (J.M. Baek, 1994, 1997; J.K. Kim, 2000a; H.T. Kim, 2000b; 
H.K. Lee, 1998, 2000).
The origins of the state interventionism had already emerged during the 1950s. 
When the Korean War produced explosive welfare needs, foreign aid organisations 
dominated in providing the relief for the poor and needy. Although the government 
hardly contributed to social services in terms of delivery and finance due to its scarce 
financial capability, it chose an evident interventionist stance in terms of regulation (S.Y. 
Moon, 2000; H.K. Lee, 1998: 55). It decided who deserved to run welfare institutions as 
well as how those institutions should operate. It franchised, controlled and supervised 
social welfare institutions through various legal mechanisms.
Under the authoritarian military regimes, as mentioned above, economic 
development had been the only invincible goal of the regime and social welfare system 
should not have hindered that goal. In other words, the social welfare system of Korea 
could not have escaped its instrumental and residual nature. As a result, institutional 
care for the needy, whose family could not care or did not exist, formed the dominant 
social service provision until the late 1980s. The state intervened when the family failed. 
In 1970, the entrusted and subordinated relationship, which still remains as the most 
significant feature of the social service system in Korea, between the state and third 
sector organisations in social service provision was institutionalised through the ‘Social 
Welfare Service Act’. The purpose of this law was to define the basic principles of 
social services, including the state’s responsibility for social services, the scope of social 
welfare services, the licence of social workers and the introduction of a social welfare 
incorporation system (H.K. Lee, 1998: 58). The ‘social welfare incorporation’ system
22 On the other hand, some have recently argued that the Confucian tradition has influenced the structure 
of the third sector (Yoo and Chang, 1998; H. Kim, 2000). In Korea, the influence o f various affinity 
groups based on blood, region and school has remained pervasive, and particularism, paternalism and 
personal networks still work within people’s everyday life (Yoo and Chang, 1998: 127-137). Similarly, H. 
Kim (2000) argues that the Confucian tradition has formed particular third sector organisations different 
from Western civil society. Instead o f civic, professional and political associations, neighbourhood 
associations and affective linkage groups are more popular in Korea. These types o f organisation, based 
on Confucian culture, have been the main target of criticism because their particularism has been regarded 
as an obstacle to civil society development as well as modernisation in Korea. However, Yoo and Chang 
(1998: 139-144) assert the role o f affinity groups as an alternative that can connect individuals to the 
community. Also, H. Kim (2000) argues that those affinity groups and their vertical networks have 
produced social capital in Korea, and at the same time, the state’s paternalistic interventions have 
encouraged those particular third sector organisations. However, aside from the conceptual and functional 
ambiguity whether those affinity groups can be understood as part o f the third sector, it is almost 
impossible to estimate the reality, scope and scale of those affinity groups. Accordingly, the difficulty in 
estimation as well as the conceptual ambiguity makes affinity groups be excluded from analysis o f the 
development o f the third sector in Korea.
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can be characterised as a particular social service system to Korea (especially in 
institutional social services), and as the exact basis of the peculiar government-third 
sector relationship. The government has consolidated this system by entrusting the 
services under its responsibility to private organisations rather than providing the 
services through its own delivery agencies. Social welfare corporations can receive 
public funding but are obligated by the government to be entrusted with the ‘welfare 
replacement’ , and, at the same time, they are under the special supervision and 
guidance of the government. They are also entitled to levy and collect service fees from 
users (H.K. Lee, 1998: 59). As a result, the subordinated status of NPOs providing 
social services was institutionalised, and they have been placed as the vendors of the 
public sector. This institutional feature regarding the third sector and the government 
relationship has been called the ‘collaborative vendor model’ (Moon, 2000; H.K. Lee, 
1998).
On the other hand, until the late 1970s, almost all the foreign aid organisations 
had withdrawn, and thus caused a lack of funding for social welfare institutions. Since 
this meant a significant limitation on budgetary increases, the government began to 
encourage the de-institutionalisation of social services. Although the social welfare 
related legislation of the early 1980s was based on universalism, the social welfare 
system was not expanded significantly until the late 1980s. Instead, the government’s 
strategy utilising the third sector as its agent had been consolidated.
In terms of the advocacy function, the activities of third sector organisations 
were the target of the government’s control. According to J.K. Kim (2000: 8), until the 
end of the military regimes, QUANG024s had served the government in terms of 
manipulating people’s recognition and public opinion through their campaigns (e.g.
‘Saemaul Movement’ and ‘Bareugae-salgi Movement’). Since establishment was 
dominated by and their funding highly dependent on the government, the state often 
controlled their activities and operations. So mainstream civil society played only the
23 ‘The entrustment of welfare placement’ means that the government entrusts its legal social welfare 
services and provides grants for the service costs to private institutions. The basic notion of the concept is 
that public financial support should be deservedly accepted when NPOs care for the needy for whom the 
government is responsible. However, as direct grants may impinge on the independence o f NPOs, ‘the 
entrustment o f welfare placement’ was introduced to maintain a superficial ‘independent’ relationship 
between two sectors. Nonetheless, the NPOs cannot refuse ‘the entrustment o f welfare placement’ 
because it is defined as a legal obligation (H.K. Lee, 1998: 60).
24 Quasi-Non-Govemmental Organisations (Hereafter QUANGOs) are subject to the control o f the 
government. Although superficially these organisations are independent from the government in 
definition, their operation is severely dependent upon the government's support.
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marginal roles allowed by the regime. However, those organisations, which opposed the 
government’s control, became the target of political repression (P.M. Yoo, 1998: 80). 
Substantially, the activities, if not the existence, of civil society organisations, 
themselves, had been legally legitimised, yet remained marginal. The dominant form of 
social movement was ‘illegal’ demonstrations against the military regimes, which were 
organised by ‘underground’ social movement organisations (D.Y. Cho, 1999: 118). So 
the advocacy function of the third sector was marginal or repressive during this period, 
and the target of social movements was concentrated on political democratisation, rather 
than on social welfare issues.
To sum up, until the late 1980s, the state intervened in social services only when 
the family failed. So the coverage of social services was extremely restricted to 
narrowly defined target populations, and the dominant type of social services was 
residential care. In the delivery of statutory residential services, the government utilised 
third sector organisations. It entrusted its responsibility for care to the organisations with 
substantial financial support and, at the same time, exercised a strong regulatory power 
over them. Under these situations, the third sector organisations were virtually 
subordinate to the government, but the advantages of third sector provision such as 
diverse services and pioneering new services could not be expected. Moreover, as the 
authoritarian regimes controlled civil society, the voice mechanism of the (underground) 
social movement organisations was focused on political democratisation, rather than on 
the welfare issues.
4.3.5. The Family and Household: Primary Welfare Source
For the thirty years between 1960 and 1990, Korea transformed to an industrial society 
very fast; in 1960 more than 70 per cent of people lived in rural areas but in 1990 three 
quarters of the population resided in urban areas (see Table 4.12). The rapid 
urbanisation was accompanied by rapid changes to household structures; i.e., the 
decrease of stem family households and the increase of single person and other non- 
traditional households (Han Park and Cho, 1995: 121). As seen from Table 4.12, for 
example, the ratio of stem family households (three or four generation households) fell 
down most significantly, from 28.5 per cent in 1960 to 12.5 per cent in 1990. Basically,
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such a decrease in stem family households meant a decline in the co-residence of the 
elderly with their adult children. Nevertheless, In Korea, the importance of welfare 
provisions by the family or household has been larger than any other country. As many 
have indicated (Hong, 1999; Jung et al, 1998; Kwon, 2001; Son, 1998), in spite of the 
declining capability of the family revealed in demographics and household structures, 
the role of the family has been the most fundamental welfare source particularly when 
state welfare remained in a underdeveloped state.
Table 4.12. Transformation of Household Structure: 1960-2000
(No, %)
1960 1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
Ratio o f Urban Residency 28.0 41.1 57.3 74.0 79.7
Average No. in Household 5.6 5.5 5.2 5.1 4.5 4.1 3.8 3.3 3.2
Nuclear Family Household (%) 63.51 64.7 68.1 67.7 68.3 68.8 68.0 68.6 68.3
Type o f Household By Generation (%)
One-person Household 4.8 4.2 4.8 6.9 9.0 12.7 15.5
One Generation 7.5 5.7 6.8 6.7 8.3 9.6 10.4 12.6 14.2
Two Generations 64.0 67.7 70.0 68.9 68.5 67.0 66.3 63.3 60.8
Three Generations or more 28.5 26.7 23.2 20.1 17.0 14.8 12.5 10.0 8.4
Other (Non-blood) 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.1
Note 1. 1955
Sources: 1960-1990: Han Park & Cho, 1995: Table 4 & 5.
1995 and 2000: National Statistical Office [http://www.nso.go.kr/kosisl
According to De Vos and Lee (1993), the co-residence rate of the elderly was 71 
per cent in 1970 , and still 64 per cent of the elderly lived with one of their adult 
children in 1980. Moreover, they conclude that, despite a significant decrease in the co­
residence rate, young people still care for their parents when they need to be cared for. 
The relatively high co-residence rate helps explain that, while traditional norms had 
been the main motivation for co-residence in the past, co-residency has become more 
important in terms of substantial necessity such as child care among dual career 
households and saving on housing costs within large cities (De Vos & Lee, 1993: 388). 
Moreover, this kind of necessity has been met by the adaptation of new family 
behaviour such as ‘adjacent separate living’ (Chang, 1997: 28), and it has made it
25 If we consider that the co-residence rate of the elderly would have decreased as industrialisation and 
urbanisation progressed, the figure (71 per cent in 1970) means it can be assumed that most elderly lived 
in extended family households until the 1960s.
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possible that elderly parents and their (grand)children can look after each other without 
any damage to independent living. Therefore, despite significant and rapid changes in 
demographic and household structures, it does not seem that the importance of family as 
a source of informal welfare has been reduced fundamentally.
On the other hand, it must be mentioned that most of the elderly who do not live 
with one of their children have been dependent on the financial support of their 
children26 (Jung et al., 1998). In relation to the underdeveloped and immature public 
pension schemes, the private income transfers from their children have been the most 
important income source for the elderly, especially when there is a specific need due to 
health problems, poverty or other special events (B.D. Son, 1998). The role of the 
family as the primary welfare source has not been restricted to its provisions for the 
elderly. The family has taken almost exclusive responsibility in caring for infants, pre­
school children, the ill and the disabled. As mentioned above, the state hardly developed 
universal social services for ordinary people, but instead only intervened when the 
family failed in its service and caring provisions. In a sense, when considered alongside 
women’s increasing economic participation, the rapid decrease in the total fertility rate 
(FTR) between 1960 and 1990 paradoxically reveals that most of the caring burden had 
been levied to the family. Instead of providing direct public benefits or services, the 
government indirectly has lightened the burden on the family though income tax credit 
schemes; and income tax deductions for dependent family members like children, the 
disabled and the elderly (Income Tax Law, Article 51 and 53).
To sum up, demographic changes and household structure transformations until 
the late 1980s have been weakening the basis of family welfare provision in Korea. 
However, the majority of elderly people have lived with their adult children or other 
relatives or been depended on private transfers from their descendents. Moreover, their 
caring responsibility had not been socialised, but has been left as the burden on the 
family (mostly mothers, and/or other relatives), except when the family was dissolved 
or unavailable. Substantially, under the condition of the underdeveloped state welfare 
system with a strong familialism in the social service and public assistance system, the 
family has remained as the primary welfare source for the vast majority of people.
26 Such a traditional norm that children have to support their parents has been absorbed even in public 
welfare programmes. Most notably, the public assistance programme has never forgiven the principle that 
the elderly with adult (grand)child(ren) who are able to support them cannot be entitled to receive public 
assistance benefits.
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4.4. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I briefly introduced trends in environmental factors and political 
institutions in Korea. Since 1987, Korea has experienced rapid changes in its political 
economy. The Korean economy has greatly integrated into the global economy. The 
financial Crisis of 1997 and the following economic recessions indicate how the Korean 
economy has been getting gradually more fragile to the volatility of international 
markets than ever before. At the same time, Korean society has been transforming 
towards a post-industrial society, especially in terms of the change in employment 
structure to service-based and more flexible employment, a declining fertility rate, 
increasing single households and other indicators regarding family dissolution. It can be 
ascertained that the intensification of these external forces and internal pressures 
together has increased the social needs and demands that should be dealt with by the 
social welfare provisions of state and non-state sectors. It can be expected, therefore, 
that the welfare mix structure among the five different sectors would have changed.
However, it is a very hazardous assumption that environmental factors would 
automatically cause a certain change in the welfare mix structure. As discussed below, 
political variables are critical in shaping national responses to the changing 
environments. In this respect, the democratic transition since 1987 has been of immense 
importance to welfare politics because political democratisation has provided the basic 
institutional conditions for the emergence of mobilised labour, an active civil society 
and social pact politics. At the same time, it can be assumed that the changes to the 
welfare mix would be restricted by the context of institutional legacies, i.e., previous 
welfare mix structures and related state’s interventions in social welfare. The typical 
state interventions relating to the institutional legacies of the welfare mix have been (1) 
the income transfer system based on social insurance with minimised state financial 
support, (2) related to an avoidance of the state’s financial responsibility, the 
encouragement and utilisation of non-state sectors in social welfare provision through 
such interventions as the legislation for mandatory enterprise welfare, tax benefits for 
market and enterprise welfare provision, and the utilisation of the third sector in social 
service provision, (3) as the primary welfare provider, the emphasis has been on the 
responsibility of the family.
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Until 1987, the social welfare institutions of Korea had been thoroughly 
subordinate to the political and economic logic of the authoritarian regimes. Since the 
social welfare system should not hinder the supreme goal -  i.e., economic development, 
the coverage of the state welfare programmes was very restricted, and their benefit 
levels were minimal. Whereas some occupational schemes covering the core, privileged 
personnel such as civil servants, military personnel and teachers have provided a 
substantial level of benefit, the state not only attempted to minimalise its financial 
burden in the expansion of existing social insurance schemes but also was very reluctant 
to introduce new schemes. Instead, the state positively utilised non-state sectors in 
social welfare provision. Most notably, the NPOs were entrusted to take the state’s 
responsibility in social services and therefore the state could control them via various 
regulatory and financial means. Enterprise welfare programmes were introduced and 
developed utilising methods of various state interventions. The mandatory severance 
pay was a substantial substitute for pension and unemployment benefits, and other 
voluntary programmes also offered supplements for low wages and social incomes. But 
the social services provided by NPOs were targeted to needy groups without family 
members, and enterprise welfare benefits were limited only to the workers in relatively 
large workplaces. Under this situation, the vast majority of people had to depend on 
either their family or their own payment ability in the market. The insurance industry, 
and the financial market in general, grew rapidly in the 1970s and 1980s. In spite of the 
processes of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation, the family remained the most 
important welfare source. Adult children lived with their elderly parents or supported 
them through private income transfers if they did not live together. Most pre-school 
children were cared for within the confines of their family. To sum up, the institutional 
legacies of the welfare mix structure until 1987 can be summarised by, ‘a residual level 
of state welfare with a minimised financial burden; a growing market sector; an 
entrusted and subordinated third sector in social service provisions; for workers, 
enterprise welfare as de facto substitute for residual state welfare; and pervasive family 
provision as the primary welfare source for the vast majority of people’.
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CHAPTER 5. TRACKING WELFARE MIX EXPENDITURES:
1990-2001
Were there welfare mix changes in Korea between 1987 and 2002? If so, how has the 
welfare mix structure changed and which sector(s) had become more important than 
others? These are the main questions that this chapter attempts to answer. To examine 
welfare mix changes during the research period, this chapter firstly analyses welfare 
mix expenditure because the expenditure analysis has been regarded as one of the most 
important ways of measuring the welfare effort of a society. In this chapter, I propose 
new empirical research methods for an estimation of the welfare mix expenditure of 
Korea, and present the results of the estimations. Even though the expenditure study of 
the research covers only the period between 1990 and 2001 due to data restriction, we 
can expect that the various aspects of the welfare mix changes could be revealed 
through inter-sectoral comparisons as well as decomposed sector-by-sector analyses 
when we follow up the expenditure trends.
This chapter consists of five sections. The first section introduces the research 
methods for tracking welfare mix expenditure between 1990 and 2001. Here, I 
operationalise the components of welfare mix expenditure, and present detailed 
estimation methods and data sources. In the second section, I attempt to decompose 
welfare mix expenditure into sector-by-sector trends, to investigate why the expenditure 
trends of each sector have changed. Then, the third section examines the basic trends in 
gross welfare mix expenditure, the sum of expenditure in all the five sectors. In the 
fourth section, through inter-sectoral comparison, the main analytical focus turns to 
structural changes within welfare mix expenditure during the research period. In the 
final section, I shall summarise the major findings of the expenditure study.
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5.1. Research Methods for the Expenditure Study
As discussed above, despite the recent research of the OECD, it is very hard to find an 
empirical study where the analysis of social welfare expenditure is expanded to a 
genuine welfare mix approach, which encompasses all five sectors -  the state, market, 
enterprise, third and family sector. In this section, I attempt to operationalise the welfare 
expenditure of all five sectors of the welfare mix, and introduce the estimation methods 
for tracking welfare mix expenditure trend during the research periods. The scope of the 
welfare mix expenditure in the research is restricted to the social protection and health 
areas, as found in most of the comparative expenditure research of major IGOs. Now, 
let me explain the detailed estimation methods of the five sectors respectively. A 
summary of the contents and data sources is presented in Table 5.1.
The State (Public) sector
There is some variance in the definition of and estimation of public social expenditures, 
according to the different standards of different IGOs like the OECD (Adema, 1996, 
1999, 2001), ILO (1996) and EUROSTAT (2000). In the estimation of the welfare 
expenditures of the state (public) sector, I mainly follow the OECD standards, but there 
are some differences. In the research, the welfare expenditures of the state sector is 
made up by those expenditures on cash and in-kind benefits and social services 
provided by social insurance institutions, the central government and local authorities. 
However, the OECD’s category of public social expenditures includes not only the 
elements stated above, but also mandatory private expenditures. Mandatory private 
expenditures like mandatory severance pay, maternity pay, and sickness benefits paid by 
employers clearly have a social purpose and legally set by the state. However, there are 
some critical problems which apply to those OECD’s guidelines in the research. Most of 
all, the research defines five sectors of the welfare mix and one of them is enterprise 
welfare. Despite their legal and institutional features, their finance and provision are 
exclusively in the hands of employers. In the research mandatory enterprise welfare 
benefits should be included within enterprise welfare. Nonetheless, the data on the
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state’s expenditure can be obtained directly from the series of Kho et al. (2002, 2003), 
which followed the OECD guidelines, and have separated expenditure data between 
state benefits and the mandatory private benefits within their work.
The Market Sector
The forms of households’ market purchases of welfare goods can be classified within 
two main domains; one is direct payments for health and other social services, and the 
other is contracted insurance payments (indirect payments via insurance companies). 
Household payouts for health services make up an absolute part of the former fee-for- 
service type expenditures. Since the National Health Insurance system has continued to 
play a significant part in making co-payments for the insured health services and there 
has also been many services and treatments not covered by the NHI system, households 
took the largest part of the burden for health costs in the overall national health 
expenditure until 1997 (Chang et al, 2003: 95). The data on households’ direct payments 
for health services is directly available from Chang et al. (2003), which follows the 
OECD’s guidelines for the estimation of national health expenditure. In the case of data 
on households’ direct payments for social services, the data is excluded from 
estimations because there has been no available dataset so far. What must be indicated 
here, however, is that Korea’s social service market is just emerging and the scale of 
expenditures can be considered to be of little importance when compared with health 
service expenditures.
Private insurance contracts can be divided into two functional types; the first is 
private insurers’ pay-outs to the health services and the other is life-insurance pay-outs 
to the insured or survivors in case of the death, accident and illness. Both life and non­
life insurance contracts can provide for the claims for health services. The data on them 
is available from Chang et al. (2003) and the ‘Insurance Statistical Yearbook’ published 
by the Korea Insurance Development Institute (KIDI). As Adema (2001: 33) indicated, 
the life insurance pay-outs to survivors in the case of the death of the insured person 
evidently have a ‘social’ nature or social protection function. The KIDI’s data provides 
separate expenditure information on the claims for the death, accidents, illness as well 
as on pay-outs for contract cancellation and expiry which should be regarded as a form
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of savings rather than having a social protection function.
Enterprise Welfare
Korea is one of the most developed countries in the world in terms of enterprise welfare. 
Enterprises have provided for a significant part of the welfare benefits for their workers 
and most of them, more importantly, have been set up by the government in order to 
reduce its financial burden on social protection. This part of enterprise welfare can be 
called mandatory enterprise welfare, which is based on the state’s legal statutes. The 
most important element among mandatory enterprise welfare benefits is mandatory 
severance (or retirement) pay, whilst employers also pay for part of the wages when 
workers apply for mandatory maternity leave and mandatory sickness leave. Data on 
these mandatory benefit expenditures is directly available from Kho et al. (2003). 
Although they included mandatory enterprise welfare benefits within public sector 
expenditure in order to follow the OECD guideline, I separate them from the welfare 
expenditures of the state sector.
On the other hand, voluntary enterprise welfare benefits have also made up a 
critical part of entire enterprise welfare expenditures, especially when the labour market 
conditions remained stable before the Crisis of 1997. However, there is no direct 
expenditure data available regarding voluntary enterprise welfare expenditures, so I can 
only depend on an indirect estimation method by using a set of micro-survey reports. 
The data used here to estimate the voluntary enterprise welfare benefits are the ‘Survey 
on Enterprises’ Labour Costs and the ‘Survey on Establishment Labour Condition’ -  
both conducted by the Ministry of Labour (MOL). The formal survey contains 
information on all the elements of labour costs using a scale for enterprises (from size 1 
to 61) and the latter also provides the number of workers by the scale of the enterprise. 
For each category on the scale of enterprise, the estimated expenditures can be obtained 
through multiplying the per capita costs on voluntary enterprise welfare by the number 
of workers, and the total expenditure can be calculated by the sum of each category. 
Here we need the additional presupposition that the per capita costs of enterprises with
1 The Survey on Enterprise Labour Costs divides the size o f enterprises into 6 categories by the number 
of workers as follows; size 1 for enterprises with 10-29 regular workers, size 2 (30-99), size 3 (100-299), 
size 4 (300-499), size 5 (500-999) and size 6 (1000 or more)
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less than 10 workers would be same as those of enterprises with 10-29 workers (size 1) 
because the survey omits v e r  small enterprises with less than 10 regular workers .
The Third Sector
In the same way that it is difficult to set up the range and definition of the third sector 
itself, reliable and comprehmsive data sources covering the welfare expenditures of 
third sector organisations are hard to find. There are numerous voluntary groups and 
organisations that provide sccial services and other welfare benefits, but it is almost 
impossible to find the sum of those expenditures within the works of single researchers 
or research organisations. This is especially true when the research tries to estimate 
those expenditures made by religious groups. There are so many individual churches, 
temples and other religious organisations that are dependent on rather informal and 
individual activities that cannot be organised by central or federal monitoring agencies. 
In acknowledging this limitation, the best possible alternative is to estimate the third 
sector’s welfare expenditures but restrict the scope of the third sector organisations to 
only the NPOs according to national tax legislation like in the US case (Rose-Ackerman, 
1986; James, 1990; Salamon, 1995). Only once the definition of third sector 
organisations is limited to formal non-profit corporations (organisations) subject to the 
tax benefits of central and/or local governments, vis-a-vis for-profit corporations subject 
to corporation tax, then NPO’s expenditure information is directly available from one 
source of Korea’s official data - Korea’s National Accounts of the Bank of Korea (BOK). 
The BOK provides tens of sub-accounts and one of them is the ‘Final Consumption 
Expenditure of Nonprofit Institutions Serving Households’. There are several NPO 
categories (like sports, education and research, health, social welfare and so on) in the 
sub-account and we can obtain the welfare expenditures of the third sector by collecting 
the expenditure data of the social welfare and health categories only.
2 It was since 1998 that the survey began to cover enterprises of size 1. So until 1997 the presupposition 
should be expanded to size 1 enterprises; that is, the voluntary welfare expenditure of those enterprises 
with less than 30 workers is as much as those o f size 2 enterprises. O f course, these presuppositions 
would cause over-estimations, if not underestimation, but I made an inference that the estimation method 
applied here would produce better results than those excluding small enterprises’ expenditures.
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Family and Households
It is very difficult and. in a sense, sceptical to present the role of family as a type of 
expenditure -  it is very hard not only to get hold of informal and private income 
transfers but also to transform those services and caring into monetary expenditure 
figures. Here I shall only consider private income transfers as the welfare expenditures 
of the family because it seems more suitable that intra-family services and caring are to 
be dealt with within the dimensions of institutional features themselves rather than to 
dangerously transform them into an expenditure type without a generally accepted 
estimation measure or available data covering the entire research period. Nonetheless, it 
should be noted that omitting services and caring from the expenditures of the family 
inevitably underestimates its overall importance in the welfare mix.
Even the estimation of inter-household private transfers is not an easy job. First 
of all, the nation-wide private transfer income in the year of 2000 can be calculated by 
using the ‘National Survey of Household Income and Expenditure’, which has been 
conducted by the National Statistical Office (NSO) every 5-years since 1991 . Until the 
second survey, however, the national survey covers only the income information for 
workers’ households. For other years, therefore, I have to depend on indirect estimation 
measures again with some critical presuppositions to calculate the sum of private 
income transfers using the currently available data in Korea. For obtaining private 
household income transfers year by year, the ‘Annual Report on Urban Households’ 
(urban workers’ households), the ‘Farm Household Economy Report’ (farmers’ 
households) and the ‘Fishery Household Economy Report’ (fishermen’s households) are 
used. All of them are yearly reports conducted by the NSO. Since the ‘Annual Report on 
Urban Households’ does not include income information on urban self-employed 
households, I also presuppose that the private transfer income among urban self- 
employed households is same as that of urban workers’ households. With these data, I 
have calculated the per capita private transfer income of each category (urban, farming 
and fishery) and then multiply that by the number in each population. Finally, to correct 
the estimated result, I compared the estimated sum of private transfer income of 2000 
with the figure initially calculated by the ‘National Survey of Household Income and 
Expenditure’ in 2000. At the next stage, I could obtain the ratio between those two
3 The third survey schedule in 2001 was actually conducted in 2000.
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estimations and then multiply all the other years’ estimations by that ratio4. Such 
measures seem more valid for the estimations around 2000, but more error can 
inevitably be expected as the estimations go back to the years closer to 1990. This 
should be mentioned as a limitation to the estimation measures but, nevertheless, seems 
the best way under the given conditions of data restriction.




• Public social expenditures on social 
protection and health, from central and local 
governments and social insurance funds
• Kho et al. (2002, 2003). OECD’s public 
social expenditure excluding mandatory 
enterprise welfare.
Market
• Households’ expenditure on health 
including co-payments
• Directly both available from Chang et al. 
(2003), following OECD’s National Health 
Expenditure guidelines.• Private health insurance pay-outs
• Private life insurance pay-outs due to the 
death and accidents o f the insured
• Korea Insurance Development Institute, 
Insurance Statistical Yearbook, various 
years.
Enterprise
• Mandatory severance benefits • Khoet al. (2001)
• Mandatory maternity leaves
• Mandatory sickness benefits
• Voluntary enterprise welfare benefits •  Indirect estimation from Ministry of 
Labour, Survey on Enterprises’ Labour 




• NPO’s expenditures on social welfare and 
health
• Bank o f Korea, National Accounts, Final 
Consumption Expenditure o f Non profit 
Institutions serving Households, various 
years
Family
• Inter-household (intra-family) private 
income transfers
• Indirect estimation from, National 
Statistical Office (2000), National Survey of 
Household Income and Expenditure, 2000; 
NSO, Annual Report on Urban Household, 
Farm Household Economy Report, Fishery 
Household Economy Report, various years
4 All the estimation procedures stated so far can be summarised as the following mathematical expression, 
S(PIT) = E(PITu Nup, PITft-Nffap, PITfi-Nflp) R20oo 
(S(PIT)=Sum o f Private Transfer Income; PITu=Per capita Private Transfer Income o f Urban households; 
Nup=Number o f Urban Population; PITfa=Per capita Private Transfer Income of Farming households; 
Nffap=Number o f Urban Population; PITfi=Per capita Private Transfer Income o f  Fishery households; 
Nfip=Number of Urban Population; R20oo=Ratio between the estimation using three datasets and the 
estimation using the national survey data)
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W elfa re  P e n ta g o n  M o d e l  in th e  E x p e n d itu r e  S tu d y
It is possible for us to adapt the welfare pentagon model to an empirical expenditure 
study. In this case, as illustrated by Figure 5.1, a more useful framework for inter­
sectoral comparisons can be developed, which is composed by five lines. The level of 
welfare expenditure as a proportion o f GDP appears along each line. When the points 
indicating the spending level o f each sector are connected, a pentagon shape can be 
made. For typical examples, let me deal with the four cases drawn in Figure 5.1. 
Whereas country A reveals a ideal type o f a genuine welfare mix structure, B presents a 
state-dominated welfare mix, C shows a market-enterprise dominated structure and D 
indicates a state-family dominated model. If the four cases appeared in a country in a 
chronological order from A to D, the model would indicate a change in the structure of 
the welfare mix. With this welfare pentagon model, it is possible for us to compare the 
relative importance of each sector as well as allowing us to indicate the mixed state of 
welfare in neutral terms. Moreover, it enables us to count the overall level o f welfare 
effort and to compare one society with another. It can also be an important 
methodological tool when analysing the dynamics of welfare mix structures, which 
makes it possible to follow changes in welfare mix structure over time.
State
Fam ily >  M arket
Third Enterprise
C
Figure 5.1 Welfare Pentagon Model for an Expenditure Study
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5.2. Welfare Mix Expenditures: Sector-by-Sector Trends
The most outstanding feature of the overall welfare mix expenditure between 1990 and 
2001 was the increase in state welfare expenditure (see Table 5.2). In 1990 the state 
expenditure on social protection and health remained just 3.2 per cent of GDP but it had 
almost doubled by 2001. What is more interesting in the trends of state expenditure is its 
rapid increase between 1997 and 1999, when the Korean economy faced a drastic 
financial crisis and the following recession. Whereas the increase in the state 
expenditure had maintained a stable trend until 1997, its share of GDP rose up by 2.6 
per cent between 1997 and 1999. This was largely due to the rapid increase in social 
protection expenditure. During the same period, the social protection expenditure of the 
state rose to 4.5 per cent of GDP, from 2.2 per cent in 1997. The mass unemployment 
accompanying the economic recession in 1998 and 1999 gave rise to a rapid increase in 
unemployment benefits expenditure, lump-sum payments of public pension schemes 
and other government expenditures on unemployment policies. As the Korean economy 
recovered and the unemployment rate fell, the social protection expenditure of the state 
began to decrease from 2000 but, instead, health expenditure increased much more. 
While the social protection expenditure stuck at a 3 per cent level of GDP, owing to the 
health reforms of 1999, the state’s health expenditure increased by one third, from 2.4 to 
3.2 per cent of GDP, between 1999 and 2001.
However, the relatively rapid increase in state expenditure has not occurred 
alongside a significant change in its institutional structure. The expenditure structure is 
dominated by social insurance and has hardly changed; rather, it had been reinforced 
slightly until the public assistance reforms of 1999 widened its official coverage to the 
able-bodied. Really, the share of public assistance expenditure had decreased 
continuously between 1990 and 1998. On the other hand, showing a stable trend, the 
social service expenditure of the state held a relatively high share throughout the 
research period. But, we must remember that the greatest share of the social service 
expenditure was taken up by health and employment services, rather than personal 
social services. More detailed discussion of these issues shall be forwarded to the 
following chapter.
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Table 5.2. Trends of the State Welfare Expenditure
(Billion Won, per cent of GDP, per cent of Total State Welfare Expenditure)
Total Expenditure By Function (% of GDP)
By Institutional Type 













1990 5,651 3.2 1.4 1.7 15.2 19.5 65.2
1991 6,415 3.0 1.5 1.5 16.1 17.0 66.9
1992 7,979 3.2 1.7 1.6 14.1 20.7 65.2
1993 9,248 3.3 1.7 1.6 13.6 19.6 66.7
1994 10,943 3.4 1.8 1.6 12.1 20.7 67.2
1995 13,846 3.7 2.0 1.7 11.0 21.2 67.8
1996 16,331 3.9 2.0 1.9 10.9 21.9 67.2
1997 19,388 4.3 2.2 2.1 10.7 22.9 66.4
1998 26,513 6.0 3.6 2.4 9.5 21.9 68.7
1999 33,372 6.9 4.5 2.4 10.0 21.2 68.7
2000 29,287 5.6 3.0 2.6 13.0 22.7 64.3
2001 33,774 6.1 2.9 3.2 15.6 19.8 64.6
1. Expenditure on institutional services, community care, personal social services, employment services 
and other services related to ALMPs, and the health services (health expenditure o f the central and local 
governments).
Source: Kho et al., 2003.
Table 5.3. Expenditure Trend of the Market Sector
(Billion Won, per cent of Total, per cent of Health Expenditure, per cent of GDP)
Social Protection1 Health2 Total
Amount % Total Amount % Total S.H.E3 Amount % GDP
1990 185 3.6 4,938 96.4 91.7 5,123 2.9
1991 232 3.7 5,993 96.3 91.4 6,225 2.9
1992 297 4.0 7,055 96.0 91.6 7,352 3.0
1993 388 4.6 7,990 95.4 90.4 8,378 3.0
1994 531 5.7 8,866 94.3 89.9 9,397 2.9
1995 681 6.4 10,023 93.6 89.8 10,704 2.8
1996 847 6.9 11,466 93.1 88.7 12,313 2.9
1997 992 7.6 12,003 92.4 87.4 12,995 2.9
1998 1,074 oo bo 11,097 91.2 84.7 12,171 2.7
1999 1,252 8.7 13,204 91.3 84.3 14,456 3.0
2000 1,397 8.7 14,629 91.3 81.8 16,026 3.1
2001 1,402 8.3 15,410 91.7 80.8 16,812 3.0
1. Private life insurance pay-outs to the death and accident o f  the insured
2. Households’ expenditure on health including co-payments and private health insurance pay-outs
3. The share o f households expenditure in total health expenditure o f the market sector, per cent 
Source: own calculation from Chang et al (2003); Korea Insurance Development Institute, Insurance
Statistical Yearbook, various years
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Contrary to the dynamics of state welfare, the overall expenditure of the market 
sector seems static over the research period -  at approximately a 3 per cent level of GDP. 
However, if we dissect it again into social protection and health sections respectively, 
some meaningful findings can be extracted. Most of all, as seen from Table 5.3, the 
share of social protection expenditure, i.e., the private life insurance pay-outs to the 
death and accident of the insured, increased continuously, even though its share never 
exceeded 10 per cent of the total expenditure of the market sector. Along with the 
growing importance of private life insurance, private health insurance markets expanded 
gradually. In the research, the health expenditure of the market sector can be divided 
into two components; one being the household expenditure on health (including co­
payments under the Medical Insurance, or the National Health Insurance after 1999, 
system), and the other is private health insurance pay-outs to individuals and households. 
In 1990, the share of household expenditure had been 91.7 per cent but it decreased to
80.8 per cent by 2001. As a conclusion, despite the static expenditure trend of the 
market sector, the direct expenditure of households purchasing health goods and 
services declined, but instead private insurance markets grew significantly for both 
social protection and health.
Following on from the state sector, another dynamic trend can be found in 
enterprise welfare expenditure. The gross sum of enterprise welfare expenditure 
including both voluntary and mandatory benefits rose up by more than 50 per cent 
between 1990 and 2001, from 3.0 per cent to 4.6 per cent of GDP (see Table 5.4). As it 
has been known that, following the ‘Great Struggle of the Labour’ between 1987 and 
1989, enterprise welfare has expanded much since the early 1990s (Song, 1994, 1995; 
Park, 1996; Hong, 1999), there was a dramatic increase in the voluntary enterprise 
welfare expenditure between 1990 and 1992 -  the nominal expenditure more than 
doubled for two years. The share of voluntary enterprise welfare expenditure reached a 
peak in 1992, and then turned into a downward trend afterwards. Similar to the trend of 
state expenditure, gross enterprise welfare expenditure rose steeply by 1.3 per cent of 
GDP for a year between 1997 and 1998, from 4.4 per cent to 6.7 per cent of GDP. Such 
a rapid increase in the gross enterprise welfare expenditure was directly due to mass 
unemployment in 1998 because employers had to pay lump-sum mandatory severance 
payments or retirement benefits to the employees who lost or retired from their jobs.
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Table 5.4. Expenditure Trend of the Enterprise Welfare
(Billion won, per cent of Total, per cent of GDP)
Voluntary M andatory1
Total
Social Protection Health (Social Protection)
Amount %. total Amount %. total Amount %. total Amount %.GDP
1990 2,937 55.3 435 8.2 1,940 36.5 5,312 3.0
1991 4,572 62.7 429 5.9 2,287 31.4 7,288 3.4
1992 6,696 70.0 619 6.5 2,256 23.6 9,570 3.9
1993 6,609 62.9 711 6.8 3,192 30.4 10,512 3.8
1994 7,502 58.5 1,117 8.7 4,205 32.8 12,823 4.0
1995 7,626 55.0 1,080 7.8 5,157 37.2 13,864 3.7
1996 9,209 57.4 1,105 6.9 5,742 35.8 16,057 3.8
1997 9,031 44.9 1,303 6.5 9,786 48.6 20,119 4.4
1998 7,089 23.8 1,083 3.6 21,622 72.6 29,794 6.7
1999 8,191 35.1 1,521 6.5 13,636 58.4 23,347 4.8
2000 9,154 31.7 1,612 5.6 18,089 62.7 28,855 5.5
2001 9,888 38.6 1,843 7.2 13,873 54.2 25,605 4.6
1. Expenditure on mandatory severance pay, mandatory paid maternity leave and mandatory sickness 
benefits.
Source: own calculation from Kho et al (2002, 2003); Ministry o f Labour, Survey on Enterprises’ Labour
Costs and Survey on Establishment Labour Conditions, various years.
Between 1996 and 1998, whereas voluntary enterprise welfare expenditure 
decreased significantly due to the economic recession, the mandatory enterprise welfare 
expenditure multiplied almost fourfold. These trends began to reverse from 1999 and 
voluntary enterprise welfare expenditure recovered until 2000. So it can be 
acknowledged that voluntary enterprise welfare is very sensitive to economic conditions 
and, by dividing enterprise welfare expenditure into voluntary and mandatory types, 
there is a trade-off relationship between them. But, as an exception, mandatory 
enterprise welfare expenditure rose up temporarily during 2000, because an adjustment 
to the mandatory severance pay was introduced and many employees claimed in 
advance lump sum mandatory severance payments that had been accumulated so far. To 
sum up, in spite of some fluctuations since the financial crisis, generally speaking, 
enterprise welfare has expanded greatly in terms of expenditure. And, more importantly, 
due to the state’s previous interventions setting up the mandatory severance pay scheme 
through labour legislation (the Labour Standard Law), the enterprise sector had to pay a 
significant part of the cost of mass unemployment during the Crisis.
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Table 5.5. Expenditure Trend of the Third Sector
(Billion Won, per cent of Total, per cent of GDP)
Social Protection Health Total
Amount % of Total Amount % of Total Amount % of GDP
1990 99 71.0 41 29.0 140 0.1
1991 116 69.0 52 31.0 169 0.1
1992 138 70.7 57 29.3 196 0.1
1993 161 72.3 62 27.7 222 0.1
1994 197 72.6 74 27.4 271 0.1
1995 232 72.5 88 27.5 320 0.1
1996 262 73.0 97 27.0 359 0.1
1997 291 72.6 110 2 1 A 402 0.1
1998 325 73.7 116 26.3 441 0.1
1999 346 74.3 120 25.7 465 0.1
2000 371 75.1 123 24.9 494 0.1
2001 417 75.4 136 24.6 553 0.1
Source: Bank of Korea, National Accounts, various years.
Table 5.6. Average Transfer Income of Urban Workers’ Households and the 
Estimated Gross Private Transfer
(Thousand Won, per cent of Ordinary Income, Billion Won, per cent of GDP)
Urban Household Estimated Gross of 
Private TransferPublic Transfer Private Transfer
Amount % of inc Amount % of inc Amount % of GDP
1990 4 0.4 24 2.7 6,536 3.7
1991 5 0.5 32 2.9 8,474 3.9
1992 6 0.5 35 2.7 9,201 3.7
1993 6 0.4 33 2.4 9,299 3.4
1994 7 0.4 40 2.5 11,374 3.5
1995 7 0.4 43 2.4 12,387 3.3
1996 10 0.5 45 2.2 13,036 3.1
1997 13 0.6 56 2.6 15,905 3.5
1998 9 0.5 49 2.4 13,650 3.1
1999 11 0.5 57 2.8 16,206 3.4
2000 14 0.6 52 2.4 15,089 2.9
2001 23 0.9 52 2.1 15,090 2.7
Sources: own calculation from National Statistics Office (NSO), Annual Report on Urban Households, 
various years; NSO, Farm Household Economy Report, various years; NSO, Fishery Household 
Economy Report, various years; and NSO, National Survey o f  Household Income and Expenditure
2000.
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Lastly, Table 5.5 and 5.6 represent the expenditure trends of the third sector and 
family respectively. The expenditure of the third sector in both social protection and 
health remained minuscule throughout the research period, and its gross expenditure 
never exceeded 0.1 per cent of GDP. On the contrary, the private income transfers of the 
family have remained a very important income source. As indicated from Table 5.6, the 
share of private income transfers was maintained at 2~3 per cent of the ordinary income 
of urban households, but public income transfers never exceeded 1 per cent throughout 
the research period. It can be implied that private transfers are a more important welfare 
source than the public ones for the majority of the general population. Moreover, until 
the early 1990s, the estimated gross total of private income transfers had been larger 
than the totals of the state and market sectors. Nonetheless, it must be noted that the 
relative scale of private income transfers deceased gradually (from 3.7 to 2.7 per cent of 
GDP) over the research period.
5.3. Trends of the Gross Welfare Mix Expenditure
Before presenting the gross sum of welfare mix expenditure, it is worthwhile to remind 
ourselves of the recent OECD research on social expenditure. Although state 
expenditure on welfare has been regarded as a typical indicator measuring the welfare 
efforts of a nation in comparative social policy studies, the welfare expenditure of non­
state sectors has not been included in most cases. However, the OECD has developed its 
guidelines to produce net social expenditures that are internationally comparable, 
including the expenditure on some private social benefits. According to the recent 
research (Adema, 2001), private social expenditure, both mandatory and voluntary, is 
very important in the makeup of the gross total social expenditure in some countries.
As seen from Table 5.7, for example, whereas the public social expenditure (the 
state welfare in the research) of such advanced welfare states as Germany and Sweden 
were more than 25 per cent of GDP, the level of US expenditure remained 14.7 per cent 
in 1997. If private expenditures were included, however, the gross sum of the total
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social expenditure in the US rose up to 22.9 per cent of GDP. In the case of Korea where 
a genuinely mixed state of welfare can be highlighted as the main feature of its welfare 
model, the low expenditures of the state and the importance of non-state sectors should 
be more prominent. Even though all mandatory private and most voluntary private 
social expenditure in the Table 5.7 was held within the enterprise sector, the private 
share made up almost half of the gross total social expenditure. If we consider the 
market, third and family sectors together, it can be expected that the dependency on the 
private sector within welfare expenditure would be much higher. Presumably, one may 
argue that a more mixed state of social welfare in Korea could have offset for, if not 
substituted for, the state’s marginal role in the expenditure figures.
Table 5.7. International Comparison for Gross Total Social Expenditure, 1997: 
OECD standards
___________________________________________________________ (per cent of GDP)
Germany Sweden UK US Japan Korea
a. Gross public social expenditure 26.4 31.8 21.2 14.7 14.0 4.3
Pensions (old age and survivors) 10.9 8.4 7.0 6.0 6.4 1.3
Disability spending 1.4 2.5 2.6 0.9 0.5 0.4
Sickness benefit 0.3 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.0
Unemployment 1.5 2.1 0.6 0.3 0.5 0.0
Public expenditure on health 8.2 6.8 5.6 5.9 5.6 2.1
Other1 4.1 11.0 5.2 1.4 1.0 0.5
b. Gross mandatory private S.E. 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 2.4
c. Gross voluntary private S.E. 1.0 2.6 3.4 7.8 0.4 1.8
Pensions 0.9 2.1 3.1 3.6 0.4 0.0
Health 0.1 0.1 0.2 4.2 0.3
Other 0.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5
d. Gross total S.E. (a+b+c) 28.6 34.8 24.9 22.9 14.9 8.4
e. Public share in gross total S.E. 
(a/b, %)
92.3% 91.4% 85.0% 64.3% 94.0% 50.7%
1.including services for the elderly and the disabled; family cash benefits; family services, active labour 
market policies (ALMP); and other contingencies (e.g., cash benefits to those on low income)
Source: Adema, OECD, 2001: 13.
Now, I present my own estimates of the aggregated welfare mix expenditures. 
When we include those expenditures of non-state sectors, the level of gross social
129
welfare expenditure has been it least a few times larger than that of the state. As Table
5.8 and Figure 5.2 indicate, in 1990 the expenditure of the state was just over 3 per cent 
of GDP (also see Table 5.2) bit the gross total social welfare expenditure including all 
five sectors was 12.7 per cent of GDP. Indeed, the role of non-state sectors was far 
greater than that of the state sector, in terms of expenditure. Between 1990 and 2001, 
the gross level of welfare expenditure covering all five sectors increased more than four 
times when measured using the Korean local currency (from 22.7 to 91.8 Trillion Won), 
but its proportion increased by only 4 per cent of GDP. Even when we divide the gross 
expenditure into social protection and health expenditures respectively, such a basic 
trend -  a gentle increase in expenditure as a percentage of GDP -  does not seem to 
change; a 2.3 per cent increase in social protection and a 1.6 per cent in health 
expenditures. The incremental increase trend between 1990 and 2001 does not seem to 
indicate a dramatic change in welfare mix expenditures.
Table 5.8. The Gross Expenditures on Social Protection and Health
Total Social Protection Health
Amount %.GDP Amount %.GDP %. total Amount %.GDP %. total
1990 22,762 12.7 14,221 8.0 62.5 8,541 4.8 37.5
1991 28,571 13.2 18,862 8.7 66.0 9,708 4.5 34.0
1992 34,298 14.0 22,660 9.2 66.1 11,637 4.7 33.9
1993 37,659 13.6 24,500 8.8 65.1 13,160 4.7 34.9
1994 44,808 13.9 29,690 9.2 66.3 15,118 4.7 33.7
1995 51,121 13.5 33,501 8.9 65.5 17,619 4.7 34.5
1996 58,096 13.9 37,383 8.9 64.3 20,712 4.9 35.7
1997 68,809 15.2 46,061 10.2 66.9 22,747 5.0 33.1
1998 82,569 18.6 59,707 13.4 72.3 22,862 5.1 27.7
1999 87,846 18.2 61,379 12.7 69.9 26,469 5.5 30.1
2000 89,751 17.2 59,771 11.5 66.6 29,980 5.7 33.4
2001 91,834 16.6 56,570 10.3 61.6 35,263 6.4 38.4
Sources: own calculation from Chang et al (2003); Kho et al (2002, 2003); Korea Insurance Development 
Institute, Insurance Statistical Yearbook, various years; Ministry o f Labour, Survey on Enterprises' 
Labour Costs and Survey on Establishment Labour Conditions, various years; Bank of Korea, 
National Accounts, various years; National Statistics Office (NSO), Annual Report on Urban 
Households, various years; NSO, Farm Household Economy Report, various years; NSO, Fishery 
Household Economy Report, various years; and NSO, National Survey o f  Household Income and 
Expenditure 2000.
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Figure 5.2. The Gross Expenditures on Social Protection and Health as % of GDP
Sources: see Table 5.8.
However, at the same time, we can extract two important implications for further 
analysis. The first is that the stable trend between 1990 and 2001 can be used as a 
baseline when explaining the extraordinary fluctuations in some years. As a matter of 
fact, the most outstanding feature revealed in Figure 5.2 is a rapid increase in the gross 
expenditures during 1998. Between 1992 and 1996, the expenditures remained quite 
static, approximately 14 per cent of GDP. But the expenditures suddenly rose up to 18.6 
per cent in 1998. Again the expenditures increases reverted into a steady decrease 
afterward. It can be said that, although further analysis of expenditure trends after 2001 
is required, the extraordinary expenditures during the end of the 1990s began to return 
to the stable baseline from the early 2000s. The rapid increase of 1998 was due to a 
similar increase in social protection expenditures and, therefore, can be interpreted as 
the cost of the sudden devastating social problems caused by the financial crisis. 
However, the health expenditure presents a quite stable trend over the period, despite an 
incrementally increasing trend from 1998. The other point of note is that, due to the 
gentle trends in the gross welfare expenditures, the changes of importance between 
sectors are revealed clearly and more evident. In other words, if one or a few sectors’
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importance increased and other sectors remained basically stable or deceased, then such 
changes can be interpreted as structural changes in the welfare mix. Based on inter­
sectoral comparisons, more detailed discussions shall follow below. From now on, let us 
turn our analytical focus to the structural changes of the welfare mix expenditure.
5.4. The Changes in the Expenditure Structure: Inter-Sectoral Comparisons
The overall landscape of the expenditure structure of the welfare mix can be grasped 
using inter-sectoral comparisons incorporating all five sectors. In spite of the 
overarching stable trend in welfare mix expenditure shown in Figure 5.2, a rapid 
increase in the overall social welfare expenditure can be noted between 1997 and 1999. 
As investigated above, it was solely due to the expansion of the state and enterprise 
sector in the welfare mix. As seen from Figure 5.3, Korea until 1996 fundamentally 
presents the well-balanced nature of the welfare mix system among the four major 
sectors -  the state, market, enterprise and family -  even though the importance of the 
state and enterprise sectors began to increase slightly from 1993. In 1990, the 
expenditure of the family sector took the largest share of the welfare mix. Whilst the 
expenditure level of the family tended to decrease and the expenditure of the market 
sector remained steady over the period, the relative importance of the state and 
enterprise sectors has been outstandingly reinforced since 1997. The gap between the 
two groups, therefore, has widened due to the rapid expenditure increases in the state 
and enterprise sectors. If it is the case, why have these stmctural changes happened?
As the shock of economic globalisation reached its peak during 1998, the 
expenditure of the enterprise sector can be recorded at its highest point throughout the 
period. This was due to the massive increase in the mandatory severance pay-offs that 
employers had to pay their employees when they lost (or resigned) their jobs. Although 
the expenditures on voluntary enterprise welfare tended to fall, the increase in 
mandatory welfare expenditures overwhelmed the decreases in the voluntary enterprise 
welfare. Once the massive unemployment period had passed, the burden on employers
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for mandatory severance payments decreased but still remained at a very high level 
because of the following industrial restructuring processes, which have occurred 
intermittent1 y so far. Since the state has institutionally passed over its responsibility for 
unemployment compensation to employers, the expenditures o f the enterprise sector 
eventually increased dramatically due to the mass unemployment which took place in 
1998. This phenomenon can be understood by an interpretation that the institutionalised 
regulation set by the state at an earlier time induced the unintended rapid increase of 
expenditure in the non-state sectors.
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Figure 5.3. Trends of the Welfare Mix Expenditures: Social Protection and Health
Sources: see Table. 5.8
In case o f the state sector, a time lag phenomenon can be observed -  its 
expenditure level reached at peak in 1999. Although there were major institutional 
changes to state welfare including the universal coverage o f social insurances, public 
assistance and health reforms between 1998 and 2000, those changes could not instantly 
have contributed to increases in state expenditure levels. Instead, the government had to 
invest greatly between 1998 and 1999 to deal with the massive, but perceived as 
temporary, unemployment and the other social problems caused by the economic crisis. 
The government allocated more public finance in 1999 than it did in 1998. The state’s 
expenditure decreased in 2000 when unemployment reduced, but it began to increase
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again from 2001. Such increases seem to be due to the institutional expansion of state 
welfare rather than temporary state welfare programmes.
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Figure 5.5. Trends o f the W elfare M ix Expenditures: Health
Sources: see Table 5.8
However, the third sector has remained minuscule in terms o f expenditure levels 
over the period, and the importance of the market and family has faded or remained
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static. The family had taken the largest share in 1990 but took the fourth largest share 
from 2000. The expenditures of the market sector remained at around a 3 per cent level 
of GDP throughout the research period. Nonetheless, the family and market sectors still 
remain as some o f the most important providers o f social protection and health care 
respectively (see Figure 5.4 and 5.5). In social protection expenditure, despite the 
significant decrease over time, the importance o f the family should not be ignored; its 
expenditure level was almost same as that o f the state in 2000 and 2001. The market 
sector revealed a relatively consistent level of expenditure on health (around 2.7 per 
cent o f GDP) and it was after 2001 that the state’s expenditure on health became more 
important than the expenditure o f the market sector. In addition, the expenditures o f the 
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Figure 5.6. Private/Public D ichotom y M odel
Sources: see Table 5.8
To be able to find the dynamic nature o f the welfare mix, it seems useful to 
apply different approaches to the welfare mix by reorganising the classifications of the 
sub sectors o f the welfare mix; i.e., public-private dichotomy and public-market-
Nevertheless, it seems sceptical that private life insurance has a social protection function in Korea, 
especially when we consider Korea has one of the largest insurance markets. In 1999, the gross amount of 
claims paid in life insurance corresponded to 7.8 per cent o f GDP, but the proportion of claims paid for a 
‘social’ purpose (the death, illness and accident o f the insured) was no more than 0.25 per cent of GDP 
(KIDI, 2000). After all, life insurance in Korea seems to reveal the typical features of individual savings.
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community welfare triangle model. At first, the mandatory enterprise benefits can be 
classified as public because they are based on the state’s legal and compulsory 
framework, then we can draw up another type o f graph that shows the public-private 
dichotomy in gross welfare mix expenditures. As Figure 5.6 indicates, the public 
(mandatory) expenditure on social protection and health began to exceed that o f the 
private sectors from 1998 and we can conclude that such a sudden leap in the public 
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Figure 5.7. Public-M arket-C om m unity Triangle M odel
Sources: see Table 5.8
On the other hand, in terms o f the private-public dichotomy, the private sector 
dominance o f the welfare mix structure o f 1990 changed into a public sector-led welfare 
mix or, at least, a balanced welfare mix between the public and private sectors until 
2001. The share o f the expenditure o f the private sectors (the family, the third sector, the 
market and the voluntary enterprise sector) made up two thirds o f gross welfare mix 
expenditure in 1990, but the expenditures o f the public sectors (the state and the 
mandatory enterprise sector) exceeded more than half (52 per cent) o f the gross sum. 
Furthermore, when we apply Korea’s expenditure data to the welfare triangle model, the 
dominance of the public sector appears more evident (see Figure 5.7). Whilst the 
importance of community (the third sector and the family) and the market (the market
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and the voluntary enterprise sector) remained steady or decreased slightly, the public 
sector (the state and the mandatory enterprise sector) has emerged and remained as the 
most important sector since 1997.
Welfare Mix Pentagon
STATE
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Figure 5.8. W elfare M ix Pentagon M odel (Social Protection and H ealth, % o f G DP)
Sources: see Table 5.8
Lastly, Figure 5.8 presents the welfare pentagon model proposed above (Chapter 
2). Here we can compare the welfare mix structure o f  both the first and the last year. 
Compared with 1990, the expenditure of the state was double and the expenditure of the 
enterprise sector rose by 50 per cent in 2000. On the other hand, there was almost no 
change in the expenditure of the market sector, and the expenditure o f the family sector 
even decreased by 1 per cent of GDP. In terms o f expenditure, overall, we can 
summarise that, in spite o f the constant importance o f other sectors, the welfare mix 
structure o f Korea has changed from a genuinely balanced welfare mix to a ‘public- 
leading’ welfare mix, especially when mandatory enterprise welfare benefits are 
considered as part o f the public sector. Even so, the very mixed nature o f  the welfare 
mix in Korea has hardly changed and the role of the state, at least as a direct financer, 
remains very weak, compared with its Western welfare states counterpart as can also be 
seen in Table 5.7.
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5.5. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, based on the welfare pentagon model proposed in Chapter 2, I have 
attempted to indicate that there were significant changes in the structure of welfare mix 
expenditure during the relatively short period between 1990 and 2001. First of all, the 
genuinely mixed welfare mix structure had been transformed into a public-leading one 
by 2001. As seen from Table 5.9, the gross welfare mix expenditure increased by 4 per 
cent of GDP between 1990 and 2001, but this does not seem to be a dramatic increase. 
Nonetheless, the inner structure of welfare mix expenditure changed significantly. In 
1990, the relative importance of the four major sectors -  state, market, enterprise and 
family -  was roughly the same (one-fourth each) although the family sector took the 
largest share. By 2001, however, the state sector had become the largest sector in terms 
of the expenditure (36.8 per cent), followed by the enterprise sector (27.9 per cent) and 
the market (18.3 per cent) sector. The family sector, by contrast, had fallen down to be 
the fourth largest sector.
Table 5.9. Changes of the Welfare Mix Expenditure Structure: Summary
Per cent o f  GDP Per cent o f  gross W M expenditure
1990 1995 2001 1990 1995 2001
State 3.2 3.7 6.1 24.8 27.1 36.8
Market 2.9 2.8 3.0 22.5 20.9 18.3
Enterprise 3.0 3.7 4.6 23.3 27.1 27.9
Third Sector 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.6 0.6
Family 3.7 3.3 2.7 28.7 24.2 16.4
Total 12.7 13.5 16.6 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: see Table 5.8
Following the ‘Great Struggle of Labour’ between 1987 and 1990, the 
expenditure on enterprise welfare benefits increased significantly during the early 1990s. 
Between 1995 and 2001, the rapid increase in state welfare expenditure and some 
fluctuations in the enterprise sector dominated the overall expenditure structure of the
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welfare mix. Although the voluntary enterprise welfare expenditure decreased during 
the economic recession of 1998/9, expenditures on the mandatory benefits that the 
state’s previous intervention had resulted in, far exceeded the decreased share of 
voluntary enterprise welfare expenditures. The relative importance of state welfare 
expenditure increased to 36.8 per cent of gross expenditure by 2001. If the mandatory 
enterprise welfare benefits had been included in the ‘public’ category, from 1998 the 
public expenditure began to exceed that of the private sectors (market, voluntary 
enterprise, third sector and family) (see Figure 5.6). By contrast, as the relative 
importance of the state and enterprise sectors grew within the gross welfare mix 
expenditure figures, the figures of the market sector decreased even though its share of 
the market sector as a percentage of GDP remained at 3 per cent level. In addition, the 
gross value of private transfers decreased in terms of both the percentage of GDP and its 
share of the gross welfare mix expenditure. Lastly, in terms of expenditure, the role of 
the third sector was always marginal in the welfare mix.
Nonetheless, the welfare pentagon expenditure model remains a quantitative or 
monetary concept. Fundamentally, it cannot demonstrate the institutional and qualitative 
aspects of the welfare mix such as the coverage of state benefits, the inequality of 
market and enterprise welfare benefits, the pervasiveness of private health and pension 
markets, the advocacy role of civil society and some fundamental roles of the family 
like the co-residence of the elderly with their adult children. These features are of 
immense importance but almost impossible to calculate in monetary terms. In this 
respect, the expenditure study and analyses of institutional and more qualitative features 
should mutually complement each other. Our next task in the following chapter, 
therefore, is to demonstrate the institutional-qualitative features of the welfare mix.
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CHAPTER 6. THE WELFARE MIX CHANGES BETWEEN 1987 
AND 2002: DEVELOPMENT AND PROVISIONS
Whereas the general historical development of the welfare mix since the 1960s and its 
institutional legacies have been discussed in section 4.3, the focus of the research in this 
chapter is restricted to changes in the welfare mix during the research period between 
1987 and 2002. The main task of the chapter is to present and analyse the changes to 
welfare mix provision. Based on a wide range of empirical evidences on the welfare 
provisions of the five sectors, I attempt to illuminate the overall shape of the welfare 
mix structure and its dynamics during the research period. To do so, it is inevitably 
necessary to collect and synthesise all the split materials and analyses of previous 
studies on the separate sectors together, since I have hardly found any systemic research 
on the overall welfare mix in Korea. At the same time, based on reorganising various 
primary and secondary sources, I shall introduce new material and data of my own 
where other scholars’ works provide an insufficient empirical foundation. I shall sort 
and categorise all the data and information related to the various kinds of welfare mix 
provision and, based on them, provide new conceptual interpretations to develop my 
own arguments.
This chapter has six sections. From the first to the fifth section, I shall present 
and analyse the development and changes to the welfare provisions of the state, market, 
enterprise, third and family sector respectively. Based on this sector-based work, 
comprehensive discussion on the changes to the welfare mix and arguments on their 
path-dependent tendency will be dealt with in the final section.
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6.1. State Welfare
Fuelled by the political democratisation of 19871, the period between 1987 and 1989 
was the heyday of the labour movement in Korea and there was an expansion of social 
insurances at the same time. The National Pension Insurance (hereafter NPI) was 
launched in 1988 and coverage of the Medical Insurance was universalised for the first 
time in 1989. In the early 1990s, there was a massive swathe of social service legislation 
including employment facilitation services for the disabled, social services for mothers 
with young children and a child care system. The period between the late 1980s and 
early 1990s can be seen as the third wave of ‘massive social welfare legislation’ and 
some scholars named the period as ‘welfare explosion’ (Kim and Sung, 1993: 331). In a 
sense, the nature of the legislation in the third period seems quite different from the 
previous ones; whilst the former two periods of welfare legislations related to the 
emergence of the respective military regimes, the latter one referred to the exit of a 
military regime (C.S. Nam, 2000: 28). From this period onwards, the state began to 
adopt welfare legislation as an important strategy to cope with the overall socio­
economic conditions including the political dynamics within the labour market, and not 
just as an instrument to secure the regimes’ political legitimacy (Ibid: 30). In other 
words, as shall be discussed in the following chapter, it has been since 1987 that, based 
on the labour and civil society movements, welfare state development, and probably the 
welfare mix in general, has been subject to genuine interaction between environmental 
factors, political institutions and welfare politics.
Nevertheless, the basic perception of the government on the social welfare 
system hardly changed in the 1990s. Under the banner of international competitiveness, 
the government executed a set of neo-liberal economic reforms including a reduction in 
state intervention, deregulation of the market and privatisation of main public 
enterprises by 1997. All the programmes reinforced the logic of the market, and the 
social welfare system was not an exception to this trend. Instead, the higher political 
legitimacy of the Kim Young Sam government made possible even stronger market- 
friendly or market-confirmative social policies, without the need for massive social
1 See section 4.2.1.
2 See section 3 and Table 6.16 o f this chapter.
141
welfare legislation. As had been the case during previous military regimes, there was a 
wide recognition that the social welfare system in general should not impose a burden 
on the economy and the level of benefits should not hinder the incentive to work (Shin, 
2000: Chapter 7; H.K. Lee, 1999). Although the outline for the welfare state had been 
completed by the mid-1990s through the introduction of the Employment Insurance 
System (hereafter EIS) and the expansion of NPI coverage to the rural self-employed in 
1995, the basic orientation of the state welfare system -  a minimisation of benefit levels 
and the maintenance of a minimal financial responsibility -  was thoroughly retained. 
The social welfare spending of the central government for five years under the Kim 
Young Sam government (1993-1997) remained at a similar level to that of the Rho 
government (1988-1992); i.e., average 4.3 per cent of the total government expenditure 
or 0.8 per cent of GDP (see Table 4.8).
The real changes began to occur in order to cope with the drastic socio­
economic problems caused by the economic crisis in 1997. Under the Kim Dae Jung 
government (between 1998 and 2002), there were significant welfare reforms such as; 
first, the coverage of all social insurance systems becoming universal; secondly, the pre­
modem public assistance system was reformed to form a new system; third, social 
services for the disabled, the elderly and the unemployed were expanded; fourth, there 
was legislation about the common fund-raising system for private welfare institutions 
(the Korean United Way); lastly, all of these reforms required more public resources and 
the public social expenditure3 increased rapidly. Although evaluations of these reforms 
differ greatly4, the welfare reforms of the Kim Dae Jung government seem relatively 
progressive when compared with those of previous regimes. However, there has been 
strong evidence that the historical legacies of state welfare and earlier state interventions 
in social welfare remain within the welfare reforms of the Kim Dae Jung government5. 
The expansion of social insurance coverage was based on the existing institutional 
settings rather than on a more radical institutional change. Strong familialism remained 
even in the new public assistance system. In social services, the government still utilised 
the third sector rather than provided direct services. The government emphasised the
3 For the increase o f public expenditure on social protection and health including the expenditures from 
social insurance funds, see the expenditure study in the following chapter.
4 Refer to Epilogue.
5 Details on the historical legacies o f welfare mix changes including state welfare under the Kim Dae 
Jung government will be discussed in the Chapter 7. And brief investigations on the role o f the private 
sector and related state’s interventions are also dealt with in the remainder o f the Chapter.
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role of private sectors in the delivery and finance of social welfare provisions, including 
an expansion of the market sector. And, despite the rapid increase of public social 
welfare expenditures, the main share was paid for by social insurance funds but the 
direct financial burden on the state (the central government) still remained very low (see 
Table 4.8 again).
In this section, the state welfare provisions -  the social benefits and services 
provided by the state and other public agencies -  are categorised into three main types 
according to their institutional features; i.e., social insurance, public assistance and 
social services. Since there have been many studies on state welfare in Korea, I mainly 
summarise them, update them and add some data to them where necessary. From now 
on, let me investigate the major changes in state welfare provision, to begin with 
looking at the social insurance institutions.
Social Insurances
Most importantly, new social insurance institutions were introduced, and the coverage 
of all major social insurances, including the new ones, was universalised until 2000. As 
mentioned above, traditionally social insurances have been pivotal in the social welfare 
system in Korea because they were the only way in which the previous (military) 
governments could introduce social welfare programmes without direct financial 
contributions from the state. Therefore, the coverage of social insurance institutions has 
been expanded from the employees of large-size firms, from which the government or 
public administration agencies could easily collect social insurance contributions, to 
those smaller sized firms and the self-employed (see Table 6.1). Except for the National 
Health Insurance (the National Medical Insurance until 1999), which was universalised 
to the entire population in 1989, it was between 1998 and 2000 that the coverage of the 
other social insurances became universal. In the midst of the Economic Crisis and at a 
time of mass unemployment, the Employment Insurance System (EIS) covered the 
entire regular and a part of irregular workers during 1998 even though the EIS was 
launched most latterly (in 1995). This schedule was an earlier one than the original plan 
that was about to be universal by 2000. In case of the National Pension Insurance, 
launched in 1988, its coverage was expanded to the employees of workplaces with 5 or
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more in 1992, to farmers and other rural self-employed in 1995 and, finally, became 
universal in 1999, thus including the urban self-employed and the workers who were 
excluded from workplace schemes. At last, in 2000, the Industrial Accident and Injury 
Compensation Insurance6 (IAICI) covered all workplaces.
Table 6.1. Expansion of Compulsory Coverage of Social Insurance Institutions
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Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare, White Paper on Health and Welfare, various years; Ministry of  
Labour, White Paper on Labour, various years.
Officially speaking, it can be said that the coverage of social insurance 
institutions was universalised by 2000. However, with an exception of the public health 
schemes (the NHI and medical aid programmes), the real coverage rates seem far from 
the ‘universalism’ (see Table 6.2). Until 1985, the coverage rate of public pension 
schemes remained at 5.5 per cent of total employed because some privileged 
occupational groups -  soldiers, government employees and private school teachers -  
already had their own pension schemes from a time when the NPI scheme had not been 
introduced. The coverage rate of public pension schemes increased to 31.2 per cent 
when the initial compulsory coverage of the NPI was raised to workplaces with 10 or 
more employees. In 1995, when the NPI was extended to the rural self-employed, the 
coverage rate increased again. In the final stage, the NPI was universalised in 1999 and 
the urban self-employed were covered. Although the actual coverage rate almost 
doubled between 1990 and 2000, still 40 per cent of the total employed were not 
covered by one of the public pension schemes because around 5 to 6 million members
6 It is compensation insurance. It means that the insured o f the IAICI are employers and all contributions 
are taken from them.
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of the NPI had not contributed to it. Most of these non-contributing insurants are low- 
income earners, irregular workers, the unemployed and the small scale self-employed. 
The existence of such a large number of non-contributing insurants had largely been due 
to the failure of income assessments, the insufficient administrative ability of the 
government as well as contribution evasion by some professional groups (Kim and Kim, 
2004). On the other hand, coverage of the IAICI further reduced until 1999. This seems 
due to the fact that, whilst the legal coverage expansion had not changed during the 
period, the proportion of those employed in industry had decreased but new service 
employment not covered by the IAICA had increased continuously (see also Table 4.4). 
In 2000, when the legal coverage became universal, the rate increased by 10%. In the 
case of the EIS, the real coverage rate is the lowest because the majority of irregular 
workers are excluded from it.
Table 6.2. Actual Coverage Rate of Social Insurances
(Thousand, % of total employed, % of population, % of non-agricultural employed)
Total
Employed
Non-agricultural Coverage Rate o f  Social Insurance




1985 14,970 11,165 74.6 5.5 44.1(52.1) 40.3 N.A.
1990 18,085 14,629 80.9 31.2 Universal 51.6 N.A.
1995 20,414 17,729 86.8 41.1 Universal 44.5 23.7
1996 20,853 18,237 87.5 41.2 Universal 44.7 23.7
1997 21,214 18,644 87.9 40.3 Universal 44.2 23.0
1998 19,938 17,330 88.9 38.8 Universal 42.8 29.7
1999 20,291 17,765 87.6 58.5 (85.7) Universal 41.9 34.1
2000 21,156 18,650 88.2 60.9 (81.9) Universal 50.9 36.2
2001 21,572 19,125 88.7 59.9 (80.7) Universal 55.3 36.1
1. The gross sum o f the actual coverage of the National Pension Insurance, the Government Employees 
Pension and Private School Teacher’s Pension schemes as a percentage o f the total employed. The figure 
in brackets from 1999 is the ratio including the number of non-contributing regional insurants.
2. In 1985, 44.1 per cent o f the population was covered by the Medical Insurance. If we include medical 
aid programmes, the coverage rate o f public health programmes was 52.1 per cent. Universal coverage 
from 1989, included beneficiaries o f medical aid programmes.
3. The Industrial Accident and Injury Compensation Insurance, as percentage o f the non-agricultural 
employed.
4. The Employment Insurance System, as percentage of the non-agricultural employed.
Sources: Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Statistical Yearbook o f  Health and Welfare, various years; Korea 
Labour Institute, KLI Labour Statistics, various years.
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Table 6.3. International Comparison for the Labour Market Structure: 1998








Sweden 89 78 11 0 10
Norway 92 81 10 1 8
Germany 89 78 11 1 10
France 89 77 12 0 11
Netherlands 88 77 11 1 11
Italy 72 65 6 4 24
UK 87 81 6 1 12
US 92 - - 0 8
Japan 83 73 10 6 12
Korea 62 30 32 9 29
Sources: National Statistical Office (Korea), Ministry of Labour (Japan), and Labour Force Statistics 1999 
(OECD 2000: 37); all recited from M.K. Jung (2002: 421).







Paid Employed (Total) 51.8 52.3 54.3 55.1 46.9 47.4
Regular Employed 92.7 92.2 94.8 94.6 80.0 79.1
Irregular Employed 19.3 21.5 22.2 24.8 20.7 23.2
1. Ratio of workplace insurants, half o f their social insurance contributions are paid by employers. 
Regional insurants have to pay all the contributions by themselves. The state only supports rural NHI 
insurants for an amount corresponding to the half o f the NHI contribution o f the lowest income bracket. 
Source: Jung et al., 2004: 393.
However, the actual coverage rates of social insurance institutions have been far 
from universal. These issues are closely related to the structural problems of the labour 
market in Korea. Traditionally, whereas the proportion of the self-employed and their 
non-paid family workers has been high, the proportion of the paid employed began to 
exceed 60 per cent of the total employed after 1990 (see Table 4.4). The existence of 
such a high proportion of self-employed and their non-paid family workers seems more 
outstanding when compared to the labour market structure of other OECD nations. As 
seen in Table 6.3, whereas more than 80 per cent of the total employed were paid
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employed in most other OECD nations (except Italy), the rate was only 62 per cent in 
Korea. Since the IAICI and EIS have been mainly targeted towards industrial 
employees, the existence of such a large number of the self- employed people led to a 
relatively low actual coverage rate for them. Also, as mentioned above, it has been the 
main barrier to the expansion of the NPI scheme because there have been severe 
difficulties in the income assessment process as well as the administrative ability of the 
government to cover small scale self-employed workers.
Moreover, what has made matters worse since the financial crisis has been the 
increase in irregular employment. The rising irregular employment problem and the 
issue of the social exclusion of irregular workers have appeared as one of the most 
contentious issues in recent social policy debate in Korea (Ahn et al., 2001; J.K. Kim, 
2001, 2002; Y.M. Kim, 2001; Y.S. Kim, 2001; M.K. Jung, 2000, 2002; Jung et al., 2004). 
As repeatedly indicated, social insurance is the main type of institution in the overall 
social welfare system in Korea, and to be covered by social insurance systems workers 
are required to be employed in a stable workplace so that they and their employers can 
pay social insurance contributions. However, as discussed in chapter 4, due to the 
Economic crisis and following restructuring, the speed of the increase in the number of 
irregular workers dramatically accelerated (see Table 4.4). In 1995, the ratio of regular 
workers was 58.1 per cent of total paid workers, but from 1999 it decreased to below 50 
per cent. Table 6.3 indicates that the ratio of regular paid workers corresponded to 30 
per cent of the total employment in 1998. According to Hwang (2000), in 2000 58.4 per 
cent of total paid employment jobs were irregular jobs. It therefore can be said that the 
relatively low actual coverage rates shown in Table 6.2 were largely due to the rapid 
increase in irregular employment, or structural changes to the labour market in general. 
As a matter of fact, Table 6.4 shows that the majority of irregular workers are excluded 
from major social insurance systems; whereas more than 90 per cent of regular workers 
are covered by the workplace schemes of the NPI and the NHI (half of their
n t
contributions paid by their employers ), most irregular workers (75~80%) are excluded 
from the social insurance coverage or placed in the regional scheme (all the contribution 
are therefore paid by themselves). In case of the EIS, approximately 80 per cent of 
regular workers are covered by it, but more than 80 per cent of irregular workers are
7 Along with the self-employed, employees o f workplaces with 4 or less or most irregular workers have 
to be placed with the regional insurants, without employers’ social insurance (NPI and NHI schemes) 
contributions.
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excluded from it. Similarly, it is known that 60% of irregular workers were not covered 
by the IAICI in 2000 (J.W. Hong, 2000).
Public Assistance8
One of the most important reforms during the research period was the enactment of the 
‘Basic Livelihood Security Law’ of 1999. It replaced the existing ‘Livelihood Protection 
Act’, which was enacted by and amended a few times by military regimes. Some have 
evaluated that, despite a few critiques, the public assistance system in Korea has 
become modernised (J.Y. Moon, 2001; Y.M. Kim, 2002; B.Y. Ahn, 2000). Under the old 
public assistance programmes which continued until September, 2000, the recipients 
were categorised into two major groups. The first group that was entitled to receive 
livelihood protection benefit was very restricted according to a set of conditionalities; 
means-tests, demographic conditionality and the ‘condition of support obligator’9. The 
other group included the able-bodied but met the means-tested requirement. The number 
of recipients of livelihood assistance benefits, self-reliance benefits and medical aid 
decreased continuously until 1998, and the government budget never exceeded 0.2 per 
cent of GDP. However, this by no means indicates that more and more people escaped 
from poverty, but just points out the custom that the government set its budget first and 
then allocated to a number of recipients under its fixed budget (W.O.Jung, 1998; H.K. 
Lee, 1993).
The old Livelihood Protection programmes, however, could not cope with the 
mass-unemployment and rising poverty problems between 1998 and 1999, following 
the financial crisis. For most of the unemployed, no public benefit was available; the 
EIS was pre-mature and they were not entitled to livelihood protection benefits because 
they were able to work. Accordingly, in April 1998 the government introduced the 
‘Temporary Livelihood Protection System’ for those who were not covered by the EIS.
8 More detailed processes of public assistance reforms shall be discussed in the following chapter. Here I 
only attempt to introduce briefly the trends in public assistance provision.
9 Under the past the Livelihood Protection Act, livelihood protection was given to those meeting all the 
conditionalities as follows; first, a demographic condition that those who cannot work because they are 
elderly, children, disabled or widowed; second, a means tested conditionality that their income and assets 
should be under the guideline set by the government; third, they must not have family or kin who can 
support them.
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It provided the low-income unemployed with temporary livelihood protection benefit 
and public temporary jobs. The number of recipients totalled 311 thousand in 1998 and 
570 thousand in 1999. In addition, the expenditure on support for low-income 
households had more than doubled between 1997 and 1999 (see Table 6.5), from 0.2 to 
0.4 per cent of GDP. At the same time, social movements10 for public assistance reform 
began to be more active, and their voice influenced the new government’s reform plan. 
The socially devastated situation at that time became an effective instrument to confront 
the opposite arguments of capital and conservatives.
Table 6.5. Main Indicators of Public Assistance Programmes
(Thousand, per cent of total population, Billion won, per cent of GDP)
Recipients Gov’t Budget1
Livelihood Self-reliance Medical aid Bn won % o f GDP
1985 345 (0.8) 1,928 (4.7) 3,259 (8.0) 148 0.2
1990 421 (1.0) 1,835 (4.2) 3,930 (9.2) 386 0.2
1995 385 (0.9) 1,370 (3.0) 1,990 (4.4) 574 0.2
1997 374 (0.8) 1,040 (2.3) 1,642 (3.6) 927 0.2
1998 377 (0.8) 798 (1.7) 1,323 (2.8) 1,121 0.2
1999 409 (0.9) 766(1.6) 1,637 (3.5) 1,945 0.4
Basic Livelihood Security Med. Benefit
* 2000 1,489 (3.2) 1,570 (3.3) 2,409 0.5
2001 1,420 (3.0) 1,503 (3.2) 3,270 0.6
2002 1,351 (2.8) 1,421 (3.0) 3,403 0.6
1. Support for low income households only, i.e. Livelihood Protection (Basic Livelihood Security) and 
medical aid programmes, excluding supports for veterans and survivors, natural disaster victims and the 
refugees from North Korea.
Sources: Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Statistical Yearbook o f Health and Welfare, various years.
Under the public assistance reforms, the paternalistic feature of the system was 
replaced by a social right and demographic conditionality was abolished. In addition, 
the existing flat rate benefits were replaced by supplementary benefits. The abolition of 
demographic conditionality allowed the number of livelihood benefit recipients to be 
multiplied by three and half times; from 409 thousand in 1999 to 1489 thousand in 2000. 
The government budget for public assistance programmes has increased rapidly and is
10 In reality, there already had been the movement dominated by a civil movement organisation (PSPD: 
People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy, established in 1994) and a few related scholars. See the 
following chapter.
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up to 0.6 per cent of GDP (see Table 6.5). But the abolition of demographic 
conditionality has been accompanied by workfare conditions for those who have the 
ability to work. They have been entitled to livelihood benefit on the condition that they 
participate in the workfare programmes run by government and other public agencies. 
Nevertheless, the underdeveloped nature of the previous public assistance system has 
also been reflected in the government’s primary concern for ‘family responsibility’. 
However poor they were, the old public assistance programmes did not make payments 
to recipients who had family able to support them. Unfortunately, this primary principle 
of family responsibility has been maintained in the new public assistance system under 
the guise of ‘the condition of support obligator’11.
Social Services
Whilst income security looks to rectify problems with the distribution mechanism of the 
market, social services are the social mechanism that supplements and prevents the 
failure of the family’s socialisation, reproduction and caring functions. Generally 
speaking, where the tradition of familialism is stronger, the slower the speed of social 
service development a larger resistance to the social service system is expected (H.K. 
Lee, 2000: 194-7). As in the public assistance system, the state has intervened in the 
traditional family domain only when family’s functions fail. Traditionally, as discussed 
in the chapter 4, the state’s responsibility as a provider of social services has been 
relatively restricted and its role has been mainly as a regulator and financial supporter. 
Even when the problem of family dissolution during the Economic Crisis was severe, 
the state depended upon reforms related to income security yet hardly reformed the 
social service system. Similar to the principle of the ‘condition of support obligator’ in 
public assistance, the state has not replaced or complemented the role of family but has 
maintained the ‘subsidiarity principle’ that can be found in Conservative welfare states 
(C.S.Nam, 2002: 167-9).
Nevertheless, there had been some development of social services in the 1990s. 
Firstly, despite far from universal social services, the number of social service 
institutions including nurseries, community welfare service centres and day-care
11 For details, see footnote 5 o f Chapter 4.
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facilities for the disabled, elderly and children increased under the financial supports of
1 9the state . As seen from Table 6.6, the expenditure on personal social services including 
residential care and non-residential services, increased steadily. Of course, the 
government still has utilised third sector organisations in the delivery of social services, 
rather than expanded public social service programmes, and most government 
expenditure has made up their financial supports. Secondly, there was some 
improvement to the state’s indirect intervention through legislation and regulation. A set 
of legislation concerning sexual and domestic violence was enacted to set the legal 
foundation for the related social services for women. In 1998, the government initiated 
compulsory regulation over the convenience facilities for the disabled in public places. 
In addition, in 2000 the categories of disablement widened to incorporate some kinds of 
chronic illness including autism and a few cases of kidney and heart disease.
Table 6.6. Social Service Expenditure of the State Sector
(Billion Won, per cent of GDP)
Total Residential3 Non-res. svcb Employm ent Health svcd
%GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP %GDP
1990 1,103 0.62 52 0.03 104 0.06 100 0.06 846 0.47
1991 1,090 0.50 64 0.03 128 0.06 97 0.04 801 0.37
1992 1,652 0.67 74 0.03 174 0.07 166 0.07 1,238 0.50
1993 1,817 0.65 85 0.03 239 0.09 189 0.07 1,304 0.47
1994 2,261 0.70 123 0.04 297 0.09 319 0.10 1,523 0.47
1995 2,935 0.78 138 0.04 424 0.11 418 0.11 1,956 0.52
1996 3,578 0.86 163 0.04 580 0.14 501 0.12 2,334 0.56
1997 4,446 0.98 216 0.05 797 0.18 808 0.18 2,626 0.58
1998 5,799 1.31 216 0.05 840 0.19 2,049 0.46 2,694 0.61
1999 7,090 1.47 197 0.04 915 0.19 3,056 0.63 2,922 0.61
2000 6,657 1.28 258 0.05 1,152 0.22 2,276 0.44 2,970 0.57
2001 6,701 1.21 355 0.06 1,357 0.25 1,483 0.27 3,506 0.64
a. Residential care for the disabled, the elderly and children
b. Non-residential services include home care, home-help, day care and other personal social services for
the disabled, the elderly, children and women.
c. Employment and other related services for workers. This category includes public employment creation, 
vocational training and employment services for the disabled and the elderly.
d. Public health services including state hospitals for the disabled and special patients, public health 
centres, public hygienic, disinfections and etc.
Source: Kho et. al. (2003); Bank o f Korea, National Accounts, various years
12 Since the government has utilised the third sector in social service provision and encouraged welfare 
pluralism including the market sector, detailed discussions o f the trends in social service provision pass 
over to the following sections of this chapter.
151
Table 6.7. Public Employment Service Agencies
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Employment Counsellor 40 100 1,296 1,825 1,919 1,949
Employment Agencies Total 52 53 134 157 149 191
Regional Labour Office 46 46 - - - -
Employment Security Centre3 - - 99 122 126 168
Manpower Bank 3 7 20 20 7 7
Otherb 3 - 15 15 16 16
a. Established from 1998, a few divisions o f regional labour offices became independent agencies for one-
stop employment related services, 
b. Employment Service Centre for Professionals and Job Centres for Daily Workers 
Source: Korea Public Administration Association, 2002: Table 2.3 and Table 5.2.
Thirdly, in 1998 the Social Welfare Collaborative Fund Raising Conference 
(SWCFRC, which is called the ‘Korean United Way’) was established by a 
government’s legislation. Despite the government’s various interventions, the SWCFRC 
has been successful in terms of the establishment of collaborative private fund raising 
and distribution system. Lastly, after the Economic Crisis and the mass unemployment 
of 1998, public employment service system was expanded. As shown in Table 6.7, the 
number of public employment service agencies almost tripled between 1997 and 1999; 
53 agencies in 1997, 134 in 1998 and 157 agencies in 1999. The increase of 
professional employment counsellors was more dramatic; from a hundred in 1997 to 
almost two thousands counsellors in 2000. In 1999, for example, the employment 
agencies connected 31.9 thousand among 1.7 million job-seekers enrolled in the 
agencies (MOL, 2000: 129-30).
6.2. The Market Sector
According to the expenditure study of the previous section, the expenditure scale of the 
market sector revealed a static trend during the research period, i.e., approximately 3 per
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cent of GDP. However, it is hard to say that the importance of the market sector has also 
stagnated within the overall welfare mix structure of Korea. There is strong evidence 
that indicates the growth of the market sector in welfare provisions during the 1990s. 
The main features of welfare markets are conceptualised as growing private insurance 
markets, private dominance in health expenditure and growing private social service 
markets. That is to say, private insurance markets related to pension and health schemes 
have emerged and grown, and the dominance of the private sector in health expenditure 
has fundamentally remained. In addition, when the government began to commit to 
welfare pluralism in social services, market providers could have entered the personal 
social service markets (Baek, 1997). The analyses of these three trends has been 
substantially based on existing studies -  like Park and Kim (2001) in private health 
insurance, Chang et al. (2002) in financial structure of health expenditure, and Kim and 
Shin (2003) in private employment services -  but I also include my own analysis of 
primary data on life-insurance pay-outs, private individual pension schemes, and other 
welfare service markets.
Growing Private Insurance Markets
In the 1980s, as mentioned above (Chapter 4), private insurance markets had grown fast 
because commercial banks had provided relatively low interest rates under the 
government’s industrial policy. Traditionally, for most people life insurances have not 
been differentiated from other types of financial savings. So the security function of life 
insurance has been very weak in Korea because people have cancelled life insurance 
contracts in times of financial difficulty. As seen from Table 6.8, more than half of the 
total pay-outs from life insurance contracts have been due to cancellation (surrender). 
Particularly, during the drastic economic recession between 1997 and 1999, there was a 
massive number of cancellations of life insurance contracts. Due to the massive 
cancellations, the total pay-outs rose to 10.3 per cent of GDP in 1998, and 5.9 per cent 
when the economic recession was the most severe in 1995. Paradoxically, these figures 
indicate the importance of the market sector in people’s lives as well as the fragility of 
private schemes during times of economic recession, especially when the state welfare 
system had not matured or remained residual.
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Table 6.8. Details of Pay-outs of Life Insurance
(B illion^onjier cent of GDP,_per cent of total pay-outs)
Total Pay-outs % o f Total Pay-outs
Bn won % o f GDP Claim Paid Refunds (Surrender) Other
1985 2,490 3.1 42.1 56.5 (50.5) 1.4
1990 9,094 5.1 27.6 68.8 (60.8) 3.6
1995 22,404 5.9 22.4 75.4 (61.0) 2.2
1997 41,176 9.1 15.7 82.4 (71.6) 1.9
1998 45,654 10.3 18.3 79.7 (65.6) 2.0
1999 37,801 7.8 19.2 79.2 (67.1) 1.6
2000 37,385 7.2 22.1 76.3 (62.5) 1.6
2001 30,188 5.5 18.0 80.3 (57.8) 1.7
Source: Korea Insurance Development Institute, Statistical Yearbook o f  Insurance, various years.




Life Non-Life Total Life Non-Life Total
1996 1,251 69 1,320 441 65 506
1997 1,498 97 1,595 638 107 745
1998 1,767 119 1,887 862 139 1,000
1999 2,243 199 2,442 1,232 221 1,453
2000 2,800 282 3,082 1,699 343 2,042
% o f GDP
Year
Premiums Claims Paid
Life Non-Life Total Life Non-Life Total
1996 0.30 0.02 0.32 0.11 0.02 0.12
1997 0.33 0.02 0.35 0.14 0.02 0.16
1998 0.40 0.03 0.42 0.19 0.03 0.23
1999 0.46 0.06 0.51 0.25 0.05 0.30
2000 0.54 0.05 0.60 0.33 0.07 0.39
Note) The medical expenditure from automobile insurance schemes are excluded from non-life insurance 
category.
Source: Reorganised from Park and Kim, 2001: 56; Bank o f Korea, National Accounts, various years.
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Table 6.10. Private Individual Pension Schemes: Comparison with the NPI
(Thousand, Billion Won, per cent)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
PIPS
a. No. new contracts1 4,865 2,471 1,630 908 473 397 595 237
b. No. reserved contracts1 4,107 4,960 5,178 4,997 4,115 3,811 3,869 3,773
c. Yearly premium2 2,341 5,385 5,561 5,232 4,426 4,159 4,243 3,594
d. Raised fund2 1,939 5,416 8,954 12,051 13,965 16,804 19,635 22,358
NPI
e. No of insured1 5,445 7,497 7,829 7,836 7,126 16,262 16,210 16,278
f. Yearly contribution2 3,326 3,966 4,944 5,676 7,841 9,386 10,359 12,067
g. Raised fund2 12,766 18,160 25,028 33,191 44,852 58,362 73,662 90,369
b/total em ployed (%) 20.7 24.3 24.8 23.6 20.6 18.8 18.3 17.5
e/total em ployed (%) 27.4 36.7 37.5 36.9 35.7 80.1 76.6 75.5
d/GDP (%) 0.6 1.4 2.1 2.7 3.1 3.5 3.8 4.1
g/GDP (%) 3.9 4.8 6.0 7.3 10.1 12.1 14.1 16.4
c/f (%) 70.4 135.8 112.5 92.2 56.4 44.3 41.0 29.8
d/g (%) 15.2 29.8 35.8 36.3 31.1 28.8 26.7 24.7
1. Thousand
2. Billion Won
Sources: calculated from J.W. Lee (2002) and MOHW (2003)
At the same time, from the early 1990s, there have been two important changes 
in private insurance markets, more specifically and thus closely related to welfare 
provision. The first is a growth in health insurance markets, and the second is the 
introduction of the Private Individual Pension Schemes (hereafter, PIPS). In a departure 
from traditional saving related insurance goods, insurance companies have actively 
marketed health-related commodities. As far as the earned premium is concerned, the 
market size of private health insurances reached 0.6 per cent of GDP in 2000 (see Table 
6.9). This growth was mainly due to the enormous sales of the so-called ‘Cancer 
Insurances’ of the life-insurance industry, which covered specific diseases or illness like 
cancers, stroke and heart diseases. Since the individual financial burden for the 
treatment of these diseases or illness is very high, the sales of cancer insurances and 
other private health insurance have been very successful, even despite the existence of 
the NHI. In a sense, the success of private health insurance sales reflects the fact that the
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low benefit level of the existing NHI programmes or the market dominance of overall 
health expenditure which is discussed below.
On the other hand, the PIPS market was introduced in June 1994, as defined- 
contribution plans with a period of at least 10 years contribution or savings13. Not only 
insurance companies but also commercial banks and other financial companies have 
been allowed to supply PIPS. The individual pension market grew fast for the initial 
three years because the government supported the PIPS market in the form of a tax 
benefit, whereby the premiums were deducted from the individual income tax base. As a 
matter of fact, as indicated from Table 6.10, the popularity of PIPS was ‘explosive’ until 
the financial crisis. The yearly-earned premiums of PEPS for the 30 months between 
June 1994 and December 1996 overwhelmed the gross yearly contributions of the NPI 
scheme during the same period. When we consider the National Pension Insurance 
(NPI) launched in 1988, the growth of the PIPS market seems more amazing; PEPS 
almost caught up with the NPI within 30 months. In 1996, the number of reserved PEPS 
contracts corresponded to 24.8 per cent of the number of total employed.
However, the fast growth of PIPS turned into massive cancellations from 1997 
and continuous declines in all of the related indicators afterwards. It also indicates that 
private pension plans can be unstable due to economic conditions. Nonetheless, the 
importance of the private individual pension markets should not be underestimated; 
PEPS still cover one-fifth of the total employed and the level of the yearly premium 
exceeded 40 per cent of the yearly contributions of the NPI until 2000. Moreover, it 
seems too early to assert that the declining trend will continue because PIPS have not 
yet matured, and neither has the NPI. If the massive cancellations were concentrated in 
people facing financial difficulties, the implication would be that the unequal nature of 
market provision would have been reinforced in private pension schemes. Most of all, 
the introduction of the PIPS market and their substantial scales indicate that the market 
sector has permeated into the traditional income maintenance area.
The Dominance of the Private Sector in Health Expenditure
13 So the initial PIPS benefits are due to be provided from 2004, and until then PIPS cannot be included 
in the expenditure study.
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Another important feature that should be included when one attempts to mention the 
market principle in the social welfare provisions of Korea is the dominance of the 
private sector in overall health expenditure. Although the public health programmes, the 
NHI and the Medical Aid programmes, began to cover the entire population from 1989, 
the financial burden on households would not have decreased dramatically because the 
Medical Insurance programmes have utilised the ‘low burden and low benefits’ 
principle. There has been a substantial level of individual co-payments in most medical 
treatment and services, and many expensive treatments have been excluded from the 
scope of NHI benefits (T.K. Yoo, 1997; Lee et al., 1999). Inevitably, therefore, the 
availability of some expensive medical treatments has been highly dependent on the 
purchasing capability of individuals and households.
Table 6.11. Financial Sources of National Health Expenditure (OECD guidelines)
Gross N.H.E. % o f the gross national health expenditure
Bn won %. GDP Public Private Pri. Ins. Hous. Other1
1985 3,465 4.1 26.6 73.4 5.0 59.9 8.5
1990 8,541 4.8 36.6 63.4 4.8 53.0 5.6
1995 17,619 4.7 36.5 63.5 5.8 51.1 6.6
2000 30,680 5.9 44.4 55.6 8.7 41.3 5.7
1. Expenditure o f enterprises and NPOs
Source: Reorganised from Chang et al., 2002: Table V-l and V-5.
According to the recent estimation of the National Health Expenditure following 
the OECD guideline (Chang et al, 2002), the private dominance of health expenditure 
continued until 2000 even though its share decreased significantly (see Table 6.11). 
Especially, the burden of households paying for health services and goods has been 
maintained as one of the largest shares of the gross national health expenditure. It was 
from 2001 that the public health expenditure began to exceed the private one, when the 
introduction of the ‘Specialization of Dispensary and Medical Practice’ could have 
caused the rapid increase in the level of medical treatment fees reimbursed by the NHI14.
14 The government implemented the separation o f dispensary from medical services from 1999/2000. In 
Korea, people could buy antibiotic drugs from the chemist directly without a doctor’s prescription and
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In addition, the growth of private health insurance markets mentioned above is 
confirmed again by Table 6.11. The share of private insurance schemes increased to 8.7 
per cent of the gross national health expenditure.
Table 6.12. International Comparison of National Health Expenditure Structure: 
1985 and 1999
(per cent of GDP, per cent of total health expenditure)
Gross Health Expenditure 
(% o f GDP)
1985 1999
Share o f  Public Sector 
(% o f  Total H.E.)
1985 1999
Share o f  Private Sector 
(% o f  Total H.E.)
1985 1999
Sweden 8.7 7.91 90.4 83.81 9.6 16.21
Norway 6.7 9.3 85.8 75.8 14.2 24.2
France 8.3 9.4 76.9 78.1 23.1 21.9
Germany 9.3 10.31 77.4 75.81 22.6 24.21
Italy 7.0 8.21 77.2 67.31 22.8 32.7 1
U.K. 5.9 6.9 85.8 83.3 14.2 16.7
U.S. 10.0 12.9 39.9 44.5 60.1 55.5
Japan 6.7 7.41 70.7 78.51 29.3 21.51
Korea 4.3 5.5 26.6 43.1 59.9 56.9
1 .1998
Source: Reorganised from Chang et al., 2002: Appendix Table 5.15-5.17
Compared with other OECD nations, the dominance of the private sector in the 
health expenditure becomes more evident. As indicated in Table 6.12, whereas the 
public sector spent roughly more than three-quarters of the gross health expenditure in 
most of nations with a universal public health system (except Italy), in Korea the share 
of the private sector, mostly households’ burden in the forms of charges and fees, has 
remained at the highest level with the US. Although Korea has a universal health care 
system, the financial structure of national health expenditure is very peculiar in terms of 
its similarity to that of the US in which the public health system only covers a very
doctors (hospitals) could sell drug directly to patients. This system had been criticized as the main reason 
for the abuse o f antibiotics and drugs. The government especially wanted to control the drug costs in the 
health insurance finance by the specialisation o f dispensary and medical practices -  permitting patients to 
buy antibiotic and other professional drugs only with doctor’s prescriptions. However, for most private 
practitioners in the community the drug dispensary was one o f the main income sources, so doctors 
wanted the range o f professional drugs widened and the diagnosis fee raised. In summer o f 1999, doctors 
in large hospitals went on a strike and private practitioners refused to see patients for a number o f days. 
After all the government accepted most o f doctors’ requests, including the increase of the medical 
treatment and service fees. In conclusion, the specialisation o f dispensary and medical practice has led a 
rapid increase in the public health expenditure from the NHI programmes.
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restricted target population. T«o sum up, considering both the financial structure and the 
institutional features of the puilic health system, therefore, it can be asserted that, 
similar to the US, the market pmciple has been significantly diluted even in the public 
health system in Korea.
Rising Private Social Service Markets
As mentioned above, it was h  the early 1990s that the market sector began to 
participate in social service provision. The main areas of market involvements in social 
services are in running residential and nursing home services for the elderly people and 
the nursery or day care for pre-school children. In case of the other social services, 
welfare markets are not fully formed yet. First let us look at the nursery services 
provided by the market sector.
As seen from Table 6.13, until 1990, since the main target of social services had 
been to provide residential care for the needy like orphans, the disabled, the elderly 
without family members who could care for them, the nursery service remained 
underdeveloped as did other social services for the general population. It was the 
nursery services that the government targeted first when looking to develop towards 
universalisation, as women’s economic participations has increased. The Nursery Act of 
1991 came into legislation, and the share of private providers in the nursery industry has 
rapidly increased during the 1990s. The delivery structure of nursery services has been 
pluralized among the public, NPOs (organisations and corporations in the private sector) 
and market providers (I. Kim, 2003). The market sector in nursery industry is mainly 
composed by private individual facilities and small home nurseries. Between 1992 and 
2000, the shares of nursery places among different sectors experienced a sea change; 
whilst the relative importance of the public sector dropped fast, the nursery places 
provided by the market sector have dramatically increased. In 2000, the public sector 
and the third sector provided 14.6 per cent and 25.4 per cent of nursery places 
respectively, but the market sector (individuals and home nurseries) provided 15,443 
nursery centres (80.1 per cent) and accommodated 405 thousand pre-school children (59 
per cent). It can be said that the market sector has dominated overall nursery services 
since the mid 1990s. What is indicated by this is that, in a similar way to public and
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non-profit organisations, they have been subject to the financial support of as well as 
regulation from the government. Especially, many market providers could start their 
nursery business relatively easily when the government provided financial loans to 
private individuals (from the NPI funds) for the construction costs of nursery facilities 
(MOHW, 2000).
Table 6.13. Number of Nursery Centres and Accommodated Children by Type
_____________________________________ No. of Centre (No. of Children in Thousand)
Year Total Public
Private






1,919 360 39 20 1,500
(48) (25) (1.5) (1.5) (20.0)
9,085 1,029 4,125 3,175 22 928 87 3,844
(294) (79) (170) (93) (1) (77) (2) (42)
19,276 1,295 11,304 8,970 324 2,010 204 6,473
(686) (100) (511) (337) (16) (158) (8) (68)
22,147 1,330 12,679 10,471 575 1,633 199 7,939
(801) (103) (598) (426) (30) (142) (9) (91)
Sources: Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Statistical Yearbook o f  Health and Welfare, various years
Table 6.14. Residential or Nursing Home for the Elderly by Institutional Type
Year





























84 41 21 8,396 4,806 2,784 806
(100) (57.5) (28.1) (14.4) (100) (57.2) (33.2) (9.6)
2000 250 93 102 55 13,907 4,872 6,797 2,238
(100) (37.2) (40.8) (22.0) (100) (35.0) (48.9) (16.1)
2002 299 91 143 65 17,549 4,522 9,783 3,244(100) (30.4) (47.8) (21.7) (100) (25.8) (55.7) (18.5)
Note: F.C. Free-of-charge institutions; C.S. Cheap sanatorium; C.H. Charged (nursing) home 
Sources: Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Statistical Yearbook o f  Health and Welfare, various years
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Such a growth of the market sector was caused not only by the legislation of 
1991, but also by the government’s support for private day care facilities. Between 1995 
and 1997, most new day care institutions were founded by private providers because the 
government provided public loans for nursery facilities (Beon, 2001: 6). However, the 
growth of nursery markets could not have guaranteed to a higher quality of nursery 
services. Most individual nurseries are small but excluded from the government support 
for operating costs. In 1999, while the average number of places of public and other 
types of nurseries were 76.8 and 73.9 respectively, that number of individual nurseries 
averaged no more than 36.2. It has been known that many individual nurseries have had 
difficulty in maintaining their facilities and paying for their workers while some luxury 
private nurseries located in middle and upper class areas have had long waiting lists 
(Ibid).
Table 6.15. Main Indicators of Employment Services: Public vs. Private
(Number, per cent)
N o o f  A gencies N o  o f  E m ployed1 (thousand)
Total Public (%) Private (%) Total Public (%) Private (%)
1990 1,3922 2 4 .62 75.4 2 567 30.8 69.2
1995 1,610 21.1 78.9 1,460 10.5 89.5
1997 2,046 16.4 83.6 2,290 7.6 92.4
1999 3,058 14.4 85.6 2,227 18.2 81.8
2000 3,831 11.2 88.8 -
1. Number of the employed, who found jobs through employment service agencies.
2. 1991
Source: Reorganised from Kim and Shin (2003: Table 3-5 and 3-8)
On the other hand, although the Amended Elderly Welfare Act of 1993 and 1997 
have allowed the cheap sanatorium and the charged (commercial) residential or nursing 
home services respectively, the residential services for the elderly still remain residual 
because of the strong familial tradition. In 2000, only 0.4% of elderly people (65 or 
more) are accommodated within residential or nursing homes. As seen from Table 6.14, 
most of residential and nursing home services are provided by private institutions 
including NPOs, which receive financial supports from as well as being regulated by the 
government. Since virtually all residential and nursing homes are run by the private
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sector, the levied charges or fees can be a crucial indicator to categorise current 
residential and nursing homes for the elderly. It is possible to divide them into three 
types; free-of-charge institutions, cheap sanatoriums and charged residential and nursing 
homes. The places in free-of-charge institutions are limited to public assistance 
recipients and the government provides public assistance benefits directly to the 
institutions. Cheap sanatoriums levy charges but only small amounts. They also receive 
financial support from the government and their residents are subject to means-tested 
investigation. Hence, only charged institutions do not have entry requirements other 
than a sufficient purchasing power.
Until recently, the participation of the market sector in residential and nursing 
home services has remained paltry. Despite a significant increase in their number and 
places, the charged residential or nursing homes provided only 18.5 per cent of total 
places in 2002 (see Table 6.14). Although the share of free-of-charge institutions has 
decreased rapidly, residential services for the elderly have been dominated by cheap 
sanatoriums, rather than the charged (commercial) residential or nursing homes, since 
2000. However, what must be said here is that it is too early to judge the penetration of 
the market sector in residential and nursing home services. Opening residential and 
nursing home businesses could take more than a few years, especially when they are 
large-scale and luxurious ones. In reality, large and luxurious residential or nursing 
institutions targeting wealthy elderly people are under construction in planning by large 
companies including some Chebols15. Therefore, residential services for the elderly are 
likely to be polarised; residential and nursing home services are provided either for very 
rich or for very poor elderly people.
At last, although the public employment service system has expanded much 
since the Crisis to deal with the mass unemployment problem (see Table 6.7), Table
6.15 indicates that the private sector, composed mostly of commercial providers, has 
dominated employment services. In 1995, among 1610 employment service agencies 
78.9 per cent were run by the private sector and 89.5 per cent of job seekers (1.46 
million) found their positions through these private agencies. The number of private
15 For example, Samsung Noble County, located in a suburban area o f Seoul, opened in April 2001. It 
provides both residential and nursing home services. The deposit required at entry time is 243-788 million 
won (approx. £131,000-426,000) for a residential home and 100-200 millions won (approx. £55,000- 
110,000) for a nursing home place. Besides, the users pay monthly fees, which are 1-2.3 million won 
(approx. £540-£ 1,240) for residential homes and 2.1-4.4 millions won (approx. £1,130-2,400) for nursing 
homes (KEWIA, 2001).
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agencies increased even more between 1995 and 2000, when the government lessened 
or withdrew lots of administrative regulations over the employment service industry 
through its amendments of the ‘Employment Security Law’ in 1995 and 1999 (Kim and 
Shin, 2003: 63-4). In addition, the absolute majority of the private agencies are 
commercial providers charging fees for their employment or recruitment services -  for 
example, according to D.S. Kim et al. (2002), 92 per cent of private employment service 
agencies (3968 among 4314 agencies) were commercial agencies in 2001. However, it 
is also noteworthy that, except some for head-hunting agencies targeting professionals 
or highly-skilled workers, most of the commercial agencies have specialised in 
managing daily or temporary workers -  95 per cent of the gross job places provided by 
the agencies were daily or temporary jobs (Kim and Shin, 2003: 68-9).
6.3. Enterprise Welfare
The year 1987 is one of the most important milestones in the modem history of Korea, 
and enterprise welfare was no exception in its importance. It is after 1987 that enterprise 
welfare has been hugely expanded. Between 1987 and 1989 trade union membership 
augmented dramatically; the density increased by almost 5%. Based on a rapid increase 
in mobilisation, there were a great number of strikes and numerous workers participated 
in the labour movement. In the period of the ‘Great Stmggle of Labour’ in 1987, more 
than 3,700 strikes were reported and roughly 1.3 million workers fiercely resisted the 
capitalists’ exploitation and the repressive state (see table 6.16). The state’s control over 
labour on the behalf of employers and most of the restrictions on unionisation were 
withdrawn with the enactment of the New Labour Law of 1987 (C.I. Park, 1996). For 
business, the formal (but superficial) withdrawal of the state’s direct intervention meant 
that businesses had to design an alternative to cope with radical-militant labour 
unionism. However, on the other hand, owing to the enterprise trade unionism and the 
state’s ‘autonomous industrial relation’ principle, most agenda between labour and 
business was discussed only at an individual enterprise level.
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Table 6.16. Trade Union Mobilisation, Industrial Dispute, Wage Increase and 
Labour Cost: 1980~2002
Union Industrial Dispute Wage Increase Labour Cost
Member Strike & Workers Working Nominal Actual Total Cash Non- 
*' -ship Lockout Involved Day Lost Wage Wage Cost Cash
_________Rate________ (N) (1,000) (1,000) (%) (%) (l.OOOw) (%) (%)
1980 14.7 206 49 61 23.4 -4.2 329.8* 79.4* 20.6*
1985 12.4 265 29 64 9.2 6.7 392.5 83.2 16.8
1986 12.3 276 47 72 8.2 5.3 430.5 82.0 18.0
1987 13.8 3,749 1,262 6,947 10.1 6.9 468.6 83.9 16.1
1988 17.8 1,873 293 5,401 15.5 7.8 546.3 83.9 16.1
1989 18.6 1,616 409 6,351 21.1 14.5 659.7 84.1 15.9
1990 17.2 322 134 4,487 18.8 9.4 816.3 81.7 18.3
1991 15.8 234 175 3,271 17.5 7.5 1,011.5 77.2 22.8
1992 14.9 235 105 1,528 15.2 8.4 1,179.5 75.5 24.5
1993 14.1 144 109 1,308 12.2 7.0 1,336.8 74.0 26.0
1994 13.5 121 104 1,484 12.7 6.1 1,501.9 75.4 24.6
1995 12.6 88 50 393 11.2 6.4 1,726.7 75.0 25.0
1996 12.2 85 79 893 11.9 6.7 1,870.5 77.8 22.2
1997 11.2 78 44 445 7.0 2.4 2,082.2 74.1 25.9
1998 11.5 129 146 1,452 -2.5 -9.3 2,337.1 60.5 39.5
1999 11.8 198 92 1,366 12.1 11.1 2,383.8 65.3 24.7
2000 11.6 250 178 1,894 8.0 5.6 2,795.2 62.6 37.4
2001 11.8 234 89 1,083 5.6 1.5 2,676.5 69.1 30.9
2002 11.6 321 94 1,580 11.6 8.7 2,827.6 72.6 27.4
* 1982
Sources: Ministry o f Labour, Statistical Yearbook o f  Labour, various years; Korea Labour Institute, KLI 
Labour Statistics, various years
As a result, there has been a continuous and rapid wage increase as well as a 
significant expansion of enterprise welfare until 1997. Whereas the wage increases were 
implemented intensively during the period of great conflict between 1987 and 1990, a 
relatively significant expansion of enterprise welfare can be found after 1990 (Table
6.16 indicates a rapid increase in non-cash labour costs after 1990). On the one hand, 
the state still delegated the welfare responsibility for workers to enterprises through the 
mandatory enterprise welfare legislation. Through amendment of the Labour Standard 
Law, the compulsory coverage of mandatory severance pay was expanded to 
workplaces with 10 or more employees in 1987 and 5 or more in 1989. The Intra- 
Company Welfare Fund Law was launched in 1991. This legislation concentrated on the
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period when militant trade unionism was at its peak. On the other hand, the existing 
voluntary enterprise welfare programmes were generalised and reinforced, and new 
programmes such as intra-company welfare funds and support for housing and private 
insurance were introduced. Beyond the income-supportive feature of existing 
programmes, the new ones focused on the asset accumulation of workers.
These changes reflected the fact that, although the state’s regulatory power still 
remained strong, the main actors in the enterprise welfare expansion between 1987 and 
1997 changed from the state to labour and business. According to C. Park (1996), trade 
unionism, the business’ strategy for labour control and the size of enterprises have been 
its major determinants since 1987. Whereas the expansion of enterprise welfare between 
1987 and 1989 was largely due to business’ fear of strikes and strong trade unions, in 
the 1990s both the employers and union leaders pursued the expansion of enterprise 
welfare as a strategic compromise16, because it offered a good device for both of them; 
the former could control labour effectively through enterprise welfare programmes and 
the latter could attract union members by ‘showing them fruits’.
The intra-organisational feature of enterprise welfare, as an enterprise’s strategy, 
seems to have been reinforced since the Financial Crisis of 1997. During the economic 
recession between 1997 and 1999, most enterprises attempted to reduce overall labour 
costs, along with a reduction in their employee numbers. Many companies became 
bankrupt and the unemployment rate rose. Trade unions had to tolerate significant 
decreases in enterprise welfare benefits as well as a decline of real wages. The 
government forced public enterprises to reduce their enterprise welfare benefits to set an 
example (Y.M. Kim, 1999: 94-95). Nevertheless, the importance of enterprise welfare as 
a substitute for state welfare became more prominent during this period. When the state 
welfare system could not cope with the mass-unemployment problem, the state’s 
previous interventions over mandatory severance pay caused a massive increase in 
mandatory enterprise welfare expenditure. Moreover, the level of the enterprise welfare 
benefits had recovered to the level before the financial crisis, as the economic situation 
improved. Instead, reflecting its the intra-organisational features, the inequality of 
enterprise welfare, between regular or core workers and irregular or peripheral workers
16 This feature o f  enterprise welfare, as a strategic compromise between business and enterprise trade 
unions, is very similar to the enterprise welfare development o f  Japan during 1950s and 1960s (Cho, 
1996: 296). At the same time, this similarity has been regarded as evidence o f either strategic imitation 
(diffusion) process o f  Japanese industrial relations or cultural explanation (J.S. Park, 1997; Song, 1994: 
387-389).
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as well as between large and small workplaces, has been reinforced.
In the remaining part of the section, I present not only the changes to enterprise 
welfare but also such the issue of inequality, through a labour cost analysis. In the 
analyses of enterprise welfare, I owe substantial gratitude to the insightful studies of G. 
Choi (1992), H.K. Song (1995), C. Park (1996), K.J. Hong (1999) and Y.M. Kim (1999). 
But the main analyses build on my own conceptualisation and analyses of official 
statistics.
Labour Cost and Enterprise Welfare
If the aggregated trends in enterprise welfare expenditure were focused on in the 
expenditure study above, the specific structure of the enterprise welfare changes can be 
grasped by a micro-analysis on the overall labour costs. Particularly in Korea, this is due 
to the fact that the relationship between enterprise welfare and the cash wage, as well as 
the voluntary and mandatory enterprise welfare benefits, can be seen as supplementary 
to each other. In other words, employers have preferred to provide more enterprise 
welfare benefits instead of rapid wage increases, and they reduced the voluntary 
benefits when the burden of mandatory benefits was higher. Moreover, a labour costs 
analysis enables us to examine the inequalities within enterprise welfare between large 
and small-medium size enterprises by comparing their labour cost structures. Before 
moving on a labour cost analysis, first the range of enterprise welfare must be defined.
Table 6.17 indicates the categories and contents of the labour cost system in 
Korea. The left column shows the classification followed by the categories of the ILO’s 
labour cost system, and the right column explains which kinds of programmes are 
included in each category and have been implemented in Korea. Although there has 
been no agreed definition of enterprise welfare, recent studies on the enterprise welfare 
of Korea have suggested that no benefit related to social security or state intervention 
should be included (Choi, 1992; Song, 1995; Hong, 1996; C. Park, 1996; Y.M. Kim, 
2000). Therefore, there is no doubt that the categories of ‘non-statutory welfare’ and 
‘benefit in kind’ should be included in enterprise welfare. Most scholars also classify 
‘education and training’ as enterprise welfare, but exclude ‘severance pay’ and 
‘statutory welfare costs’, because the former is based on the state’s labour standard
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legislation and the latter signifies the social insurance contributions of employers 
(Ministry of Labour, 1988; Park, 1988; Choi, 1992; Song, 1995).
Table 6.17. Contents of Labour Cost in Korea
Classification o f Labour Cost Contents
1. Remuneration In Cash_________Regular Wage, Bonus, etc________________________________
2. Non-Cash_________________________________________________________________________
a. Severance or retirement ' Mandatory Severance Pay
_______________________________ - Dismissal Pay_______________________________________
b. Statutory Welfare ' Social Insurance Contribution
_______________________________ - Contribution of Employment Promotion Fund for the Disabled
c Non-Statutorv Welfare " Housing (Dormitory, Company House, Housing Allowance, etc)
- Medical and Health (Medical Facility, Health Check)
- Catering (Inc. Meal Allowance)
- Culture, Sport and Entertainment (Library, Gym, Shower, etc)
- Saving Support (Private Insurance, Mutual Aid Credit etc)
- Aid for Ceremonial Occasions
- Education (Education Allowance for Workers’ Children)
- Child Care (Day Care Centre or Allowance)
- Holiday Support
- Worker’s Stock Ownership
- Intre-Company Welfare Fund 
_______________________________ - Others (Parking, Petrol, Consumer Co-operation etc)_________
d. Benefit in Kind - Transport (Company Buses, Transport Ticket)
- Goods of enterprise (discount or free of charge)
- Presentations (Gifts)
e. Education & Training - On-the-Job-Training (OJT)
- Contracting-Out Training
- Evening School
f. Recruitment Cost - Advertising Cost
- Cost for Recruitment Test or Screening
g. Other - Company News Paper
- Working Cloth
Sources: Song (1995:26), Hong (1999:161)
In this research, the categories of ‘non-statutory welfare’, ‘benefit in kind’ and 
‘education and training’ are classified into the voluntary enterprise welfare category. 
However, ‘statutory welfare’ is excluded from enterprise welfare because it is a form of 
state welfare. On the other hand, ‘severance or retirement pay’ is included within 
mandatory enterprise welfare. This is for two reasons. Firstly, despite its institutional
1 7weakness , the severance (or retirement) pay of Korea carried out the function of the
17 ‘Severance (or Retirement) Pay’ o f Korea has performed various functions simultaneously; first, it has 
been a compensation system for workers’ low-wages (deferred wage), second, it has been a substitute for 
state welfare (social security: unemployment benefit or old-age pension), third, it has been a method of
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occupational pensions and unemployment benefits. Secondly, its mandatory feature is
• 18 not exclusive to Korea; France, Sweden and Australia also have mandatory schemes .
In addition, in terms of policy implications, there has been a rising necessity for a
transformation to enterprise pension schemes (Bang, 1998; Bang et al, 2000; J.H. Kim,
2000). So, I present both voluntary enterprise welfare and ‘mandatory severance pay’ in
separate categories in the labour cost analysis.
Table 6.18. Monthly Labour Cost and Enterprise Welfare Expenditure Per Worker















1985 392.5 (100) 326.6(83.2) 65.8(16.8) 24.7 (6 .3 ) 8.2 (2.1) 30.0 (7 .6)
1988 546.3 (100) 458.1 (83.9) 88.1 (16.1) 3 1 .2 (5 .7 ) 18.7 (3.4) 35.1 (6 .4)
1990 816.3(100) 667.3 (81.7) 149.0(18.3) 56.8 (7 .0) 24.0 (2.9) 63.2 (7.7)
1992 1,179.5 (100) 891.0(75.5) 288.5 (24.5) 104 .6(8 .9) 50.9 (4.3) 122.3(10.4)
1994 1,501.9(100) 1,132.3 (75.4) 369.6 (24.6) 145.6(9 .7) 55.1(3.7) 157.2(10.5)
1995 1,726.7(100) 1,294.9 (75.0) 431.8 (25.0) 203.9(11.8) 64.7 (3.7) 147.6(8.5)
1996 1,870.5 (100) 1,456.0(77.8) 414.5 (22.2) 137 .7(7 .4) 81.0 (4.3) 182.7(9.8)
1997 2,082.2(100) 1,542.9 (74.1) 539.3 (25.9) 228.6(11.0) 98.1 (4.7) 198.8(9.5)
1998 2,337.1 (100) 1,414.6(60.5) 922.5 (39.5) 618.4 (26.5) 121.7 (5.2) 172.8 (7 .4)
1999 2,388.7(100) 1,557.2 (65.2) 831.4 (34.8) 439.7(18.4) 168.6(7.1) 212 .7(8 .9)
2000 2,795.2(100) 1,749.7 (62.6) 1,045.5 (37.4) 635.3 (22.7) 183.1 (6.6) 213 .9(7 .7)
2001 2,676.5 (100) 1,849.8 (69.1) 826.7 (30.9) 388.3(14.5) 210.3 (7.9) 217 .5(8 .1)
Source: Restructuring from Ministry of Labour, Survey on Enterprises ’Labour Costs, various years.
The growth of enterprise welfare in Korea should be explained in context of the 
rapid increase in overall labour costs between late 1980s and early 1990s. As shown 
from Table 6.18 (and also see Table 6.16), the favourable condition for business, a low 
labour cost, began to be depleted from the late-1980s. Although the annual increase rate
labour management (firms’ organisational necessity). However, the second and third functions have 
remained weak; the benefit is available whenever employment terminates, and the Labour Standard Law 
(state’s mandatory regulation) defines the coverage and benefit level (Bang, 1998; Bang et al, 2000).
18 In spite o f its mandatory feature, in 1995 it only covered 29.7% o f the working age population, or 50% 
of employees. After all, ‘Severance (or Retirement) Pay’ o f Korea is mandatory but not universal (Bang , 
1998), because its mandatory coverage is limited to firms with 5 or more employees and most of irregular 
workers have been excluded.
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of overall labour costs was maintained at two-digit percentages between 1988 and 2000, 
except 1996 and 1999, the dominant factors resulting in the labour cost increase were 
not the same. Whilst wage increases had dominated labour cost augmentation during the 
period o f fierce and militant labour movements (the late 1980’s), the expansion of non­
cash labour costs was remarkable during the early and late 1990s (See Figure 6.1). The 
gross sum of the total labour cost, in terms o f the nominal value, increased by seven 
times between 1985 and 2000. What is more surprising is that the non-cash labour cost 
had multiplied by more than fifteen times during the same period. Aside from these 
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Figure 6.1. Annual Increase Rate of Labour Cost (per cent)
Source: see Table 6.18.
Firstly, the relative importance o f the cash wage in the overall labour cost has 
revealed a decreasing trend in general, even though the increasing rate o f cash wage 
maintained two-digit until 2000 (except in 1997 and 1998). Until 1990 remunerations in 
cash occupied more than 80 per cent o f the total labour cost, but the ratio decreased 
down to 60.5 per cent in 1998 and was remained below 70 per cent afterwards. This 
means that the expansion of enterprise welfare benefits has been more dramatic than 
that of the cash benefits. The non-cash labour costs became more important during the 
period when industrial relation based on the institutionalisation of enterprise unionism
169
had been relatively stable (between 1990 and 1992) and when the Korean economy 
faced a mass unemployment problem (between 1997 and 1999). This is enough to draw 
one’s attention, because enterprise welfare became a core part o f the bargaining strategy 
o f both business and labour groups since the early 1990s, whilst mandatory severance 
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Figure 6.2. Non Cash Labour Cost (per cent of total labour cost)
Source: see Table 6.18.
Secondly, the scale o f voluntary enterprise welfare expenditure overwhelms that 
o f statutory welfare (see Figure 6.2), but the difference between them also has decreased 
significantly since 1998. Both the absolute amount and the relative proportion o f 
statutory welfare had been far below the proportion o f voluntary enterprise welfare even 
though there had been a continuous increase in employers’ social insurance 
contributions due to the expansion of social security system 19 until 1997. However, as 
seen from Figure 6.2, the relative proportion of the statutory welfare cost almost caught 
that o f voluntary enterprise welfare between 1998 and 2001, as the Kim Dae Jung 
government expanded social insurance institutions. Instead, the burden o f mandatory 
severance pay greatly increased during the same period when mass unemployment 
swept through the whole country and the adjustment to the mandatory severance pay
19 There was the implementation of National Pension Insurance (NPI, 1988), the universalisation of 
National Health Insurance (NHI, 1989) and the introduction of Employment Insurance Schemes (EIS, 
1995).
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was introduced in 2000. These trends support the position that enterprise welfare has 
been more than a kind of fringe benefit; rather, the institutional legacy where enterprise 
welfare has replaced state welfare has been maintained and even reinforced. In reality, it 
can be asserted that, in workers’ lives, enterprise welfare has been more important than 
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Figure 6.3. Annual Increase Rate of Remuneration in Cash, Severance Pay and the 
Voluntary Enterprise Welfare (per cent)
Source: see Table 6.18.
Thirdly, although the increase in the rate o f cash wages remained relatively 
stable, the rates o f  both mandatory severance pay and voluntary enterprise welfare have 
fluctuated severely (See Figure 6.3). Whilst the fluctuations in severance pay reflect 
changes in the economic situation, the rapid change o f voluntary enterprise welfare 
expenditure indicates that voluntary enterprise welfare can be manipulated by the 
enterprise’s strategic necessity, i.e. the inner logic o f the business. Its relative flexibility 
implies that a reduction in voluntary enterprise welfare is always possible as long as 
enterprises consider the internal and external business conditions. This expectation 
seems to have been realised after the financial crisis o f 1997. It is relates to the next 
argument.
Lastly, after the crisis, the reduction in the scale of enterprise welfare 
expenditure was far more than that of the cash wage in 1998. Although it was a
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temporary phenomenon and in 1999 the voluntary enterprise welfare cost had recovered 
to above the level in 1997, and the overall level remained static between 1999 and 2000. 
However, at the same time, it is an important trend to recognise that statutory welfare 
costs rose significantly as the public social security system began to expand. Two 
possible explanations of this arise. The first is that the business had to reduce (or 
maintained a status quo after 1999) the voluntary enterprise welfare cost under the dual 
pressure of increasing statutory welfare costs and the multiplying burden of severance 
pay caused by cutting back their employees. The other is that, under the external 
pressure of globalisation (global capital, IMF etc), the structural power of capital has 
been reinforced, and business could force the labour force to agree to a reduction of 
enterprise welfare (Y.M. Kim, 2000). Despite the analytical partition, both explanations 
seem to offer each side of the coin. Furthermore, it must be mentioned that the reduction 
of the voluntary enterprise welfare was the main element of the compromise between 
employers and trade unions, during the economic recession which was followed by the 
financial crisis (J.S. Kim, 1999).
Inequality of Enterprise Welfare
Both in principle and empirically, as most studies on enterprise welfare have indicated, 
one of the most important impacts of enterprise welfare is the strengthening inequality 
between workers (Cho, 1996; Choi, 1992; Esping-Andersen, 1990, 1996b; Hong, 1996, 
1999; C.J. Lee, 1997; C. Park, 1996; Shalev, 1996; Song, 1994, 1995). The expansion of 
enterprise welfare can cause two types of inequality amongst workers; inequality 
between enterprises on the one hand, and within enterprises on the other. The former 
indicates that large firms have a tendency to pay more for enterprise welfare than small- 
medium firms do. The latter implies the possible inequality caused by the internal 
labour market within a firm. Since there is no available data whereby one can measure 
the differences in the enterprise welfare benefits between workers, most analysis 
focuses on the discrimination between large and small-medium enterprise. Instead, we 
can guess that the inequality problem is caused indirectly by the internal labour market 
within a firm through an analysis of labour market flexibility.
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Table 6.19. Inequality between Large and Medium-Small Enterprises: Cash Wage, 
Severance Pay and Enterprise Welfare
(Thousand Won, per cent)
Year



















1985 328.0 315.3 104.0 50.5 43.1 117.0 30.7 22.6 135.7
1988 465.1 408.2 113.9 30.4 36.9 82.3 35.9 29.1 123.3
1990 679.2 537.9 126.3 56.5 59.9 94.3 65.0 42.7 152.2
1992 906.5 720.5 125.8 104.8 103.3 101.4 125.1 92.8 134.8
1994 1,200.4 863.2 139.1 146.5 140.7 104.1 168.3 93.1 180.8
1995 1,340.7 991.3 135.2 217.0 116.7 185.9 157.8 98.2 160.7
1996 1,513.4 1,072.7 141.1 140.8 116.5 120.9 194.2 105.1 184.8
1997 1,581.4 1,174.9 134.6 234.7 169.9 138.1 208.7 105.6 197.6
1998 1,453.3 1,072.0 135.6 658.8 260.0 253.4 181.7 93.3 194.7
1999 1,608.6 1,156.1 139.1 461.6 268.7 171.8 225.0 116.7 192.8
2000 1,815.1 1,219.5 148.8 690.7 186.0 371.3 225.1 123.4 182.4
2001 1,919.4 1,335.8 143.7 410.0 227.5 180.7 230.6 120.1 192.0
1. Large Size Enterprise (300 employees or more)
2. Small and Medium Size Enterprise (30-299 employees)
3. Small and Medium Size Enterprise=100.
Source: see Table 6.18.
First of all, in terms of the cash wage, severance pay and voluntary enterprise 
welfare, whatever is considered to be the standard, the inequality between large and 
small-medium enterprises has drastically widened (see Table 6.19 and Figure 6.4). In 
1985 there was not a significant discrepancy in the cash wage but there already existed a 
large gap in voluntary enterprise welfare. Until 1988, the gap of enterprise welfare 
decreased slightly whereas the cash wage discrimination began to rise. The real 
inequality began from 1990, just after (and during) the peak time of militant labour 
unionism in large manufacturing workplaces. What draws one’s attention is that 
voluntary enterprise welfare dominates the overall inequality, even though the 
inequality of mandatory severance pay shoots up enormously in 1998 and 2000. On the 
contrary, the gap in the cash wage remained relatively stagnant between 1994 and 1999. 
What was more interesting is that the gap in voluntary enterprise welfare was 
remarkable during the period of the stagnation of the cash wage gap (See Figure 6.4). In 
the case of severance pay, two explanations can be extracted. First, the low severance
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pay cost between 1988 and 1992 implies a relatively stable employment condition in 
large firms. It implies that there have been significant inequalities in employment 
stability (workers’ tenure)20. Second, the benefits o f early retirement or mandatory 
severance pay during the economic recession have favoured the workers within large 
firms. Compared with the mandatory regulations set by the Labour Standard Law, most 
o f large firms have applied more favourable compensation schemes to their workers 
through accumulated retirement pay schemes according to workers’ years o f tenure 
(Bang, 1998). Especially, since many workers in large firms applied for an adjustment 
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Figure 6.4. Inequality between Large and Medium-Small Enterprises: Cash Wage, 
Severance Pay and Enterprise Welfare (Medium-Small Enterprises=100)
Source: see Table 6.18.
On the other hand, labour market flexibility has been reinforced and the ratio of 
regular employment in total paid employed has decreased significantly since the crisis 
(see Table 4.4). It can be evaluated from the evidence that the inequality between 
regular and irregular workers has been nurtured (Jung et al, 2004; Y.S. Kim 2001, 2002). 
Whereas many firms have cut their regular employment through massive lay-offs and 
the encouragement o f  early retirement with high compensation, they have utilised 
irregular employments to reduce a significant part o f their labour costs -  statutory social 
insurance contributions and other enterprise welfare benefits. As indicated in Table 6.20,
20 This may be the mixed outcome of strong trade unions, labour shortages and the higher profitability of 
large firms (mainly Chebols).
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most irregular workers are excluded from the actual coverage of the mandatory 
severance pay, bonuses and paid holidays, and also from workplace social insurance 
programmes (see also Table 6.4). As a result, for irregular workers who occupy more 
than the half of the paid labour force, not only do the social insurance programmes 
remains nominal, but enterprise welfare has not played a role as a substitute for 
insufficient state welfare.
Table 6.20. Actual Coverage Rate of Fringe Benefits and Statutory Enterprise 
Welfare: Regular vs. Irregular Workers
(per cent)
Severance pay1 B onus1 Paid holidays2 Maternity leave2
Total Em ployed 48.3 48.0 40.5 16.8
Regular Workers 93.2 92.5 75.4 32.9
Irregular Workers 13.8 13.9 15.6 5.3
1. In 2002
2. In 2000
Source: Jung et al, 2004: 396.
6.4. The Third Sector
One of the most important features of the Korean social welfare system has been its 
underdeveloped social services. Until the 1980s, the government restricted the scope of 
its interventions in social services to only acting when the caring function of family fails, 
and the main social services were residential or caring services for the needy who did 
not have a family member who could care for them. Moreover, the government has 
actively utilised third sector organisations as its agents for the delivery of social services, 
rather than developed its own social service delivery system. Since the main function of 
third sector organisations has been to provide the statutory social services that were 
defined as the government’s legal responsibility, they are highly dependent on public 
payments, and inevitably utilising public funding has been accompanied by pervasive
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supervision and guidance from the state. As a result, even though the third sector has 
taken a great, if  not absolute, role in the overall provision of social services, the 
advantages of the third sector’s social provision -  such as widened choice, participation, 
responsiveness, diverse social values, innovation and so on -  have not developed well 
under these circumstances. This is particularly true for social welfare corporations 
which have been the main suppliers of institutional (residential) caring services. Also, 
most of other social welfare organisations that have received government grants cannot 
be free from those restrictions. All of these features raise question about the 
independence of the third sector.
However, there have been significant changes in the social service provisions of 
the third sector since the late 1980s. First, a set of legislation regarding social services21, 
enacted during the early 1980s, were implemented. Despite de-facto selectivism, the 
legislation has been linked to the diversification of social services. Second, these 
diversified social services have been possible on the basis of the ‘deinstitutionalisation’ 
policy of the government (Baek, 1997). From institutional caring, the initiatives of the 
social services have been transformed into community welfare facilities such as 
community social welfare centres, home caring service centres and nursery services. 
Third, through the revision of the ‘Social Welfare Service Act’ in 1997, not only social 
welfare corporations, but also various organisations, foundations, and even enterprises 
and individuals can enter the ‘social service industry’. For example, not only have for- 
profit corporations been participating in nursery and elderly care industries, but CSOs 
have also provided new social services since the Financial Crisis. Finally, in order to 
mobilise private resources, the government has actively encouraged volunteer activities 
as well as private charity donations. Across the country, local governments have 
established quasi-public volunteering centres (MOHW, 2000: 127-128) and a united 
fund-raising organisation (Korean United Way) was founded in 1999 (Kang, 2000: 345). 
Despite such developments, the basic tendency that the government utilises the third 
sector in social service delivery and makes them subject to strong regulation has not 
changed.
Rather, it was the CSOs’ social welfare movements that have revealed the 
potential of the third sector in Korea. According to Kramer (1981: 9), the voice
21 For examples, ‘Elderly Welfare Act [1981]’, revision o f ‘Child Welfare Act [1984]’, ‘Disabled Welfare 
Act [1981]’ and ‘Infant Education Encouragement Act [1982]’.
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mechanism of the third sector, which pressures the government to establish social 
welfare programmes and to improve their provision and eligibility criteria, forms one of 
the most important functions. The increasing advocacy role of the third sector has been 
based on the growing civil society since 1987. At the earlier stage, Civil Society 
Organisations revealed their radical objectives and put emphasis on the struggle against 
the authoritarian state. But the prevailing social movement soon began to be 
transformed into a civil society movement; a movement from radical, revolutionary
99social movements to a focus on issue politics . The newly established CSOs have taken 
a moderate stance using legal activities, which distinguish them from the illegal and 
violent ways of the anti-governmental organisations (P. Yoo, 1998: 83). For those 
organisations, welfare issues have been one of the most important issues to deal with, 
and they have actively accomplished an advocacy role vis-a-vis the government since 
the launch of the Kim Young Sam government in 1993. Their activities have covered 
various welfare issues including the expansion of social insurance coverage, the protest 
for social rights, the establishment of new social services and so on. For example, 
women’s organisations protested the enactment of laws to prevent domestic and sexual 
violence during the 1990s (Kim, Yoon and Park, 1999). The PSPD launched the 
‘national minimum’ movement in 1994 and dominated the public assistance reform 
processes under the Kim Dae Jung government (Ahn, 2000; J.Y. Moon, 2001). 
Especially when the financial crisis created unprecedented mass unemployment and 
poverty problems, many CSOs formed a coalition to campaign for the expansion of state 
welfare programmes and they actively participated in all the major welfare reform 
processes including the unification of the National Health Insurance and pension 
reforms. As shall be discussed in the following chapter, the CSOs have had an abundant 
manpower pool including professional scholars and lawyers, so they could participate
22 According to Cho, this trend was the result o f and reflected a change in the internal and external 
circumstances (D.Y. Cho, 1999: 133-143). First, the radicalisation o f  social movements, esp. student 
movement, during the late 1980s was too far from people’s emotional generosity. Second, the collapse of 
Communism caused confusion and disturbance within radical social movements. Some activists gave up 
their faith and flew into institutional politics, and others began to realise the necessity o f ‘a new form’. 
Third, the fruits o f democratisation, in terms of the procedural dimension, have provided favourable 
conditions for various social movements. The requirements for establishing organisations have been more 
moderate. And the state’s power over civil society has weakened. Fourth, social problems became more 
serious, and new issues such as distributional (Economic) justice, inequality, environment and domestic 
violence have arisen. In order to cope with these social problems caused by the compressive economic 
growth, incremental reform based on civil movements, rather than revolutionary, have been justified. 
Fifth, the material conditions of civil movement have matured. The advent and growth o f the middle class, 
or citizen, who can afford to pay membership fees and their attention to social problems.
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and influence nearly all the social policy processes from the formation of the policy 
agenda to its actual implementations. Moreover, contrary to the past business-state 
policy coalition, they sometimes constructed a ‘critical’ policy coalition with pro­
welfare government Ministries when reformative welfare reform proposals were faced 
by severe resistance from the business-economic bureaucracy coalition. Since these 
processes are much more related to welfare politics, rather than direct social welfare 
provision, and detailed discussions of the advocacy role of CSOs will continue in the 
following chapter, the analytical focus of the section concentrates on social service 
provisions and the structural features (mainly employment and finance structure) of the 
third sector. Again, I will substantially build on the existing works in the analysis of the 
third sector (e.g., Kim, Yoon and Park, 1999; Beon, 1996; Baek, 1997; S.Y. Moon, 2000, 
M.S. Kim, 2002, and especially T.K. Park, 2000, in the finance and employment 
structure), but a significant part of the analysis based on official statistics is added 
within this section.
Social Service Delivery Structure
Since the government has endowed its responsibility for providing social services to 
third sector organisations, the role of the third sector in social welfare provisions should 
be analysed in the context of the overall social service system. In Korea, social welfare 
organisations providing social services can be divided into two types; i.e., social welfare 
residential institutions (providing residential and caring services for the needy) and 
users’ welfare facilities/centres. The former type looks to accommodate those who 
cannot live in the community and are defined as the ‘statutory’ needy such as the elderly 
poor, the disabled and needy children (Moon, 2000: 57). Social welfare institutions have 
formed a cmcial part of the social service system of Korea, and most of them have been 
run by social welfare corporations. In 1999, more than 99 per cent of institutions and 
residents were included within the private sector (see Table 6.21), and almost all the 
private institutions were run by third sector organisations. Only some parts of elderly 
welfare institutions (approximately 22 per cent) were included in the ‘charged nursing 
home’ category in 2000 (see Table 6.14). On the other hand, the latter type can be 
understood as facilities to meet the social service needs of the community. Nursery
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facilities and community social welfare service centres occupy the absolute majority of 
social service centres or facilities, and all of them increased during the 1990’s (see Table 
6.13 and 6.22). Whilst the providers of nursery services are relatively pluralized despite 
the dominance of market providers, most community social welfare service centres are 
being operated by third sector organisations.
Table 6.21. Outlook of Social Welfare Institutions: Public vs. Private (1999)





















































































Source: Ministry o f Health and Welfare, White Paper on Health and Welfare 2000, p. 644.
Although these ‘formal’ social welfare institutions have dominated social service 
provisions, it is evident that they are not the only type of supplier. It has been known 
that there have been a significant number of unlicensed residential institutions mostly 
run by individuals or religious organisations with philanthropic purposes. In 1995, for 
example, it was reported that there were 293 unlicensed social service providers across 
the country and approx. 73% of them were founded between 1986 and 1995 (Beon, 
1996). As most of the unlicensed institutions have been excluded from the financial 
support and regulation of the government, the government has encouraged them to turn 
into formal institutions via the amendment of the ‘Social Welfare Service Act’ of 1997.
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The law included a set of de-regulations, and the existing sanction system has been 
transformed into a registration system for the establishment and operation of social 
welfare institutions. Nonetheless, the number of unlicensed institutions has increased 
rapidly; whereas the number of formal social welfare residential institutions increased to 
925 in 2001, from 778 in 1995, 637 unlicensed institutions were reported in 2001, 
compared with 283 in 1996 (M.S. Kim, 2002: 51). Such an increase, M.S. Kim asserts 
(2002: 44-5), has been due to an increasing number of needy people for whom it has not 
been possible to enter formal residential institutions. Similar to public assistance 
programmes, it has been very difficult for those who have family members to gain 
admission to formal residential institutions because, as agents of the government, they 
have to provide statutory social services for the ‘needy’ as stipulated by the government.










1985 29 25 1 1 2
1990 88 76 4 3 5
1995 297 221 58 10 8
2000 345 251 62 18 15
2002 360 260 64 17 19
Source: Ministry o f Health and Welfare, Statistical Yearbook o f  Health and Welfare, 2002: Table 5-1-4.
On the other hand, beyond their voice mechanism, many CSOs have participated 
directly in the field of social services, and the trend whereby the third sector replaces the 
role of the government in social service delivery has been reinforced, especially since 
the financial crisis (Moon, 2000: 59-61). CSOs have been in charge of newly rising 
needs such as homelessness, domestic violence and sexual harassment, unemployment, 
adolescents leaving home and adolescent sexual problems. For example, legislation on 
the domestic violence and sexual harassment (1994 and 1997 respectively) were finally 
realised after women’s organisations had protested for them as the result of human 
rights movements for women. Most services relating to the sexual and physical violence
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such as the emergency call service, counselling, legal information and temporary shelter 
services have been provided by these women’s organisations with the financial support 
of the government (Kim, Yoon and Park, 1999; Park and Hwang, 1999). Most of all, the 
emergency services for the homeless and unemployment services, which began to 
emerge after the financial crisis, have been dominated by the third sector. Catering and 
shelter services for the homeless were initiated and provided by religious organisations, 
CSOs and community social welfare centres (S.M. Hong, 2002). When the government 
sanctioned the release of enormous resources to deal with the mass unemployment 
problem in 1998 and 1999, many CSOs (especially women and consumer related 
organisations) participated in the unemployment programmes of the government and 
began to provide the various social services directly (Moon, 2000: 60). The most 
outstanding feature of these social services is that the pioneering or experimental feature 
of the third sector has been revealed and, different from traditional social welfare 
institutions, the issue of independence of the third sector organisations has hardly been 
raised despite their significant aid from the government. This is due to the fact that the 
organisations initiated their programmes first and the government admitted their 
necessity and supported them later, rather than the government first setting up basic 
guidelines to run the services.
To sum up, the social service delivery structure of the third sector, as Moon 
(2000: 62) indicates, can be summarised as follows; first, social welfare institutions, 
mainly run by social welfare corporations, provide statutory social services on behalf of 
the government [agents of the government]; second, unlicensed organisations play a 
supplementary role by providing social services to those who are not covered by 
statutory social services [supplemental to the government]; third, along with some 
leading religious organisations, CSOs have initiated and dominated experimental 
programmes in order to cope with the newly emerging social problems [pioneering as 
well as supplementary role]. Although there have been expansions of some social 
services for the general population since the early 1990s, the overall dominance of the 
third sector in social service delivery and the strong interventions of the government on 
the private social service providers has not been changed much.
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Finance and Employment Structure
In spite of the recent growth of the third sector, it has been reported that the role of the 
third sector in social welfare and health has been very weak in overall social welfare 
provision, as the expenditure study above has shown. More fundamentally, it has been 
reported that the size of the third sector itself is very small when compared with the size 
of the third sector in other countries. According to the comparative study of Salamon et 
al. (1999), in 1995, the average of third sector expenditure among 22 countries was 4.6 
per cent of GDP (5.7 per cent including volunteers), the average employment size 
occupied 4.8 per cent of the total non-agricultural or 10 per cent of service employment 
(6.9 and 13.9 per cent respectively including volunteers). Conversely, in Korea, the 
estimated gross sum of the operating expenditure corresponded to 2.9 per cent of GDP 
(3.9 per cent if volunteers were included), and the size of third sector employment did 
not exceed 2.9 per cent of the total non-agricultural or 8.5 per cent of service 
employment (4.3 per cent and 12.8 per cent respectively including volunteers; see Table 
6.23 and 6.31 for details)23.
First of all, it has been reported that, in 1997, there were 73,584 third sector 
organisations with 28 million members in Korea24 (T.K. Park, 2000). According to the 
estimations of the third sector using the ICNP025’s standard (Ibid), the gross amount of 
third sector expenditure was 13,905 billion Korean Won (approximately US$ 11 
billions), and it exceeds KW 18,819 billion (approximately US$ 14.5 billions) when the 
value of volunteers was included (see Table 6.23). It corresponded to 3.07 per cent, or
4.16 per cent when including volunteering, of the GDP in 1997. When it is analysed 
categorically, the proportion of the education area was overwhelmingly high (70.6 per 
cent of the total expenditure) in terms of the operating expenditure, but it reduced by 
just over half when the value of volunteering was included. The share of social welfare 
organisations was very low -  2.1 per cent of the total operating expenditure of the third
23 Here, many Korean scholars evaluate that Korea has revealed those features which Salamon and 
Anheier (1996)call ‘statist’ and, in terms of the government-third sector relationship, the structure that 
Gibron et al. (1992) categorise as the ‘collective-vendor’ model (H.K.Lee, 2000; Moon, 2000; T.K.Park, 
2000).
24 In terms o f the number o f organisations, 70% were religious organisations, 12.9% civil & political 
organisations, 7% social welfare, 4.8% professional organisations and 1.3% were entertainment and 
culture. The others were below 1%. In terms o f membership, the situation was not so different; 62.3% 
were taken by religious sector, 25.1% civil & political organisations, 8.7% professional groups.
25 International Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, Johns Hopkins University, U.S.A.
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sector (but it reached almost 8 per cent including the value of volunteering).
In terms of the employment structure, the third sector employed not only 
approximately 536,000 of the paid labour force, but also had volunteers corresponding 
to more than 274,000 full-time paid staff (see Table 6.24). This size corresponded to 2.9 
per cent of the total non-agriculture employment or 8.5 per cent of the service 
employment (4.3 and 12.8 per cent respectively including volunteering activities). 
Whilst the absolute majority of paid workers were employed within the education (33.5 
per cent), religion (26.8 per cent) and health (21.8 per cent) sectors, social welfare 
organisations employed only 7.5 per cent of the total of third sector employment. 
However, in terms of the proportion of volunteering activities, social welfare (23.8 per 
cent) and civil organisations (21.4 per cent) were both dominant fields as were religious 
groups (35.4 per cent). When volunteers are included, the volume of the employment of 
social welfare organisations occupied 1.7 per cent of the total service employment.
Table 6.23. Estimated Expenditure of NPO sector (1997): ICNPO standard











Value of  
volunteers
B+C a b  
(%)
Entertainment & 378.9 358.1 94.5 172.2 530.3 48.1Culture (2.7) (2.7) (3.5) (2.9)
Education 9,799.9 9,281.4 94.7 53.2 9,334.6 0.6& Research (70.5) (70.6) (1.1) (51.7)
















Professional (inc. 1,084.8 985.0 90.8 5.2 990.2 0.5trade union) (7.8) (7.5) (0.1) (5.5)
Total 13,905.4 13,143.0 94.5 4,913.7 18,056.7 37.4(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Source: Reorganised from Park, 2000: Table. 3 & 4
26 Followed by ICNPO methods, wholesale, retail, restaurant and hotel employment were excluded in the 
total service industry (Park, 2000).
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Table 6.24. The Size of Employment and Volunteers (1997): ICNPO Standard
__________________________________________________________ (Number, per cent)
Paid Employment Volunteers
ICNPO Category Number % o f Service Number % of Service
(% of total) Employment (% of total) Employment
Entertainment & 22,121 0.3
9,741 0.2
Culture (4.1) (3.9)
Education & 179,566 2.8




Social Welfare 40,403(7.5) 0.6
65,210
(12.0) 1.0




Professional 17,971 0.3 300 0.0(inc. trade unions) (3.4) (2.3)
Total 536,127 8.5 274, 494 4.3(100.0) (100.0)
Source: Reorganised from Park, 2000: Table. 5.
Table 6.25. Revenue Structure of the Third Sector (1997): ICNPO Standard
_______________________________________________________ (Billion Won, per cent)
ICNPO Category
Public Payment Private Giving Private Fee and Charge






Culture 97.0 25.4 32.2 8.5 249.7 66.1
Education & 
Research 1,479.8 15.1 480.2 4.9 7,839.9 80.0
Health 416.7 39.1 - - 649.1 60.9
Social Welfare 197.6 67.9 47.9 16.5 45.9 15.7
Civil & Political 
Organisations 93.3 16.6 93.1 16.7 372.3 66.7
Religion - - - - 726.9 100.0
Professional 1,084.7 100.0(inc. trade unions)
Total 2,283.4 17.3 653.4 5.0 10,241.6 77.7
Source: Park, 2000: Table. 6
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Table 6.26. Revenue Structure of Unlicensed Residential Service Institutions
(per cent of total revenue)
S elf Revenue Government
Private Donation
OtherAid Foreign Aid Private Aid
Y.C. Beon 
(1995) 32.9 7.8 13.2 25.6 20.5
M.S. Kim 
(2002) 19.8 10.6 - 26.7 30.41
1. Including public assistance benefits to inmates of institutions (19.7% o f total).
Source: Y.C. Beon, 1996: 7; M.S. Kim, 2002
On the other hand, in the case of finance structure, although the revenue of the 
third sector has been highly dependent on fees and its membership in general, very 
diverse structural features can be found from one category to another (see Table 6.25). 
For health and medical organisations, for example, fees and charges for health services 
were the largest financial income source. Whilst the most outstanding feature in the 
revenue structure of social welfare organisations has been a higher dependency on 
government aid. Almost 70 per cent of their income came from the public sector in 1997. 
This has been largely due to the particular relationship they have with the government 
as mentioned above; i.e., the government legally requests that the statutory needy be 
protected and accommodated in appropriate facilities and, in turn, the government pays 
most of costs of caring to social welfare corporations (Moon, 2000: 70-73). In the case 
of unlicensed social service organisations, however, the importance of government aid 
has remained residual whilst private donations can be taken as one of their most 
significant sources of revenue (see Table 6.26). Moreover, the importance of private 
financial sources has increased greatly in social service provisions. For example, 88 
major enterprise foundations that were enrolled in the Korea Employers’ Federation
97(KEF) spent KW 124.4 billion on social welfare, corresponding to 14.8 per cent of the 
government’s social service spending (C.S. Hwang, 1998: 159). Additionally, financial 
aid from the SWCFRC (the Korean United Way), launched in 1998, provided another 
source of private giving28.
27 This amount occupied 44% of enterprise foundations’ total expenditure.
28 It collected 16.7 billion in the year of 1998-1999 and 29.5 billion in 1999-2000 (Kang, 2000: 355).
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6.5. Family and Household Provisions
Although the transformation of demographic and household structures has reduced the 
capability of the family in informal welfare provision, there is much evidence that the 
family and household provisions have remained as the most important welfare source 
for ordinary people. Under the condition of an immature public transfer system, private 
income transfers among family members (different households) have not only been the 
largest income source for the elderly, but have also played a significant role when 
ordinary people face hard situations. Most of the elderly still either live with their adult 
children in the same household or are cared for by the children who reside in the same 
region or neighbourhood area. Most of caring burden has been left as the share of the 
family, or, more correctly, women. In this section, I attempt to indicate how important 
family and household welfare provision has remained to Korea. To do so, I synthesise 
various sources of materials and the data of other scholars, in an analysis of the effects 
of private income transfers (B.D. Son, 1998, 1999; J.K. Choi, 2000; Seok and Kim, 
2000), informal caring related to the elderly (Jung et al., 1998). I also refer to other 
primary official data and statistics, especially in the analysis of the income source of 
different income groups and the gender issue of informal caring based on time survey 
data.
Private Income Transfers
It is private income transfers that have been defined as one of the most unique features 
of family and household provision in Korea. To understand the importance of private 
income transfers, it is necessary to analyse the overall income structure of households, 
based on a nation-wide income survey29. As seen from Table 6.27 below, the share of 
transfer incomes (5.8 per cent) as a regular income was as important as that of property 
incomes in 2000. Similar to the transfer income structure shown in Table 6.8, the
29 The National Statistical Office has implemented such a kind o f income and expenditure survey at a 
five-year intervals since 1991. But it was in the most recent survey held in 2000 that the income data of 
the self-employed began to be published. Until then, same as the Urban Household Survey o f NSO, only 
the expenditure data of the self-employed were reported whereas both the income and expenditure data of 
the worker’s households are now published.
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importance of the private transfers overwhelmed that of public transfers. Especially, for 
the lowest quintile group, the private transfers (subsidy from other household) were one 
of the largest income sources (14.8 per cent of regular income) whereas the public 
transfer incomes took up only 5 per cent of regular income. So it can be said that the 
private transfers are of immense importance for lower-income households.
The importance of private income transfers and their dominance of the overall 
transfer incomes has been reported within many empirical studies (Kim and Son 1995; 
B.D. Son, 1998, 1999; J.K. Choi, 2000). As a matter of fact, whilst state welfare 
benefits have hardly contributed to poverty reduction in terms of the poverty rate (head­
count) and poverty gap, private transfers have played a relatively important role. Son 
(1999) reports that the poverty reduction rate among households receiving private 
income transfers was 20.8-37.9 per cent for the urban workers’ households, or 
18.9-21.1 per cent for the unemployed households in 1998. For very poor households 
(below 25 per cent of median income), private income transfers were also very 
important in order to maintain their livelihood even though their scale was not large 
enough for them to be escape the poverty line.
Table 6.27. Household Income Sources by Yearly Income Quintile Groups (2000)
____________________________________ (Thousand won, per cent of Regular Income)
Ave I n m IV V
Regular Income 28,962 9,306
17,531 24,187 32,722 61,054
(100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Earnings 16,402
5,047 10,919 14,811 20,554 30,673
(56.7) (54.2) (62.3) (61.2) (62.3) (50.2)
Business Incomes 9,219
1,796 4,357 6,728 3,448 24,102













Transfer Incomes 1,682 1,838
1,526 1,587 1,488 1,973
(5.8) (19.8) (8.7) (6.6) (4.5) (3.2)
Pension
337 149 278 371 319 566
(1.2) (1.6) (1.6) (1.5) (1.0) (0.9)












Subsidy from other household 1,177 1,373
1,062 1,109 1,054 1,288
(4.1) (14.8) (6.1) (4.6) (3.2) (2.1)
Source: National Statistical Office, National Survey o f  Household Income and Expenditure 2000 -  Vol. 1 
Two or More Person Household, 2002: 54.
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Table 6.28. Poverty Reduction Effects of Private and Public Transfers1: Average of 
6 years (1992-1998)
Povertv Rate (head-count) 
Public Transfers Private Transfers
Poverty^Gap2 
Public Transfers Private Transfers
Pre-Transfer (A) 19.26 20.61 46.86 53.66
Post-Transfer(B) 18.50 18.50 44.58 44.58
A-B 0.76 2.11 2.28 9.08
PRE3 3.95 10.24 4.87 16.9
1. Poverty line and equivalent scale follows the official standard o f Korea
2. (Poverty Line) - (Average income o f households under poverty line)
3. Poverty Reduction Effect = (A-B)/A*100 
Source: Re-organised from Choi, 2000: 45-49.
Table 6.29. Primary Income Source of the Elderly1: International Comparison
(Per cent)
Major Income Sources
Korea Japan Taiwan US Germany
‘80 ‘95 ‘80 ‘95 ‘80 ‘95 ‘80 ‘95 1995
1. Earned Income 16.2 26.6 31.3 21.6 29.9 26.9 15.2 15.5 4.6
2. Assets Income 5.5 9.9 11.2 6.6 6.7 8.8 26.2 23.3 13.7
2.1 Income from Property 3.3 4.5 5.3 2.5 3.8 4.8 14.5 8.5 2.0
2.2 Saving 2.2 4.9 2.1 2.4 1.7 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.6
2.3 Private Income 0.0 0.5 3.8 1.7 0.2 2.1 10.0 13.3 10.1
3. Private Transfers 75.6 56.6 18.7 6.6 61.6 56.5 3.8 1.6 1.9
3.1 From Children 72.4 56.3 15.6 4.2 58.2 52.9 0.3 0.0 0.2
3.2 Others 3.2 0.3 3.1 2.4 3.4 3.6 3.5 1.6 1.7
4. Public Transfers 2.0 6.6 36.1 57.4 2.3 7.6 54.6 55.8 77.6
4.1 Public Pension 0.8 2.9 34.9 57.1 2.2 7.3 53.9 55.5 77.0
4.2 Public Assistance 1.2 3.7 1.2 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.6
1. 65 and more
Source: Seok & Kim, 2000: 35.
Similarly, according to Choi (2000), the average poverty reduction effects of 
private transfers between 1992 and 1998 were 2.5~3.5 times higher than those of public 
income transfers (see Table 6.28). In terms of the poverty rate, whereas the poverty 
reduction effect of private transfers was on average 10.24, that of the public transfers 
remained at 3.95. When we turn our focus to the poverty gap, the discrepancy of the 
effect between private and public income transfers becomes even wider; the private
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transfer reduce the poverty gap by 9.08 on average but public transfers only reduced it 
by 2.28. Although Choi’s study applies different research methods to the LIS, the 
poverty reduction effect of public transfers seems almost negligible in Korea when
i n
compared with that of major OECD countries . Rather, it seems that the role of family 
has been more important when people face financial difficulty.









Average 38.6 10.7 40.1 6.5 4.1
Male 50.4 12.4 25.0 9.3 2.9
Female 30.2 9.5 51.0 4.5 4.8
Aged 60-64 59.2 11.6 19.0 8.3 1.9
65-69 43.0 11.5 34.4 7.7 3.4
70-79 20.6 10.0 58.7 4.8 5.9
80 or over 6.2 7.4 77.8 1.1 7.6
1. Themselves or spouse
2. Public assistance, aids from society and etc.
Source: National Statistical Office, 2002 Report on the Social Statistics Survey
Most of all, private income transfers have been known as a primary income 
source for the elderly. Table 6.29, which indicates some international comparisons of the
30 LIS (Luxembourg Income Study) has developed a research method that is suitable for international 
comparison; e.g. a common definition of disposable income, an equivalent scale and a poverty line. The 
table below indicates the poverty reduction effect by head-count in major OECD countries. When 
compared with the figures o f Korea, although Choi’s study uses an absolute poverty line and different 
equivalent scale, we are able to easily recognise the nominal, rather than substantial, role of public 
transfers in terms o f poverty reduction.
Poverty Reduction Effect in Major OECD Countries (Poverty Rate, Head Count): 1995___________
Country________Pre-Transfer (A) Post-Transfer (B)______ A-B______ Poverty Reduction Effect
Sweden 33.3 6.1 27.2 81
Norway 24.4 5.3 19.1 78
Germany 25.6 6.9 18.7 73
Netherlands 20.1 5.6 14.5 72
UK 31.7 12.1 19.6 61
Australia 27.9 12.9 15.0 53
Canada 24.7 10.7 14.0 56
US 24.2 16.6 7.6 31
Average 25.8 9.5 16.3 63.2
Source: Kim, 2000; Recited from Choi, 2000: 46.
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primary income sources of the elderly, provides some useful information. In Germany 
and the United States, the proportion of the elderly whose primary income source is 
shown to be the private transfers from children was close to ‘zero’. Instead, as everyone 
can suppose, public pension schemes were the most important income source for most 
elderly people in US, Germany and Japan, even though incomes from the market 
(earning and assets income) were the primary income source for a significant part of the 
elderly in Japan and US. On the contrary, private income transfers, which mainly come 
from adult children still remain as one of the most important income sources for more 
than the half of the elderly in Korea (and in Taiwan), despite a notable decrease between 
1980 and 1995. Furthermore, what must be indicated is that, the reduced proportion of 
private transfers as a primary income source was filled by a higher dependence on 
market incomes (earning and assets income), rather than on public income security 
schemes. In terms of income composition, it was reported that, in 1996, the average 
income of the elderly was composed by an earned income of 37.5 per cent, an assets 
income of 26.8 per cent, private transfers of 27.5 per cent and public transfers of 7.8 per 
cent; in other words the proportion of each can be expressed roughly as ‘work : market: 
family : state = 4 : 2.5 : 2.5 : 1* (Seok & Kim, 2000: 39). A more recent survey has also 
indicated that the vast majority of elderly people depend on the market or the family for 
their livelihood, rather than on state welfare (see Table 6.30). For more than half of the 
female elderly and older elderly groups (aged 70 and over), the support of their children 
formed the main source of their income.
Informal Caring
As investigated in chapter 4, the fast industrialisation and urbanisation of Korean 
society has transformed household structures significantly (e.g. the reduction of three- 
generation households) and the traditional caring capability of the family seems to have 
decreased. Nevertheless, the family has taken the greatest caring responsibility, 
especially for the fragile elderly, as is the case in many Western welfare states. 
Especially, different from many advanced welfare states, co-habitation of the elderly 
with their adult children has remained as the largest residential category in Korea even 
though we cannot expect the same trend to occur in the future. In 1998, despite a
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significant decrease in the co-residence rate since the 1970s, still more than half of the
T1elderly households were included in the category of ‘co-residence with children’ (see 
Table 6.31). And, according to the most recent national population census data, 49 per 
cent of the elderly aged 65 or more lived with their children and another 22.7 per cent of 
them resided in neighbouring areas32 in 2000 (NSO, 2002:112). So, we can conclude that, 
if the norm of ‘adjacent separate living’ (Chang, 1997: 28) is considered, the vast majority 
of the elderly are still being cared for by their adult children either directly or indirectly.
Table 6.31. Distribution of Elderly Households by Household Type: 1998
(per cent)
Total Urban Rural
Elderly Alone 20.1 18.1 23.6
Elderly Couple1 21.6 18.3 27.5
Co-residence with Children 53.2 57.6 45.4
Others 5.1 6.0 3.5
1. Either one of couple or both of couple are 65 or more.
Source: Jung et al., 1998: 68.
‘Adjacent separate living’ has made it possible for elderly parents and their 
(grand)children to look after each other without damage to independent living. An exact 
case showing the advantages of ‘adjacent separate living’ can be found within the 
example of day-care for pre-school children. Despite the expansion of nursery 
institutions during the 1990s, the primary responsibility of the family does not seem to 
have been changed (see Table 6.32). 93 per cent of infants (age between 0 and 2) are 
cared for by either their parents or other family members (mainly grandmothers). 
Especially in the case of working mothers, where informal care by their own mothers 
(or mother-in-laws) seems very important.
31 What is more interesting is that, ‘elderly alone’ and ‘elderly couple’ households are more prevalent in 
rural area than in cities. According to Jung et al. (1998), 54 per cent and 40.7 per cent o f the elderly lived 
with their children in urban and rural areas respectively. This is opposite to the expectation that the 
traditional extended family would be preserved more in rural communities, but it is due to the rapid 
urbanisation which has been accompanied with the migration o f  the younger generation to cities.
32 Same eup/myeon/dong (the most basic unit o f region) or shi/gun/gu (the lowest level o f local 
government like ‘city’).
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Total 52.6 9.7 0.9 36.2 0.6
Mother’s Employment Status
Working 24.0 22.1 2.5 50.5 1.1
Non-working 70.8 2.4 0.1 26.4 0.3
Age of Pre-school Children
0 88.1 10.1 1.0 0.6 0.1
1-2 78.3 13.0 1.2 7.1 0.4
3-4 44.4 9.6 0.9 44.3 0.9
5-6 16.5 6.1 0.4 75.9 0.9
Source: NSO (2000), Report on Social Statistics Survey.
















Total 43.9 23.4 14.4 9.8 2.5 6.1
Region
Urban 41.5 22.9 15.5 12.0 2.6 5.6
Rural 48.3 24.0 12.5 5.9 2.2 7.1
Age
65-69 63.6 15.3 11.1 5.7 1.9 2.4
70-74 47.3 16.2 14.0 12.1 3.6 6.9
75- 24.4 35.9 17.5 11.5 2.0 8.7
Sex
Male 87.9 5.0 3.8 1.6 0.2 1.6
Female 16.8 34.6 20.9 14.9 3.8 8.9
Note. Among the elderly with chronic disease, the ratio o f receiving care is 37.3%.
Source: Jung et al., 1998: 279.
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In addition, the family has almost exclusively taken a caring responsibility for 
the fragile elderly in Korea. Examples of the elderly being cared for by other sources 
outside the family are very rare. As seen from Table 6.33, among the elderly with 
chronic diseases receiving care, 93.9 per cent were cared for by either their spouse or 
children in 1998. For elderly males, the exclusive source of informal caring was their 
wives (almost 90 per cent). By contrast, the caring responsibility for elderly females 
was most likely to be attributed to the eldest son or daughter-in-law. In the case of 
elderly people who require more intensive care, the caring responsibility tended to be 
spread out more (see Table 6.34). The eldest son or daughter-in-law was more likely to 
be the primary carer than the spouse or other children. This trend can be explained by 
traditional Confucian culture, which puts an emphasis on the role of the eldest son and 
daughter-in-law in terms of filial piety. However, when wives were available, most 
elderly males (68.4 per cent) were likely to receive care from their spouses.
















Total 24.5 27.7 16.0 9.6 2.9 19.4
Region
Urban 22.0 26.2 16.5 12.8 3.6 19.0
Rural 28.2 29.8 15.2 5.0 1.9 19.8
Age
65-69 42.9 20.0 14.9 7.1 3.5 11.7
70-74 30.9 17.1 16.8 8.7 4.5 22.0
7 5 - 14.2 36.3 15.9 11.1 1.8 20.8
Sex
Male 68.4 12.0 9.8 3.6 0.4 5.9
Female 11.8 32.2 17.8 11.4 3.7 23.3
Note. Among the elderly with IADL(s), 65.5% (A) are receiving care, 10.7% (B) need it but do not 
receive and 23.9% respond that they do not require it. Care-receiving rate is 86.0% (calculated as 
A/(A+B)*100).
1. Severe difficulty (cannot do without help) in any one or more among 6 items;
Bath or Shower, Changing Cloths, Sitting or Standing, Bedding, Walking, Toileting.
2. Including grandchildren/spouse, friends and neighbours.
Source: Jung et al., 1998: 279.
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As a result, it is evident that the family has taken the caring responsibility almost 
exclusively33. However, this point leaves some room to make two different arguments 
possible. The first is that, in Korea, where the influence of Confucianism is still strong34, 
the role of the family (or informal sector in general) was and is crucial in the area of 
caring. In other words, the strong role of the family is a very prominent feature of the 
welfare mix in Korea. The other argument is that, the reason why the family has taken 
most responsibility in caring is closely connected to the underdeveloped public social 
service system. Moreover, when we consider that informal caring is extremely subject 
to the availability of family members or personal networks, the prevalence of informal 
welfare can raise the problem of insufficient coverage as well as the issue of inequality. 
Most of all, all the main features discussed so far raise questions about gender 
inequality issue within informal caring.
Gender Issue of Informal Caring
As discussed in chapter 2, one of the most crucial issues in the informal caring is the 
gendered nature of caring. Korea is no exception. Rather, connected with cultural 
features, the gendered feature of informal caring is deployed quite complexly in Korea. 
Most of care-givers are women. What is different from the features of informal caring in 
Western welfare states is that the dominant care-givers for the elderly are daughter-in- 
laws, rather than daughters. As-indicated above, most of elderly males received informal 
caring from their wives but only 16.8 per cent of the elderly females with chronic 
diseases and 11.8 per cent of them with ADL, were primarily cared for by their 
husbands in 1998 (see Table 6.33 and 6.34). In the context of the Korean situation, it 
seems quite normal that elderly females look after their husbands but not vice versa. It is 
probably due to either the fact that men live shorter lives than women or the patriarchal 
taboo that caring is not men’s work. So the caring responsibility is given to daughter-in-
33 Although caring for the disabled has not been discussed, the situation does not seem any different. 
Considering the lack of daycare institutions or facilities, the caring responsibility for the disabled also 
seems to have been attributed to the family. In terms o f institutional caring, the number o f disabled people 
was estimated to be 1,053 thousand in 1995 but only 2.4 per cent (25 thousand) o f them are 
accommodated within institutions (MOHW, 2000: 231).
34 Han Park and Cho (1995: 131) indicate that ‘Confucian influence on the Korean family is still strong; 
persistent deference by wives to their husband’s status and role, son preference, and strong kinship bonds’.
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laws’ when their mother-in-laws require care. According to a national survey held in 
1984 (Im et al, 1985: 221-36; recited in Chang, 1997: 33), the proportion of daughter- 
in-laws amongst carers was 93.8 per cent. In 1998, more than the half of elderly females 
with ADL or chronic disease were cared for by son and daughter-in-laws (see Table 6.33 
and 6.34 again). Under Confucian patriarchal norms, sons (especially the eldest son) 
take most responsibility in looking after the elderly, and it means that substantially most 
of caring burden is imputed to daughter-in-laws.
Table 6.35. Time Spent on Domestic Work of Married Couples: 1999
(per cent, Hour:Minute)
Single Career Couple1 Double Career Couple
Wives Husbands Wives Husbands
Ratio2 Time3 Ratio2 Time3 Ratio2 Time3 Ratio2 Time3
Total Domestic Work 99.8 6:43 39.5 1:06 99.0 3:45 43.3 1:00
Meal Preparation 99.2 2:28 4.4 0:30 96.5 1:50 8.8 0:34
Cloth Care 74.4 0:59 1.3 0:24 56.0 0:44 2.2 0:28
Cleaning 90.8 1:01 12.6 0:31 75.2 0:45 19.1 0:32
House Upkeep 16.2 0:30 8.3 0:49 8.4 0:26 10.5 0:47
Shopping 62.2 0:44 7.9 0:37 37.8 0:36 7.4 0:35
Household Maintenance 20.7 0:26 2.4 0:31 11.5 0:23 3.5 0:28
Caring Family 79.3 2:29 20.5 1:03 56.2 1:10 14.2 0:55
1. Husbands working, Wives not working.
2. Participation Rate (%)
3. Participant Average Time Spent (Hour:Minute)
Source: National Statistical Office (2000b), Report on the Time Use Survey 1999.
The gendered feature of informal caring is confirmed again by recent national 
time survey data (NSO, 2000b). As Table 6.35 indicates, whereas almost 80 per cent of 
housewives (single career couple) or 56 per cent of career women were involved in 
some forms of informal caring, the ratios among men were much lower in both 
categories. More generally, despite the increase in women’s participation in the labour 
market, women’s burden of domestic work does not seem to have lessened. Rather, 
according to a study (Kong et al., 1990: 114-17; recited in Chang, 1997: 32), working
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wives had a greater burden of domestic work (81.6 per cent of total domestic work) than 
that of non-employed housewives (80 per cent) in the late 1980s. This trend has hardly 
changed; according to the time survey of 1999, it seems evident that the employment 
status of wives does not affect the domestic work of their husbands. Rather, although 
working wives spend less time on unpaid domestic work, the contributions of their 
husbands is less than that of the husbands of non-working housewives. Regardless of 
their employment status, almost all wives do some domestic work everyday. For 
working wives, although they tend to spend less time on domestic work than non­
working housewives, they still have to take on almost four hours’ burden a day. In 
conclusion, the dual burden hypothesis -  that working women suffer from both paid 
work and non-paid domestic work -  seems quite valid in Korea, and the embedded 
gender division of labour has hardly changed so far.
6.6. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented the significant changes in the welfare mix between 
1987 and 2002 (major changes are summarised in Table 6.36). First, one of the most 
important and outstanding features of the welfare mix changes, departing from its 
residual nature, the state’s commitment to and interventions in social welfare have 
greatly expanded. The official coverage of social insurance institutions had expanded 
and was finally universalised by 2000. The entitlement to public assistance benefits was 
established as a social right and the demographic conditions were abolished by the 
public assistance reform of 1999. Also, there were significant expansions in some social 
services, even though it was accompanied by a role for the state as regulator providing 
substantial financial support, rather than a direct provider. Secondly, welfare markets 
emerged and/or grew substantially in health, pensions and some social services. In 
addition, despite a significant reduction, the market dominance in health expenditure 
remained strong. Thirdly, in general, the importance of enterprise welfare increased. 
Voluntary enterprise welfare had been expanded greatly by the mid-1990s and the kinds
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of the benefits diversified throughout the 1990s. Between 1997 and 2000, there were not 
only massive expansions in mandatory enterprise welfare benefits as the (non-intended) 
result of the state’s previous interventions, but also severe fluctuations. For many 
workers who lost their job or retired, the mandatory severance payments were a de facto 
substitute for the scarce public benefits. Fourthly, the third sector not only remained as 
the largest provider of formal statutory social services despite strong state support and 
control, but also experimented with a pioneering role in new social services and its 
advocacy role emerged and grew in social policy making processes. Nonetheless, as 
seen from the financial and employment structure of social welfare organisations, its 
size and relative importance in overall welfare mix provisions remained marginal. 
Lastly, the capability and actual welfare provision of the family was declining, but 
family provisions still remained as the most important welfare source for the majority of 
people. Private income transfers were more important than public ones. Despite a 
significant decrease, still most of the elderly lived with or were cared for by their adult 
children, and the family took on most of the caring burden.
So, if we could summarise the main tendencies in welfare mix provision until 
1987 as ‘a residual and limited state welfare, underdeveloped welfare markets despite 
growing insurance markets in general, a substantial enterprise welfare as a substitute for 
state welfare, a marginal and subordinated third sector, and pervasive family provision 
as the primary welfare source’. The major changes to welfare mix provisions between 
1987 and 2002 can be defined ‘the expansion of state welfare, the emergence and 
growth of welfare markets, the increasing importance of enterprise welfare, the still 
marginal and subordinated third sector, and a declining but still important family sector’.
Although these changes in welfare mix provisions per se are significant enough, 
the following three important points embedded in the changes should not be ignored. 
Firstly, the institutional legacies of the welfare mix structure formed until 1987 are 
strongly represented in the changes to the welfare mix between 1987 and 2002. Such 
path-dependent development in the welfare mix changes can be supported by the 
abundant empirical evidence. In state welfare, the coverage expansion of social 
insurances was implemented basically within the existing institutional settings, rather 
than being fuelled by radical institutional changes. The subsidiarity principle, based on 
strong familialism, largely remained in public assistance and statutory social service 
systems. The market dominance of health expenditure structure had not changed much
197
by 2002, nor was there any fundamental proposals which were linked to actual policy 
implementation. In enterprise welfare, its nature as a de facto substitute for state welfare 
was still prominent, especially in the area of mandatory benefits. In social service 
delivery, the utilisation of the third sector by the government (the collective-vendor 
model) has been reinforced.
Table 6.36. Welfare Mix Changes between 1987 and 2002: Summary
Major Changes o f the Welfare Mix Results
State • Expansion o f coverage and universalisation o f social insurance 
but exclusion of irregular workers
• Public assistance reform (abolishment of demographic 
conditions, workfare programmes and general expansion) but 
still strong familialism
• Significant expansions in some social services, but subsidiarity 
principle and utilisation o f the third sector not changed.
Expanding 
commitments to 





Market • Growing private insurance markets in health and pensions, but 
fragile to the economic conditions. Growing inequality between 
have and have-nots in health and pensions expected
• Despite a significant reduction, the market dominance in health 
expenditure still remains strong
• Emerging private markets in some social services. Polarisation 
of the elderly residential services between poor and rich
Emerging and 
growing welfare 
markets, hence higher 
inequality according 
to purchasing power
Enterprise • Rapid expansion and diversification in voluntary enterprise 
welfare until the mid-1990s as a means of wage restriction and 
industrial peace. Basically sensitive to economic conditions
• Massive expansion and severe fluctuations in mandatory 
enterprise welfare benefits since the crisis
• Inequality among workers deepened in both mandatory and 
voluntary benefits.
Expansion in general 
and a de facto  
substitute for state 
welfare among 
(regular) core 




•  Still the largest provider in formal statutory social services, but 
under strong state’s support and control.
• Rising pioneering role and leading to new social services.
•  Nonetheless, still small third sector size in terms o f expenditure 
and employment
• Expansion of CSOs’ influence on social policy making 
processes.
Increasing voice but 
still marginal in the 
overall welfare mix 
structure
Family • Private transfers more important than public ones
• Despite a significant decrease, still most o f the elderly live with 
or are cared for by their adult children
• Despite its declining capability in providing caring and services, 
most o f caring burden is taken by the family.
•  Gender inequality in caring and domestic work.
In general, declining 
in both capability and 
actual welfare 
provision, but still 
most important 
welfare source for 
majority o f people
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Secondly and closely related to the path-dependent development, the dominant 
state intervention types largely remained in the welfare mix changes. The dominant role 
of the state in social welfare was as a regulator, rather than a direct provider or financer. 
The scope of the state’s direct provision role was largely restricted to the public income 
maintenance system (social insurances and public assistances). Although the state 
expanded its role as a direct provider through the expansion of social insurance 
coverage between 1987 and 2002, the state’s financial supports for social insurance was 
always marginal and public assistance benefit recipients as well as most of statutory 
social services were targeted narrowly through the subsidiarity principle based on strong 
familialism. Instead, the state as a regulator and indirect financer encouraged or 
mandated social welfare provision by non-state sectors through various interventions, as 
can be seen in the example of the dominant role of the third sector in social service 
delivery, the mandatory enterprise welfare programmes being substitutes or 
compliments to the scarce state welfare, and the encouragement of welfare markets and 
voluntary enterprise welfare provisions. In addition, related to strong familialism, the 
state never forgot to put an emphasis on the role of the family as the primary welfare 
provider, and supported the family through indirect tax benefits.
Lastly, significant inequality issues among different classes, groups and genders 
were absorbed in the welfare mix changes between 1987 and 2002 (see Table 6.36 
again). Irregular workers were largely excluded from the actual social insurance 
coverage as well as mandatory enterprise welfare benefits. Emerging and growing 
welfare markets imply a higher inequality according to purchasing power, and thus were 
very fragile to the economic conditions. The inequality in enterprise welfare between 
workers in large and small workplaces deepened in mandatory as well as voluntary 
benefits. Within family welfare provision, the gender inequality issues can be raised 
when considering informal caring and domestic work.
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CHAPTER 7. DYNAMICS OF THE WELFARE MIX CHANGES: 
ENVIRONMENTS, INSTITUTIONS AND WELFARE POLITICS
In the research, the welfare mix as a whole is the dependent variable that needs to be 
explained. Although there are many studies that have explained the development of 
specific sectors of welfare mix, especially state welfare (Kim and Sung, 1993; H.K. Lee, 
1993, 1999; C.S. Nam, 2000; D.M. Shin, 2000; H.J. Kwon, 1999), enterprise welfare 
(H.K. Song, 1995; C. Park, 1996; K.J. Hong, 1999) and the third sector (H.K. Lee, 
1998; S.Y. Moon, 2000; J.K. Kim, 2000), there has been no systematic attempt to 
analyse and explain the development of the overall welfare mix. In this research, 
however, I have attempted to do this. In this chapter, I turn the focus of the research to 
the ultimate goal of the research, i.e., explaining the changes to the overall welfare mix, 
based on the dynamics between environments, institutions and political actors. Most of 
all, as I proposed earlier, the qualitative context and political processes of the changes 
shall be emphasised throughout this chapter, by synthesising both a structure-centred 
and actor-based approach. In other words, although the structural and institutional 
factors provide the conditions, contexts and constraints for the welfare mix changes, the 
interaction and dynamics among different political actors significantly influence on 
social policy processes. So, the main discussion and arguments of the chapter 
concentrate on how environments (external forces and internal pressures) and domestic 
institutions (political democratisation, social pact institutions and institutional legacies 
of the welfare mix until 1987) influenced the welfare mix changes and through which 
policy processes and welfare politics. By doing so, I shall ultimately argue the 
importance of national politics in the dynamics of the welfare mix in Korea.
As I explained in the first chapter, to explain the overall welfare mix structure, I 
have depended not only on extensive academic literature but also on a large amount of 
grey literature and my own interviews. I shall refer to a lot of newspaper articles, 
speeches of the Presidents, a collection of reminiscences and interviews that were
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produced by a newspaper company, official statements of business agencies, trade 
unions and civil society organisations as main sources of grey literature. I have 
conducted my own interview with two professional activists who have speculated and 
participated in welfare politics. They have been deeply involved in the pension, health 
and public assistance reforms as members of government committees as well as 
representatives of civil society under the Kim Dae Jung government. Since their 
activities have been closely connected to trade unions and other political actors 
including high officials of government Ministries and the Presidential Office, they could 
provide abundant information and stories behind the policy making processes, including 
the positions and recognitions of different political actors. Based on synthesising all this 
information and literature, I analyse and interpret social policy processes to develop my 
arguments on how environments, institutions and the role of the state and other political 
actors have been intermediated through and how they have been associated with 
changes in the welfare mix.
The explanations of the welfare mix changes will be dealt with in chronological 
order, following the changes of government. Since the Korean polity adopts a 
presidential government system, the power of the President is stronger than any other 
political actor and parties. In this respect, changes to the government per se have 
brought significant changes of political situations. So, the chronological order of the 
explanations reflects the importance of the polity, along with the general 
transformations of environments and political democratisation. From now on, the 
political and institutional intermediation between structural changes and welfare mix 
changes in the post-1987 period will be investigated, according to a change of 
governments -  the Rho Tae Woo (1988-1992), Kim Young Sam (1993-1997) and Kim 
Dae Jung (1998-2002) governments -  in the following three sections. Although the 
dynamics of welfare politics were revealed most dramatically under the Kim Dae Jung 
government, the institutional foundations of welfare politics -  political democratisation 
since 1987 and social pact experiments from the early 1990s -  were formed much 
earlier, let alone the fast transforming internal, external environments.
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7.1. Stable Environments, Democratisation and the State-dominated Welfare 
Politics: 1987-1992
Whilst the Korean economy has enjoyed an extraordinary rapid growth since the 1960s, 
the political institution remained crippled under the control of a military dictatorship. 
Since the strict political authoritarianism which continued until 1987 suppressed 
virtually all economic and political desires that people claimed, the main social forces in 
society like worker and student groups primarily concentrated on the establishment of 
procedural democracy. Once the wave of mass demonstrations between 1985 and 1987 
had swept every comer of nation, President Chun and his most likely Presidential 
successor Mr. Roh were forced to make a concession in June 1987. Mr. Roh, who also 
led the Coup with Chun in 1979, announced the Declaration for Democracy. The so- 
called ‘6.29 Declaration’ included a set of democratic measures including a 
constitutional amendment to a direct presidential election and the release and the 
reinstatement into society of political prisoners. Although the democratic camp led by 
Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung failed to gain power in the 1987 presidential 
election, their opposition parties succeeded in gaining the majority in the National 
Assembly in the 1988 general election. Parliamentary democracy was at least formally 
restored.
The rapid dissolution of political authoritarianism, however, continued until the 
time of the political and social turbulence between 1987 and 1989. The democratisation 
provided a momentum for the ‘Great Struggle of labour’. The dissolution of 
authoritarianism also changed the repressive industrial relationship in workplaces and 
workers began to speak out with the demands that they had earlier repressed. Between 
1987 and 1989, 5200 new trade unions were formed at a workplace level and the 
mobilisation rate increased by 5 %, from 13.8 per cent to 18.6 per cent (see Table 6.16). 
The number of industrial disputes and workers involved during 3 years exceeded 7 
thousand and 1.9 million respectively. Trade unions not only protested for the rapid 
wage increases but also protested against the repressive legal system of industrial law. 
At the end of 1987, just after the time when the militant industrial disputes were at a 
peak, a set of industrial laws including the Trade Union Law and the Labour Dispute 
Adjustment Law, were amended to reduce or withdraw the government’s major
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regulations concerning union establishment and the restriction on collective action. With 
this as a turning point, the Roh Tae Woo government, launched in February 1988, could 
not continue the repressive labour controls of past regimes. Furthermore, Roh gained 
only 35.9 per cent of vote in the Presidential election and his ruling party was defeated 
in the general election of 1988. Under the circumstances of his frail political basis, Roh 
and his government could not exercise an absolute power in the policy processes as past 
regimes had done. Lee comments this point as follows;
During the first two years o f President Roh s term, the nation was to encounter 
ceaseless political turmoil, social unrest and the erosion o f social discipline.
Roh, himself a former military general, was hampered by the image that he 
was close to the military and not true civilian. The Roh government’s early 
responses to the social unrest were compensatory and welfare oriented. (H.K.
Lee, 1999: 29).
In addition, the excellent economic performance between 1986 and 1988 was 
another contributing factor to the social unrest and demands on the fruits of the nation’s 
economic development. More favourable international economic conditions -  low 
international interest rates, low oil prices and a low Korean currency value (Coming in 
parallel with an appreciation of the Japanese Yen) led to a rapid improvement of the 
international competitiveness of the manufacturing industry of Korea. Between 1986 
and 1988, the amount of exports increased from 34.7 to 60.7 billion US dollars, and 
Korea recorded a balance-of-payment surplus for the first time (Bank of Korea, various 
years). Based on such a good performance in exports, the annual growth rate of the 
three consecutive years of 1986, 1987 and 1988 reached two digits; 11.6, 11.5 and 11.3 
per cent respectively. Moreover, thanks to the rapid economic growth, employment in 
industry also increased rapidly, and the unemployment rate began to fall down below 2 
per cent from 1987 (see Table 4.1 and Table 4.4). A general shortage of labour force and 
an especially severe imbalance of labour supply and demand between different 
industries began to occur from the late 1980s (J.J. Huh, 2004: 297). Under these 
economic conditions, the government and business could do nothing but accept the 
demands of labour to some extent.
Most of all, under the conditions of a labour shortage in manufacturing industry 
and the ‘militant’ trade unionism between 1987 and 1989, business and the government
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had to accept a big increase in real wages exceeding the productivity growth rate. The 
annual increase rate of real wages was on average 8.8 per cent between 1985 and 1990, 
far exceeding the 5.6 per cent level of the real productivity increase rate (J.H. Jung, 
2004: 326-8). This was largely due to the fact that business could not depend on the 
state’s compulsive measure for wage restriction anymore because the government 
officially elucidated non-intervention in industrial relations. Real wages rose 7.8 per 
cent in 1988, 14.5 per cent in 1989 and 9.5 per cent in 1990 (see Table 6.16). On the 
other hand, the government also expanded its social welfare measures in terms of a 
compensation for workers. The Rho government announced a master plan for workers’ 
welfare including an increase in housing supply, the establishment of a worker’s bank 
and the introduction of the intra-company welfare fund. The government also legislated 
and implemented the minimum wage system from 1988. More importantly, there was 
meaningful progress in social insurance. In 1988, the National Pension Insurance 
scheme, initially covering workplaces with 10 or more workers, was launched as 
scheduled. In 1989, the Medical Insurance programmes was universalised by extending 
its coverage to the self-employed and workplaces with 4 or less workers.
Although the President could not dominate political situations and opposition 
parties held the National Assembly, he executed a veto against more rapid reformative 
legislation. When the opposition parties made further revisions to industrial law, which 
allowed labour rights of civil servants, the political activities of trade unions and third- 
party intervention, to pass the National Assembly in 1989, the President executed his 
veto (K.S. Lee, 2000). In addition, another Presidential veto was executed against the 
plan for the unification of the MEP1. For large conglomerates (mostly Chebols), they 
could form a medical insurance association by themselves, it meant the individual 
conglomerate could control the fund. So business, and the economic Ministries (The 
Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Finance), opposed the unification 
proposal and, finally, the President accepted their disagreement.
Furthermore, Roh’s initial appeasement orientation was revised with another 
political upheaval, i.e., the Grand Conservative Coalition in January 1990. The ruling 
forces recognised that they could not stabilise political and economic unrest with their
1 In front o f the universalisation of the MIP, the regional insurants -  mainly farmers’ agencies -  argued 
that their contribution burden was much higher than that o f  workers. The alternatives suggested were to 
unify the MIP insurers into a single organization and the half o f contribution had to be supported by the 
government. The three opposition parties, occupying the majority o f the National Assembly, politically 
accepted the unification policy and passed the legislation.
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existing minority seat in the National Assembly. From 1989, with the exhaustion of 
favourable international circumstances based on the three low prices, the international 
competitiveness of Korea’s exports goods began to be marginal. The main reason was 
indicated as due to the ‘excessive’ wage jump. The economic growth rate fell to 6.4 per 
cent in 1989, from 11.3 per cent in 1988. Conservative groups criticised the 
government’s abandonment of the ceaseless social unrest, caused by the ‘militant’ 
labour movement and the students’ anti-government demonstrations. The only solution 
was the restoration of the principle of law and order standards, and to achieve this a 
more powerful ruling party was required (H.K. Lee, op. cit). At last, three political 
parties (one ruling and two opposition parties) announced their merger, establishing the 
Democratic Liberal Party (DLP). One of the most influential democratic leaders, Kim 
Young Sam, became the Presidential candidate of the ruling DLP by joining the so- 
called Grand Conservative Coalition. Now the government began to deal with industrial 
relations more actively. The government began to set a wage guideline to restrict its 
rapid increase, and it also introduced the intra-company welfare fund in 1991 and 
induced employers to provide more enterprise welfare on the other. Really, the labour 
cost of the enterprise welfare began to rapidly increase from 1989. Between 1989 and 
1992, the annual average increase rate was recorded at about 30 per cent (see Figure 
6.3). On the other hand, by 1992, the coverage of the NPI and the IAICI had been 
incrementally extended to workplaces with 5 employees or more (see Table 6.1).
In addition, internal socio-demographic problems began to emerge. Such 
problems required to change in the structure of social service providers, from 
accommodated institutions to user service facilities to meet the welfare needs of 
communities. Instead of providing direct services, the government began to induce 
NPOs to establish users’ social service facilities to cope with such phenomena as the 
increase in the number of elderly people and the rise of non-typical (single-parent) 
households. In 1989, the government announced a set of regulations to encourage the 
establishment of community welfare centres operated by NPOs and the number of the 
centres rapidly increased between 1990 and 1993, from 88 to 250 centres (MOHW, 
1996). On the other hand, as the women’s participation rate was growing and the labour 
shortage problem continued, the government legislated the Nursery Act, which 
stipulated the installation of public, private and workplace nurseries, in 1991. All of 
these facilities, along with the existing residential institutions for providing statutory
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social services, were subject to state regulation as well as financial supports, and the 
vertical relationship between the government and the third sector had hardly changed.
Although the breakdown of the unification of the MIP showed the political 
nature of welfare issues, most social welfare policies were still dominated by the 
government. Neither civil society organisations (CSOs) nor trade unions emerged as 
main actors in welfare politics. To begin with the former, the existing influential 
organisation, the Citizens’ Coalition for Economic Justice (CCEJ), concentrated on 
economic issues rather than on the social welfare. Besides this, the activists of the 
democratic camp remained on the street but they were not absorbed into CSOs. Most of 
all, there was no central or peak trade union organisation that could represent the newly 
established ‘democratic’ trade unions after 1987. Of course, there was the Federation of 
Korea Trade Unions (hereafter, FKTU) as the existing peak association of trade unions. 
However, this was regarded as a government-patronised trade union, and, really, the 
FKTU, established in the 1960s, gave previous authoritarian governments blind support 
and regimes were allowed to politically manipulate labour through controlling the 
FKTU (B.S. Yoo, 2003: 80). Instead of the FKTU, the newly mobilised ‘democratic’ 
trade unions founded the ‘National Commission of Trade Unions’ as their central 
agency in January 1990.
However, although the democratic trade union camp was already concerned 
about social welfare issues to some extent, the government never recognised the camp 
as a legally legitimate organisation. Therefore, the likelihood of its participation in 
welfare politics was thoroughly prevented and the democratic trade unions concentrated 
on the obtainment of a legal status. Instead, in 1990, the FKTU proposed the National 
Economic and Social Conference (hereafter, NESC) in order to discuss social welfare 
issues with business. It was as a result of the FKTU’s strategic selection that it tried to 
discriminate itself from ‘radical’ labour movements (B.S. Yoo, Ibid: 82-3). The FKTU 
wanted to establish an image of a ‘new trade unionism for a democratic welfare society’ 
through pursuing legal social reform. By doing so, at the same time, the FKTU wanted 
to set out its new identification, free from the label of the earlier government-patronised 
organisation. The NESC was the first trial of social pact politics even though the 
government was not involved directly. The FKTU did not want to discuss wage issue, 
but business and the government sought to take the opportunity to rationalise the 
government’s wage guideline policy. As a result, both issues were dealt and the NESC
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became the forum for collective industrial relations between the FKTU and the Korea 
Employers’ Federation (hereafter, KEF). The NESC proposed several policy 
suggestions including the expansion of social insurance coverage and NPI reform, but 
most of them were not reflected by government policy (the government did not accepted 
many of them). Without the policy support by the government, the NESC was useless 
and became only nominal.
To sum up, with relatively stable external and internal environments, the period 
between 1987 and 1992 was the time when the basic preconditions for the working of 
the welfare politics (i.e., the political democratisation and the rise of labour movement) 
emerged, rather than their political dynamics concerning social welfare issues became 
active. The initial expansion of social insurance institutions was as a result of the 
government’s political necessity as compensatory measures for social unrest, but the 
principle of the ‘minimised financial burden of the state’ remained untouched. Again, 
the role o f the state in social welfare as a regulator, rather than a direct provider, was 
reinforced as the government continued to utilise the third sector in its expansion of 
social services. Moreover, the rapid expansion of enterprise welfare during this period 
was also induced by the government’s minimal intervention in industrial relations and 
its regulations like the legalisation for the intra-company welfare fund. In this respect, 
the government was the most important actor in the ‘immature’ welfare politics of this 
period.
7.2. Increasing External Pressures, Establishment of the ‘Civilian’ Government 
and the Emerging ‘Real’Welfare Politics: 1993~1997
It was the 1992 Presidential election that provided a chance to establish a ‘true’ civilian 
government and to sweep away all the negative legacies of previous military regimes. 
President Kim Young Sam distanced his government from the previous ones by calling 
it the ‘Civilian Government’. Although the President Kim Young Sam himself was 
elected by making the Grand Conservative Coalition with the ruling forces of the
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previous military regimes, he tried to discontinue their negative legacies of cronyism 
and strong government interventions in the economy. Under the rhetoric of 
‘Constructing New Korea’, the President Kim Young Sam wanted to renovate a basis of 
moral and political legitimacy distinct from the previous regimes, through implementing 
a set of political and economic reformative measures. In his inaugural address, he said;
We have to develop our strength to run towards 'New Korea’. But we are 
suffering from a disease. We are suffering from the ‘Korean Disease’ ... We 
have to implement and complete three reformative tasks. The first one is to 
sweep all the corruptions. The second one is to revitalise the economy. And the 
third one is to tighten the disciplines o f the country. (Inaugural address of the 
President Kim Young Sam, 25/2/1993)
Firstly his government tried to sweep out the elite politicians from the military2 
and prosecuted those who were related to the corruption and cronyism of the previous 
regimes including former Presidents Chun (1980—1987) and Rho (1988—1992). Along 
with the political renovations, the government implemented strong economic 
revitalisation policies like the ‘100-day New Economy Plan’ in the short term (D.M. 
Shin, 2001). The government and ruling elites believed that the Korean economy faced 
problematic situations3. The growth rate fell to 5.1 per cent in 1992 and 5.5 per cent in 
1993, and the balance of payments recorded deficits for three consecutive years between 
1990 and 1992. The government diagnosed the main reason for the economic problems 
as the weakness in the nation’s international competitiveness caused by the severe 
industrial conflicts during the Roh government. Furthermore, the government in its 
early years recognised that Korea’s economic difficulties originated from rather 
fundamental problems, the so-called ‘Korean Disease’. Institutionalised corruption, 
political rent-seeking, concentrated economic power and a loosened work discipline 
formed the problems causing the difficulties (H.K. Lee, 1999: 30). As a measure to 
drive out the embedded cronyism and to gain a transparent financial and taxation system, 
the government suddenly announced the launch of the ‘Real-name Financial Transaction
2 President Kim Young Sam held a strong line that the elites o f the previous military regimes should be 
excluded from the new Cabinet of his government (Special News Team o f Donailbo(an influential daily 
newspaper in Korea), Lost 5 Years -  the behind story o f  the ‘Civilian Government’ 1800 days, p 22)
3 For example, President Kim said, ‘So far, I  have done my best to establish the democratisation o f  the 
country. But, as the President, I  believe that the revitalisation o f  the economy is the historical mission at 
present ’ (Special speech on the ‘New Economy Plan’, 19/3/1993).
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System (RFTS)’4 in August 1993.
Although the Kim Young Sam government sought to control the wage increases, 
it had to depend on a new form of social consent between labour and business. In these 
processes, the social welfare issue could not be ignored. The ‘civilian’ government 
differentiated itself from the previous ‘military’ regimes by making labour and business 
reach an autonomous agreement on the wage issue (B.S. Yoo, 2003). For the 
government, the Wage Agreement Council (WAC) between the KEF and FKTU was 
regarded as an efficient instrument for pursuing both procedural democracy and the 
objective of wage restriction. The KEF also thought the stabilisation of wage increases 
was possible through negotiation at a central level (KEF, 1994: 32; recited from Ibid: 
84). For business, the rapid real wage increases were regarded as one of the most urgent 
problems, so employers were ready to discuss the social welfare issue alongside debate 
of the wage problem. The FKTU and the KEF reached an agreement on the wage 
increase rate of 4.7-8.9 per cent in 1993. The government and business propagated it as 
a ‘historical fact’, but the FKTU was criticised by the democratic trade union camp and 
field workers because the process of the agreement lacked a democratic procedure 
within its organisation. To overcome such criticism, the FKTU argued the necessity of 
social policy discussion in 1994. The government also accepted it and the KEF and the 
FKTU announced a ‘social consent’ in April 1994; it included not only the wage issue 
but also comprehensive contents on social policy reform including the expansion of 
social insurance coverage, increases in companies’ efforts in enterprise welfare and 
supporting the workers’ housing problem (Ibid: 84-5). However, the WAC became 
nominal soon because the government did not implement their policy suggestions. 
Moreover, since the WAC, alike the NECS, excluded the democratic trade union camp, 
the influence of the agreements was limited. Severe criticisms were raised about the 
deceit by the government and business groups.
In spite of the strong political and economic reforms of the new government, 
little attention was paid to social welfare issues. Under the logic of the so-called ‘pain- 
sharing’ to heal the ‘Korean Disease’, the government announced that the demands for 
social welfare expansion as well as labour’s protest for wage increases had to be
4 As a matter o f fact, financial transactions through false-name and/or borrowed name accounts were 
regarded as critical measures of cronyism, corruption and political rent-seeking. Although the system 
faced a vigorous resistance, the government propelled its implementation as scheduled. Especially, 
President Kim was very active to implement the RFTS as the core part o f his reformative policies (Special 
News Team o f Donailbo, pp. 274-297).
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controlled5. In this respect, as Sung (K.R. Sung, 2002: 497) indicates, at least for its first 
two years, the Kim Young Sam government did not seem to consider a comprehensive 
plan for social welfare expansion at all. Only the Employment Insurance System was 
legislated for in 1993 (implemented from 1995) which was scheduled by the previous 
Rho government, to support the industrial restructuring the government recognised that 
it was indispensable when looking to regain Korea’s international competitiveness. As 
many indicate, in the EIS, the feature of industrial policy was stronger than that of 
social security function for the unemployed (H.S. Ahn, 1995; H.K. Lee HK, 1999; D.M. 
Shin, 2001; K.R. Sung, 2002). The 14 day waiting period, short benefit duration, strict 
benefit requirements and low replacement ratio were the main features of the 
unemployment benefit programmes whereas employment stabilisation and vocational 
training programmes required relatively generous conditions.
Also, the introduction of the Private Individual Pension Schemes in 1994 
showed the pro-market nature of the government’s interventions in welfare issues. As a 
matter of fact, the Private Individual Pension Schemes (PIPS) began to be discussed to 
support the RFTS {Hankookilbo, 26/1/1994). The government worried about the 
likelihood that the implementation of the RFTS would cause a mass exit of savings 
from formal financial institutions. Business, especially financial institutions and 
insurance companies, strongly call for PIPS as early as possible to fill the pension 
market in advance before NPI coverage was expanded to the self-employed. To 
encourage savings, the government allowed all types of financial institutions to deal 
with PIPS and provided taxation support, including a tax exemption for interests as well 
as income deductions for the premiums (or savings) paid (Hankeorae, 3/4/1994). What 
must be indicated here is that the government recognised PIPS as a social welfare 
measure {Hankeorae, 12/4/1994), but the implementation of PIPS was dominated by the 
Ministry of Finance without policy consultation with the Ministry of Health and 
Society6. The government recommended PEPS instead of extending the coverage of the
5 The President Kim put his initial policy priority on the economic growth and the international 
competitiveness in his ‘Five-Year New Economy Plan’. He said 7« this year, as the first year [o f  'Five- 
Year New Economy Plan], the government attempts to recover the international competitiveness and to 
revitalise the economy. . . . In the fourth year, 1996, the government will make efforts on deal with such 
issues like housing, environment, transport, old-age and social welfare, to pull up the quality o f  life o f  the 
people. I  will restrict the government expenditure as low as possible. ... The government shall become the 
small and productive one. ... I  appeal to workers. ... Let the wage become stable this year. Farmers and 
Fishermen, please participate in the pain-sharing’ (Special speech on the ‘New Economy Plan’, 
19/3/1993).
6 So, there was no master plan to settle the long-term relationship between the PIPS and the NPI, in terms
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NPI to the self-employed. Under the fierce competition among financial institutions, the 
PIPS market had expanded dramatically by 1996 (see Table 6.10).
It was in 1995 that the Kim Young Sam government changed its catchphrase for 
a national reform, from constructing ‘New Korea’ in its early years to ‘Saegyewha’ 
(Globalisation in Korean). The environmental forces that pushed such a change were the 
intensifying external pressure for market openness and financial liberalisation in the
n t
early 1990s . The government recognised that the pressures of globalisation were
Q
unavoidable and Korea had to meet the challenge of globalisation successfully . 
Although some CSOs and the opposition party were opposed to it, the Kim Young Sam 
government hurried to join the OECD9. And to do so, all Korea’s social and economic 
system had to reach global standards of excellence. So the government not only 
accelerated economic openness to global economy through the removal of most of 
financial regulation10, but also had to meet all the global social standards that the OECD 
required.
of the private-public partnership in old-age pension schemes. Labour and CSOs did not raise the issue, 
either (Interview with YM.Kim, 10/5/2004).
7 As a matter o f fact, Korea was under a high market opening pressure from the mid-1980s. The US, 
which recorded a severe trade balance deficit with Korea, required the Korean government to open a 
commodity market to promote its exports, and later raised more fundamental issues that might have 
caused the deficit since the late 1980s, i.e., Korea’s industrial policy and financial system to promote 
exports. Most commodity markets except some agricultural products were liberalised though the 
withdrawal o f import restrictions until 1991, almost all non-commodity markets as well as agricultural 
markets were forced to be open in the early 1990s. In terms o f the financial system, until 1997 most 
financial regulation o f the government such as interest rates, foreign exchange and international capital 
flow were abolished or were diminished greatly.
8 This recognition was presented well within the President’s address on the ‘embodiment o f Saegyewha 
(globalisation)’, 26/1/1995. In this address, the President Kim asserted that ‘in the era o f  globalisation ... 
the ‘productivity’ and ‘flexibility’ o f  all the sectors like politics, economy, public administration, society, 
and culture should be strengthened’. This recognition had become the fundamental basis o f the reform 
policies o f his government between 1995 and 1997, including the openness o f financial markets and 
liberalisation o f  international capital mobility, and the reforms to industrial relations. Also, these reform 
policies were the main negotiation agendas with the OECD (Chosunilbo, 2/7/1996, 12/10/1996; 
Hankookilbo, 12/10/1996).
9 The opposition Democratic Party announced that entrance to the OECD was too early (Chosunilbo, 
16/3/1995) because Korea had to open the financial and capital markets completely according to the dual 
entry conditions, i.e., the ‘Service Liberalisation Agreement’ and the ‘Capital Transaction Agreement’. 
Especially the CCEJ worried that, when Korea joined the OECD, it could give rise to serious economic 
instability, caused by the massive mobility of international capital, so-called ‘hot money’ (Dongailbo, 
14/3/1995). However, the government actively conducted the P.R. on the advantages that Korea could 
utilise the accumulated experience and information of the advanced economies. Minister of Finance and 
Economy, Mr. Hong, said ‘Korea is already recognised it qualification by the OECD’ (Dongailbo, 
30/3/1995). Nonetheless, the dominant view and comment on the entry to the OECD was a kind of  
‘political achievement’ for the Civilian government and was worried about the possible disadvantages 
caused by the unavoidable openness (the editorial o f Chosunilbo, 2/7/1996).
10 Really, the gross private capital flows as per cent o f GDP began to increase rapidly from 1994 (see 
Table 4.2)
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Most of all, while the openness of most agricultural markets caused by the 
Uruguay Round produced a severe social conflict between sectors with and sectors 
without competitiveness, the construction of social cohesion seemed an indispensable 
factor in the globalisation age. When the first shock wave of globalisation swept the 
rural communities of the country, farmers’ agencies resisted it vigorously but economic 
Ministries and employers’ agencies like the KEF asserted its inevitability for the entire 
Korean economy (Special News Team of Donailbo: 325-340). With the promise of 
comprehensive supports and subsidies to the agricultural industry11, the government 
only manage a conciliation with them through the extension of the NPI to the rural self- 
employed. This should be understood as the typical example of how some state welfare 
programmes can be expanded as the functional equivalent to protectionism or as a 
compensation to the victims of globalisation (Reiger and Liebfried, 2003). From 1995 
the NPI began to cover the rural self-employed under the existing NPI system and the 
government decided on bringing in financial support to the NPI contributions of farmers.
More fundamental welfare reform plans rose to the surface when the President 
Kim Young Sam announced the ‘Saegyewha’ in the Summit Conference for Social 
Development in Copenhagen and asserted the ‘globalisation of quality of life’ in March 
1995 (Kyunghyangshinmun, 24/3/1995; K.R. Sung, 2002: 498-9). In May 1995, the 
National Welfare Planning Board (hereafter NWPB) was established under the 
Saegyewha Committee. In February 1996, the Committee reported the ‘Basic Ideas on 
the National Welfare for the globalisation of quality of life’ to the President. This report 
suggested a Korean social welfare model with five basic ideas (National Welfare 
Planning Board, 1996); first, a harmonisation between economic growth and social 
welfare; second, a social security model reflecting the originality of the Korean 
situations enough; third, the reinforcement of productive and preventive welfare; fourth, 
the construction of a pluralizing welfare community (the construction of welfare 
pluralism); finally, the simultaneous achievement of material and mental welfare. In 
addition, the report indicated five implementation strategies as follows. First, the social
11 In a special speech on the Uruguay Round, the President said, 7 sincerely apologise fo r  the result that 
the government could not protect the rice market completely. ... /  will strongly implement the master plan 
like, not only the improvement o f  structural bases in agricultural communities, the restoration o f  the 
advantages that the Uruguay Round and the openness o f  the agricultural market produce to farmers and 
agricultural communities, but also the reforms o f related institutions and structures including the 
monetary compensations fo r farmers ’ (Special speech of the President on the openness of the rice market, 
9/12/1993).
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safety net would be constructed until 2000 so that all people should be protected by 
social insurance. For this, the extension of social insurance coverage, the improvement 
of social insurance management and the construction of a nation-wide network were 
suggested. Secondly, a minimal livelihood should be guaranteed for all people. Such 
measures were indicated at the introduction of supplementary benefits, reinforcement of 
rehabilitation for low-income families, the raising public assistant benefit level and the 
implementation of protective social policy. Thirdly, the expansion of social services 
should be able to not only cope with ageing population, but also to facilitate the 
economic participation of women. Fourthly, the concept of ‘cultural welfare’ should be 
introduced. Fifthly, the participation of private sectors including NPOs, firms and 
religious groups should be encouraged within social welfare in order to construct a 
Korean welfare community. The new Korean welfare model should facilitate 
collaborative fund raising and volunteering, and could partly accept the ‘fee-for-service’ 
principle (Choi et al, 2000: chap. 7).
Although the report contained a comprehensive master plan for a Korean
welfare model, the main focus was placed on the long-term plan which could not be
immediately implemented by the Kim Young Sam government. The universal coverage
of social insurance was scheduled between 1998 and 2000, and the implementation was
passed over to the next government. However, the plan’s emphasis on non-state sectors
was supported within a set of policy measures. In 1997, the Elderly Welfare Law was
amended and for-profit firms were allowed to enter the elderly welfare service market.
Business, of course, welcomed it and some large companies began to establish luxurious
nursing homes (so-called ‘Silver Town’) for the wealthy elderly. In addition, to facilitate
third sector’s fund raising and to mobilise private resources in social service provision,
the government enacted a law for the Social Welfare Collaborative Fund Raising
1 0System (Community Chest or the Korean United Way) in 1997 . Along with the new 
interventions, to minimise the government’s financial burden, it continued the strategy 
of an ‘NPO dominated social service structure’ and, for example, the number of 
community welfare centres almost doubled under the Kim Young Sam government, 
from 175 to 329 (MOHW, 1996, 2000).
12 However, the SWCFRS were faced with the fierce opposition o f NPOs because the SWCFRS, a 
nation-wide fund raising body, would cause a reduction in NPOs’ individual fund raising as well as the 
legislation for the SWCFRS levied too many regulations of the Government (H.S. Cho and T.S. Lee, 
1999).
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Eventually and different from its ambitious plan, the Kim Young Sam 
government was very cautious to expand the state welfare and the ruling elites. 
Especially neo-liberal economists of the Korea Development Institute (KDI), always 
worried about the budgetary austerity that might occur in the long run (H.P. Moon, 
1995). The nature of the government can also be found in the report of the National 
Pension Reform Committee in 1997. The NPI scheme had been criticized as an 
unsustainably generous benefit system with relatively low contributions. It was worried 
that the unbalanced financial structure of Tow contributions and high benefits’, along
n
with the population ageing, would cause the long-term financial instability of the NPI . 
So the Committee suggested a pension reform whose main contents were an expansion 
of the NPI coverage to the urban self-employed by 1998 and to represent a market 
conforming approach; i.e., the Committee proposed a dual system of a basic universal 
pension as the first tier (pay-as-you-go) and income-related benefits for second tier 
(fully funded); this proposal was similar to that proposed by the World Bank14. 
According to this model, not only would the NPI only cover the first tier (possibly the 
second tier but only for employees), but also the vertical redistribution effect would be 
far reduced.
Another important example of the market-confirming welfare reforms can be 
found in the controversy over the IAICI privatisation between 1996 and 1997. In August 
1996, business required the government to introduce the competitive system to the 
IAICI and recognise the exemption of white-collar workers from its compulsory 
coverage15. The Ministry of Finance and Economy announced that the IAICI would be 
opened to private insurance companies to improve the ‘monopolised and inefficient’ 
system in January 1997 (MOFE, 1996; Kyunghyangshinmun, 5/1/1997). But there were
13 The NWPB estimated that, if  the existing contribution and benefit rate were maintained, the NPI fiind 
would be exhausted by 2033 (Kyunghyangshinmun, 29/1/1996).
14 In the NPRC three proposals were under examination. The first plan was to focus on the maintenance 
of the existing NPI with a gradual institutional improvement. It suggested, following the traditional public 
pension reforms in advanced welfare states, pulling up the contribution rate and cutting down the 
replacement ratio without structural reform to the NPI. The second plan was a structural reform 
transforming the existing single tier pension scheme to a two-tier system, the National Pension would be 
divided into a pay-as-you-go type basic pension and a funded type income-related scheme. It was known 
that the Board had a plan to privatise the second scheme in the long term (World Bank, 2000: 29; recited 
from Yang, 2001: 73). At last, a full privatisation proposal like the Chilean reforms were considered as the 
third plan (fully funded individual saving account). The Board decided on the second plan as its final 
suggestion to the President in December 1997 (J.J. Yang , 2001: 72-4).
15 The Korea Chamber o f Commerce and Industry (hereafter KCCI) held a meeting between leading 
managers and Minister o f Finance and Economy. In this meeting, they proposed the plan to the Minister 
to reduce the burden of IAICI contributions.
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serious criticisms that the privatisation of the IAICI would cause an adverse selection 
problem, and most of the small-medium size firms would have to take on a greater 
burden in the existing IAICI whereas the burden on large firms would be reduced 
(Ministry of Labour, 1997; KIHASA, 1997). This proposal caused a serious social 
conflict. Labour (FKTU and KCDTU) and related organisations were fiercely opposed 
against it (Hankyeorae, 22/1/1997; KCDTU, 1997; FKTU, 1997). Although the 
government, the MOFE, finally decided to legislate for the privatisation of the IAICI 
during 1997 (Naeoekyungjaeshinmun, 19/7/1997; Seoulshinmun, 11/8/1997), such a 
radical reform was not realised due to a lame duck, which was more accelerated by the 
Financial Crisis of 1997.
As a result, the master plan for welfare reform by the Kim Young Sam 
government lack concrete proposals and was hardly implemented. On the other hand, 
even though they were not implemented, the pension reform proposals of the NPRPB 
and the controversy over the IAICI privatisation revealed the market-confirmative or 
productivist nature of the social policies. The state’s intervention in social welfare 
remained minimal, and the state’s expenditure on social welfare as a percentage of GDP 
even decreased, compared with the previous Rho government (see Table 4.8). Instead, 
the Kim Young Sam government encouraged welfare provisions from private sectors, 
especially the market sector, as seen in PIPS example. Lee evaluates that;
Generally speaking, the efforts o f the Kim Young Sam administration in social 
welfare reform were focused on the systematic search fo r  a new comprehensive 
model o f Korean social welfare which would enhance national competitiveness 
in the changing environment. It wanted to encourage private sector initiatives 
to participate in the provision o f social welfare services and to expand the 
social security system within the general principle o f small government with 
productivist priorities. But it had neither the comprehensive immediate action 
plans to strengthen the private sector, not the notion o f the balance o f the 
responsibility between the state and the private sector. In other words, much o f 
the concrete and specific choices o f policies and programmes were left open 
fo r further discussion. (H.K.Lee, 1999: 32)
In some respects, the labour reforms of the Kim Young Sam government were 
more noteworthy, than its welfare reforms. In spite of the political democratisation since 
1987, Korea’s labour legislation still levied severe restrictions on basic labour rights. 
Since the execution of the Presidential veto in 1989, both labour and business groups
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continuously argued for labour reform. Business asserted that the series of rigid labour 
regulations on layoffs, dispatched workers and working hours should be reduced. The 
labour market flexibility, for employers, seemed indispensable in enhancing the firms’ 
competitiveness. On the other hand, labour, especially the democratic trade union camp, 
had protested against the prohibition of multiple trade unions, unions’ political activities 
and the deprivation of labour rights for teachers and civil servants. Moreover, the 
Korean government had been under intensifying external pressures from IGOs. Not only 
had the ILO continuously required the Korean government to be more consistent with 
the ILO’s labour standards, but the OECD also raised issues of labour reforms when 
looking to negotiating Korea’s entry conditions (Chosunilbo, 2/7/1996 and 12/10/1996). 
Also, labour reform was necessary in terms of the consolidation of democracy in Korea. 
Finally, in 1996, the government launched the Presidential Committee on Industrial 
Relation Reform (hereafter, PCIRR) to induce a social compromise between labour and 
business16. The government again depended on the social pact politics.
Basically, the PCIRR was the place of exchange the legalisation of democratic 
labour movements and neo-liberal labour market flexibility. Labour accepted a part of 
labour market flexibility, and in turn it obtained the major basic labour rights. Most of 
all, the PCIRR, which existed between 1996 and 1998, was different from the previous 
experiments of social consent in terms of the following points. Most of all, the Korea
1 n
Confederation of Democratic Trade Unions (hereafter, KCDTU), which was 
thoroughly excluded from social pact politics before, participated in the Committee and 
was recognised as a legal agency. Secondly, not only the amendments of labour-related 
laws but also the overall social welfare agenda were dealt with by the Committee. The 
main agreements concerning social welfare were for income deductions for NPI 
contributions, reforms of social insurance management and the expansion of the 
Industrial Injury and Accident Compensation Insurance coverage. Although labour’s 
primary concern was labour reform itself, it is worthy to note that labour began to state 
its interest in pursuing social welfare reform.
16 The President’s recognition on the necessity o f a social consent mechanism in industrial reform is 
presented well in his special speech on the ‘Embodiment o f the New Industrial Relations’, 24/4/1996.
17 In January 1990, the National Commission of Trade Unions’ was established as a central agency of 
‘democratic’ trade unions, and its name was changed to the ‘National Council o f Trade Union 
Representatives’ in 1993. And, it was the predecessor o f the ‘Korea Confederation of Democratic Trade 
Unions’ (KCDTU), which was established in November 1995.
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During the era of the Kim Young Sam government, the conditions for the 
working of dynamic welfare politics matured -  democracy was consolidated through 
labour reform, the KCDTU began to emerge as an important actor and the PCIRR 
showed new possibilities within social pact politics. When the privatisation plan of the 
IAICI was proposed by the government, labour groups were instantly opposed to it. 
Moreover, as the newly established CSOs extended their scope of influence and some of 
them like People’s Solidarity for Participatory Democracy began to turn the direction of 
their social movement towards social welfare issues. Nevertheless, the government’s 
dominance in welfare politics had hardly changed. The role of political parties and 
interests groups in welfare politics could hardly be found. There were no fundamental 
welfare reforms that possibly provoked a fierce conflict between the actors of welfare 
politics. But the professional bureaucracy and government committees cautiously 
considered the possible long-term effects of socio-demographic change as well as their 
financial viability within their policy development processes. Most of all, the 
government’s recognition of the external pressures was critical in determining the policy 
direction. Basically, when the government set its policy priority to meet the challenge of 
globalisation, the direction of welfare reforms was market conforming and productivist 
way so as not to injure national competitiveness and economic development. In this 
respect, business did not need to take a different stance from that of the government at 
least in social welfare areas, even though business proposed the privatisation of the 
IAICI and sometimes resisted against some of the reformative policies like RFTS and 
regulation policies over Chebols. Business pushed the government to accept its demands 
for labour market flexibility. In turn, it had to make concessions for the expansion of 
trade union activities. Although labour emerged as a key political actor in social pact 
politics, basic labour rights, rather than social welfare as a social wage, were still the 
main object for negotiation with business. Under these conditions, the basic picture of 
the welfare mix has not changed significantly compared with the previous period (under 
the Rho government), and most of the institutional legacies of the welfare mix and 
related state interventions were largely represented.
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7.3. Financial Crisis, Social Dislocation and the Dynamic Welfare Politics under 
the Kim Dae Jung Government: 1998-2002
There are many explanations of the financial crisis of Korea in 1997 -  the limitations of 
the developmental state, cronyism, the rapid deregulation and liberalisation of the 
financial market in the early and mid 1990s, the attack of venture capital, the indiscreet 
foreign loans of Chebols and short-term financial companies and so on (S.W. Chang, 
1998; Goldstein, 1998; J.Y. Jung, 1998; W.C. Jung, 1998; Wade and Veneroso, 1998). 
This is not the place to deal with them. Whatever the reason was, however, the financial 
crisis brought enormous socio-economic shocks, incomparable with those caused by the 
previous openness of the agricultural market. At least during the initial stages of the 
Financial Crisis, the Korean government lost a substantial part of its policy autonomy
1 fton macro-economic management through IMF standby agreements , and it had to 
adopt the policies of austerity, high interest rates and a devaluation of the Korean 
currency, in spite of the rapid economic recession which followed. As a result, Korea 
barely escaped from the moratorium, but consumption, production and investment all 
were rapidly depressed. Many firms were bankrupt and the unemployment rate leapt up.
In addition, even though both external forces and internal pressures had 
continuously intensified since the early 1990s, such intensification was mostly 
concentrated on the period since the Financial crisis of 1997. Most of all, whilst the 
major driving force of the Korean economy had been the vitality of domestic markets 
between the early and mid 1990s, the economic recovery after the financial crisis was 
more dependent on a rapid increase in exports19. Moreover, capital mobility in general 
had augmented enormously and FDI inflows also greatly increased between 1998 and 
2000 (see Table 4.2). When the government had to accept the IMF’s liberalisation policy 
prescriptions including deregulation of capital mobility and the abolition of the floating
18 The IMF managing director Michel Camdessus urged that not only the existing Korean government 
but also all the President Candidates had to promise to implement the conditionality that IMF would 
require (Special News Team o f Dongailbo, 1999: 223-4). And, really, they agreed with it (Chosunilbo, 
22/11/1997). The President-elect Kim Dae Jung asserted that the agreement with the IMF would be 
completely implemented when he met some high officials o f the US (Hankyeorae, 23/12/1997). Although 
the long-term influences o f the IMF agreements on the Korean macro-economic and social policies seems 
sceptical (Interview with Jin Young Moon, 29/2/2004), it is evident that the Korean government had to 
implement a set o f neo-liberal policy prescriptions in a relatively short period.
19 The share o f trade in goods as a percentage of GDP had decreased until 1993, but it began to increase 
again from 1994 and reached at 60-70 per cent level after 1998 (see Table 4.2)
218
limits on the exchange rate between 1997 and 1998, the global integration of the Korean 
economy was seen to dramatically intensify under the Kim Dae Jung government. At 
the same time, the long-term internal pressures began to rise to the surface. The mass 
unemployment following the Crisis and the labour market flexibility led an overall 
deterioration of the labour market. The economic crisis seemed to speed up the de­
industrialisation process and heightened the instability of employment: both industrial 
employment and regular employment had decreased significantly since the Crisis (see 
Table 4.4). Moreover, although the demographic pressure would be expected to cause 
more long-term impacts, the indicators related to the family and household structure 
consistently revealed an intensification of the internal pressures for less than two 
decades between 1985 and 2002; the divorce rate leapt up by almost 5 times, the 
average household size dropped by 1 person per household between 1985 and 2000 and 
the share of single households increased more than two times (see Table 4.5 and 4.6).
What all these internal changes say is evidence of newly rising needs on (social) 
services and, at the same time, the decreasing capability of the family in terms of 
service and caring provision. Most of all, the economic shocks caused by the Financial 
Crisis created, not only mass unemployment and poverty, but also new social problems 
such as homelessness and family dissolutions. But the social welfare institutions could 
not fully cope with the social dissolutions; the coverage of social insurance was not 
enough and the public assistance system did not provide benefits to the able-bodied. The 
basis of public social services remained marginal. In this respect, the Financial Crisis 
provided an opportunity to review how insufficient the existing social welfare system 
was to cope with a situation of social crisis. Not only economic, labour market reforms 
to overcome the shocks of the Financial Crisis, but also the large-scale social welfare 
reforms to deal with the social crisis, emerged as the most urgent tasks for President­
elect Kim Dae Jung. The first step to cope with the Crisis was to construct a social 
consent mechanism.
The Tripartite Committee and the Social Pact Politics
Politically, the financial crisis helped to provide more favourable conditions for a 
change of regime. People elected Kim Dae Jung, the leader of the first opposition party,
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as President, instead of giving their confidence to the ruling Shinhankook (New Korea, 
in English) party again. Although the peaceful change of government from the ruling to 
the opposition party was another milestone in the development of Korea’s democracy, 
the new Kim Dae Jung government faced enormous pressure to overcome the crisis. 
Soon after the Presidential election on the 18th of December 1997, the President-elect 
Kim Dae Jung led the Cabinet even though he had to wait for two months to become the 
President. The IMF required neo-liberal restructuring in the form of increased labour 
market flexibility, the deregulation of financial markets and foreign capital flows, a 
reduction in intervention in the foreign exchange market and the austerity of financial 
policy (Chosunilbo, 4/12/1997). At the same time, the IBRD and the World Bank called 
for the government to construct a social safety net to support the restructuring (MOFE, 
SAL II Policy Matrix, 1998). Under these urgent conditions and requirements, what Kim 
Dae Jung did first was to extract social consent on the fair ‘pain-sharing’ between
*yr\
labour, business and the government, to collaboratively overcome the crisis .
At the end of December, 1997, the President-elect Kim Dae Jung urgently 
proposed that labour, business and the government should form the Tripartite 
Committee (Chosunilbo, 26/12/1997). He recognised that, to cope with the 
unprecedented crisis, the collaboration of labour would be indispensable. His 
government had to immediately follow the IMF’s policy recommendations such as 
labour market flexibility. If this is the case, the mobilised labour would struggle against
71the one-sided sacrifice . Moreover, Kim Dae Jung, who continuously proposed and 
promised the harmonious development of democracy and the market economy, wanted 
to gain a procedural legitimacy for his social and economic reforms through the 
Tripartite Committee. Therefore, the government had to give equivalent compensations 
like social welfare and additional labour standard improvements to labour. The FKTU 
and the KCDTU could do nothing but strategically accept the proposals of Kim Dae 
Jung because, if labour market flexibility was unavoidable, they had to do their best to 
obtain the greatest rewards possible (B.S. Yoo, 2003: 136). Instead, they called for the 
direct participation of the government within the Committee because they wanted a
20 In the second letter of Intent to the IMF, the government had already promised to extract a social 
consent among the major economic actors on 24/12/1997 (Hankyeorae, 27/12/1997)
21 The President-elect Kim Dae Jung recognised the inevitability o f labour market flexibility to overcome 
the financial crisis (Hankyeorae, 23/12/1997). But, the KFTU and KCDTU warned that, if  the labour 
legislations was amended to allow massive layoffs, they would resist it with all possible measures 
including ‘general strikes’ (Chosunilbo, 26/12/1997).
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guarantee that the policy agreements produced by the Committee would be immediately 
implemented. It was an opportunity for labour, which had been thoroughly excluded 
from the policy making process, to emerge as an influential actor in welfare politics. On 
the other hand, business did not have any other alternative but to participate in the 
Committee because Chebols were being blamed as the culprits causing the crisis. 
Moreover, employers expected that labour market flexibility measures including the 
reduction of layoff requirements would be agreed within the Committee.
Table 7.1. Different Recognition about the Crisis
Labour Business Government
Cause o f Crisis Structural factor: Chebol 
system & cronyism
Economic cycle and 
external factors outside 
firms




Reforming Chebols and 
political structure
Labour market flexibility Overall reform o f social 
system including Chebol 





Expansion of basic labour 
right and social welfare
Withdrawal o f state 
regulation and 
rationalisation o f the 
labour market
Acceptance of the IMF’s 
requirements: labour 
market flexibility along 
with the construction o f a 
social safety net
Source: B.S. Yoo, 2003: 92
On the 15th January 1998, the Tripartite Committee was launched. The main 
agenda of the Committee covered comprehensive social and economic policy issues; the 
promotion of labour market flexibility, employment stability and unemployment policy, 
the endowment of basic labour rights to civil servants and teachers, the enhancement of 
the transparency of firms’ management, an expansion of the social security system, the 
stabilisation of consumer prices, social integration and the economic crisis (H.T. Sun, 
2003: 274-5). However, the processes in order to reach a comprehensive agreement 
were not simple. Most of all, as seen from Table 7.1, the recognition of, the diagnosis of 
and the alternative solutions to the crisis were different among the political actors 
involved. At last, after continuous negotiations, the Committee reached the ‘Grand
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Compromise for Overcoming the Economic Crisis’ on 6 February, 1998. Generally 
speaking, although the political activities of trade unions were allowed and the basic 
labour rights of teachers and civil servants were recognised, the basic framework of the 
compromise was the exchange between labour market flexibility and social welfare. 
Among the contents of the compromise, agreements concerning social welfare 
expansion could be summarised into three categories (Choi et al, 2000: 448-50). Firstly, 
the EIS would be expanded to cope with the mass-unemployment. Universal coverage 
for the entire paid labour was scheduled to occur by 1998, the benefit requirements were 
loosened, the benefit duration was extended and the minimum benefit level increased to 
70 per cent of the minimum wage. Secondly, to support the livelihood of the retired and 
the unemployed who were not be covered by the EIS, the committee called for a 
comprehensive unemployment policy. Thirdly, the committee made an agreement on the 
extension of the social security system which meant a growth of government spending 
on social security programmes, the reform of the social insurance management system, 
the reinforcement of the connection between labour market policy and the social 
insurance system, participation by representatives of labour, business and CSOs to 
monitor the operation of social insurance; and a unification of the MIP.
The committee became a presidential consultative agency in March 1998 and 
continued its activities in monitoring the implementation of the compromise as well as 
discussing the issues that could not be agreed. Although the grand compromise was 
fiercely criticised by field workers and trade unions at workplace level, the agreements 
on labour market flexibility was immediately legalised22. On the contrary, most reform 
plans targeting business were delayed and, to repel a one-sided sacrifice of labour, the 
KCDTU and the FKTU repeated the participation and withdrawal. In the end, the 
KCDTU rejected the participation in the Committee in December 1998. Sun (2002) 
indicates that the Tripartite committee only resulted in concession by labour and was the 
product of a collaborative strategy between the state and business to legitimate the neo­
liberal restructuring. Even though the Committee became a permanent policy 
consultation agency via a special law in May 1999, its influences on policy formations 
and their implementation began to weaken when labour repeated the participation to and 
the withdrawal from the Committee (Choi et al, 1999: 233-262). This was because
22 The amended labour laws were passed by the National Assembly on 15th o f February, just 9 days after 
the ‘Grand Compromise’ (.Hankyeorae, 16/2/1998).
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labour criticised the Committee, saying it had been degraded to an apparatus to approve 
government’s policies without thoughtful discussion with labour (H.T. Sun, 2003: 280). 
Nevertheless, the activities of the sub-committee for social security were the most lively 
in the Tripartite committee and the Kim Dae Jung government implemented most of the 
agreements on social welfare policies between 1998 and 2000 (Choi et al., 2000). At 
least within the area of social welfare policy, the committee showed the possibility of 
social pact politics. Moreover, as labour emerged as a main actor in welfare politics, 
trade unions continuously exerted an influence and interests within later welfare reforms.
Pension Reform
As discussed in the previous section, a fundamental pension reform plan began to be 
considered under the Kim Young Sam government. The National Pension Reform 
Committee proposed a two-tier system but the Kim Dae Jung government started by 
investigating various alternatives. Most of all, since the public pension reforms formed 
one of the Structural Adjustment Loan (SAL) agreements between the government and 
the World Bank, part of the pension reforms of 1999, whose main tasks were to expand 
coverage and to promote a sound financial basis by mediating the contribution and 
benefit levels, were under the influence of the WB and the IMF.
However, in spite of the external pressure for neo-liberal pension reform, the 
ideal pension model of the WB was never accepted by the Kim Dae Jung government 
and the main contents of the NPI were hardly affected by the pension reforms of 1999 
(Y.M. Kim, 2001: 41-2). Most of all, the government expanded NPI coverage to the 
self-employed without a separation of the NPI system from April, 1999, even though 
there was a strong argument for a separation -  pension for employees and self- 
employed -  based on a fierce criticism of the contribution equity issue between 
employees and the self-employed. The basic framework of the NPI maintained; the 
occupationally integrated pension system, the defmed-benefit one-tier income-related 
system with considerable redistributional effects and a partly-funded type. Instead, the 
government reported that, to increase the sustainability of the NPI, its contribution rate 
would be raised step by step until 2015 to 18 per cent of income but would reduce the 
expected benefit level from 70 to 60 per cent of average income in the case of medium
223
income earners (Y.M. Kim, 2002:119-121). Kim evaluated the NPI reform to be an 
expansion of the social solidarity principle to the urban self-employed so that the state’s 
responsibility in pension planning was widened to the entire population (Y.M. Kim, 
2001,2004).
Of course, business was opposed to the government’s pension reform plan. Since 
the expansion of social insurance would ultimately crowd out the basis of the private 
insurance market, insurance companies worried about the expansion of the NPI 
coverage to self-employed because it would cause the reduction in their sales of 
individual pensions (Y.M. Kim, 2001: 47). More fundamentally, the FKI and its think 
tanks (the CFE and the IKER) have constantly criticised the NPI scheme on the basis of 
the following arguments; first, the government-dominated system would cause 
inefficiency and political risks in the fund operation; second, the old-age income 
security function of the national pension has been overlapping mandatory severance 
pay; finally, the partly-funded system, which supposes that the pension fund will be 
exhausted in the future, could not deal with the rapid trends of population ageing (J.G 
Kim, 2003: 41-2) Most of all, employers’ agencies protested against the scheduled 
contribution increases that would cause a higher labour cost (Chosunilbo, 18/9/2000). 
Since the unified pension fund would cause an additional burden of business, 
employers’ agencies called for the separation of the national pension fund between 
workers (workplace) and the self-employed (regional). Furthermore, as an alternative to 
the existing NPI scheme, they suggested the market-conforming pension reform plan; 
the transformation of mandatory severance pay to an enterprise pension scheme and the 
construction of a three-tier pension system similar to the WB’s alternative through the 
facilitation of individual pensions (Kong and Kwon, 1998; FKI, 1999a, 2000; O.S. 
Kwon, 1999).
Whilst employers’ agencies revealed a relatively consistent attitude, labour’s 
interest in the pension reform was not uniform. Along with the KEF and the KFI, the 
FKTU opposed the expansion of NPI coverage to the self-employed. The FKTU argued 
that, under the occupationally integrated pension system the government proposed, 
workers would be losers while the self-employed, who mostly underreport their incomes, 
would gain more (Chosunilbo, 3/5/1999). So the FKTU called for a separated pension 
system for workers or, at least, an independent fund for workers (.Dongailbo, 14/7/1999). 
Although the opposition of business and the FKTU did not change the basic direction of
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the pension reforms, the government faced serious opposition from paid workers. On 
the other side, based on nation-wide solidarity, the KCDTU basically supported the 
government’s plan with CSOs like the PSPD. The KCDTU and CSOs worried that the 
separate pension schemes of the self-employed and workers would hinder social 
integration. Instead, the KCDTU as well as CSOs called for the government to reinforce 
its capability citing the underreported incomes of the self-employed (Y.M. Kim, 2001: 
45-6; PSPD, 1999; Hankyeorae, 26/5/1999). As advocates of the whole population and 
especially for the unprivileged who could not mobilize their interests easily, CSOs 
played an important role in the expansion of the NPI. Especially, when expansion of the 
NPI faced resistance from other social groups, they confronted the opposing social 
forces with the logic of social solidarity and the public interest and made a coalition 
with the government and the KCDTU to overcome the opposition23 (Interview with Jin 
Young Moon, 29/2/2004 and Yeon Myung Kim, 10/5/2004).
Health Reform
One of the most important changes in the welfare reforms of the Kim Dae Jung 
government was the unification of the MEP. As a matter of fact, the controversy between 
the unification and the maintenance of separate systems had continuously confronted 
each other for 20 years (K.S. Lee, 2000: 68-74). The unionists criticised the intensifying 
financial discrepancies between associations (until the MIP unification of 1998, there 
were 227 regional associations, 144 workplace associations and 1 corporation for civil 
servants and teachers), and they argued for unification under the logic of the equity of 
contribution, the reinforcement of the social security function, social solidarity, and the 
enlargement of risk by pooling to the national level. On the other hand, the separatists 
criticised the unification because the transparent worker’s purse should not be abused to 
redistribute income from workers who pay tax directly to the self-employed many of 
whom avoid taxation. Moreover, the MEP system with multiple insurers, they argued, 
could induce competition between different associations and it would increase the
23 In this respect, both interviewees agreed that, even though it was restricted to some o f social welfare 
issues, a strategic-critical policy coalition between CSOs, labour and the government (The Presidential 
Office and the Ministry o f Health and Welfare) emerged under the pro-welfare Kim Dae Jung government, 
instead of a state-business coalition.
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possibility for a market-friendly system to avoid inefficiency.
The attitude of business had been made clear. The KEF and the FKI had always 
fought against a trial of the unification because the unification would allow the large 
firms’ (Chebols) a degree of control over the their own medical associations and funds 
(Y.M. Kim, 2001). Under the existing MIP system, a single firm with tens of thousands 
of workers could make up its own medical association. In addition, business worried 
about the likelihood that, in the long run, the unification of the MIP would improve the 
MIP benefits level and it could shrink the private health insurance market, which at the 
time was growing fast. When the government announced the unification of MIP, the 
KEF and FKI requested the freezing of employers’ health insurance contributions (1.57 
per cent) for the following three years and the division of the NHI fund into a workplace 
health insurance fund and a regional health insurance fund (KEF, 1997). Furthermore, 
even after the unification of the National Health Insurance system, employers’ agencies 
have argued the necessity of the privatisation of social insurance. The FKI argued that 
the introduction of a Medical Savings Account (MSA) would be necessary to cope with 
the fundamental problems of the NHI (FKI, 2000).
On the other hand, the unification of the MIP required a recalibration of workers’ 
interests in terms of the reserved fund and the possible increase in workers’ 
contributions. Along with the KEF, the FKTU stood against the unification because it 
would cause a rapid increase in the workers’ contributions and lose the workers’ 
reserved fund of their associations. The FKTU expressed the exclusive interests of trade 
unions (or workers), rather than pursuing nation-wide equity. The FKTU formed an 
opposing coalition with employers’ agencies and the opposition One-Nation Party, and 
induced the reversal of the financial integration between the workplace associations’ 
fund and the regional associations’ fund. On the other hand, same as in the case of the 
NPI, the KCDTU supported the unification on the basis of social solidarity. (Y.M. Kim, 
2002a: 45-6)
Ahead of the Presidential election of 1997, the ruling One-Nation Party 
promised the unification of regional associations and the ‘Medical Insurance 
Corporation for civil servants and teachers’ in 1997. Since the opposition party led by 
Mr. Kim Dae Jung already ultimately planned the unification legislation including 
workplace associations, the National Assembly unanimously passed the first unification 
legislation (Dongailbo, 19/11/1997). According to the legislation, the first step of the
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unification was implemented in October 1998. The National Medical Insurance 
Management Corporation was founded through a unification of the existing 227 
regional associations and 1 corporation for civil servants and teachers. However, the 
financial integration between the two categories was deferred. Subsequently, based on 
the agreement of the Tripartite committee, the government issued a notification of the 
unification legislation. The government called for the National Assembly to pass the 
National Health Insurance Law during 1999 and it decided to implement the legislation 
from January 2000. In these processes, the People’s Coalition for the Unification of the 
MIP, composed of 72 social groups including farmers’ associations and CSOs 
participated in the coalition and played a decisive role in pressuring political parties into 
enacting it. However, the opposite coalition between business and the FKTU was also 
consolidated. Finally, when the issue of the contribution equity between workers and the 
self-employed was raised in 1999 and the opposition of the FKTU and employers’ 
associations became fierce, the unification (the launch of the NHI) was postponed for 6 
months (to July 2000) and the integration of the NHI funds was also delayed for two 
years24 (Chosunilbo, 13/7/1999).
Public Assistance Reform
Whilst the pension and health reform, based on the Tripartite agreements, were enacted 
relatively smoothly, until the first half of 1999 there was no significant progress in the 
public assistance reforms, which was regarded as one of the most important tasks within 
the welfare reform of the Kim Dae Jung government. Although CSOs like the PSPD 
continuously petitioned the government for public assistance reforms, the government 
took a rather passive attitude. It was the President’s decision that revised the situation to 
enact the public assistance reform . Nevertheless, most studies of the public assistance 
reform of 1999 (the enactment of National Basic Livelihood Security Law) stress the 
role of CSOs like the PSPD in policy making processes (B.Y. Ahn, 2000; M.A. Lee, 
2000; S.W. Nam, 2000; J.Y. Moon, 2001). Substantially, as Ahn indicates (2000: 2), the
24 The unification of the NHI funds was scheduled in January 2002, but it had not been implemented by 
the end of the Kim Dae Jung government.
25 The speech o f President Kim Dae Jung in Ulsan was decisive (Interview with Jin Young Moon, 
29/2/2004)
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CSOs, especially the PSPD, dominated all processes including agenda formation, 
alternative exploration and even legislation itself, and the Administration and the 
National Assembly followed such trends . Although the President’s decision was 
decisive in the legislation, such a decision came as a result of the President’s 
consideration o f the viability of the CSOs’ arguments as well as the prevailing set of 
political and economic conditions at that time simultaneously. Firstly, let us explore the 
CSOs’ petitioning activities for the legislation for public assistance reform until June 
1999, the time when the President referred to the necessity of its enactment.
The PSPD had deployed various social welfare movements since its foundation 
in 1994. A PSPD’s professional sub-committee, the Social Welfare Committee was
onmainly composed of young scholars and reformative lawyers, and had continuously 
argued for the dissolution of the Livelihood Protection Act and a guarantee of a national 
minimum for all people including the able-bodied (PSPD, 1994). The PSPD had started 
various public movements to put the issue on the policy agenda but the movement had 
not been paid any attention until the Crisis. However, the Crisis and the following social 
problems provided a decisive chance to raise it as a social issue. At that time, the 
government could not cope with the mass unemployment appropriately using the 
existing social security programmes. Since the coverage of the EIS was restricted, many 
of the unemployed were not able to depend on EIS benefits. Moreover, the existing 
public assistance programmes excluded the able-bodied. The government made special 
short-term programmes that gave livelihood protection benefits to the unemployed, but 
the special programmes would only last at best for two years. The PSPD asserted that 
the government could not construct a suitable social safety net under the existing public 
assistant system and it began a public movement for a petition on public assistance 
reform28 (PSPD, 1998a, 1998b).
26 Why NGOs appear as an important actor in social policy making processes, Ahn explains, is due to the 
fact that the needy could not be mobilised as an interest group and trade unions did not represent irregular 
workers and the chronic unemployed who required public assistance benefits. These situations made the 
NGOs take the role o f agency as an advocator (Ahn, 2000: 2).
27 It is quite interesting to mention that some junior university professors (social welfare or social policy 
department) have actively participated in the social policy processes as well as the social welfare 
movements. Professor Moon, Jin Young and Kim, Yeon Myung with whom I interviewed are the most 
representative examples. They were main actors in the Social Welfare Committee o f the PSPD and 
participated in various government committees discussing welfare reform agendas during the Kim Dae 
Jung government. Whereas Professor Jin Young Moon specialised in the public assistance reforms, 
Professor Yeon Myung Kim was mainly involved in the health and pension reforms.
28 The PSPD held a conference for the legislation of the National Basic Livelihood Security Law in June 
1998, and deployed various social movements for it from July, 1998 (PSPD, Petition for the National
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On the other hand, by Spring 1998, 209 nation-wide university professors 
specialising in social welfare, delivered an official statement that claimed the formation 
of a proper ‘social safety net’. And the KCDTU and other important CSOs including 
religious and environmental NGOs joined the movement during the summer. With the 
help of a few reformative MPs, the legislation, the so-called ‘National Basic Livelihood 
Security Law’, passed the Health and Welfare Sub-committee of the National Assembly 
in December 1998 (Interview with Jin Young Moon, 29/2/2004). 28 social groups and 
CSOs including the PSPD, the KDCTU and the other 26 CSOs founded a new 
independent organisation, the ‘Solidaritic Conference for the Legislation of the National 
Basic Livelihood Security Law’ (Hereafter SC) in March 1999 (SC, 1999a). The 
Conference not only continued its public movements, but also lobbied ruling elites 
including high officials in the ruling party and the presidential office. Most of all, the 
professional group of the Conference, mainly young social welfare professors, 
developed logics, suggested alternatives and, even, proposed the concrete contents of 
the Law. In spite of the enthusiastic activities of the Conference, the position of the 
authorities concerned remained lukewarm and the social atmosphere did not seem fully 
matured to the legislation (Ahn, 2000:11). Here, the statement of the President in Ulsan 
on 21 June 1999 was decisive enough to break though the stalemate situation. Then why 
did the President suddenly decide on an enactment of the Law?
Park (2002) criticised the fact that most studies focus upon the role of CSOs and 
devalue the importance of political situation at that time. He indicates that the formation 
of the institution was the outcome of the interaction of various factors including the 
social and political situations, the President’s understanding of those situations, and the 
CSOs’ petition and active participation. Most of all, he focused on the political crisis in
1999. He argued that the political situation was decisive in the formation of public 
assistance reform; a set of political scandals and a following nation-wide 
disappointment with the government affected the President’s understanding of the 
political and social situation in 1999. On the one hand, social problems caused by the 
Crisis like mass unemployment, the rise of poverty and the increase of homeless people, 
profoundly affected and shrank the basis of the President’s supporting groups -  the 
middle and lower classes. On the other hand, the government’s moral crisis in the early
Basic Livelihood Security Law, 1998)
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1999, caiused by the ‘furgate29’ scandal and the ‘rigging-strike30’ scandal, forced the 
President to save the situation by turning the policy focus to social welfare reform. In 
this situation, the President could not do anything but use political gestures to break the 
deadlock, by adding productive welfare to his basic goals for the ‘harmonious 
development of democracy and market economy’. The role of the President was 
decisive because no government ministry had reported a positive opinion on the 
legislation until the President's speech in Ulsan (June 1999). In this respect, it can be 
said that the role of CSOs was meaningful not in terms of the decision of the enactment 
itself but the formation of policy agenda and the policy development processes.
Anyway, the President’s willingness to enact the legislation greatly contributed 
to an improvement of the position of the Conference (Interview with Jin Young Moon, 
29/2/2004). The conference actively participated in the policy-making processes; it co­
ordinated, mediated and negotiated various interests related to the legislation with the 
authorities concerned. It also monitored the processes so as not to deteriorate the 
original policy purpose (SC, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d). However, at this stage of its 
implementation, a more complex dynamic was revealed within welfare politics. The 
Ministry of Finance and Economy, which controlled the government’s budget, took a 
negative position to the legislation and raised many issues including the budgetary 
constraints and its negative impact on the economy. And business took same position 
within the economic bureaucracy. The FKI argued in a report in 1999 that the 
fundamental solution to unemployment was to create employment based on the labour 
market flexibility, rather than to expand the social security system (FKI, 1999a). The 
CFE negatively suggested that giving public assistant benefits to the able-bodied would 
cause a negative work incentive and the means-testing processes would reveal a 
problem of higher administration costs and a lower target efficiency. So the CFE argued 
that the implementation had to be postponed and, more fundamentally, that the
29 In May 1999, there was a suspicion that the wife o f a CEO of a large insurance company, which had 
been subject to restructuring and M&A during the Crisis, had attempted to seek the influence o f high 
senior government officials by buying their wives expensive clothes (Chosunilbo, 27/5/1999). A few high 
officials were arrested for the scandal.
30 In 1998 the president o f Korea Minting and Security Printing Corporation induced the firs trade union 
to illegally go on to strike by proposing a compromise unacceptable to the trade union; he pushed ahead 
with a merger o f the firs two minting plants in the name of restructuring, about two years earlier than 
originally scheduled (Hankyeorae, 8/6/1999). When his intension to induce an illegal strike then break 
down the trade union of the firm was revealed, the scandal gave rise to a strong resistance to trade unions. 
Labour at once blamed the government because, for trade union activists, it was regarded that the basic 
approach o f the government to trade unions had not changed from the authoritarian repressive one of the 
past (Dongailbo, 11/6/1999).
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government’s public assistance reform plan had to be reconsidered (CFE, opinion 
leader’s digest No. 64, 1999 and No. 124, 2000). Although the Ministry of Finance and 
Economy could not be opposed to the public assistance reform itself because it was the 
president’s decision, the economic bureaucracy induced ‘non-decision making’ by 
deferring the allocation of its budget (B.Y. Ahn, 2000). When the President referred to 
his definite willingness not to retrench the basic principle of the legislation, however, 
the public assistance reform plan was implemented without significant deterioration of 
the basic framework (Interview with Jin Young Moon, 29/2/2004)31.
The new public assistance system widened its entitlement to able-bodied, but the 
government introduced a workfare system, to cope with the logic of its negative effect 
on the incentive to work. The able-bodied people have to participate in workfare 
programmes to receive the livelihood benefits. The workfare programmes are diverse 
from simple manual works like cleaning to running collaborative businesses, but most 
of supporting agencies are run by NPOs. Since the government continued its welfare 
mix strategy, by especially utilising NPOs, in social services, the workfare supporting 
agencies increased from 20 in 1999 to 193 in 2002 (MOHW, 2003).
Non-State Sectors: Enterprise Welfare, Private Welfare Market and Third Sector 
Provisions
As noted earlier, the government induced firms to expand enterprise welfare as a 
substitute for state welfare or wage increases (J.S. Kim, 1999). Business as well as 
labour agreed with the expansion of enterprise welfare at the expense of maintaining 
industrial peace and rapid wage increase. Especially, at the workplace level, the issue of 
enterprise welfare had been one of the most important agenda in collective bargaining, 
and, therefore, workers in large firms with strong trade unions gained more enterprise 
welfare. Really, the increased rate of enterprise welfare expenditure had far exceeded 
that of the overall labour cost until 1997, yet it had also caused the deepening inequality 
of enterprise welfare between large and small-medium sized firms (J.H. Kim, 2003: 
588-91).
31 Jin Young Moon asserted that the pro-welfare attitude o f the President and his willingness were 
decisive in overcoming the opposition of the economic Ministries of the government when the political 
processes of the reform reached a deadlock
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The drastic economic recession in 1998 revised the trend of continuous increases 
of enterprise welfare. Many firms were bankrupt and the surviving ones also cut their 
workers and reduced voluntary enterprise welfare benefits. It is noteworthy that the 
decreased rate of voluntary enterprise welfare in 1998 was larger than any other 
category o f labour cost but the trend reversed again to a stable increase from 1999 (see 
the previous chapter, section 6.3). Kim interprets that firms began to control the increase 
of voluntary welfare expenditure in terms of the management of the overall labour cost 
(2003: 585). Business began to call for the government to meet the expansion of welfare 
institutions for workers using the public finance, not finance from employers. When the 
government legislated for the extension of paid maternity leave by 30 days (from 60 to 
90 days) in 2002, business was strongly opposed to their additional burdens32 and, 
finally, the EIS covered the required finance cost for the additional 30 days.
On the other hand, paradoxically, the increase in layoffs caused by firms’ 
restructuring inevitably caused a rapid rise of expenditure on mandatory severance pay. 
As seen from the previous chapter, in 1998 the ratio of enterprise welfare in overall 
welfare mix expenditure rose because of the rapid, but temporary, increase in mandatory 
severance pay. Although the expenditure trends of mandatory enterprise welfare became 
stabilised from 1999, business asserted its problems again. When the Kim Dae Jung 
government started to discuss the pension reform plans, business raised the issue of the 
mandatory severance pay. Employers’ agencies argued that mandatory severance pay, 
which had been regarded as the substitute for pension and unemployment benefits, 
should be abolished since the NPI and the EIS had already been launched (KEF, 1999; 
FKI, 1999b). For business, social insurance contributions and severance pay were a dual 
burden. But labour argued that severance pay had to be understood as a kind of deferred 
wage and the argument of labour had been legally recognised by the Supreme Court 
(FKTU, 1999; H.K. Lee, 1999: 32). The arguments of business were not accepted, and 
the main framework for the mandatory severance pay programme was not altered. 
Business, instead, called for changes to the enterprise retirement pension plans run by 
private insurance companies.
Such an argument looked to an enlargement of the welfare market. Whenever 
the controversy on pension and heath reform arose, business argued the necessity of
32 60 days’ paid maternity leave has been one o f the mandatory enterprise welfare benefits where 
employers had to bear the full expenses
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privatisation. The FKI called for the introduction of a Medical Saving Account (MSA) 
to overcome the fundamental problems of NHI (FKI, 2000). And, the FKI, the CFE and 
the IKER constantly argued for the introduction of the market factor in pension schemes 
even though details of their arguments were flexible according to the situation, from the 
occupationally separated pension funds to full privatisation like the Chilean pension 
reform (J.G. Kim, 2003: 42). Although business’s arguments for the privatisation of 
social insurance were not accepted, there were growing private welfare markets for 
health and pension insurance. Since the MIP (the NHI from 2000) provided a low level 
of benefits, private insurance companies developed various commodities like cancer 
insurance and did their best to expand the private health market through aggressive 
marketing strategies during the 1990s (B.H. Choi 2001). As a result, according to the 
calculations by Chang et al (2002), the share of insurance companies’ payments of the 
total national health expenditure increased to almost double between 1990 and 2000, 
from 4.8 per cent to 8.7 per cent.
On the other hand, the sales of PIPS, which gained an explosive popularity in 
the earlier period, indicated a fluctuation according to the economic situations. The 
growth of the PIPS market between 1994 and 1997 was followed by a mass cancellation 
of PIPS contracts in 1998 and 1999. This phenomenon shows the vulnerability of the 
income security function, as market provisions in general cannot guarantee long-term 
stability. Nevertheless, to encourage the depressed private individual pension market, in 
2000 the government launched the New Individual Pension Schemes (NIPS) as the 
substitute for the existing PIPS. The NIPS expanded the tax benefits and lengthened the 
minimum contribution period, to enhance the long-term income security function (J.W. 
Lee, 2002). In addition, to strengthen the competition principle, the NIPS allowed the 
transfer of contracts between financial or insurance companies. Due to the interventions 
of the government, the sales of private individual pension began to increase again from
2000. In 2001, the accumulated fund was 22.4 trillion won (4.1 per cent of GDP), which 
was one-quarter of the NPI fund (J.W. Lee, 2002; MOHW, 2002).
Finally, the dominant role of the third sector in social service had hardly changed. 
Although the Kim Dae Jung government expanded state welfare greatly, it never gave 
up the strategy for welfare pluralism and the third sector seemed critical within the 
strategy (Presidential Committee for Quality of Life, Office of the President, 1999, 
2002). The government, most of all, accepted the NPOs’ argument for reform of the
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SWCFRS, legislated in 1997. In 1999, the legislation for the establishment of the Social 
Welfare Collaborative Fund Raising Conference (SWCFRC) passed the National 
Assembly, as the substitute legislation for the existing SWCFRS. The new legislation 
not only strengthened the autonomy of the SWCERC in collecting and distributing 
procedures, but also admitted 10 per cent of expenses in fund raising (C.H. Kang, 2000). 
The new legislation was the first trial where the NPOs, which had been under the state’s 
strong supervision and passive in social service policy- making processes, succeeded in 
changing the policy direction. This was not unrelated to the intensifying importance of 
NPOs in social services since the Crisis. Along with some CSOs, they actively coped 
with the newly rising needs, caused by post-industrial pressures and the economic crisis, 
such as homelessness and family dissolution, domestic and sexual violence and 
adolescent leaving home.
Summary and Evaluation: the Financial Crisis and the Welfare Politics
Under the Kim Dae Jung government, the institutional conditions for the operation of 
the dynamics of welfare politics matured. Although the shock of globalisation brought 
drastic influences on the Korean economy and society, it also paradoxically provided a 
critical opportunity for the development of Korea’s democracy and its welfare state at 
the same time. The Crisis of 1997 not only led to the regime change from the ruling to 
the opposition party in terms of the development of political democracy, but it also 
forced the President-elect Kim Dae Jung to try another experiment in social pact politics 
to extract policy measures able to cope with the Crisis. Considering the external 
pressure of globalisation, in this respect, the welfare reforms under the Kim Dae Jung 
government would challenge the dominant position that globalisation would impose on 
the policy autonomy of the state in general and restrict welfare state expansion. Instead, 
under the wave of globalisation, Korea experienced the opposite phenomenon. Sung 
(2002:511-2) explains the reason for the state welfare expansion as a relative 
reinforcement of the state’s autonomy vis-a-vis labour and business. Under the 
temporary and exceptional condition of mass unemployment for labour and mass 
bankruptcy for business, their relative power which had been reinforced since the ‘exit’ 
of authoritarian military regimes, weakened severely. For business, the state decided
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which firms had to ‘disappear’ and which ones could ‘survive’, through the execution of 
the conditionality of SAL. For labour, the basic picture was not so different because it 
executed a de facto control over labour through admission or denial of the employment 
adjustments of firms and through providing support for the unemployed. In conclusion, 
although other driving forces should not be ignored, basically welfare state 
development since 1998 is likely to be explained, at least partly, by the state’s reinforced 
role under the exceptional conditions caused by globalisation.
Even though the government’ dominant role in the welfare politics had hardly 
changed, the maturing of institutional conditions -  the consolidation of political 
democratisation and the establishment of social pact politics -  made it possible for 
various groups to actively participate in welfare politics under the Kim Dae Jung 
government. Most of all, labour, which had been excluded from the policy-making 
processes by previous regimes, made a bright debut as an important actor in welfare 
politics, through the participation in the Tripartite committee. In addition, based on the 
growth of civil society since 1987, CSOs also began to play an enthusiastic role in 
welfare politics. They actively represented the unprivileged who could not mobilise 
their interest enough (in the public assistance reform), and with the KFTCU and, 
sometimes, the government, they constructed a reformative coalition against the 
conservative coalition of business and, sometimes, the FKTU (in the pension reform and 
the MPI unification).
Along with the emergence of labour in welfare politics, business began to take a 
different stance from the government’s. As a matter of fact, at least until the Crisis, it 
had not been necessary for business to take pains to fulfil their interests in policy­
making processes directly; for the previous forty years the ruling parties and the 
governments had always taken the employers’ side although to different extents. In 
other words, under the crony capitalism -  chronic corrupt relationship between political 
and business circles, business had not had to exercise their ‘agency power34’ because 
their interests had been structurally connected to those of the political elite. As state 
welfare, especially social insurance institutions, were expanded under the Kim Dae Jung
33 For example, rising welfare needs themselves have become the pressure to require state programmes 
and financial supports. Another important source is the leading role of reformative civil society 
organisations in social welfare legislation processes. As an example, a civil society organisation, PSPD 
(People’s Solidarity and Participatory Democracy), dominated the public assistance reforms in 1999.
34 For details about the structural and agency power, please refer to the theoretical work of Gough and 
Farnsworth (2000).
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government, business however worried about the increase to the social insurance 
contributions schedule as well as the possibility of welfare disease. Business began to 
exercise its agency power. Employers’ agencies called for the mitigation of firms’ 
welfare burden by transferring the cost of welfare from firms to workers and the 
government, the introduction of the market-principle within the NHI and the NPI and, 
even looking to the privatisation of social insurance institutions to solve their 
fundamental problems. Nonetheless, the dominant role of the government in welfare 
politics should be emphasised. The government’s bureaucracy and its research institutes 
still led policy development and implementation. Most of all, the role of the President 
should still be considered as critical. When the intra-government conflict between the 
economic and welfare bureaucracy emerged and the conservative coalition opposed the 
welfare reforms, the President’s decision, based on his pro-welfare attitude, was 
decisive to the policies implementation. At the same time, it cannot be ignored that he 
and his government manipulated welfare reforms to overcome a set of political and 
social crises.
Finally, the path-dependent nature of the welfare reforms, and the welfare mix 
changes in general, should be indicated. In spite of the rapid expansion of state welfare, 
the welfare reforms of the Kim Dae Jung government were based on the existing 
institutional stmcture, and any radical reform agenda -  e.g. MSA in health and the full 
privatisation or the WB’s multi-tiered pension scheme -  were not accepted. Although 
the government spent enormous financial resources to unemployment policies between 
1998 and 1999, the principle of a minimised financial burden on the state remained 
untouched by social insurance institutions. Also, strong familialism and the subsidiarity 
principle were still maintained in public assistance programmes and social services. In 
terms of the welfare provisions of non-state sectors, when the government continued to 
hold the role as a regulator, along with an indirect financial support, features such as the 




In this chapter, I have argued that the significant changes to the welfare mix during a 
relatively short period (1987—2002) can be explained by the intermediation and 
dynamics o f the environments, institutions and welfare politics. The political 
democratisation since 1987 and the Financial Crisis of 1997 can be especially regarded 
as two historical junctures that led to structural, institutional changes in welfare politics 
as well as the welfare mix changes. First of all, democratisation since 1987 provided the 
basic conditions for the working of welfare politics. The ‘on-the-street’ social 
movements brought about the political democratisation and the dissolution of 
authoritarianism. Such changes gave the opportunity for the eruption of the labour 
movement on the one hand, and for the growth of the civil society on the other. These 
accumulated democratisation processes made possible the first peaceful regime change 
of 1997 -  from the ruling to the opposition party -  in Korea. Moreover, as 
democratisation permeated industrial relations, the state and business began to recognise 
labour as a social partner. Especially when they were facing ‘militant’ industrial 
disputes, social pact politics began to be experimented with. Although such experiments 
with social pact politics came to an end without a fruitful outcome until 1995, the 
PCIRR between 1996 and 1997 succeeded in gaining consent, for the first time, on the 
exchange between labour market flexibility and the expansion of basic labour rights. 
However, the agreements on social welfare were not fully implemented.
It was under the Tripartite committee that the agreed social policy tasks began to 
be implemented by the government, when the shock of globalisation -  the second 
historical juncture -  swept every comer of the country. The financial crisis of 1997 
proceeded into a social crisis. The government had to implement two contradictory 
tasks at the same time; neo-liberal economic policies including labour market flexibility, 
and an expansion of the social protection system to mitigate the crisis. Especially, the 
government directly participated in the Tripartite committee and promised to expand the 
social protection system as compensation for the victims of globalisation. Really, within 
the confines of the committee, the dynamic of the welfare politics between business, 
labour and the government was revealed, and many agreements of the committee came 
into legislation between 1998 and 2000. Whilst the participation of labour and business
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in welfare politics was institutionalised by the Tripartite committee under the Kim Dae 
Jung government, the active welfare movements of CSOs deployed various measures 
from ‘on-the-street’ picketing to the construction of a reformative coalition with labour 
and even the state (pro-welfare Ministries). Such unprecedented actions from CSOs 
reveal the real dynamics and novelties of welfare politics in Korea. In this respect, the 
denotation of the power resource mobilisation was not restricted to the traditional class 
structure in Korea, but to a broader coalition between labour and civil society (and, in 
some cases, the pro-welfare bureaucracy of the government). However, despite the 
establishment and the development of a parliamentary democracy, the role of political 
parties in the welfare politics still remained weak by the end of the Kim Dae Jung 
government.
Although labour, civil society and business began to actively participate in 
welfare politics, the government still dominated policy-making processes as the most 
important actor. The professional bureaucracy and ministries’ research institutes 
dominated the development and implementation of policy. Most of all, as seen from the 
example of public assistance reform, the President’s influence on policy-making 
processes seemed critical especially when intra-govemmental conflict between different 
ministries emerged. Moreover, the typical modes of state intervention in social welfare 
were largely maintained. Although there was a rapid expansion in state welfare in terms 
of direct provision, the dominant type of state intervention was as its role as regulator. 
For example, the government induced the expansion of enterprise welfare through 
providing tax benefits for enterprise welfare as well as creating the intra-company 
welfare fund. In terms of the welfare market, the government took a market-conforming 
attitude by introducing PIPS in 1994. The government encouraged the private pension 
market by providing tax exemptions to the interest of PIPS as well as income 
deductions for PIPS contributions. The government’s supervision and financial support 
were especially critical in the growth of the third sector’s social service provisions, even 
though the relative importance of the third sector in terms of welfare provision remained 
almost ignorable in the overall welfare mix structure. Taking the case of family, 
however, the focus seems rather different; family’s provision is not so much the subject 
of discussion in welfare politics than long-term socio-demographic change itself.
As the result of the intermediation and dynamics between the environments, 
institutions and welfare politics, there were significant changes in the structure of the
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welfare mix (see Chapter 6). But, as continuously discussed in the preceding chapters, 
such changes can be basically featured as path-dependent developments; the 
institutional legacies of the welfare mix structure formed until 1987 remained strongly 
influential in the welfare mix changes between 1987 and 2002.
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CHAPTER 8. CONCLUSIONS
In this research, I have attempted to analyse the welfare mix changes in Korea between 
1987 and 2002, and to explain why such changes happened. The main argument of the 
research is that there were significant changes in the welfare mix structure during the 
research period and such changes of the welfare mix can be understood as the results of 
the intermediations between the structural transformations and the dynamics of welfare 
politics. Whereas the structural factors related to environments and domestic institutions 
provided the basic conditions, contexts and constraints for the welfare mix changes, the 
dynamics of welfare politics shape the actual form of the changes. Most of all, the 
importance of domestic institutions has been placed at the centre of the discussions on 
the influence of the different environments. Political democratisation and the social pact 
institutions have provided to analyse the most fundamental opportunity for the operation 
of welfare politics. In can be seen that, politics mattered, not only in the development of 
the welfare state, but also in the welfare mix changes. The role of the state remained 
vital in managing the national responses to the transforming environments as well as in 
the welfare mix changes. In reality, the typical modes of state intervention in social 
welfare were strongly maintained. On the other hand, the welfare mix changes basically 
followed a path-dependent route, whereby previous institutional legacies have 
constrained and influenced the development of the welfare mix.
This concluding chapter is organised into three parts. In the following section, I 
shall summarise the main findings of the research in chronological order and proceed to 
additional discussion of the path-dependent route of the welfare mix changes. In the 
second section, I shall rearrange the main explanations and arguments of the research 
with a variable-by-variable approach. Finally, in the third section I shall suggest the 
necessity of the welfare mix approach in social policy studies and the direction of future 
research.
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8.1. Summary of Research Findings
The First Period: 1987~1992
During the first period, both external forces and internal pressures were weak. Although 
most manufacturing markets were open until the end of the 1980s and structurally the 
Korean economy was highly dependent on international trade, the FDI inflows were low 
and most capital mobility was restricted by government control. The economic boom 
and labour shortage in the late 1980s were connected to higher employment stability. 
Until the early 1990s, Korea’s employment structure seemed to indicate a higher level 
of industrialisation and other internal pressures also remained low. Therefore, it is 
difficult to say that the environmental factors caused new welfare needs or produced 
higher pressures for the expansion of welfare expenditures. Rather, internal political 
situations were more important features to explain the dynamics of the welfare mix at 
that time. The Political democratisation of 1987 continued with the eruption of militant 
trade unionism in the late 1980s and also led to the dissolution of political 
authoritarianism. Nonetheless, labour was mostly excluded from the policy processes 
and pro-labour political actors had just emerged. The features of the developmental state 
remained strong and most policy processes were dominated by the state. Basically, the 
issue of social policy did not rise to the surface in the political discourses in which the 
interests of various political actors intersected. Most social legislation were introduced 
to soothe the militant labour movements. The launch of the NPI, the universalisation of 
the MLP coverage and the introduction of the intra-company welfare fund offered an 
initially compensative nature. Employers, and the state, willingly accepted the 
expansion of (voluntary) enterprise welfare not only as a substitute for the rapid wage 
increases but also as a measure to maintain industrial peace. The state’s welfare 
legislation and the following institutional expansion of state welfare, however, seldom 
changed the state’s low expenditures because it would take long time to initiate 
expenditures into full-pension benefits and the level of the MI benefits remained low. 
After all, people’s higher dependency on the market within health provisions as well as 
on the family in social protection were preserved features throughout the first period.
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Table 8.1. Summary of Environments, Welfare Politics and Welfare Mix Changes
Period 1987-92 1993-97 1998-2002




• Openness of 
manufacturing markets
• Openness of agricultural 
and financial markets
•Further openness of most 
domestic markets
•Foreigners’ investment to 
stock market allowed
• Most control over capital 
mobility withdrawn
• Liberalisation of financial 
market
• Low FDI and high control 
over capital mobility
• Low FDI but increasing 
capital mobility
• Great volatility of capital 
mobility
1.2. Political Pressures 
from IGOs
• Low • Rising: OECD’s social 
standards requirements
• High: Policy agreements 





• Higher proportion of 
regular employment but 
decreasing industry 
employment
•Decreasing industry and 
regular employment
• A sudden drop and not 
recovered in both industry 
and regular employment
• Women’s participation rate 
(WPR) remained static
• Increasing WPR. • A sudden drop of WPR but 
recovered until 2001
2.2. Ageing • Low (5.1%, 1990) • Low (5.9%, 1995) • Moderate (7.2%, 2000)
2.3. Household 
Structure
• Low divorce rate (11.4%), 
AHM 3.7 and SH 9.0% in 
1990
• Increasing divorce rate 
(17.1%), AHM 3.3 and SH 
12.7% in 1995
• High divorce rate (35.9%), 






• Establishment of 
parliamentary democracy
• Emergence o f ‘Civilian 
government’
• First regime change from 
ruling to opposition party
• Dissolution of 
authoritarianism and 
militant labour movement
• Growth of civil society • Maturity of civil society
1.2. Social Pact 
Politics
• NESC between FKTU and 
KEF: making policy 
suggestion to government
• WAC (‘93-4) between 
FKTU and KEF: consent on 
wage, enterprise welfare and 
social policy
• PCIRR (’96-7) among 
FKTU, KCDTU, KEF and 
FKI: exchange labour and 
capital (labour market 
flexibility <-» labour rights 
and social welfare)
• Tripartite committee 
among labour, capital and 
government: social consent 
on the exchange between 
immediate labour market 
flexibility and the expansion 
of social welfare along with 
enhancement of labour 
rights
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Table 8.1. -  Continue
Period 1987-92 1993-97 1998-2002
2. Main Actors of Welfare Politics
2.1. Government Dominant Dominant Dominant
2.2. Business Moderate Moderate Strong
2.3. Labour Excluded1 Growing Strong
2.4. CSOs Emerging Weak Strong
2.5. Political Parties Weak Weak Weak
2.6. Interest Groups N.A. 
M. Major Welfare Mix Changes
N.A. Emerging
1. Quantitative (Expenditure) Changes
1.1. State • Static (3.2% of GDP) • Increasing (3.3—>4.3%) • Rapid increase to 6.9% 
(’99) and then 6.1% (’01)
1.2. Enterprise • Increasing between 1990 • Slightly increased • Rapid increase and
and 1992 (3.0^3.9%) (3.8—>4.4%) fluctuations (6.7-4.6%)
1.3. Market • Static (2.9-3.0% of GDP) • Static (3.0-2.8%) • Slightly increasing, 
variation range is 2.7-3.1%
1.4. Third Sector • Very low (0.1 % of GDP) • Very low (0.1% of GDP) • Very low (0.1% of GDP)
1.5. Family • Static (3.7~3.9% of GDP) • Slightly decreasing, •Decreased to 2.7% of GDP
variation range is 3.1-3.5% in 2001
2. Institutional and qualitative Changes
3.1. State Welfare • Launch of NPI • Launch of EIS • Public assistance reform
• Universal coverage MIP • NPI coverage expansion • Universal coverage of 
social insurances
• Health reform 
(MIP-»NHI)
3.2. Enterprise Welfare • In-plant welfare fund • Extension of paid 
maternity leave
• Rapid wage increase • Expansion instead of wage • Rapid increase and
-►Enterprise welfare, esp. restriction, but vol.welfare fluctuation of mand welfare
voluntary welfare rapidly decreasing slightly; but static vol. welfare
increased and diversified —►rise of inequality —►higher inequality
3.3. Welfare Market • PIPS (‘94) and growing • PIPS->NIPS and
PIPS market fluctuation of market
•Private health insurance • Growing private health • Growing private health
insurance market insurance market
• Permission of commercial 
elderly services
• Growing ‘silver’ industry
3.4. Third Sector • SWCFRS • SWCFRS—►SWCFRC
•Accommodation institution • Growing social service • Emerging social services
—►Social service facilities 
(community welfare centres)
facilities for newly rising needs
3.5. Family • Strong family in income • Decreasing slowly but still • Decreasing but still
maintenance, services and important family important; 49% of elderly
caring
1 r r m n r  r • 1 1 1 ■ 1 / •  1 • .  ' 1 .  .1
live with adult children in 
2000
Only FKTU included in welfare politics but the participation o f the central agency of the democratic 
trade union camp (the NCTU (1990-93) and NCTUR( 1993-95)) was denied until 1996 when the KCDTU 
was recognised as a legal agency
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The Second Period: 1993~1997
It was during the second period (1993-1997) that the environmental factors began to 
influence Korean society in general and the dynamics of the welfare mix specifically. 
According to the Uruguay Round, Korea had to decide to open most of its agricultural 
markets. This caused severe resistances from farmers and finally led not only to the new 
state support to the agricultural industry but also the extension of NPI coverage to the 
rural self-employed in 1995. In a similar way to the previous coverage extension of 
social insurance institutions in the late 1980s, it was basically executed on the basis of 
compensation. Economic globalisation during the second period intensified in the 
financial market. As most regulations over international capital flows were withdrawn 
including the liberalisation of the short-term capital mobility, Korea’s financial market 
became more integrated with the international financial market and, therefore, revealed 
higher capital mobility. Such trends were directly related to the Saegyewha 
(globalisation) policy orientation of the Civilian government launched in 1993. In 
addition, internal pressures began to be visible during the period. Whilst the women’s 
participation rate (WPR) increased slowly but continuously, the share of both industry 
and regular employment decreased in the overall employment figures and paid 
employment respectively. The ageing problem began to be indicated as a long-term 
pressure and burden on pension expenditures, and social problems related to family 
dissolutions emerged as increasing needs for social services.
Along with those environmental factors, the maturing of political democracy and 
the experiments with social pact politics provided opportunities for social policy issues 
to emerge on the policy agenda in the domestic political domain. Although the state still 
dominated social policy making processes, labour and a growing civil society began to 
participate in the formal social policy making processes. Labour wanted higher 
standards in basic labour rights. Moreover, they were joined by IGOs like the ILO who 
put more pressures on the government as Korea joined the OECD. On the other hand, 
the state and business argued the necessity of labour market flexibility to reinforce 
international competitiveness. After all, they agreed to an exchange between labour 
market flexibility and higher basic labour rights with a reinforcement of the social 
security system. To this end, the EIS was launched in 1995 but its initial purpose was 
due to economic concerns to support restructuring and labour market flexibility, rather
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than because of the social security concerns of workers.
Most of all, since the Kim Young Sam government revealed its business-friendly 
nature, the slogan of the so-called ‘Saegyewha’ (globalisation) was also manipulated as 
logic for the expansion of private markets. The PIPS, introduced to support the 
government’s RFTS implementation, and private health insurance markets grew rapidly 
during the second period. Such expansion of the health and individual pension insurance 
markets was also the product of the business’ lobbying of the state. In the case of 
enterprise welfare, albeit its expenditures increased slightly, the structure of inequality 
rose especially in voluntary types, under a situation of the emphasis on firms’ 
international competitiveness. Although social service needs increased, on the other 
hand, the state still maintained its traditional ‘third sector utilising model’, rather than 
chose an expansion of the state’s social service programmes. Accordingly, state 
intervention in social services remained low according to the ‘subsidiarity’ principle 
based on strong familialism. This was also related to the decreasing but still important 
role of the family in the welfare mix.
The Third Period: 1998-2002
During the third period, the impacts of globalisation and internal pressures reached a 
peak. The financial crisis of 1997 caused the government to ask for emergency loans 
from IGOs like the IMF and the WB. Through the IMF standby agreement and the SAL 
agreement with the WB, the Korean government lost a substantial part of its policy 
autonomy. A set of liberalisation policies that the IMF required Korea to implement led 
to a higher global integration of the Korean economy. Korea experienced massive 
foreign capital inflows and great volatility due to enhanced capital mobility. At the same 
time, the socio-economic shocks caused by the financial crisis made the internal 
pressures intensify. When the massive unemployment was concentrated in the industry 
sector, there was a sudden drop of employment in both industry and regular 
employment. The overall instability of Korean society caused a rapid increase in the 
divorce rate and homelessness. Moreover, the long-term pressures related to 
demographics and household structure began to be realised. The impacts of all these 
factors were evident; augmenting welfare needs but with a limited state financial
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capability.
Here, the choice, between an expansion of state’s intervention in social welfare 
to cope with the increasing needs and a reduction of state welfare to retain its fiscal 
austerity, seemed to depend on national politics. Although the state still held its 
dominant position in the social policy making process, the Kim Dae Jung government 
sought to extract a social consent on the solution to overcome the crisis through the 
Tripartite committee. Labour as well as business emerged as important actors in welfare 
politics, and the voice of CSOs had an influence on the welfare reforms, based on the 
growth of civil society. As various actors participated in the social policy making 
process under the conditions of the maturing political democratisation, the policy 
choices produced within national welfare politics converged on a higher level of state 
intervention rather than an austerity orientation. This seemed inevitable because the 
IMF and the WB strongly required the reinforcement of labour market flexibility up to 
the so-called ‘global standard’ and, in order to follow such a direction, the government 
had to provide equivalent compensation for workers’ sacrifices -  i.e., the expansion of 
the social security system. To deal with the problem of massive unemployment, the 
government accepted the implementation of a deficit public finance and received 
concessions on it from the IMF. In a sense, the shock of globalisation provided 
favourable conditions for, rather than restrictions to, an expansion of the state welfare in 
Korea. The results were straightforward; there were massive welfare reforms between 
1998 and 2000 including the extension to universal coverage for all social insurances, 
public assistance and health reforms. The expenditures of the state on social protection 
and health increased rapidly.
However, the dynamics of the welfare mix caused by such environmental factors 
did not remain within the state sector. The mass unemployment brought an 
unprecedented leap in the enterprise welfare expenditure on mandatory severance pay, 
but the sudden increase in the mandatory enterprise welfare led to a decrease in 
voluntary enterprise welfare. Moreover, as irregular type and service employment -  
usually receiving a low level of enterprise welfare -  increased, the inequality of 
enterprise welfare in general was nurtured according to workers’ employment status as 
well as the payment capability of firms. At the same time, the instability of income 
caused by the crisis was connected to a massive cancellation of PIPS. It may indicate 
how fragile the market provisions are in a situation of socio-economic crisis.
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Nevertheless, the importance of private markets did not seem to be damaged in the 
overall welfare mix. Private health insurance markets grew and the commercial sector 
began to enter social services and caring markets positively. The expenditures of the 
market sector during the third period actually increased somewhat.
Another sector that revealed a significant change was the third sector. The voice 
of civil society that was arguing the necessity of an improvement in Korea’s social 
security system could gain clear legitimacy in the situation of the crisis. Since then 
major CSOs have enlarged their voices and roles in social policy making processes. In 
terms of social services, despite its trivial expenditures, the role of the third sector was 
expanded with new initiatives. Some pioneering CSOs and NPOs began to provide 
experimental social services dealing with the newly rising needs, and some of them 
were spread to be nation-wide social services.
Lastly, the reduced income during the economic crisis and the increasing 
pressures concerning the changes in household structure seemed to reduce the capability 
of the family in providing welfare goods and services. Nonetheless, the family still 
remained important in terms of both private income transfers and informal 
services/caring. Private income transfers are still more important than public ones, and 
especially among the elderly, the income support of their adult children was their most 
important income source. The gross expenditure of private income transfers has been 
estimated to be as much as that of the market sector on average during the period. In 
2000, still almost half of the elderly over 65 were living with their adult children and 
another quarter of them resided in the local neighbourhood area.
Dynamic but Path-dependent Development of Welfare Mix Changes
Considering all the periods between 1987 and 2002, there were significant changes in 
the welfare mix. By 1987, state interventions in social welfare had been thoroughly 
subordinated to the political and economic logics of the regimes. Under the 
authoritarian regimes, the basic principles of social policy were that state welfare 
programmes should not have hindered the nation’s supreme goal, economic 
development, but state welfare programmes were only considered in order to gain their 
political legitimacy. So, the scope of state intervention was very restricted and the
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state’s financial burden had to remain at a minimal level. Really, whereas the state put 
an emphasis on family responsibility as seen from the subsidiarity principle retained in 
public assistance and statutory social services, it was very hesitatant to take the role as a 
direct financer and provider. Instead, as a regulator, the state positively utilised non-state 
sectors in social welfare provision -  it entrusted NPOs to take the responsibility for the 
care of the needy in social service delivery, enterprise welfare programmes were 
introduced and developed by various state’s interventions as a de facto substitute for the 
residual state welfare. Therefore, for the vast majority of people, either the family or 
their own payment ability in the market was their main welfare source. The institutional 
legacies of the welfare mix structure formed until 1987 can be summarised as ‘a 
residual state welfare with a minimised financial burden; a growing market sector 
despite underdeveloped welfare markets; an entrusted and subordinated third sector in 
social service provisions; for workers, enterprise welfare as de facto substitutes for the 
residual state welfare; and pervasive family provision as the primary welfare source for 
the vast majority of people’.
In a sense, there was evidence that the welfare mix changes between 1987 and 
2002 could be distinguished from its previous features. Firstly, we have discovered that 
the expenditure structure of the welfare mix has transformed, from a genuinely mixed 
structure incorporating the state, market, enterprise and the family sector, to a public led 
model dominated by the state and mandatory enterprise welfare. Really, as seen from 
other empirical data and institutional features, the state’s commitment and interventions 
in social welfare were greatly expanded and the relative importance of enterprise 
welfare increased significantly. The official coverage of social insurances had been 
universalised by 2000 and the public assistance reform of 1999 established the 
entitlement of public assistance benefits as a social right. Whereas voluntary enterprise 
welfare had been expanded rapidly by the mid-1990s, there were not only massive 
expansions of mandatory enterprise welfare benefits, as the de facto substitute for the 
scare public benefits, but also severe fluctuations between 1997 and 2000. On the other 
hand, there were other important changes worthy of mention. Welfare markets emerged 
and/or grew substantially in health, pension and some social services. The third sector 
began to experiment with a pioneering role in new social services and its advocacy role 
emerged and grew in social policy making processes, even though its size and relative 
importance in social welfare provision still remained marginal. On the other hand,
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accompanied by the transformation of demographics and household structure, the 
capability and actual welfare provision of the family declined.
As historical institutionalists emphasise the path-dependent changes of 
institutions and their non-intended outcomes (Hall, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Krasner, 1984, 1988), however, the institutional legacies formed until 1987 and the 
typical types o f state interventions in social welfare strongly remained in the welfare mix 
changes. First of all, there is abundant empirical evidence supporting the idea that the 
route o f the welfare mix changes in Korea followed a path-dependent route. The 
universalisation of social insurance coverage was the result of an incremental expansion 
processes basically within the existing institutional settings, but the radical reform 
proposals based on neo-liberal ideology in health and pensions had not been realised. 
Based on the strong familialism, the subsidiarity principle, where the state intervenes 
only when the function of the family fails, largely remained in public assistance and 
statutory social service systems. The market dominance of health expenditure structure 
had not been changed much, nor had any fundamental proposal to reform its structure 
been implemented by 2002. In enterprise welfare, the nature of the de facto substitute 
for the state welfare was maintained and even strengthened especially when the 
financial crisis revealed the frailty of the state welfare system in coping with mass 
unemployment. In social services, the basic features and the relationship between the 
third sector and the state (the collective-vendor model) had not changed; rather, the 
government utilised the third sector more and more to deal with the newly rising welfare 
needs.
Closely related to the path-dependent development of the welfare mix, the 
typical modes of state intervention in social welfare were also largely maintained in the 
welfare mix changes. Most of all, traditionally the state was very hesitant to expand its 
role as a direct provider and/or fmancer. State interventions as a direct provider were 
largely restricted to the public income maintenance system (social insurances and public 
assistance programmes). Although the state expanded its role as a direct provider by 
expanding the compulsory coverage of social insurance, the state’s financial support for 
social insurance was always marginal and the public assistance benefit recipients as well 
as most of statutory social services were narrowly targeted by the subsidiarity principle 
based on the strong familialism. Instead, the state encouraged or mandated the social 
welfare provisions o f non-state sectors through various interventions. In other words,
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the role o f  the state in finance and regulation was vital in the welfare provisions o f non­
state sectors. The state traditionally entrusted its responsibility for providing social 
services to NPOs, and utilised the third sector more and more to deal with newly rising 
needs. Related to the strong familialism, the state never forgot to put an emphasis on the 
role of the family as the primary welfare provider, and supported the family through 
indirect tax benefits. The state legislated for mandatory enterprise welfare programmes 
to be the de facto substitute or complements to the scarce state welfare. Moreover, in 
some cases, such interventions produced non-intended outcomes at a historical juncture. 
During the period of the ‘Crisis’, the previous legislations on the mandatory severance 
pay led the sudden, rapid increase in the mandatory enterprise welfare expenditure, and 
it overwhelmed the decrease in voluntary enterprise welfare expenditure, when Korea 
faced mass unemployment. Similarly, despite the general trend of growing welfare 
markets, there were also massive cancellations of PIPS during the severe economic 
recession following by the Financial Crisis. These phenomena seem to be opposite to 
the general expectation that higher external forces would cause an increase of market 
provisions and a decrease of enterprise welfare. So we can conclude that historical 
institutionalism provides a useful analytical tool in explaining not only the different 
routes of the welfare state development or adaptations, but also the path dependent 
development o f welfare mix changes and their non-intended outcomes.
8.2. Explanations of Welfare Mix Changes: Welfare Mix as a Dependent Variable
Now, I turn to an explanation of the welfare mix changes. Since I have already dealt 
with the institutional legacies above, I mainly focus on the influences of environments 
on the one hand, and political variables on the other, to rearrange the main explanations 
and arguments of the research. In addition, I shall emphasise the welfare mix approach 
as a dependent variable, which makes up a core part of the research originality.
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Environments and Welfare Mix Changes
So far, the research has argued that the fast transformations of external and internal 
environments in Korea has provided the basic conditions for welfare mix changes. The 
main arguments on the impacts of the environments are two-fold as follows.
External Forces and Welfare Mix. The impacts o f globalisation (external forces) were 
positive in state welfare, welfare markets, mandatory enterprise welfare and third sector 
provisions, but negative in voluntary enterprise welfare and with no evident effects in 
the family sector. Most of all, opposite to the ‘social dumping’ hypothesis that external 
forces would compel nation states to implement neo-liberal welfare reforms and shrink 
welfare state programmes (McKenzie and Lee, 1991; Cemy, 1996; Mishra, 1999; 
Strange, 1996), the impacts of globalisation on state welfare seem positive in Korea. 
The NPI coverage, for example, was expanded to the rural self-employed as a 
compensation for the opening of the agricultural markets. The welfare reforms since the 
Financial Crisis were the reforms far from the usual neo-liberal prescriptions that the 
World Bank and IMF required. Rather, the IBRD and the World Bank called for the 
Korean government to construct an appropriate social safety net to support the 
restructuring, and the social crisis caused by the shock of globalisation had to be 
mitigated. So, as far as the social welfare institutions were concerned, the Korean case 
is much more likely to support the 'compensation ’ or 'upward mobility’ hypothesis 
(GS+), originated by such scholars as Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1985), Rodrik 
(1998) and Rieger and Leibffied (2003).
The positive impacts of globalisation can be also found in the market and third 
sector. Although the expenditure level of private markets in social protection and health 
remained static between 1990 and 2001, there were clear institutional expansions of the 
commercial market in the overall welfare mix structure, as seen from the introduction 
and expansion of PIPS as well as rising high quality in the social service market for the 
well-off elderly. These trends suggest that, as the ‘marketisation o f welfare ’ hypothesis 
(GM+) indicates, the logic of marketisation became pervasive under the general 
emphasis on the globalisation (e.g. the slogan of ‘Saegyewha’) and penetrated social 
welfare domains. In addition, when the shock of globalisation, i.e., the financial crisis, 
brought about massive socio-economic disasters, as the ‘resistance and compromise’
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hypothesis (GT+) suggests, the advocacy role of the third sector has been greatly 
expanded as well as some third sector organisations have pioneered new social services 
to meet the needs of new kinds of social problems. In the case of enterprise welfare and 
the family sector, the impacts of external forces are either too complex or vague to 
assume a single direction. In a sense, the importance of enterprise welfare increased in 
the overall welfare mix, especially when the massive unemployment during the crisis 
led to a sudden and rapid increase in mandatory severance pay-outs. However, this was 
also accompanied with a decrease in voluntary enterprise welfare during the same 
period. The reasoning seems straightforward; as the 'labour cost competitiveness’ 
hypothesis (GE-) demonstrates, for business, the motivations for providing voluntary 
enterprise welfare benefits faded and, instead, labour cost competitiveness started to 
gain importance under the name of the international competitiveness of firms in the 
global economy. Finally, we could not find clear evidence on the connection between 
external forces and family provision. The impacts of environments on the family sector, 
people’s micro behaviours, seem more long-term one, rather than an instant effect is 
expected.
Internal Pressures and Welfare Mix. The influences o f internal pressures were also 
positive in state welfare, welfare markets and third sector provisions, but negative in 
enterprise welfare as well as the family sector. In Korea, the internal pressures between 
1987 and 2002 could be understood by the transformation processes from an industrial 
to a post-industrial society. Despite the fast speed of the transformation, it should be 
noted that basically the impact of the internal pressures were slow-moving, long-term 
effects, and there is a considerable ‘time-lag’ between the changes of policy 
environments and actual policy making and implementation. The Korean economy still 
heavily depends on the manufacturing industry. The ageing pressure is not likely to be 
condensed even in the near future. So, as far as their influences were concerned in terms 
of rising welfare needs, the internal pressures of Korea were mainly related to the 
typical features of industrialisation and urbanisation. Nonetheless, it is also very 
difficult to deny that a substantial part of the post-industrial pressures, the 
transformation of household structure, higher women’s participation and family 
dissolution, were closely connected to the higher involvement of the state in social 
welfare in general (the 'newly rising and diverse needs’ hypothesis (IS+), and
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specifically the expansion of social services, which were mainly provided by the third 
sector (the ‘expansion o f  civil society’ hypothesis (IT+)) and, to a lesser extent, market 
providers (the ‘expansion o f service market ’ hypothesis (IM+)). However, the impacts 
of internal pressures on the family and enterprise welfare were negative. As the ‘less 
capacity family ’ hypothesis (IF-) suggests, the declining capability of family provision 
should be recognised as long-term socio-demographic changes per se. For firms, the 
irregular type of employment was preferred more than before on the basis of labour cost, 
in terms of both wage and non-wage labour costs. Along with the decreasing 
employment in industry, the increasing irregular employment led to an overall 
stagnation of voluntary enterprise welfare.
Trap of Functionalism. Although the findings and arguments of the research contribute 
to widening the scope of recognition of the impacts of environments to the overall 
welfare mix, from a narrowly defined ‘welfare state’, the serious weaknesses of such 
explanations must be identified. First of all, the impacts of external and internal 
environments are interwoven and it is very difficult to divide them from each other. 
Especially, the timing that the internal pressures began to be palpable coincided with the 
onset of the financial crisis in Korea. Moreover, inevitably, the trap o f functionalism is 
embedded in the explanations emphasising causal relationships between the 
environmental structure and welfare mix changes. They say nothing about the processes 
of the welfare mix changes, nor about the various routes of adaptation. As many have 
argued, the impacts of both external and internal environments on the welfare state are 
by no means uniform, nor general: but they are diverse according to political institutions, 
domestic politics and institutional legacies (Garrett, 1998; Swank, 2002; Iversen and 
Wren, 1998; Pierson, 2000b). The research argues that the same can be adapted to the 
overall welfare mix. Therefore, I believe, the functionalistic explanations discussed so 
far should remain as hypothesised arguments. Instead, we must bring the politics as 
well as institutions into the explanation of welfare mix changes.
Political Institutions, Welfare Politics and Welfare Mix Changes
The research has argued that, in conjunction with external and internal shifts, political
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variables like political institutions and national politics can explain better not only 
welfare state development, but also welfare mix changes in general. The political 
democratisation since 1987 led to the dissolution of authoritarianism, the eruption of the 
labour movement, the growth of the civil society, and the first peaceful regime change 
of 1997 -  from the ruling to the opposition party -  in Korea. When the state and 
business faced the ‘militant’ industrial disputes, social pact politics began to be 
experimented with and began to recognise labour as a negotiating partner. Really, not 
only the political democratisation per se became the necessary condition for the welfare 
state development (e.g. Marshall, 1972 and Linz and Stephen, 1996), but it also 
provided a critical opportunity to construct the social pact mechanism (e.g. Lehmbruch, 
1979 and Katzenstein, 1984). Especially, as Rhodes (2001) indicates the ‘New 
Corporatism’ in many countries of Europe since the 1980s, the Tripartite Committee 
was launched as another critical social pact experiment when Korea faced the economic 
and social crisis in 1997/8 as a historical juncture. Really, within boundaries of the 
committee, the dynamic of welfare politics between business, labour and the 
government was revealed, and many agreements of the committee regarding the social 
welfare reforms were made into legislation between 1998 and 2000. In this respect, the 
Korean case can strongly support the position that the influences o f external and 
internal environments are mediated according to political institutions and national 
politics. At the expense of neo-liberal economic policies and labour market flexibility, 
the government chose to expand the social protection system for the victims of 
globalisation (Rieger and Leibfried, 2003), especially dealt within social pact politics. In 
this situation, the Korean government re-negotiated its level of fiscal deficit with the 
IMF to deal with the mass unemployment and other social crises. In social insurance, in 
a similar context, the radical neo-liberal reform proposals of the World Bank and the 
IMF (e.g., privatisation of NPI and introduction of MSA) could not be accepted.
Whilst the participation of labour and business in welfare politics was 
institutionalised by the Tripartite committee under the Kim Dae Jung government, the 
CSOs’ welfare movement deployed various measures from ‘on-the-street’ picketing to 
the construction of a reformative coalition. Such unprecedented actions by CSOs 
revealed the real dynamics and novelty of the welfare politics in Korea. Compared with 
the power mobilisation theory based on the traditional class structure (Castles, 1978; 
Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985), the scope of the (pro-welfare) reformative
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coalition was much broader in Korea, and in a sense CSOs dominated the welfare 
reform processes and labour followed them. Despite the establishment of a 
parliamentary democracy, however, the role of political parties in welfare politics 
(partisan politics) was very weak. So, the politics of civil society and social pacts, rather 
than partisan politics, were the dominant modes of national politics in Korea.
The importance of the political institutions and welfare politics was not 
restricted to state welfare, but can be widened to explanations of welfare provisions 
within non-state sectors. The dissolution of the political authoritarianism accompanied 
by political democratisation, first of all, enabled business to exercise its agency power 
in welfare politics, especially in the areas of the mandatory enterprise welfare and 
private insurance markets. Business lobbied for the introduction of a private individual 
pension market as well as for-profit, high quality welfare service markets targeting to 
the well-off elderly. The Kim Young Sam government did not hesitate to implement 
market confirming social policies. However, the proposal for the privatisation of IAICI 
could have not been implemented by the end of the Kim Young Sam government as it 
faced labour’s severe resistance and the financial crisis had swept the whole country. In 
addition, enterprise welfare was another crucial part where the interests of political 
actors confronted each other. As discussed above, the political democratisation since 
1987 brought the ‘Great Struggle of Labour’ in the late 1980s. To maintain stable 
industrial relations, business had to provide not only high increases in real wages but 
also a substantial level of enterprise welfare on the table for collective bargaining. On 
the other hand, political democratisation brought about the growth of civil society in 
general. As discussed above, CSOs actively participated in welfare politics through their 
voice mechanism. Moreover, the third sector expanded its experimental role in social 
services when the newly rising social service needs emerged. However, this was 
possible on the basis of the state’s critical intervention in regulation and finance, when 
the government adhered to its position on the ‘utilisation of the third sector’ to deal with 
such problems instead of expanding the public social service delivery system. To sum 
up, we can conclude that, in Korea, national politics mattered not only in welfare state 
development but also in the overall welfare mix changes and, most o f  all, political 
institutions provided the basic conditions for the working o f welfare politics.
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Welfare Mix as a Dependent Variable
The research has shown that, despite recent rapid expansion of state welfare, the social 
welfare system as an arrangement of institutions meeting welfare needs of people has 
always been mixed in Korea. In so doing, the research suggests that the welfare mix is a 
more suitable term than the welfare state when one focuses on the overall social welfare 
of a nation. The real originality of the research is utilising the welfare mix as the 
dependent variable, and to explain welfare mix changes in Korea using the independent 
variables that contemporary welfare state theories have suggested. The research, in this 
respect, can be understood as an attempt to build a theoretical bridge between the 
welfare mix approach and contemporary explanations o f  the development and 
adaptation o f  the welfare state. On the one hand, theories of the welfare state have 
failed to grasp the variety of institutional arrangements meeting welfare needs; on the 
other hand, existing welfare mix models are either descriptive or normative, and most of 
them have failed, or have not sought, to provide an analytical framework to explain the 
dynamic nature of the welfare mix. Based on the analysis of the Korean case, I believe, 
the research has provided the following contributions to knowledge on the welfare mix.
By utilising the welfare mix as its dependent variable, the research shows that 
this can be measured and tracked over time. The welfare mix structure and its 
development then needs to be explained. Adapting the welfare mix approach to the 
analytical framework of contemporary welfare state theories, it has discovered that 
current theoretical arguments about the welfare state can be applied to the explanation 
o f welfare mix changes. The arguments about the impacts of external and internal 
environments are not exclusive to welfare state adaptations; they also can affect the 
development of the welfare provisions of non-state sectors. Politics matters not only in 
welfare state development, but also in the explanation of the broader welfare mix 
changes and their dynamic processes. Path-dependency is not restricted to welfare state 
development; the welfare mix structure at a point of time can be seen as the institutional 
legacies that shape its incremental changes afterwards. More significant inequality 
issues among different classes, groups and genders are embedded in the institutional 
features of the welfare mix. In addition, the research has asserted that the changing role 
of the state is vital in the explanation of the overall welfare mix structure. Not only is 
the state one of the most important providers in the production of welfare, but also its
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intervention in regulation and finance fundamentally influences the welfare provisions 
of non-state sectors.
8.3. Suggestions for Future Research
The research, I believe, has presented the viability and the necessity of the welfare mix 
approach in social policy research. Even though these findings are based on the Korean 
case, their implications for social policy research are enough to be emphasised -  i.e., the 
importance of the welfare mix approach in social policy study. In this last section, I 
conclude my discussions of the research with a few suggestions for the future research.
First, beyond the normative approaches of existing welfare mix models, we can 
raise new research agendas about how different welfare regimes have different welfare 
mixes and how different welfare mixes cause different welfare outcomes. In this respect, 
I believe, international comparative studies of welfare mix structure would provide an 
immense aid to our understanding of different welfare models or regimes.
Secondly, the research has focused on the welfare mix as a dependent variable, 
but such issues as inequality, social exclusion and poverty were not the main concerns 
in the research. Related to welfare outcomes, in this respect, more systemic research on 
the relationship between welfare mix structure and those traditional social policy issues 
is required. For example, the different components of welfare mix produce different 
dimensions of inequality. Whereas market provisions are closely related to income 
inequality, enterprise welfare with employment status, third sector provisions among 
different memberships (religion, ethnic, sexual orientation and so on) and informal 
caring raises the issue of gender inequality.
Thirdly, despite the primary importance of the structure of welfare provision, we 
need to focus more on the finance and regulation structure of welfare mix. As I argued, 
state interventions in regulation and finance are vital in the welfare provisions of non­
state sectors. In so doing, we may widen our understanding of the role of the state in 
social welfare.
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Appendix 1. Tables of Economic Globalisation and Post-industrialisation
1. Tables of Economic Globalisation Indicators
Appendix Table 1-1. Relative share of the world market for manufactured goods
Exports Imports
1980 1990 1980 1990
Industrialised world (24 countries) 62.9 72.4 67.9 72.1
O f which G7 45.2 51.8 48.2 51.9
-  the Triad 54.8 64.0 59.5 63.8
Developing world (147 countries) 37.1 27.6 32.1 27.9
O f which, group ‘stars’ (11 countries) 7.3 14.6 8.8 13.5
-  group 1: the poorest (102 countries) 7.9 1.4 9.0 4.9
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Petrella, 1996: 79





Trade (exports only) 
Including Excluding 
Intra-EU Intra-EU
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
A
USA and Canada 5.1 21.8 15.7 21.0
Western Europe 7.2 36.2 42.5 23.4
Japan 2.2 2.0 7.8 10.4
Total 14.5 60.0 66.0 54.8
B
Ten most important developing 
countries13
31.9 24.0° 12.2 16.2
A+B 46.4 84.0 81.5 71.0
a 1996 estimates
b In terms o f inward FDI flows between 1991 and 1996. Argentina, Brazil, China, Hungary, Indonesia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Poland, Singapore and Thailand. 
c 73% of all non-triad (or developing world) flows 
Sources: modified from Hirst and Thompson, 1999: Table 3.2 and 3.3.
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2. Tables for Post-Industrialisation Indicators
Appendix Table 1-3. Transformation of Employment Structure
______________________________________________ (per cent of aged between 15-64)
A. Industry Employment Rate3
Germany France Italy Japan Sweden UK USA OECD 18
1970 33.4 25.2 22.0 25.2 28.1 31.2 21.3 25.3
1980 28.4 22.3 21.1 24.8 25.6 26.1 20.1 22.5
1990 25.3 17.5 17.4 24.7 23.4 23.0 18.9 19.9
1997 23.1 14.7 16.1 24.9 17.9 18.6 17.6 17.8
B. Production and Production-related Service Employment Rateb
Germany France Italy Japan Sweden UK U SA OECD 18
1970 - 41.1 - 44.2 42.8 41.6 32.0 41.3
1980 39.5 36.2 33.0 40.7 40.9 37.4 31.7 37.1
1990 36.7 31.9 27.6 40.3 38.6 37.1 33.0 34.8
1997 35.3 28.8 27.1 40.3 33.7 34.8 32.2 33.5
C. Consumer-related Services Employment Ratec
Germany France Italy Japan Sweden UK USA OECD 18
1970 - 23.2 - 26.9 30.4 28.1 29.9 25.9
1980 25.5 25.9 21.7 29.5 38.5 31.9 34.2 28.5
1990 27.0 28.1 26.7 31.9 42.0 33.7 39.2 32.4
1997 28.1 29.5 24.0 34.7 37.1 35.2 41.7 33.6
a Employment ISIC 2-5 as % o f population between 15 and 64 years. ISIC 2: mining and quarrying; ISIC 
3: manufacturing; ISIC 4: electricity, gas and water; ISIC 5: construction
b Employment ISIC 1-5+7+8 as % o f population between 15 and 64 years. ISIC 1: agriculture, hunting, 
forestry and fishing; ISIC 2-5: see above note a; ISIC 7: transport, storage and communication; ISIC 8: 
financing, insurance, real estate and business services.
c Employment ISIC 6+9 as % of population between 15 and 64 years. ISIC 6: wholesale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels; ISIC 9: community, social and personal services. 
d Data from 1990 and 1997 estimated
Sources: reconstructed from Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000: Table A8, A9 and A10.
Appendix Table 1-4. Ageing Population
_________________________________________________(per cent of aged 65 and over)
Germany France Italy Japan Sweden UK USA Average
1960 10.8 11.6 9.3 5.7 11.8 11.7 9.2 10.1
1980 15.5 13.9 13.1 9.1 16.3 15.0 11.2 13.4
2000 16.4 16.0 18.1 17.2 17.4 15.8 12.3 16.2
2020 22.5 20.5 23.9 27.9 23.9 20.2 16.3 22.2
2040 30.9 26.2 34.5 34.1 29.9 27.2 21.0 29.1
Source: NSO, 2002 [http://kosis.nso.go.kr/cgi-bin]; UN, 2002 [http://esa.un.org/unpp].
259
Appendix Table 1-5. Women’s Labour Force Participation Rate
Germany France Italy Japan Sweden UK USA OECD 18
1970 48.1 49.8 29.1 55.4 60.6 53.5 50.4 49.6
1980 52.8 56.0 39.2 54.9 76.0 61.3 61.5 57.4
1990 57.0 57.6 44.5 60.4 83.3 68.1 69.7 62.9
1997 61.8 60.4 44.1 63.8 76.7 68.9 72.5 64.0
Sources: modified from Scharpf and Schmidt, 2000: Table A12 and A13.
Appendix Table 1-6. Total Fertility Rate
Germany France Italy Japan Sweden UK USA Average
1961-65 2.5 2.9 2.5 2.0 2.3 2.8 3.3 2.8
1971-75 1.6 2.3 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.4
1981-85 1.5 1.9 1.5 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.8 1.9
1991-95 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.5 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.7
Source: UN, [http://esa.un.org/unpp].
Appendix Table 1-7. Divorce Rate*
Germany France Italy Japan Sweden UK USA Average
1960 - 9.4 - 8.0 17.9 6.4 25.8 13.5
1970 - 10.2 4.2b 9.3 29.9 13.2 32.8 16.6
1980 - 24.3 3.7 18.3 52.9 37.3 49.7 31.0
1990 - 36.9 8.9 21.8 47.9 44.1 48.0 34.6
1995 39.4 46.1 9.6C 25.1 67.0 52.6 50.0 41.4
a (number of divorce)/(number of marriage)* 100. 
b 1971,c 1994
Source: Own calculation fromNSO, [http://kosis.nso.go.kr/cgi-bin].
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Appendix 2. Impacts of Globalisation and Post-Industrialisation on the Welfare 
Mix: Constructing 14 Functionalistic Hypotheses 
Constructing 14 Functionalistic Hypotheses
1. (GS+) Upward mobility hypothesis: this hypothesis regards globalisation as a 
driving force to induce welfare state expansion. The logic is as follows. The higher trade 
openness, the more volatile market, because the openness means the exposure of 
domestic markets to external forces. In this respect, economic globalisation has been 
regarded as increasing economic insecurity and social dislocation. To mitigate the 
negative effects of globalisation and to cushion higher risks caused by globalisation, 
governments expand their intervention policies. The welfare state is there to deal with 
market dislocations by redistributing risks as well as the wealth within a nation. 
Empirically, Cameron (1978), Katzenstein (1985) and, more recently Rodrik (1998) 
found a positive correlation between the trade openness and the size of governments in 
terms of public expenditure. Furthermore, Rieger and Liebfried (1998, 2002) argue that 
historically the welfare state has accomplished a decisive role in determining the pace, 
timing and extent of globalisation and in managing the social and political effects of 
economic restructuring in a nation.
2. (GS-) Downward convergence (or social dumping) hypothesis: as the most well- 
known hypothesis, this stresses the unavailability of a comprehensive welfare state in 
the era of globalisation. Economic globalisation, especially the international mobility of 
capital, has weakened the capability of the macroeconomic management of nation states, 
injured the basic economic, political and social assumptions of Keynsian welfare state 
and strengthened the structural power of capital vis-a-vis the state and labour (Mishra, 
1999; Scharpf, 2000; Strange, 1996). Coupled with the influence of IGOs, economic 
globalisation forces national governments to adopt similar neo-liberal policies; 
privatisation, deregulation and welfare residualisation to minimum level (or to the level 
of liberal American welfare state). In conclusion, globalisation is expected to lead a 
reduction of state welfare.
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3. (PS+) Newly rising and diverse needs hypothesis: post-industrial pressures have 
raised new and diverse welfare needs (or risks) that require an expansion of public 
social services. According to Iversen (2000), de-industrialisation, caused by the rapid 
increase in manufacturing productivity, is the main force for social change after WW2. 
He argues, though his empirical analysis, that the current growth of welfare states has 
been induced not by the economic openness but by the reduction in manufacturing 
employment. The logic is as follows; the fall in manufacturing employment and the 
increase of service employment mean that more people face the uncertainties of the 
labour market, and in a democratic polity this induces more state intervention to reduce 
such uncertainties. The welfare state is expected to redistribute risks; it provides 
transfers and public services to those who face higher risks, but imposes net taxes to 
those who enjoy more secure positions (Iversen, 2000:55-6).
4. (PS-) Austerity hypothesis: this hypothesis argues that post-industrial pressures not 
only create new risks and demands to be dealt with by the state (family dissolution), but 
also lead to severe burdens on existing state programmes (population ageing). 
Especially, under the condition of overall low productivity that is caused by de­
industrialisation and the rise of the service sector, these higher burdens ultimately lead 
to a critical fiscal constraint on the government. This ‘unprecedented budgetary stress’ 
of the welfare state, therefore, forces nation states to accomplish the politics of austerity 
to reform public welfare system (Pierson, 2000a, 2000b). Although the austerity agenda 
is not directly connected to the retrenchment, the processes of restructuring welfare 
states, at least partly, cannot avert a reduction of public social services through as 
cutting benefits, tightening eligibility and introducing waiting periods.
5. (GM+) Global marketisation hypothesis: this hypothesis is based on the 
recognition that globalisation has induced the permeation of market logic to health and 
welfare area. When globalisation is regarded not just as economic phenomenon but also 
as the diffusion of ideology, notably neo-liberalism, it has generated not only the 
marketisation itself, but also the notion that people should face a fiercer competition and 
behave more rationally. This is the context for the ‘commodification of care’ (Folbre, 
1999: 74). In these circumstances, voluntary caring as well as state’s services shrink and 
the welfare market substitutes the reduced share. In this respect, Standing (1999:92)
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points out that in the process of globalisation the share of private benefits (market 
provisions) has increased in the total social income structure (Standing, 1999: 92). In 
reality, not only have the entry of private providers and commercial business in health 
and welfare services has been facilitated around the world, but there also exists a 
significant international welfare market in health, education, private insurance and 
pensions (Deacon, 2000a; Midgley, 1997; WTO, 1998a, 1998b; all recited from Yeates, 
2000:43-44).
6. (PM+) Expansion of service market hypothesis: this hypothesis stresses the 
importance of post-industrial pressures -  on both the supply and demand sides -  to the 
expansion of the service market. De-industrialisation and rise of service sector 
employment induce the expansion of the personal service market on the supply side. 
Other post-industrial pressures -  population ageing and transformation of household 
structure including higher women’s participation, dissolution of family -  cause a rising 
service demand. If neither public services nor private markets are well established, the 
result of higher women’s participation would be a low fertility (Esping-Andersen, 1999). 
On the contrary, those countries where women’s participation is supported by either 
public services (Sweden) or private service markets (US) have recorded relatively high 
performance in both the participation and the fertility rate (refer to Table 3.9 and 3.10).
7. (GE+) Non-labour cost competitiveness hypothesis: this hypothesis is based on the 
recognition that the source of competitiveness is more than one or, in other words, there 
exists another kind of competitiveness beyond cost-competitiveness. Enterprises are 
required to be as competitive as possible to survive in fiercer global competition. It is 
easy for enterprises to depend on cost-competitiveness, but Porter (1986, 1990) points 
out that what really matters is not the problem of cost but ‘productivity’. If 
competitiveness is based on a higher productivity, the productivity can be achieved not 
only through differentiation and advanced technology (Porter, Ibid), but also through 
better human capital and other institutional bases like stable industrial relations (Gough, 
2000). In this respect, enterprise welfare can play a role of improving productivity 
though attracting workers’ loyalty, maintaining industrial peace, improving workers’ 
human capital and protecting core staff from outflow. In conclusion, globalisation does
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not necessarily induce enterprise welfare cuts and, rather, it would require to guarantee 
main workers (core staff) better enterprise benefits.
8. (GE-) Labour cost competitiveness hypothesis: basically globalisation forces 
enterprise to reduce the size of rigid organisations and to raise flexibility. Pressures of 
the global economy like uncertainty, volatility and competition push enterprises to 
reduce all kinds of costs including enterprise welfare benefits, in order to survive. In 
these circumstances, the overall level of enterprise welfare decreases due to the 
following factors; the first is reducing the benefit level and/or benefit cut, the other is 
decreasing the number of workers entitled to enterprise welfare through raising 
organisational flexibility, e.g., subcontracting and outsourcing (Standing, 1999: chap.4).
9. (PE-) Inferior service employment hypothesis: this hypothesis depends on the fact 
that manufacturing workers receive more enterprise welfare benefits than those of 
workers in the service sector. Whilst de-industrialisation and the decline of industry 
employment have reduced the number of workers receiving relatively abundant 
enterprise benefits, the increase in service employment means more and more workers 
are facing inferior working conditions including poor enterprise welfare. This is partly 
due to the low productivity of service sector on the one hand (Pierson, 2000a), and also 
due to weak bargaining power of service workers. In conclusion, post-industrial 
pressures cause a reduction in the overall level of enterprise welfare and its share in the 
welfare mix.
10. (GN+) Resistance and compromise hypothesis: as globalisation permeates into 
people’s lives, there has been a rise in anti-globalisation social movements around the 
world. Most of these movements are organised and dominated by national and 
international NGOs. Global coordination and cooperation among (I)NGOs has been 
reinforced by the anti-globalisation movement and, therefore, the ‘voice’ of global civil 
society has been consolidated. Mainly in delivering welfare provision or aid, large 
INGOs like Oxfam have participated in IGOs’ developmental projects and IGOs also 
use national and local NGOs to construct favourable conditions for SAPs; in these cases 
NGOs compromise with globalisation forces (Yeates, 2000:chap.5).
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11. (PN+) Expansion of civil society hypothesis: this hypothesis regards post­
industrialisation as a driving force for civil society development. As post-industrial 
pressures have not only generated newly rising needs and but also disclosed the 
seriousness of social issues like gender and caring, the roles of NGOs have expanded in 
terms of both service provision and voice (Pestoff, 1998; Salamon and Anheier, 1999). 
The rise of the service sector reflects not only the expansion of the commercial service 
market but also the increase of NGOs’ employment in the health, education and non­
profit social service areas (Slamon and Anheier, Ibid). These trends widen the scope of 
civil society in general.
12. (GF+) Increasing burden hypothesis: this hypothesis points out the uncertainties 
and insecurity people face in the competitive global economy. If globalisation forces 
even individuals to be as competitive as possible and induces an expansion of market 
logic, these trends make people depend on the family emotionally as well as 
economically when they face difficulties (UNDP) 1999:79). This trend is supported by 
Standing’s argument that globalisation causes changes in the social income structure1; it 
has increased the share of community benefits (including family provision) of social 
income (Standing, 1999:chap.4). After all, globalisation imposes an increasing burden 
on the family as more and more individuals fall behind the market competition.
13. (GF-) Dual burden hypothesis: this hypothesis focuses on the gender side of 
caring. Most unpaid domestic work including caring have been regarded as part of the 
role of women, but globalisation influences women to behave rationally. The market’s 
penetration into people’s daily life forced by globalisation encourages women’s 
economic participation on the one hand, but, on the other hand, has damaged the non- 
remunerative mechanism of care -  such values as affection, altruism and social 
obligation (UNDP, 1999:78-9; Kutner, 1996:62). These trends are expected to shrink 
women’s time providing care, so reduced provision by the family. However, the 
increased paid work of women has not been connected to a reduction in unpaid
1 According to Standing (1999:88), social income (SI) consists o f five parts: W (money wage), SB (state 
benefit), EB (enterprise benefits), CB (family and community) and PB (private benefits from market): 
[SI=W+SB+EB+CB+PB]. Globalisation has caused the change o f SI structure; while W, SB and EB parts 
decline, the share of CB and PB (plus EB for some workers) parts rise up.
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domestic work in most countries (UNDP, 1999:79-80). Therefore, globalisation reduces 
the capacity of family provision and, at the same time, causes women’s dual burden that 
could ultimately result in either the overexploitation of women’s labour forces or 
underproduction (low fertility).
14. (PF-) Less capacity of family hypothesis: this hypothesis stresses that post­
industrial pressures have injured the basic foundations of family and, therefore, have 
weakened family’s capacity to provide benefits and caring (Pierson, 2000a). The main 
source of family provision is women’s unpaid domestic work including caring, but their 
higher participation in paid employment reduces the availability of family provisions. 
Moreover, higher divorce rate and related family dissolution have caused a dramatic rise 
in untypical forms of family, notably single-parent families. In this case, household 
members usually suffer from a reduced level of caring as well as economic difficulties 
as single parents alone are forced to manage both paid and unpaid domestic work. 
Furthermore, the fast growing number of single-person households have reduced the 
overall capacity of family provision in society because no one is available within the 
household when the single person needs care, this especially the case with old people 
living alone.
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Appendix 3. Detailed Tables for External Forces and Internal Pressures in Korea
Appendix Table 3-1. Trade in Goods
(Billion US Dollars, per cent of GDP)
Trade in Goods Import Export
Bn USD % GDP Bn USD % GDP Bn USD % GDP
1980 39.8 64.0 22.3 35.8 17.5 28.1
1985 61.4 65.8 31.1 33.3 30.3 32.4
1987 88.3 65.3 41.0 30.3 47.3 35.0
1990 134.9 53.4 69.8 27.7 65.0 25.7
1991 153.4 52.0 81.5 27.6 71.9 24.4
1992 158.4 50.3 81.8 26.0 76.6 24.4
1993 166.0 48.0 83.8 24.2 82.2 23.8
1994 198.4 49.3 102.3 25.4 96.0 23.9
1995 260.2 53.2 135.1 27.6 125.1 25.6
1996 280.1 53.9 150.3 28.9 129.7 24.9
1997 280.8 58.9 144.6 30.3 136.2 28.6
1998 225.6 71.0 93.3 29.4 132.3 41.6
1999 263.4 64.9 119.8 29.5 143.7 35.4
2000 332.7 72.1 160.5 34.8 172.3 37.3
2001 291.5 69.1 141.1 33.4 150.4 35.6
Source: Bank o f Korea, National Accounts, various years
Appendix Table 3-2. Foreign Direct Investment
FDI Inflow, net
Bn USD % of GDP % o f GCF1 % o f GI2
1980 0.01 0.0 0.0 0.0
1985 0.23 0.3 0.9 0.9
1987 0.62 0.5 1.6 1.2
1990 0.79 0.3 0.8 0.8
1991 1.18 0.4 1.0 1.1
1992 0.73 0.2 0.6 0.6
1993 0.59 0.2 0.5 0.5
1994 0.81 0.2 0.6 0.6
1995 1.78 0.4 1.0 1.0
1996 2.33 0.4 1.2 1.3
1997 2.84 0.6 1.7 1.8
1998 5.41 1.7 5.7 5.0
1999 9.33 2.3 8.3 7.0
2000 9.28 2.0 7.1 6.5
2001 3.53 0.8 3.1 2.9
1. Gross Capital Formation
2. Gross Investment
Source: Bank o f Korea, National Accounts, various years
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Appendix Table 3-3. Major Indicators of Financial Market Openness
(Billion US Dollars, per cent o f GDP)
Gross Private Capital 
Flows1 Gross FDI2
Investment Inflow to 
Korean Stock Market3
Bn USD % of GDP Bn USD % of GDP Bn USD % of GDP
1980 5.7 9.1 0.0 0.1 5.7 9.1
1985 6.4 6.9 0.8 0.9 6.4 6.9
1987 9.1 6.7 1.1 0.8 9.1 6.7
1990 14.1 5.6 1.8 0.7 14.1 5.6
1991 16.2 5.5 2.7 0.9 16.2 5.5
1992 20.5 6.5 1.9 0.6 20.5 6.5
1993 23.2 6.7 1.9 0.6 23.2 6.7
1994 33.8 8.4 3.3 0.8 33.8 8.4
1995 55.3 11.3 5.3 1.1 55.3 11.3
1996 69.2 13.3 7.0 1.3 69.2 13.3
1997 68.2 14.3 7.3 1.5 68.2 14.3
1998 85.1 26.8 10.2 3.9 85.1 26.8
1999 66.6 16.4 13.5 3.8 66.6 16.4
2000 52.6 11.4 14.3 3.2 52.6 11.4
2001 48.1 11.4 5.9 1.4 48.1 11.4
1. The sum of the absolute values of direct, portfolio, and other investment inflows and outflows recorded 
in the balance o f payments financial accounts, excluding changes in the assets and liabilities of 
monetary authorities and general government.
2. The sum of the absolute values of inflows and outflows o f foreign direct investment recorded in the 
balance o f payments financial accounts, including equity capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long­
term capital, and short-term capital.
Source: World Bank, WDI2003 online; Bank of Korea, National Accounts, various years













1980 13,683 34.0 29.0 21.6 37.0
1985 14,970 24.9 30.8 23.4 44.3
1987 16,354 21.9 34.0 27.0 44.1
1990 18,085 17.9 35.4 27.2 46.7
1991 18,649 16.4 36.0 27.6 47.7
1992 19,009 15.8 35.0 26.2 49.3
1993 19,234 14.7 33.5 24.5 51.7
1994 19,848 13.7 33.2 24.0 53.1
1995 20,414 12.4 33.3 23.6 54.3
1996 20,853 11.7 32.5 22.7 55.9
1997 21,214 11.3 31.2 21.4 57.5
1998 19,938 12.4 27.8 19.6 59.8
1999 20,291 11.6 27.4 19.8 61.0
2000 21,156 10.9 28.0 20.3 61.1
2001 21,572 10.0 27.5 19.8 62.6
2002 22,170 9.3 27.3 19.1 63.3
1. The proportion of total employment recorded as working in the industrial sector, including mining and
quarrying, manufacturing, electricity, gas and water, and construction, corresponding to major 
divisions 2-5 (ISIC revision 2) or tabulation categories C-F (ISIC revision 3).
Source: Ministry o f Labour, Statistical Yearbook o f Labour, various years
268
Appendix Table 3-5. Employment Structure by Employment Type








(% of total) (% of total)
Paid Employment 
Regular Temporary Daily 
(% of Paid Employment)
1980 13,683 34.0 18.8 47.2 79.9 20.1
1985 14,970 31.3 14.6 54.1 82.8 17.2
1987 16,354 30.5 13.3 56.2 83.4 16.6
1990 18,085 28.0 11.4 60.5 54.2 29.0 16.8
1991 18,649 26.7 10.6 62.7 55.5 28.7 15.7
1992 19,009 27.2 10.1 62.7 57.4 27.7 14.9
1993 19,234 27.3 10.6 62.1 58.9 26.7 14.4
1994 19,848 27.1 10.0 62.9 57.9 27.8 14.3
1995 20,414 27.3 9.5 63.2 58.1 27.9 14.0
1996 20,853 27.4 9.3 63.3 56.8 29.6 13.6
1997 21,214 27.8 9.0 63.2 54.3 31.6 14.1
1998 19,938 28.2 10.2 61.7 53.1 32.9 14.0
1999 20,291 28.1 9.5 62.4 48.4 33.6 18.0
2000 21,156 27.7 9.1 63.1 47.9 34.5 17.6
2001 21,572 28.1 8.6 63.3 49.2 34.6 16.2
2002 22,170 27.9 8.1 64.0 48.4 34.5 17.2
Source: Korea Labour Institute, KLI Labour Statistics, various years
Appendix Table 3-6. Prospect for Elderly Dependency Ratio (Aged 65 and over): 
International Comparison
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US G7 Korea
1980 13.8 21.9 23.7 20.3 13.4 23.6 16.9 19.1 6.1
1990 16.6 21.3 21.7 22.2 17.2 24.5 18.5 20.3 7.4
2000 18.4 24.5 23.9 26.8 25.2 24.4 18.7 23.1 10.1
2010 20.6 25.3 30.5 31.1 35.0 24.5 19.2 26.6 14.8
2020 28.1 32.5 34.2 36.7 47.2 28.4 24.8 33.1 21.3
2030 38.7 39.3 44.3 47.0 52.6 33.8 31.2 41.0 35.8
2040 42.3 44.7 50.4 62.6 64.9 37.8 32.1 47.8 51.6
Sources: NSO, http://www.nso.go.kr; UN, World Population Prospects, http://esa.un.org/unpp.
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Appendix 4. Detailed Tables for the Expenditure Structure of the Welfare Mix
Appendix Table 4-1. Total Expenditure on Social Protection and Health: 5 Sectors
A. Amount (Billion Won) 
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 5,651 5,123 5,312 140 6,536 22,762
1991 6,415 6,225 7,288 169 8,474 28,571
1992 7,979 7,352 9,570 196 9,201 34,298
1993 9,248 8,378 10,512 222 9,299 37,659
1994 10,943 9,397 12,823 271 11,374 44,808
1995 13,846 10,704 13,864 320 12,387 51,121
1996 16,331 12,313 16,057 359 13,036 58,096
1997 19,388 12,995 20,119 402 15,905 68,809
1998 26,513 12,171 29,794 441 13,650 82,569
1999 33,372 14,456 23,347 465 16,206 87,846
2000 29,287 16,026 28,855 494 15,089 89,751
2001 33,774 16,812 25,605 553 15,090 91,834
B. % o f  GDP
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 3.2 2.9 3.0 0.1 3.7 12.7
1991 3.0 2.9 3.4 0.1 3.9 13.2
1992 3.2 3.0 3.9 0.1 3.7 14.0
1993 3.3 3.0 3.8 0.1 3.4 13.6
1994 3.4 2.9 4.0 0.1 3.5 13.9
1995 3.7 2.8 3.7 0.1 3.3 13.5
1996 3.9 2.9 3.8 0.1 3.1 13.9
1997 4.3 2.9 4.4 0.1 3.5 15.2
1998 6.0 2.7 6.7 0.1 3.1 18.6
1999 6.9 3.0 4.8 0.1 3.4 18.2
2000 5.6 3.1 5.5 0.1 2.9 17.2
2001 6.1 3.0 4.6 0.1 2.7 16.6
C. % o f  Total
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 24.8 22.5 23.3 0.6 28.7 100.0
1991 22.5 21.8 25.5 0.6 29.7 100.0
1992 23.3 21.4 27.9 0.6 26.8 100.0
1993 24.6 22.2 27.9 0.6 24.7 100.0
1994 24.4 21.0 28.6 0.6 25.4 100.0
1995 27.1 20.9 27.1 0.6 24.2 100.0
1996 28.1 21.2 27.6 0.6 22.4 100.0
1997 28.2 18.9 29.2 0.6 23.1 100.0
1998 32.1 14.7 36.1 0.5 16.5 100.0
1999 38.0 16.5 26.6 0.5 18.4 100.0
2000 32.6 17.9 32.2 0.6 16.8 100.0
2001 36.8 18.3 27.9 0.6 16.4 100.0
Sources: see Table 5.8
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Appendix Table 4-2. Total Expenditure on Social Protection: 5 Sectors
A. Amount (Billion Won) 
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 2,524 185 4,877 99 6,536 14,221
1991 3,181 232 6,859 116 8,474 18,862
1992 4,073 297 8,951 138 9,201 22,660
1993 4,851 388 9,801 161 9,299 24,500
1994 5,882 531 11,706 197 11,374 29,690
1995 7,418 681 12,783 232 12,387 33,501
1996 8,287 847 14,951 262 13,036 37,383
1997 10,057 992 18,816 291 15,905 46,061
1998 15,947 1,074 28,711 325 13,650 59,707
1999 21,748 1,252 21,827 346 16,206 61,379
2000 15,671 1,397 27,243 371 15,089 59,771
2001 15,900 1,402 23,761 417 15,090 56,570
B. % o f  GDP
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 1.4 0.1 2.7 0.1 3.7 8.0
1991 1.5 0.1 3.2 0.1 3.9 8.7
1992 1-7 0.1 3.6 0.1 3.7 9.2
1993 1.7 0.1 3.5 0.1 3.4 8.8
1994 1.8 0.2 3.6 0.1 3.5 9.2
1995 2.0 0.2 3.4 0.1 3.3 8.9
1996 2.0 0.2 3.6 0.1 3.1 8.9
1997 2.2 0.2 4.2 0.1 3.5 10.2
1998 3.6 0.2 6.5 0.1 3.1 13.4
1999 4.5 0.3 4.5 0.1 3.4 12.7
2000 3.0 0.3 5.2 0.1 2.9 11.5
2001 2.9 0.3 4.3 0.1 2.7 10.3
C. % o f  Total
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 17.7 1.3 34.3 0.7 46.0 100.0
1991 16.9 1.2 36.4 0.6 44.9 100.0
1992 18.0 1.3 39.5 0.6 40.6 100.0
1993 19.8 1.6 40.0 0.7 38.0 100.0
1994 19.8 1.8 39.4 0.7 38.3 100.0
1995 22.1 2.0 38.2 0.7 37.0 100.0
1996 22.2 2.3 40.0 0.7 34.9 100.0
1997 21.8 2.2 40.9 0.6 34.5 100.0
1998 26.7 1.8 48.1 0.5 22.9 100.0
1999 35.4 2.0 35.6 0.6 26.4 100.0
2000 26.2 2.3 45.6 0.6 25.2 100.0
2001 28.1 2.5 42.0 0.7 26.7 100.0
Sources: see Table 5.8
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Appendix Table 4-3. Total Expenditure on Health: 5 Sectors
A. Amount (Billion Won) 
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Total
1990 3,127 4,938 435 41 8,541
1991 3,234 5,993 429 52 9,708
1992 3,906 7,055 619 57 11,637
1993 4,397 7,990 711 62 13,160
1994 5,061 8,866 1,117 74 15,118
1995 6,428 10,023 1,080 88 17,619
1996 8,044 11,466 1,105 97 20,712
1997 9,331 12,003 1,303 110 22,747
1998 10,566 11,097 1,083 116 22,862
1999 11,624 13,204 1,521 120 26,469
2000 13,616 14,629 1,612 123 29,980
2001 17,874 15,410 1,843 136 35,263
B. % o f  GDP
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Total
1990 1.7 2.8 0.2 0.0 4.8
1991 1.5 2.8 0.2 0.0 4.5
1992 1.6 2.9 0.3 0.0 4.7
1993 1.6 2.9 0.3 0.0 4.7
1994 1.6 2.7 0.3 0.0 4.7
1995 1.7 2.7 0.3 0.0 4.7
1996 1.9 2.7 0.3 0.0 4.9
1997 2.1 2.6 0.3 0.0 5.0
1998 2.4 2.5 0.2 0.0 5.1
1999 2.4 2.7 0.3 0.0 5.5
2000 2.6 2.8 0.3 0.0 5.7
2001 3.2 2.8 0.3 0.0 6.4
C. % o f Total
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Total
1990 36.6 57.8 5.1 0.5 100.0
1991 33.3 61.7 4.4 0.5 100.0
1992 33.6 60.6 5.3 0.5 100.0
1993 33.4 60.7 5.4 0.5 100.0
1994 33.5 58.6 7.4 0.5 100.0
1995 36.5 56.9 6.1 0.5 100.0
1996 38.8 55.4 5.3 0.5 100.0
1997 41.0 52.8 5.7 0.5 100.0
1998 46.2 48.5 4.7 0.5 100.0
1999 43.9 49.9 5.7 0.5 100.0
2000 45.4 48.8 5.4 0.4 100.0
2001 50.7 43.7 5.2 0.4 100.0
Sources: see Table 5.8
272
Appendix Table 4-4. Trend of Welfare Mix Expenditure: Public/Private
Dichotomy
A. Social Protection and Health
Amount (Billion Won) % o f GDP % o f Total
Public Private Public Private Public Private
1990 7,591 15,171 4.2 8.5 33.3 66.7
1991 8,702 19,869 4.0 9.2 30.5 69.5
1992 10,235 24,064 4.2 9.8 29.8 70.2
1993 12,440 25,220 4.5 9.1 33.0 67.0
1994 15,148 29,660 4.7 9.2 33.8 66.2
1995 19,003 32,117 5.0 8.5 37.2 62.8
1996 22,073 36,023 5.3 8.6 38.0 62.0
1997 29,174 39,636 6.4 8.7 42.4 57.6
1998 48,135 34,434 10.8 7.7 58.3 41.7
1999 47,008 40,839 9.7 8.5 53.5 46.5
2000 47,376 42,375 9.1 8.1 52.8 47.2
2001 47,647 44,186 8.6 8.0 51.9 48.1
B. Social Protection
Amount (Billion Won) % o f GDP % o f Total
Public Private Public Private Public Private
1990 4,464 9,757 2.5 5.5 34.6 65.4
1991 5,468 13,394 2.5 6.2 31.4 68.6
1992 6,329 16,332 2.6 6.6 29.5 70.5
1993 8,043 16,457 2.9 5.9 34.7 65.3
1994 10,087 19,604 3.1 6.1 35.5 64.5
1995 12,575 20,926 3.3 5.5 39.0 61.0
1996 14,029 23,354 3.4 5.6 38.8 61.2
1997 19,843 26,219 4.4 5.8 43.7 56.3
1998 37,569 22,138 8.5 5.0 63.3 36.7
1999 35,384 25,995 7.3 5.4 57.8 42.2
2000 33,760 26,011 6.5 5.0 56.5 43.5
2001 29,773 26,797 5.4 4.9 52.4 47.6
C. Health
Amount (Billion Won) % o f GDP % o f Total
Public Private Public Private Public Private
1990 3,127 5,414 1.7 3.0 36.6 63.4
1991 3,234 6,474 1.5 3.0 33.3 66.7
1992 3,906 7,731 1.6 3.1 33.6 66.4
1993 4,397 8,763 1.6 3.2 33.4 66.6
1994 5,061 10,057 1.6 3.1 33.5 66.5
1995 6,428 11,191 1.7 3.0 36.5 63.5
1996 8,044 12,668 1.9 3.0 38.8 61.2
1997 9,331 13,416 2.1 3.0 41.0 59.0
1998 10,566 12,296 2.4 2.8 46.2 53.8
1999 11,624 14,845 2.4 3.1 43.9 56.1
2000 13,616 16,364 2.6 3.1 45.4 54.6
2001 17,874 17,389 3.2 3.2 50.7 49.3
Sources: see Table 5.8
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Appendix Table 4-5. Trend of Welfare Mix Expenditures:
State-Market-Community Trichotomy
A. Social Protection and Health
% o f  GDP % o f Total
State Market Community State Market Community
1990 3.2 5.8 3.7 24.8 45.8 29.3
1991 3.0 6.2 4.0 22.5 47.3 30.3
1992 3.2 6.9 3.8 23.3 49.3 27.4
1993 3.3 6.8 3.4 24.6 50.2 25.3
1994 3.4 6.9 3.6 24.4 49.6 26.0
1995 3.7 6.5 3.4 27.1 48.1 24.9
1996 3.9 6.8 3.2 28.1 48.8 23.1
1997 4.3 7.3 3.6 28.2 48.1 23.7
1998 6.0 9.4 3.2 32.1 50.8 17.1
1999 6.9 7.8 3.5 38.0 43.0 19.0
2000 5.6 8.6 3.0 32.6 50.0 17.4
2001 6.1 7.7 2.8 36.8 46.2 17.0
B. Social Protection
% o f GDP % o f Total
State Market Community State Market C om m unity
1990 1.4 2.8 3.7 17.7 35.6 46.7
1991 1.5 3.3 4.0 16.9 37.6 45.5
1992 1.7 3.8 3.8 18.0 40.8 41.2
1993 1.7 3.7 3.4 19.8 41.6 38.6
1994 1.8 3.8 3.6 19.8 41.2 39.0
1995 2.0 3.6 3.3 22.1 40.2 37.7
1996 2.0 3.8 3.2 22.2 42.3 35.6
1997 2.2 4.4 3.6 21.8 43.0 35.2
1998 3.6 6.7 3.1 26.7 49.9 23.4
1999 4.5 4.8 3.4 35.4 37.6 27.0
2000 3.0 5.5 3.0 26.2 47.9 25.9
2001 2.9 4.6 2.8 28.1 44.5 27.4
C. Health
% o f GDP % o f Total
State Market Community State Market Community
1990 1.7 3.0 0.0 36.6 62.9 0.5
1991 1.5 3.0 0.0 33.3 66.2 0.5
1992 1.6 3.1 0.0 33.6 65.9 0.5
1993 1.6 3.1 0.0 33.4 66.1 0.5
1994 1.6 3.1 0.0 33.5 66.0 0.5
1995 1.7 2.9 0.0 36.5 63.0 0.5
1996 1.9 3.0 0.0 38.8 60.7 0.5
1997 2.1 2.9 0.0 41.0 58.5 0.5
1998 2.4 2.7 0.0 46.2 53.3 0.5
1999 2.4 3.1 0.0 43.9 55.6 0.5
2000 2.6 3.1 0.0 45.4 54.2 0.4
2001 3.2 3.1 0.0 50.7 48.9 0.4
Sources: see Table 5.8
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Appendix 5. Welfare Mix Expenditure Structures Including Education
Appendix Table 5-1. Total Expenditures on Education
A. Amount (Billion Won)
State Market Third Sector Total
1990 5,062 4,087 791 9,940
1991 6,598 4,761 926 12,285
1992 8,206 5,640 1,116 14,962
1993 9,831 6,546 1,305 17,682
1994 10,879 7,594 1,532 20,005
1995 12,496 9,196 1,899 23,591
1996 15,565 10,785 2,208 28,558
1997 18,288 11,995 2,454 32,737
1998 18,128 12,100 2,537 32,765
1999 17,456 12,884 2,737 33,077
2000 19,172 13,960 2,955 36,087
2001 20,034 15,425 3,173 38,632
B. % o f  GDP
State Market Third Sector Total
1990 2.8 2.3 0.4 5.6
1991 3.0 2.2 0.4 5.7
1992 3.3 2.3 0.5 6.1
1993 3.5 2.4 0.5 6.4
1994 3.4 2.3 0.5 6.2
1995 3.3 2.4 0.5 6.3
1996 3.7 2.6 0.5 6.8
1997 4.0 2.6 0.5 7.2
1998 4.1 2.7 0.6 7.4
1999 3.6 2.7 0.6 6.9
2000 3.7 2.7 0.6 6.9
2001 3.6 2.8 0.6 7.0
C. % o f  Total
State Market Third Sector Total
1990 50.9 41.1 8.0 100.0
1991 53.7 38.8 7.5 100.0
1992 54.8 37.7 7.5 100.0
1993 55.6 37.0 7.4 100.0
1994 54.4 38.0 7.7 100.0
1995 53.0 39.0 8.0 100.0
1996 54.5 37.8 7.7 100.0
1997 55.9 36.6 7.5 100.0
1998 55.3 36.9 7.7 100.0
1999 52.8 39.0 8.3 100.0
2000 53.1 38.7 8.2 100.0
2001 51.9 39.9 8.2 100.0
Sources: see Table 5.8; Ministry of Education, Statistical Yearbook o f  Education, various years
275
Appendix Table 5-2. Total Welfare Mix Expenditure Including Education
A. Amount (Billion Won) 
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 10,713 9,025 5,312 931 6,536 32,517
1991 13,013 10,754 7,288 1,094 8,474 40,623
1992 16,185 12,695 9,570 1,312 9,201 48,963
1993 19,079 14,537 10,512 1,527 9,299 54,954
1994 21,822 16,460 12,823 1,803 11,374 64,282
1995 26,342 19,219 13,864 2,219 12,387 74,031
1996 31,896 22,251 16,057 2,566 13,036 85,806
1997 37,676 23,999 20,119 2,856 15,905 100,555
1998 44,641 23,197 29,794 2,978 13,650 114,260
1999 50,828 26,088 23,347 3,203 16,206 119,672
2000 48,459 28,589 28,855 3,449 15,089 124,441
2001 53,808 30,835 25,605 3,726 15,090 129,064
B. % o f  GDP
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 6.0 5.0 3.0 0.5 3.7 18.2
1991 6.0 5.0 3.4 0.5 3.9 18.8
1992 6.6 5.2 3.9 0.5 3.7 19.9
1993 6.9 5.2 3.8 0.6 3.4 19.8
1994 6.7 5.1 4.0 0.6 3.5 19.9
1995 7.0 5.1 3.7 0.6 3.3 19.6
1996 7.6 5.3 3.8 0.6 3.1 20.5
1997 8.3 5.3 4.4 0.6 3.5 22.2
1998 10.0 5.2 6.7 0.7 3.1 25.7
1999 10.5 5.4 4.8 0.7 3.4 24.8
2000 9.3 5.5 5.5 0.7 2.9 23.8
2001 9.8 5.6 4.6 0.7 2.7 23.4
C. % o f Total
State Market Enterprise Third Sec Family Total
1990 32.9 27.8 16.3 2.9 20.1 100.0
1991 32.0 26.5 17.9 2.7 20.9 100.0
1992 33.1 25.9 19.5 2.7 18.8 100.0
1993 34.7 26.5 19.1 2.8 16.9 100.0
1994 33.9 25.6 19.9 2.8 17.7 100.0
1995 35.6 26.0 18.7 3.0 16.7 100.0
1996 37.2 25.9 18.7 3.0 15.2 100.0
1997 37.5 23.9 20.0 2.8 15.8 100.0
1998 39.1 20.3 26.1 2.6 11.9 100.0
1999 42.5 21.8 19.5 2.7 13.5 100.0
2000 38.9 23.0 23.2 2.8 12.1 100.0
2001 41.7 23.9 19.8 2.9 11.7 100.0
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